Hèla Yousfi, Trade Unions and Arab Revolutions: The Tunisian Case of UGTT (New Texts Out Now)

Hèla Yousfi, Trade Unions and Arab Revolutions: The Tunisian Case of UGTT (New Texts Out Now)

Hèla Yousfi, Trade Unions and Arab Revolutions: The Tunisian Case of UGTT (New Texts Out Now)

By : Hèla Yousfi

Hèla Yousfi, Trade Unions and Arab Revolutions: The Tunisian Case of UGTT (New York: Routledge, 2017). 

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Hèla Yousfi (HY): Two main motives made me write this book: First, the Tunisian Revolution was often painted as a sort of “divine” event, during which the united “Tunisian people” succeeded in getting rid of their “dictator.”  As if by the force of some quasi-magical act, all it took was the coming together of the people screaming a unified dégage on 14 January 2011 for the dictator to suddenly take flight. In using this lens, the causes and consequences of the revolt itself are glossed over. This had the effect of making the diverse collective mobilizations that emerged in the past two decades as well as the role of civil society organizations invisible. That is why I wanted to shed light on the role played by the powerful trade union UGTT  (Tunisian General Labour Union) in Tunisian politics from 2011-2014. That role has continually elicited passionate debate, to say the least, between three sets of people: those who benefitted from the UGTT’s actions; those who criticized the union (especially its central leadership for failing to meet its duties as a union in meeting the social and economic demands); and those who they thought the organization embodied the surviving wing of the former ruling power. All these debates highlighted the influence of the UGTT—the country’s oldest and largest national organization—on the transformation of Tunisian politics, and they contrast with the narrative that depicts the revolution as the abrupt, untimely advent of a new political and social order. At the same time, this debate came at an opportune moment, as it raised questions about the media’s focus on controversies between Islamists and secularists and the theory that Tunisia’s political challenges boiled down to constitutional reforms or simply achieving a positive outcome in the elections. This state of affairs leads one to attempt to answer two recurring questions: what was the UGTT’s role in the revolutionary process, and why does the union evoke such strong reactions?

The second consideration integral to the work is to understand how individuals organize themselves under authoritarian regimes. One of the key characteristics of authoritarian regimes is to destroy the possibility of any collective action. The UGTT is not solely a political and social force that lent broad support to the popular uprising and influenced the direction of Tunisia’s political transformation. It is also the only space for collective organized action in Tunisia that managed to resist the authoritarian regime’s attempts to eradicate all forms of resistance. The very existence of the UGTT refutes the belief that members of societies subjected to an authoritarian regime become shadows of their former selves and succumb to apathy and demotivation. Analyzing the organizational culture that underpins this union—which has hundreds of thousands of members from a wide range of social strata and political backgrounds, regions and sectors—is key to understanding what it means to organize in a society dominated by an authoritarian system. Finally, the UGTT provided an innovative laboratory for exploring Tunisians’ expectations for a legitimate mode of government acceptable to all. The union was instrumental in establishing institutional experiments to exit different political crisis, against a backdrop of resurgent tensions caused by competing sources of legitimacy and power systems. This is how the union came to take part in instituting consensus building as the preferred conflict-mediation method.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

HY: The aim of this book is not to present the historical record of three years of social and political change in Tunisia, but rather to understand the nature, operation, and evolution of the largest national organization in Tunisia. More specifically, I locate the UGTT in the protest and revolutionary dynamics and analyze the controversies surrounding its position as a balancing power—as many labor unionists like to emphasize—negotiating uncertain power relationships between social movements, successive transitional governments, civil society’s organizations, and political parties. This book seeks to bring out diverse voices of the UGTT, not only in presenting the official positions of the organization and the statements of its leaders, but by analyzing the outlooks and discourses collected during interviews and discussions I had with the UGTT members over the past three years.

Unlike some perspectives that would reduce the revolutionary process to an event overthrowing a political order and establishing another, my intent is to make sense of the organizational dynamics of UGTT—as a space for collective action as well as a physical and symbolic refuge for social and political movements—during the revolutionary episode...

In this light, I have adopted a traditional approach within the sociology of organizations: considering a system of interdependent actors (the unionists of UGTT); looking at what constraints to which each was subject because of their organizational and political environment; and analyzing the strategies they adopted. I opted for an ethnographic approach to conducting the research for this book. This involved traveling regularly and extensively in the field to conduct interviews, capturing as closely as possible the mobilized local frameworks of meaning given to the role of the UGTT and the strategies pursued by the actors in the different episodes of the mobilization.

Unlike some perspectives that would reduce the revolutionary process to an event overthrowing a political order and establishing another, my intent is to make sense of the organizational dynamics of UGTT—as a space for collective action as well as a physical and symbolic refuge for social and political movements—during the revolutionary episode, the nature of its contribution to the transformation of the Tunisian political field, and its interaction with different organizations and social movements. The ethnographic observation of the UGTT over time and during these crises avoids teleological pitfalls and restores the fluidity and the contradictions of a context characterized by uncertainty and an ongoing reassessment of strategies facing an order of constraints as well as rapidly changing power relations. Historical departures can supplement this observation by offering the possibility of contextualizing the mobilization of the UGTT in the time, space, and the political and social order prevailing in Tunisia. It can highlight what remains of the conventional operation of the UGTT and hint at the forms of differentiation that are beginning to unfold along with the transformation of Tunisian politics.

In addition to relating the history of this momentous period in Tunisian politics, this work intends to provide in-depth analysis of the unique characteristics and development of one of the largest trade unions in the Arab world and an investigation into the social movements that set the Tunisian revolution in motion, which will largely determine Tunisia’s political future. This insight into the UGTT can help improve our understanding of the impact of spaces for organized collective action on changes that affect politics. More generally, this work sheds light on the new social and political dynamics afoot in Tunisia and raises questions—via examples of continuity and change—about the region’s ability to reinvent politics.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

HY: My work falls within the tradition of research developed by Gestion et société (Management and Society), a research team at the French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) led by Philippe d’Iribarne. The main research focus of the team is developing an ethnology of modern societies through the comparative study of organizations. The UGTT is akin to a micro society that brings together a wide range of political views and social categories, offering an exceptional laboratory for exploring the conditions required to establish viable democratic institutions. The interviews with the unionists—who are often active in associations and political networks outside the organization—are all the more valuable for their insight into issues related to the revolutionary process and the conditions for regime change, above and beyond issues pertaining to the UGTT. This has led me to develop the hypothesis—rooted in my research work in other private and public sector settings in Tunisia and other Arab countries—that the meanings the unionists assign to the organization’s various political positions and the manner in which they dealt with so many internal conflicts and outside attacks result not only from the organization’s unique culture, but also reflect the expectations shared by many Tunisians with regard to good and legitimate government.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

HY: This volume will be of key interest to scholars and researchers of social movements, labor movements, organizational studies, political transitions, and Arab revolutions. It will also likely to be of interest to practitioners, especially among activists, unionists, and advocates within civil society.

I hope that the book’s analysis of the challenges faced by the UGTT in meeting the economic and social demands championed during the revolutionary process lead those who are interested in Arab labor movement and its unions to reconsider a number of fundamental questions about their role in society and their relationship with the state, political parties, and new social movements. It should also lead them to question their role in shaping economic and socio-political decisions, as well as to reexamine their identity, structure, and organizational resources in order to cope with the fast-moving political and economic environment. What is happening on the ground today, in workplaces and public spaces in Arab countries, represents a historic opportunity for the labor movement to reconnect with its emancipatory social and political mission and to support the opportunity for the region to reinvent its politics.

Recent uprisings in the Arab world remind us that faced with the diversification of forms and seats of power new types of political opposition, activism, and collective resistance are emerging in the form of local social movements. At the same time, the case of UGTT shows that in each specific context, power relations are affected by multiple dialectics between existing repertoires of action and domination, existing institutions, and established strategies of resistance, on the one hand, and the emergence of new forms of dominant power, contentious politics, and collective action, on the other. The interconnections between established actors and organizations, and those between the social movements and challengers, offer a promising avenue for exploring the emerging dialectics between old and new forms, construction and deconstruction, and strategies and counter strategies.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

HY: I am working on three research projects. First, I just finished a field study on socio-cultural and institutional challenges of the decentralization project in Tunisia. Second, I am also following my work on the organizational challenges of resistance movements based on two ongoing studies:

  1. The organizational dynamics of “Manech Msamhin” (we won’t forgive) in Tunisia: a social movement against the law on economic reconciliation with the old regime.
  2. Contentious politics and resistance movements in Arab countries: The case of BDS and anti-normalization movement.


J: What are new challenges faced by UGTT in the new political landscape?

HY: New challenges have emerged for Tunisia’s longstanding associations such as UGTT, and which were originally created to resist the stranglehold of the single-party state and campaign for a democratic society built on new foundations. The new civil society, financed by international NGOs, aims to create autonomous spaces outside state control or to replace government completely on issues such as the vital task of decentralization. The rise of NGOs has been made possible by the lack of serious debate on the role of the state, the competition between the old guard embodied by Nidaa Tounes and the new elite associated with Ennahdha, and the general weakness of political parties as such. The new NGOs have secured their grip on power by becoming the main intermediaries between international aid donors, who demand increased economic liberalization, and local players in search of a place in the sun. Finally, this international support for the new civil society has also resulted in a de facto exclusion of informal associations and those deemed not to be civic bodies, such as religious and political associations. This has created a defective vision of civil society as it actually exists, one that is blind to the various forms of opposition to the power of the state and economic and political elites, as well as non-conventional forms of political activism (e.g. the Salafist movement, small employers’ associations, and football clubs).

There are a number of issues that organizations such as the UGTT must contend with, namely the role of government in post-January 14 Tunisia and the allocation of roles between the state, elected officials, political parties, and civil society, ensuring new social and political dynamics achieve the recognition they deserve, and resistance to the neoliberal agenda imposed by the international aid donors. The traditional organizations of Tunisian civil society will have to make progress on all these fronts if they wish to recover their ability to emancipate the people and neutralize financial backers’ attempts to sweep aside the social and economic demands of those who initiated the Revolution of Dignity (and not the “Jasmine Revolution,” as the Nobel Committee put it). The actors leading these new social dynamics have not yet had their last word.

 

Excerpt from the book:

Chapter 2:

The unionists recognize that they are not the ones who instigated the popular uprising on December 17, 2010, but they all stressed that they had provided logistical and political “guidance” to the movement. The balance of power favored the popular uprising but the movement lacked leadership, so the unionists stepped in to provide the material, organizational and political resources required to gradually transform a spontaneous intifada into a revolutionary process that hastened the fall of Ben Ali. They drew from experiences in past movements and strategies for adjusting to unforeseen developments. The unionists’ challenges, goals and expectations were regularly thrown into disorder by the unpredictable reactions of the regime and the shifting dynamics of the protest movement.

At the same time, the unionists’ accounts reveal how they carried out all their collective actions within an organizational framework that provided a stable point of reference for the movement. The political crisis led to unexpected events, such as violent police repression and the rapid spread of the movement, but the codified system of roles, rules and procedures provided a blueprint for action for the unionists, who were charged with establishing coordination mechanisms and assigning roles, as well as devising methods for pressuring the Executive Board into changing its stance. The unionists’ strategy appears to have resulted from both foresight gained from their intricate knowledge of the organization and the unpredictability of the effect their actions would have on the course of events and the other actors in the movement. The Executive Board, which had successfully controlled and refocused past social movements, was taken by surprise and, for the first time, was compelled to cede to pressure from the base and attack the regime head-on. The revolutionary process, which pushed certain regional unions and federations to distance themselves from the Executive Board and make decisions independently, set a precedent that paved the way for new relations between the intermediate sections and the central leadership. This created an opportunity for a more equal balance of power and an end to the hegemonic excesses of the Executive Board.

More broadly, the case of the UGTT raises questions about the role of organizations in transforming an uprising into a revolutionary process capable of establishing a long-term alternative to an incumbent political regime. There is no doubt that the UGTT’s centralized hierarchical structure—several local, regional, federal and national levels with more than half a million people from all walks of life—gave the union political sway and an ability to unite Tunisians on an unparalleled scale. Backed by a long history of activism and a unique organizational culture that combined strategies for pressure and negotiation, the UGTT was able to both maintain cohesion despite internal tensions caused by the uprising and serve as the driving force behind a coordination network comprising several groups of actors that focused the protest movement and hastened the fall of Ben Ali.

Lastly, the collective memory of the UGTT’s struggles supplied unionists with the resources needed to interact, communicate and attribute a shared meaning to the movement. This collective memory is also what led the unionists to depict the end of Ben Ali’s reign as the expected, predictable result of an “accumulation of struggles.” That rhetoric featured prominently in the events that followed, when it was used to negotiate the union’s role in the fast-changing Tunisian political landscape.

[….]

Chapter 5:

While the national dialogue did run into some stumbling blocks, it successfully established the conditions for a certain degree of political stability and resulted in a consensus among political actors. Ennahdha avoided the risk of being permanently removed from power and losing all legitimacy in government, through the continued existence of the National Constituent Assembly. The opposition, under the controversial, imposed leadership of Nidaa Tounes, was finally able to force the Islamists to step down. The opposition was then able to secure power by taking part in appointing the new “technocratic” government under conditions that were clearly more favorable from their perspective.

As the events unfolded, the opposition strongly urged the UGTT to take political action, but the union succeeded in remaining within the boundaries it had set and avoided shifting toward a biased position by calling for the dissolution of the NCA (National Constituent Assembly). The union’s most hardline members were compelled to clash intensely with the Troika government, while the more moderate unionists increasingly felt that the union was in danger of overstepping its role. During this tense period at the UGTT, the union’s desire to negotiate a balanced agreement with the government consistently won out. Social pressure mounted and could have caused the UGTT to implode, but instead of destroying the union, it helped lend credence to those who were seeking a political and institutional breakthrough. Now firmly entrenched in politics, the UGTT drew strength from the protest movements, which gave the union both a unique means of rallying support and an invaluable resource for negotiating with the sitting government. In this way, the UGTT was able to cement its place as a central stakeholder in Tunisian politics despite the turbulence inside and outside the union.

What is more, the UGTT, a singular forum for collective action that was spared the worst of the dictatorship, developed various institutional experiments that it was able to implement in a makeshift manner in order to effectively mediate internal and external political conflicts through consensus-building. This approach was also a stepping stone to the drafting of the constitution, which led to an entente between the Islamists and the modernists. However, this consensus was achieved largely through political maneuvering, remained confined to the political and economic elite, and suffered from a lack of viable political and economic plans.

Finally, while the UGTT continued to initiate sector-based demonstrations and appear to protect the interests of the unionized middle class, the national dialogue’s exclusive focus on political issues created conflicts within the union. The traditional divide within the UGTT during the dictatorship was between the base, which sought independence from the Ben Ali regime, and the Executive Board, which was more or less subjugated by the single-party state. This division was replaced by a new split that affected the entire organization, over the approach to be taken with regard to social issues such as the privatization of the civil service, debt relief and unemployment problems. The gap widened between those who supported limited action negotiated step by step—gradually pushing back the government without ever overthrowing it—and those who believed in the power of the social movement and sought a firmer stance that would lead to a break with the past, due to the worsening economic crisis and their dwindling confidence in negotiations with the government.

The UGTT, the main architect of the national dialogue, succeeded in saving the country from the real or imagined risk of following in Egypt’s footsteps, by establishing a consensus between the old elites from the regime and the newly elected elites. However, social movements do not play out over the same timespan as political battles. The major challenge that remains for the UGTT and political parties is to re-incorporate social and economic issues into the heart of politics, in order to prevent the political sphere from becoming even more disconnected from the social sphere.

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New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

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Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.