Follow Us

Follow on Twitter    Follow on Facebook    YouTube Channel    Vimeo Channel    Tumblr    SoundCloud Channel    iPhone App    iPhone App

A Crucial Election for Iran's Reform Movement

[Iran elections 2013. Image from Wikipedia] [Iran elections 2013. Image from Wikipedia]

Today, Iranians cast their vote for the country’s eleventh presidential election. It certainly will not be an easy decision, with a field of candidates that lack any sense of major diversity in their policies and ideologies. With one glaring exception, the deck is stacked in favor of the conservative elites.

As any astute student of Iran knows, predicting the outcome of the election is virtually impossible. The only conclusion thus far is that the road has not been kind to the reformists this election cycle. They lost their desired choice of Hashemi Rafsanjani through the qualification process. They were also forced to convince Mohammed Reza Aref, the sole reformist candidate, to withdraw in favor of Hassan Rouhani. Disillusioned by the whole process, some reformists remain jaded about participating in the election.

How Did We Get Here?

The disqualification of Hashemi Rafsanjani stacked the deck in favor of the Supreme Leader and the conservative elites by paving the way for the election of a candidate utterly loyal to the regime. Disqualifying Rafsanjani indicates, once again, that the regime’s inner circle is shrinking and that power is becoming more centralized. But why was the reformist faction counting on Rafsanjani, and why are they currently backing Hassan Rouhani? As long time regime insiders, they can hardly be labeled as reformists. The answer is simple. There is no alternative.

Following the 2009 disputed presidential election in Iran, all major reformist factions were ousted from the political scene and hundreds of reform-minded politicians, activists, and journalists were purged from public life. The 2009 reformist candidates, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, are still under house arrest at unknown locations. Significantly weakened, reformists were left to wonder about their future in a seemingly exclusive regime. Realizing that no major reformist candidate would have a chance of getting through the Guardian Council (the twelve-member conservative body in charge of qualifying all election candidates and thus vetting them), they viewed Rafsanjani’s decision to run as a blessing.

As one of the founding members of the Islamic Republic, and the current chairman of the Expediency Council, Rafsanjani presented the best chance for the opposition factions in Iran. His long resume includes influential positions such as the Chairman of the Assembly of Experts, Speaker of the Parliament, Interior Minister, and the de facto commander-in-chief of the military during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). He is also credited for buttressing Ayatollah Khamenei’s ascendency to Supreme Leadership. The possibility of his disqualification by the ruling conservatives seemed unlikely due to his history and accomplishments.

Divisions within the Reformist Faction

Major divisions permeate the reformist factions regarding whether they should consider not participating in elections in the Islamic Republic. Yet, reformists led by former president Mohammad Khatami announced on 10 June that they will endorse Hassan Rouhani, a moderate cleric who is also backed by Hashemi Rafsanjani. Rouhani is a member of the Assembly of Experts and the Supreme National Security Council. He has inched closer to the reformists, but more than likely he is vying for popular support and lacks any genuine plans for transforming the system. As a long time member of the country’s Supreme National Security Council and the former chief nuclear negotiator, Rouhani has proven loyal to the ruling establishment and has managed to retain his positions even after the 2009 shake-up. More than likely, anyone expecting him to cross the regime’s redlines will be disappointed.

Once again, reformists find themselves with no alternatives. Presidential candidate Mohammad Reza Aref, former President Khatami’s Minister of Technology, was the sole reformist candidate who dropped out in favor of Rouhani on 10 June. Aref did not have the clout to be a real threat in a race packed with conservative heavyweights. A comment made by Aref best explains the position of reformists who favor participation: “Boycotting the election is not a form of protest, it is retreating.”

Reviving a Movement

By voting for Rouhani, reformists hope to create enough breathing room for the country’s diaspora to reignite the same grassroots activism experienced during Khatami’s presidency. The Supreme Leader may set clear limits, but Rouhani’s moderate tone and pragmatism are appealing when measured against some other candidates. Such an opening may allow the reformist faction to revive the activities of the Islamic Iran Participation Front, a dominant reformist political group, credited for implementing the reformist agenda during Khatami’s presidency (1997-2005). In June 2009, Mohsen Mirdamadi, Saeed Hajarian, and other prominent leaders of the party were arrested and the group was essentially dismantled. Mirdamadi is currently serving the remainder of his six-year sentence in Evin prison.

The release of Mousavi, Karroubi, and other political prisoners such as Mostafa Tajzadeh is another top priority for reformists in favor of participating in the upcoming election. Tajzadeh, a former Political Deputy Minister of Interior, was one of the seven leading reformists who sued several IRGC commanders for their alleged intervention in the 2009 presidential election. By electing a moderate figure such as Rouhani, they hope to reach that goal.

To Participate or Not?

Reformists in Iran are far from united. In a recent statement published on 4 June, the Mujahideen of the Islamic Revolution, a reformist political faction formed in 1991, asked the country’s reformists to boycott the upcoming election and refrain from supporting a candidate. The statement released by the group said, “The upcoming presidential elections should not be viewed as legitimate” and the results will “more than likely be engineered.” The majority of the reformists who signed the statement live abroad.

Ayatollah Mohmmad Mousavi Khoeiniha, an Iranian cleric and the secretary general of the reformist Association of Combatant Clerics, has also voiced his disapproval of the upcoming election. Khoeiniha stated:

I do not believe in election participation under any circumstances. Participation will only harm the reform movement….Election participation should be dignified. Election participation should be within the framework of improving the goals of the reform movement. We should not allow the current ruling faction…to lead us to a dead end.

The reformist group opposing election participation is less clear about its ultimate goals. Given the country’s current intolerant state, they view participation to be superfluous and serving the interests of the ruling conservatives.

What Is Next?

Iranian reformists are not naïve. Even Khatami indicated his doubt about the undemocratic nature of the election in prior months. “Even if we [reformists] are qualified, we will not have the right to get any more votes than what they [ruling conservatives] have already decided,” Khatami stated in a speech to university students in Tehran on 9 May.

The problem for the reformist opposition is not their lack of understanding of the domestic political dynamics or being blindly optimistic about the future. The issue is their inability to reach a consensus about the regime’s ability to reform. The regime has repeatedly cracked down on any meaningful reforms. Amid the height of the reformist era in the 1990s, popular student protests were crushed, prominent reformists were jailed and threatened, hundreds of reformist parliamentary members were banned from reelection in 2004, and hundreds of other reform-minded activists were jailed and threatened in 2009.

The current goal is to get Rouhani elected in order to create space for the reformists. But what if he is not the winner? This is an uncomfortable impasse for reformists. If reforms are no longer possible, then what is the alternative? The Iranian opposition—and perhaps the greater public—is not ready to answer that question yet.

Latest posts in Politics:

If you prefer, email your comments to info@jadaliyya.com.

Announcements

D E V E L O P M E N T S

 

Apply for an ASI Internship now!

 




The
Political Economy Project

Issues a

Call for Letters of Interest
!

  

Jadaliyya Launches its

Political Economy

Page!
 

 


 

F O R    T H E    C L A S S R O O M 

Critical Readings in Political Economy: 1967


 

The 1967 Defeat and the Conditions of the Now: A Roundtable


 

E N G A G E M E N T 

SUBSCRIBE TO THE ARAB STUDIES JOURNAL

Pages/Sections

Archive