Tribes of Libya as the Third Front: Myths and Realities of Non-State Actors in the Long Battle for Misrata

Recent news reports originating from Libyan state media have Libyan tribes sending representatives to the rebels in Misrata, hoping to negotiate for peace and for control of the city. An April 24 article in The Guardian quoted Libya’s deputy foreign minister, Khaled Kaim, as threatening a “very bloody” assault against the rebels in Misrata if they fail to negotiate. “I hope to God we can avoid this,” Kaim lamented to The Guardian.

Why do Qaddafi’s tales of “tribal” identities mobilizing against rebels gain traction in the international media, whereas other Libyan government pronouncements (about cease-fires and civilian casualties, for example) are greeted with skepticism?

One significant cause of tribal rhetoric in Western media and academia is forty years of Qaddafi propaganda. The autocratic regime has an interest in depicting Libya as a (non)state of fragmented warring factions unified by a benevolent and beloved leader. Saif al-Islam argued in a February speech that “if there is a disturbance, Libya will split into several states.” If Libyans wouldn’t accept the government concessions, he warned, “be ready to start a civil war.” Considering the source of this most recent story, we must take note of the regime’s historic exploitation not only of tribal relationships but also of divisive tribal language. Many of Qaddafi’s policies in the last four decades have been aimed at reducing the influence and power of tribal networks. Libyan scholar Mansour O. El-Kikhia, for example, discusses how the “gerrymandering” of administrative districts broke up the historical power bases of Libya’s largest and most influential tribes. Land once under the influence of powerful, but resistant, tribal sheiks was redistributed to supportive tribes, such as parts of the Warfalla, Qadhadfa and Megarha. Favoritism towards certain families, tribes, regions, and towns all served to create inequality and the perception of deep divisions. Today, for example, towns such as Qaddafi’s hometown of Sirte (the stronghold of the Qadhadfa tribe) and the capital of Tripoli are noticeably more modern and developed, while Benghazi and many eastern towns, historically bases of tribal and popular resistance, have been starved of resources, infrastructure development, and state investment for the last four decades. In fact, as noted in several news sources including The National, accusations of regional and tribal favoritism were present from the very start of the current Libyan conflict.

Indeed many of the regime’s policies have served to create social chaos, including the use of state-controlled television to disseminate misleading or manipulative information about everything from promised reforms to socio-political dynamics. Divisive tribal language has been used by the Qaddafi regime to spread dissent and create fear; a chaotic populous—especially one with as tumultuous a history as Libya’s—is more easily forced to rely on the state for employment, income, and protection. For example, see Qaddafi’s February speech claiming, “All the tribes support me.” In the same speech he warned Libyans against joining the opposition, claiming people should remain with their tribes and not succumb to outside influence. “It’s the people of the tribes [that] will help them, not the agents of the Americans, or of Bin Laden, or Zarqawi.” Qaddafi claimed the opposition wore “turbans and long beards,” clear signifiers of outside radical Islamists. By contrast, real Libyans are not radical, belong with their tribe, and were not participating in any agitations. Saif al-Islam uses similar rhetoric. In his own February speech the younger Qaddafi described the opposition as “drunks” funded by “millionaire businessmen.” By contrast, the real “Libya is tribes, not like Egypt. There are no political parties; it is made of tribes.”

The most alarming example of this discourse is the construction of a false “tribe vs. rebels” dichotomy. This is not only inaccurate but, at a time when Libyan civilians are dying in the streets, dangerous. There is, in fact, no tribe-rebel division. Historically, most Libyans are born into a tribe that predates the modern Libyan state. Tribal structures have held different importance during different eras and under different rulers and systems of governance. Nevertheless, it follows that all Libyans involved in the opposition are therefore just as “tribal” as any supposed leaders who are on the opposite side of the negotiating table. Actually, this construction plays directly into Qaddafi’s own twisted narrative: he has long been claiming that opposition forces are outsiders or members of Al Qaeda. In The Guardian, Khaled Kaim describes “foreign fighters” in Misrata. This is regime propaganda—especially cynical in the face of mounting evidence that the regime has employed non-Libyan African mercenaries to kill its own people. Considering the source of this story, there is a significant chance it is more of the same familiar regime tactics.

In another example, an April 21 New York Times article asks, “Is the battle for Libya the clash of a brutal dictator against a democratic opposition, or is it fundamentally a tribal civil war?” These juxtapositions are fallacies: that the opposition can’t be both democratically-oriented and consist of tribes, that the fight must either be against a brutal dictator or simply be between two competing tribal alliances. None of these supposed binaries are actually mutually exclusive—although they do seem to echo the regime’s party line. Knowingly or not, media reports and news analysis in the last several decades often parrot Qaddafi’s own rhetoric.

Tribes in modern Libya have not been institutionalized; they have no real formal role, but do remain significant social support structures. As Hasni Abidi, director of the Study and Research Centre for the Arab and Mediterranean World, explained to France 24, “tribal chiefs represent a sort of moral and social support, and a refuge, given the total absence of Libyan political institutions.” An April statement signed by sixty-one Libyan tribal leaders explains it this way: “Every Libyan has certainly had [his] origins in a particular tribe. But he has complete freedom to create family ties, friendship, neighborhood or fellowship with any member of any other tribe.” This is very relevant to the most recent reports of a tribes vs. rebels standoff. Khalifa Al-Zwawi, a judge who heads Misrata's transitional council, is one opposition leader that has dismissed recent reports of tribal negotiators. “This is simply one of Qaddafi’s plots to save time, “ he told The Guardian, “He is not dealing with tribes, but with individuals within tribes.” This is an essential point to remember both when analyzing the current Libyan conflict and when speculating on the role of tribes in Libya’s future government.

Certainly there are variations in the strength of individual tribal identity depending on age and region, among other demographic indicators. An increase in urbanization and education has meant that tribes are no longer purely—or even marginally—territorial institutions. Perhaps most important at this historical moment is the remarkable demonstration of Libyan nationalist feeling, most dramatically illustrated in March by men in a liberated Benghazi training to help free cities in central and western Libya. These two areas are often painted in simplistic articles and TV reports as having irreconcilable historical tensions. In fact, the April statement mentioned above is a statement of unity between tribes of varying sizes, regions, and prominence. The sixty-one tribal leaders specifically point to Qaddafi as the source of much of tribal discord or division: “It is the dictator, trying to play the Libyan tribes against each other, dividing the country to better conquer. There is no truth in this myth, it has fed an ancestral opposition and, today, a rift between tribes of Fezzan, of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania.” These elders are united in denouncing Qaddafi and supporting the opposition movement. One specific demonstration of regional and tribal unity is found in Al-Zwawi’s comments to The Guardian. After securing Misrata, he claims, “We want to go to Tripoli and set it free, and Libya free.”

Unsophisticated language about tribes can be found everywhere. A recent report from Reuters quotes Alia Brahimi, head of the North Africa program at the London School of Economics. “In Libya, it will be the tribal system that will hold the balance of power rather than the military, he says. “I think you will see defections of some of the main tribes if that is not happening already.” This particular analysis is lacking in a few ways. Of course we must note that it has, in fact, been the military that has held the balance of power in Libya. The opposition, “tribal” or not, is pushing back against the regime only because they, too, now have some degree of military capability. But most notably for the purposes of this discussion, the “main tribes” are offhandedly discussed as monolithic entities. How reasonable an assumption can this possibly be? Consider only one example, that of Warfalla, a tribe of an estimated one million Libyans. As encouraging as the April tribal declaration is, how likely is it that one Warfalla signatory represents the desires or political leanings of one million people who live all over Libya? Brahimi’s description suggests that Libyan tribes are monolithic groups who were all part of Qaddafi’s regime in some respect (or why would they need to “defect”?). Tribes are not military units, who act in one accord and move en masse throughout the political and social structure of Libya.

However, this trope is present even in popular political analysis. In The Middle East Quarterly, McGill University’s Philip Carl Salzman argues: “The propensity of Arab states and Iran to dictatorship…has roots in tribal culture. There is an inherent conflict between peasants and nomads. Peasants are sedentary, tied to their land, water, and crops while tribesmen are nomadic, moving around remote regions.” This description, in a widely read (if conservative-leaning) journal, creates a false peasant/tribe binary. “Tribesmen” are stereotyped as isolated, landless, and in constant conflict with more civilized landed peoples. This smacks of language used to describe Native Americans during the American Western expansion. Further, Arabs are “tribal” and therefore prone to violent, autocratic regimes. Is there no hope for Arabs, then? Accurate analysis of the Libyan situation absolutely must dismiss scholarship along these lines. The reality is much more nuanced than is reflected in the current rhetoric, academic or otherwise.

Simplistic and un-nuanced language is given the sheen of legitimacy in particular when used by famous public scholars such as Benjamin Barber. Barber, the American political theorist, has repeatedly predicted that the “tribal society” that is Libya will descend into “tribal war.” “Blood trumps principle,” Barber declared to the Huffington Post in February. Qaddafi’s attacks against the Libyan people represent “his tribal struggle to uphold the ‘honor’ of his clan, the Qadaffa [sic], against rivals like the Zuwayya in the East or the Warfalla in the South.” Geographical inaccuracies aside, what are the implications of dismissing war crimes and the shooting, bombing, and torturing of civilians as a “tribal” dispute? The answer can be found in the title of this article: “Why Libya Will Not be Democratic.” In the same vein, Samuel Huntington describes the “structure of political loyalty” of Arabs and Muslims as “opposite that of the modern West.” He strangely and dismissively notes that “at least eighteen tribes have played major roles in Libyan development.” Aside from the few historical questions that these statements raise, simple generalizations in reference to tribes are once again evident. So to is a casual dismissal of Arab and/or Muslim political structures as “un-modern.” Tribes are unruly, backwards, violent, anti-modern, and generally unregenerate, according to this discourse. The same connotations have been used for centuries to justify all manner of invasion, occupation, exploitation, and disenfranchisement.

Of course, Barber (the “long time advisor to Saif al-Qaddafi,” according to Foreign Policy) is looking after his reputation and defending his questionable relationship with Qaddafi’s brutal regime. Nevertheless, it is important to point out the remarkably simplistic analyses that have unfortunately been given such a public platform (most egregiously in a March 2011 article in Foreign Policy). Recent articles in Huffington Post, The New York Times, and The Guardian are only the most recent example of this “tribal” discourse.

This discourse can be very damaging, especially when used by notable scholars in public forums. These words have a real effect on foreign policy, intervention strategy, and public perception of “other” people half a world away. And, needless to say, public perception affects aid money and the pressure (or lack thereof) that politicians feel to shape policy in one way or another. Western audiences especially hear “tribal” and think “backwards, savage, and unreformed.” A recent New York Times article uses alarmist language to question the legitimacy of the Libyan opposition. Journalist David Kirkpatrick wonders if the transitional council will use “rough tribal justice or a more measured legal process” in dealing with Qaddafi spies. When did the “secular-minded professionals — lawyers, academics, businesspeople” that Kirkpatrick describes become “rough,” and “tribal”? This comment blatantly ignores not only important Arab and Islamic justice traditions, but also the education and agency of the modern Libyans trying to better their country. This tribal discourse paints Libyans—even those progressively forming a new government—as constantly on the verge of devolving into violence and savagery.

To conclude, there is no tribe vs. rebel standoff in Libya. This is not a tribal war, but one fought by Libyans of all affiliations against an exploitative and brutal regime. There are almost certainly massive amounts of coercion and manipulation going on to maintain military support and the limited tribal or regional support that Qaddafi still has. The current hot tribe-related story comes from the most questionable of all Libyan sources and has inexplicably received uncritical treatment from even the most reputable news outlets. Most importantly, especially considering the evolution of the tribal structure over the last few decades, any discourse that relies on the tired “tribal war” trope is almost guaranteed to be inaccurate. Tribe is not the primary identification for many Libyans, and Libyan nationalist feeling is running very high in many areas, regardless of any other affiliations. Although tribes and historical tensions are very real and deserving of attention, a much more nuances understanding of Libyan history and society is required for any responsible presentation of the current Libyan conflict. As renowned Libya scholar Ali Ahmida told Mother Jones in late February, “There's a huge vacuum in our knowledge about Libya. We reduce it to tribes and clans, or to Qaddafi, or to oil. There's nothing about Libyan society. I find that appalling, even among our commentators and our scholars.” Indeed. The question is: how do we accurately and responsibly discuss Libyan tribes in this context?