Scott Savran, Arabs and Iranians in the Islamic Conquest Narrative: Memory and Identity Construction in Islamic Historiography, 750–1050 (New Texts Out Now)

Scott Savran, Arabs and Iranians in the Islamic Conquest Narrative: Memory and Identity Construction in Islamic Historiography, 750–1050 (New Texts Out Now)

Scott Savran, Arabs and Iranians in the Islamic Conquest Narrative: Memory and Identity Construction in Islamic Historiography, 750–1050 (New Texts Out Now)

By : Scott Savran

Scott Savran, Arabs and Iranians in the Islamic Conquest Narrative: Memory and Identity Construction in Islamic Historiography, 750–1050 (London: Routledge, 2018). 

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Scott Savran (SS): My objective in writing this book is to bring to light the potential of an approach which examines early Islamic historiography of the pre-Islamic period to see what it can tell us about the Muslim authors of historical texts as well as the issues and controversies that shaped their respective milieus. Since graduate school, I have been intrigued by Islamic historical portrayals of the pre-Islamic Iranians, Greeks, Indians, and other civilizations. I wondered, did these peoples, with their diverse ancient traditions and cultures, fit into an Islamic worldview, and if so, how? I came to realize that while the mining of Islamic historiography for positivist historical facts about these civilizations is a necessary endeavor, much more attention needs to be given to the very important dimension of the contemporaneous social and historical commentary which lies embedded in these textual depictions of the time before Islam. This underlying commentary becomes readily apparent to those who allow context to guide their reading of these texts.

I chose to focus on “Arabs” and “Iranians” because I was struck in my research by the strong emotions of juxtaposing pride and polemic that clearly stand out in Islamic textual depictions comparing these peoples. While previous generations of scholars have been criticized by their present-day counterparts for casually applying reductive terms like “nationalism” to describe this sentiment, it is my opinion that no study to date has provided an effective argument for expressing what exactly early Muslim scholars were thinking of when they wrote about diametrically opposed Arab and Iranian civilizations. I hope that this book will therefore contribute to an understanding of how the past was conceived in early Islamic collective memory as a tool to bolster or negate contemporaneous constructions of identity. 

This book analyzes how early Muslim historians portrayed the history of the relationship between the Sasanian empire and the tribes and states of the Arabian peninsula and Iraq as a didactic narrative forecasting the rise of Islam as well as the Muslim conquest of Iran.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

SS: This book analyzes how early Muslim historians portrayed the history of the relationship between the Sasanian empire and the tribes and states of the Arabian peninsula and Iraq as a didactic narrative forecasting the rise of Islam as well as the Muslim conquest of Iran. I ask how dynamic identity and power discourses within the early Islamic world shaped this narrative, and to what end.  My main theme is that the crystallization of Arab-Islamic and Iranian-Islamic identities occurring between 750-1050 is inextricably linked with collective memory. I show how the dialectical constructs, imagery, and themes emanating from this process of identity formation are projected into the context of this narrative. As literary and rhetorical devices, these anachronisms are intended to guide the reader of this historical drama in the direction of the unfolding plot—i.e., the gradual transition of power occurring between these two peoples. The primary sources of my analysis include works of ta’rīkh (historical chronicles) and adab (belles-lettres style literature).

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

SS: This book is an outgrowth of my Ph.D. dissertation. Besides developing a broader historical context to frame my analysis, the major difference from my dissertation is that my book is guided by a deeper reading into literary and sociological theory and approaches on identity and alterity, narrative, reception, and memory. Likewise, I have taken a more nuanced view of the Shu‘ūbiyya— i.e. the alleged movement of pro-Iranian, anti-Arab nationalists—by arguing that it was essentially a fabrication of social critics, like al-Jāḥiẓ and Ibn Qutayba, who were looking to discredit admirers of Iranian civilization.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

SS: Besides specialists and students of early Islamic history, it is my hope that this book will start and build upon conversations across historical fields, such as Antiquity, Late Antiquity, Central Asia, and contemporary Islamic/Middle East Studies. In particular, I hope that this book adds to scholarly discussions across subject areas regarding pre-modern identity construction.     

J: What other projects are you working on now?

SS: I’m currently working on a comprehensive study analyzing identity and state formation in the early Islamic Middle East. This monograph will ask how diverse manifestations of identity (tribal, sectarian, gender, social status, profession, etc.) intersect with dynamic power discourses from the rise of Islam through the early Ottoman period.

J: How does your book stand out with respect to modern scholarship in your field?

SS: My book stands out by virtue of its unique approach. Traditional scholarship on the Sasanian era has utilized Islamic historiography in tandem with Christian sources, Middle Persian texts, archaeological and epigraphic data, with the goal of creating a positivistic picture of what this period looked like. My book is unique in that my objective is to show how the drama that unfolded between the Arabs and Sasanians in the Islamic historical tradition must be viewed through the lens of discourses and issues pervading the societies of early Muslim chroniclers. That is, my primary concern is to understand how an early Muslim audience may have made sense of this narrative, and how this reception would have evolved over a three-hundred year period through changing social and political circumstances. To my knowledge, this is the first study of its kind that is devoted entirely to analyzing Islamic historiography of the pre-Islamic period through the mirror of latter day concerns.   

 

Excerpt from the Introduction, pp. 1-2:

The Battle of al-Qādisiyya (AD 636) was the decisive victory for the Muslim-Arabs over the Sasanian empire, opening up Iran for conquest and resulting in the eradication of the Sasanian dynasty. In his historical chronicle, Ta’rīkh al-rusul wa’l-mulūk, Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 923) details numerous reports (akhbār) of the embassies which the Arabs sent to the Persian camp in the days prior to this battle. His main source for these accounts is Sayf b. ‘Umar (d. 809), a Kufan transmitter of traditions who has been noted for his literary embellishment and questionable reliability. Each of these meetings proceeds roughly as follows: The Arab ambassador, entering the Sasanian camp alone, is presented as the imago Bedouin warrior. He wears tattered clothes, bears ramshackle weapons, and is generally unkempt. The Iranians, in contrast, are arrayed in full ceremonial formation. The soldiers display their glistening armor and impressive weaponry, and the nobles don their finest brocades and diadems. At the end of a spread carpet lined with cushions, the Sasanian general Rustam sits atop a golden throne. The Arab, however, pays no heed to the Iranians’ display of pomp and proceeds to approach Rustam.  Rustam then begins the dialogue by disparaging the Arabs for their poverty and offers to give them some meager provisions if they would return to their land. The Arab ambassador, however, remains composed and dignified despite this treatment, and eloquently responds by chastising the Persians for their decadence, proclaiming the message of the Prophet Muḥammad, and offering them the ultimatum of conversion, paying the jizya (poll tax), or facing open war. 

These reports’ formulaic emphasis on the contrast between the Arabs’ poverty and the Iranians’ imperial splendor renders their veracity suspect. What is furthermore intriguing is the fact that al-Ṭabarī affords far less coverage to the Arab-Muslims’ early campaigns against the Roman (Byzantine) empire than he gives to the conquest of Iran. This is unusual considering the wealth of conquest literature (futūḥ) on the Arabs’ Western campaigns to which al-Ṭabarī would have had access. These works exhibit similar tropes of contrast in their portrayals of encounters between Arabs and representatives of Roman empire. Why therefore did al-Ṭabarī devote so much attention to Sayf’s dubious rendition of the al-Qādisiyya embassies, and the conquest of Iran in general? How might the social and political circumstances in which he lived have shaped his attitude towards these events? What messages, if any, was he trying to convey to his reader through his portrayal of these embassies, and how might we compare his agenda, or the angle he approached this history, with that of his sources?

Al-Ṭabarī’s chronicle belongs to a genre of Islamic historiography consisting of comprehensive world histories composed between the late ninth and early eleventh centuries. These works vary in their coverage of the civilizations of the pre-Islamic world, yet on the whole, the lion’s share of their focus is on two groups: the Arabs and the Iranians. Across this genre, the great civilizations of Greece and Rome, India, and China are frankly not afforded the same depth of coverage in terms of their internal dynamics as the Arabs and the Iranians. Considering the fact that Islam was born in the Arabian peninsula, it is of course, natural that Arab history should be afforded a prominent position in any Islamic historical work. As far as the Iranian orientation of these texts is concerned, this is a reflection of these historians’ social context. Most of the universal chronographers were of Iranian origin. (Al-Ṭabarī hailed from the region of Ṭabaristān, south of the Caspian Sea). Moreover, they were writing in an era witnessing the dominance in the central and eastern Islamic lands of Iranian political enterprises and a concomitant wide-scale resurgence of Iranian traditions and culture.

The universal chronicles of this era therefore evince an attempt to merge the histories of the pre-Islamic Arab and Iranian peoples into a universal cycle of aggregate accounts culminating with the rise of Islam. As a watershed moment bringing these two civilizations together, it is no wonder then why the events surrounding the seminal Battle of al-Qādisiyya receive so much attention in these works in comparison to their depiction of the Byzantine conquests. Yet, this streaming of two distinct traditions into a single historical consciousness was no easy task, especially considering that the transmitters these historians relied upon lived in a different social and political context from theirs and, no doubt, thought about these events differently. So for example, while Iranian culture certainly exercised a strong influence on the early ‘Abbasid Iraq of Sayf b. ‘Umar, and the Arab genealogist and antiquarian Hishām b. al-Kalbī (d. 819), it had not yet reached the same degree of dominance there and elsewhere in the Dār al-Islām as it had by the time we arrive at the universal chronographers’ era. How then did Muslim writers of history, living in different times and in different contexts, come to terms with and give meaning to the Arab conquest of Iran? The present study addresses this question.

[Excerpted from Arabs and Iranians in the Islamic Conquest Narrative: Memory and Identity Construction in Islamic Historiography, 750–1050, by Scott Savran. Copyright (c) 2018 – Routledge. Used with permission of author and publisher.]

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.