[Below is the latest from Human Rights Watch (HRW) on attempts to hold Bush Administration officials accountable for torture.]
George Tenet asked if he had permission to use enhanced interrogation techniques, including waterboarding, on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.…
“Damn right,” I said.
—Former President George W. Bush, 2010[1]
There is no longer any doubt as to whether the current administration has committed war crimes. The only question that remains to be answered is whether those who ordered the use of torture will be held to account.
—Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, June 2008[2]
Should former US President George W. Bush be investigated for authorizing “waterboarding” and other abuses against detainees that the United States and scores of other countries have long recognized as torture? Should high-ranking US officials who authorized enforced disappearances of detainees and the transfer of others to countries where they were likely to be tortured be held accountable for their actions?
In 2005, Human Rights Watch’s Getting Away with Torture? presented substantial evidence warranting criminal investigations of then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet, as well as Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, formerly the top US commander in Iraq, and Gen. Geoffrey Miller, former commander of the US military detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
This report builds on our prior work by summarizing information that has since been made public about the role played by US government officials most responsible for setting interrogation and detention policies following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, and analyzes them under US and international law. Based on this evidence, Human Rights Watch believes there is sufficient basis for the US government to order a broad criminal investigation into alleged crimes committed in connection with the torture and ill-treatment of detainees, the CIA secret detention program, and the rendition of detainees to torture. Such an investigation would necessarily focus on alleged criminal conduct by the following four senior officials—former President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and CIA Director George Tenet.
Such an investigation should also include examination of the roles played by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Attorney General John Ashcroft, as well as the lawyers who crafted the legal “justifications” for torture, including Alberto Gonzales (counsel to the president and later attorney general), Jay Bybee (head of the Justice Department`s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)), John Rizzo (acting CIA general counsel), David Addington (counsel to the vice president), William J. Haynes II (Department of Defense general counsel), and John Yoo (deputy assistant attorney general in the OLC).
Much important information remains secret. For example, many internal government documents on detention and interrogation policies and practices are still classified, and unavailable to the public. According to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which has secured the release of thousands of documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), among the dozens of key documents still withheld are the presidential directive of September 2001 authorizing CIA "black sites"—or secret prisons—as well as CIA inspector general records.[3] Moreover, many documents that have ostensibly been released, including the CIA inspector general’s report and Department of Justice and Senate committee reports, contain heavily redacted sections that obscure key events and decisions.
Human Rights Watch believes that many of these documents may contain incriminating information, strengthening the cases for criminal investigation detailed in this report. It also believes there is enough strong evidence from the information made public over the past five years to not only suggest these officials authorized and oversaw widespread and serious violations of US and international law, but that they failed to act to stop mistreatment, or punish those responsible after they became aware of serious abuses. Moreover, while Bush administration officials have claimed that detention and interrogation operations were only authorized after extensive discussion and legal review by Department of Justice attorneys, there is now substantial evidence that civilian leaders requested that politically appointed government lawyers create legal justifications to support abusive interrogation techniques, in the face of opposition from career legal officers.
Thorough, impartial, and genuinely independent investigation is needed into the programs of illegal detention, coerced interrogation, and rendition to torture—and the role of top government officials. Those who authorized, ordered, and oversaw torture and other serious violations of international law, as well as those implicated as a matter of command responsibility, should be investigated and prosecuted if evidence warrants.
Taking such action and addressing the issues raised in this report is crucial to the US’s global standing, and needs to be undertaken if the United States hopes to wipe away the stain of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo and reaffirm the primacy of the rule of law.
Human Rights Watch expresses no opinion about the ultimate guilt or innocence of any officials under US law, nor does it purport to offer a comprehensive account of the possible culpability of these officials or a legal brief. Rather it presents two main sections: one providing a narrative summarizing Bush administration policies and practices on detention and interrogation, and another detailing the case for individual criminal responsibility of several key administration officials.
The road to the violations detailed here began within days of the September 11, 2001 attacks by al Qaeda on New York and Washington, DC, when the Bush administration began crafting a new set of policies, procedures, and practices for detainees captured in military and counterterrorism operations outside the United States. Many of these violated the laws of war, international human rights law, and US federal criminal law. Moreover, the coercive methods that senior US officials approved include tactics that the US has repeatedly condemned as torture or ill-treatment when practiced by others.
For example, the Bush administration authorized coercive interrogation practices by the CIA and the military that amounted to torture, and instituted an illegal secret CIA detention program in which detainees were held in undisclosed locations without notifying their families, allowing access to the International Committee of the Red Cross, or providing for oversight of their treatment. Detainees were also unlawfully rendered (transferred) to countries such as Syria, Egypt, and Jordan, where they were likely to be tortured. Indeed, many were, including Canadian national Maher Arar who described repeated beatings with cables and electrical cords during the 10 months he was held in Syria, where the US sent him in 2002. Evidence suggests that torture in such cases was not a regrettable consequence of rendition; it may have been the purpose.
At the same time, politically appointed administration lawyers drafted legal memoranda that sought to provide legal cover for administration policies on detention and interrogation.
As a direct result of Bush administration decisions, detainees in US custody were beaten, thrown into walls, forced into small boxes, and waterboarded—subjected to mock executions in which they endured the sensation of drowning. Two alleged senior al Qaeda prisoners, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah, were waterboarded 183 and 83 times respectively.
Detainees in US-run facilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo Bay endured prolonged mistreatment, sometimes for weeks and even months. This included painful “stress” positions; prolonged nudity; sleep, food, and water deprivation; exposure to extreme cold or heat; and total darkness with loud music blaring for weeks at a time. Other abuses in Iraq included beatings, near suffocation, sexual abuse, and mock executions. At Guantanamo Bay, some detainees were forced to sit in their own excrement, and some were sexually humiliated by female interrogators. In Afghanistan, prisoners were chained to walls and shackled in a manner that made it impossible to lie down or sleep, with restraints that caused their hands and wrists to swell up or bruise.
These abuses across several continents did not result from the acts of individual soldiers or intelligence agents who broke the rules: they resulted from decisions of senior US leaders to bend, ignore, or cast rules aside. Furthermore, as explained in this report, it is now known that Bush administration officials developed and expanded their initial decisions and authorizations on detainee operations even in the face of internal and external dissent, including warnings that many of their actions violated international and domestic law. And when illegal interrogation techniques on detainees spread broadly beyond what had been explicitly authorized, these officials turned a blind eye, making no effort to stop the practices.
The Price of Impunity
The US government’s disregard for human rights in fighting terrorism in the years following the September 11, 2001 attacks diminished the US’ moral standing, set a negative example for other governments, and undermined US government efforts to reduce anti-American militancy around the world.
In particular, the CIA’s use of torture, enforced disappearance, and secret prisons was illegal, immoral, and counterproductive. These practices tainted the US government’s reputation and standing in combating terrorism, negatively affected foreign intelligence cooperation, and sparked anger and resentment among Muslim communities, whose assistance is crucial to uncovering and preventing future global terrorist threats.
President Barack Obama took important steps toward setting a new course when he abolished secret CIA prisons and banned the use of torture upon taking office in January 2009. But other measures have yet to be taken, such as ending the practice of indefinite detention without trial, closing the military detention facility at Guantanamo Bay and ending rendition of detainees to countries that practice torture. Most crucially, the US commitment to human rights in combating terrorism will remain suspect unless and until the current administration confronts the past. Only by fully and forthrightly dealing with those responsible for systematic violations of human rights after September 11 will the US government be seen to have surmounted them.
Without real accountability for these crimes, those who commit abuses in the name of counterterrorism will point to the US mistreatment of detainees to deflect criticism of their own conduct. Indeed, when a government as dominant and influential as that of the United States openly defies laws prohibiting torture, a bedrock principle of human rights, it virtually invites others to do the same. The US government’s much-needed credibility as a proponent of human rights was damaged by the torture revelations and continues to be damaged by the complete impunity for the policymakers implicated in criminal offenses.
As in countries that have previously come to grips with torture and other serious crimes by national leaders, there are countervailing political pressures within the United States. Commentators assert that any effort to address past abuses would be politically divisive, and might hinder the Obama administration’s ability to achieve pressing policy objectives.
This position ignores the high cost of inaction. Any failure to carry out an investigation into torture will be understood globally as purposeful toleration of illegal activity, and as a way to leave the door open to future abuses.[4] The US cannot convincingly claim to have rejected these egregious human rights violations until they are treated as crimes rather than as “policy options.”
In contrast, the benefits of conducting a credible and impartial criminal investigation are numerous. For example, the US government would send the clearest possible signal that it is committed to repudiating the use of torture. Accountability would boost US moral authority on human rights in counterterrorism in a more concrete and persuasive way than any initiative to date; set a compelling example for governments that the US has criticized for committing human rights abuses and for the populations that suffer from such abuses; and might reveal legal and institutional failings that led to the use of torture, pointing to ways to improve the government’s effectiveness in fighting terrorism. It would also sharply reduce the likelihood of foreign investigations and prosecutions of US officials—which have already begun in Spain—based on the principle of universal jurisdiction, since those prosecutions are generally predicated on the responsible government’s failure to act.
Establishing Accountability
The Bush administration’s response to the revelations of detainee abuse, including the Abu Ghraib abuse scandal, which broke in 2004, was one of damage control rather than a search for truth and accountability. The majority of administration investigations undertaken from 2004 forward lacked the independence or breadth necessary to fully explore the prisoner-abuse issue. Almost all involved the military or CIA investigating itself, and focused on only one element of the treatment of detainees. None looked at the issue of rendition to torture, and none examined the role of civilian leaders who may have had authority over detainee treatment policy.
The US record on criminal accountability for detainee abuse has been abysmal. In 2007, Human Rights Watch collected information on some 350 cases of alleged abuse involving more than 600 US personnel. Despite numerous and systematic abuses, few military personnel had been punished and not a single CIA official held accountable. The highest-ranking officer prosecuted for the abuse of prisoners was a lieutenant colonel, Steven Jordan, court-martialed in 2006 for his role in the Abu Ghraib scandal, but acquitted in 2007.
When Barack Obama, untainted by the detainee abuse scandal, became president in 2009, the outlook for accountability appeared to improve. As a presidential candidate, Obama spoke of the need for a “thorough investigation” of detainee mistreatment.[5] After his election, he said there should be prosecutions if “somebody has blatantly broken the law,” but suggested otherwise when he expressed his “belief that we need to look forward as opposed to looking backwards.”[6]
On August 24, 2009, as the CIA inspector general`s long-suppressed report on interrogation practices was released in heavily redacted form with new revelations about unlawful practices, US Attorney General Eric Holder announced he had appointed Assistant United States Attorney John Durham to conduct “a preliminary review into whether federal laws were violated in connection with the interrogation of specific detainees at overseas locations.” Holder added, however, that “the Department of Justice will not prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within the scope of the legal guidance given by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) regarding the interrogation of detainees.”[7]
Holder’s statement was in line with that made by President Obama when he released a series of Bush-era memos: “In releasing these memos, it is our intention to assure those who carried out their duties relying in good faith upon legal advice from the Department of Justice that they will not be subject to prosecution.”[8] These statements themselves follow the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which provides a defense to criminal charges if the official, did not know that the practices were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and understanding would not know the practices were unlawful. Good faith reliance on advice of counsel should be an important factor, among others, to consider in assessing whether a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the practices to be unlawful.[9]
The problem is that the legal advice in question—contained in memoranda drafted by the OLC, which provides authoritative legal advice to the president and all executive branch agencies—itself authorized torture and other ill-treatment. It purported to give legal sanction to practices like waterboarding, as well as long-term sleep deprivation, violent slamming of prisoners into walls, forced nudity, and confinement of prisoners into small, dark boxes. Notably, all of the memoranda were later withdrawn by subsequent OLC officials during later periods in the Bush administration.
While US officials who act in good faith reliance upon official statements of the law generally have a defense under US law against criminal prosecution, this does not mean that the Justice Department should embrace the sweeping view that all officials responsible for methods of torture explicitly contemplated under OLC memoranda are protected from criminal investigation. Indeed, for the Justice Department to take such a position would risk validating a legal strategy that seeks to negate criminal liability for wrongdoing by preemptively constructing a legal defense. If such a strategy is seen to have worked, future administrations contemplating illegal actions will also be more likely to employ it.
In assessing the good faith of those who purported to rely on OLC guidance, the Justice Department should critically inquire, on a case-by-case basis, whether a reasonable person at the time these decisions were made would be convinced that such practices were lawful. It seems doubtful that cases of the most serious abuses would pass this test. It is especially unlikely that senior officials who were responsible for authorizing torture will be protected under this calculus, particularly if they were instrumental in pressing for legal cover from the OLC, or if they influenced the drafting of the memoranda that they now claim protect them.
For the Justice Department to look primarily into the actions of low-level interrogators would also be a mistake: it would reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of how and why abuses took place. Whether it was the coercive interrogation methods approved by the Defense Department or the CIA’s secret detention program, these were top-down enterprises that involved senior US officials who were responsible for formulating, authorizing, and supervising abusive practices.
Grounds for Investigation
Over the past several years, more evidence has been placed on the public record regarding the development of illegal detention policies and the torture and ill-treatment of detainees in US custody. Thanks in particular to FOIA lawsuits brought by the ACLU and the Center for Constitutional Rights, which have yielded over 100,000 pages of government documents concerning the treatment of detainees, the public record now includes most of a report by the CIA’s inspector general into detention practices, as well as CIA background papers, other government reports, and the infamous "torture memos" that provided the administration’s legal justification for abusive interrogation techniques.[10] An extensive amount of information was also uncovered in an investigation by the Senate Armed Services Committee, which released a report on detainee abuse in 2008 that was declassified in 2009.[11] The Department of Justice inspector general issued a report about FBI involvement in detention abuse in 2008,[12] and the department’s Office of Professional Responsibility issued a report on the role of department lawyers in crafting legal memoranda which justified abusive interrogations.[13] A report by the International Committee of the Red Cross, apparently leaked by US officials, also describes the treatment of “high-value” detainees in CIA custody.[14] In addition, former detainees and whistleblowers have come forward to tell their stories, and many of the principals have spoken about their roles. As described in this report, however, there is also much key evidence—beginning with President Bush’s directive authorizing CIA "black sites"—that remains secret.
In this report, our conclusion, which we believe is compelled by the evidence, is that a criminal investigation is warranted with respect to each of the following:[15]
President George W. Bush: had the ultimate authority over detainee operations and authorized the CIA secret detention program, which forcibly disappeared individuals in long-term incommunicado detention. He authorized the CIA renditions program, which he knew or should have known would result in torture. And he has publicly admitted that he approved CIA use of torture, specifically the waterboarding of two detainees. Bush never exerted his authority to stop the ill-treatment or punish those responsible.
Vice President Dick Cheney: was the driving force behind the establishment of illegal detention policies and the formulation of legal justifications for those policies. He chaired or attended numerous meetings at which specific CIA operations were discussed, beginning with the waterboarding of detainee Abu Zubaydah in 2002. He was a member of the National Security Council (NSC) “Principals Committee,” which approved and later reauthorized the use of waterboarding and other forms of torture and ill-treatment in the CIA interrogation program. Cheney has publicly admitted that he was aware of the use of waterboarding.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld: approved illegal interrogation methods that facilitated the use of torture and ill-treatment by US military personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq. Rumsfeld closely followed the interrogation of Guantanamo detainee Mohamed al-Qahtani who was subjected to a six-week regime of coercive interrogation that cumulatively amounted to torture. He was a member of the NSC Principals Committee, which approved the use of torture for CIA detainees. Rumsfeld never exerted his authority to stop the torture and ill-treatment of detainees even after he became aware of evidence of abuse over a three-year period beginning in early 2002.
CIA Director George Tenet: authorized and oversaw the CIA’s use of waterboarding, near suffocation, stress positions, light and noise bombardment, sleep deprivation, and other forms of torture and ill-treatment. He was a member of the NSC Principals Committee that approved the use of torture in the CIA interrogation program. Under Tenet`s direction, the CIA also “disappeared” detainees by holding them in long-term incommunicado detention in secret locations, and rendered (transferred) detainees to countries in which they were likely to be tortured and were tortured.
In addition, there should be criminal investigations into the drafting of legal memorandums seeking to justify torture, which were the basis for authorizing the CIA secret detention program. The government lawyers involved included Alberto Gonzales, counsel to the president and later attorney general; Jay Bybee, assistant attorney general in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC); John Rizzo, acting CIA general counsel; David Addington, counsel to the vice president; William J. Haynes II, Defense Department general counsel; and John Yoo, deputy assistant attorney general in OLC.
An Independent Nonpartisan Commission
The US and global public deserve a full and public accounting of the scale of abuses following the September 11 attacks, including why and how they occurred. Prosecutions, which focus on individual criminal liability, would not bring the full range of information to light. An independent, nonpartisan commission, along the lines of the 9-11 Commission, should therefore be established to examine the actions of the executive branch, the CIA, the military, and Congress, and to make recommendations to ensure that such widespread and systematic abuses are not repeated.[16]
The investigations that the US government has conducted either have been limited in scope—such as looking at violations by military personnel at a particular place in a restricted timeframe—or have lacked independence, with the military investigating itself. Congressional investigations have been limited to looking at a single agency or department. Individuals who planned or participated in the programs have yet to speak on the record.
Many of the key documents relating to the use of abusive techniques remain secret. Many of the proverbial dots remain unconnected. An independent, nonpartisan commission could provide a fuller picture of the systematic reasons behind the abuses, as well as the human, legal, and political consequences of the government’s unlawful policies.
[Click here to download the full report.]
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[1] George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), p. 170.
[2] Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, “Preface” to Physicians for Human Rights, Broken Laws, Broken Lives: Medical Evidence of Torture by US Personnel and Its Impact, http://brokenlives.info/?page_id=23 (accessed June 7, 2011).
[3] “Government Withholds Key Torture Documents In ACLU Lawsuit,” American Civil Liberties Union press release, September 1, 2009, http://www.aclu.org/national-security/government-withholds-key-torture-documents-aclu-lawsuit. For a listing of the documents withheld, see Index of Information Withheld in FOIA Lawsuit, http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/oig_vaughnindex.pdf (both accessed June 15, 2011).
[4] As one commentator has written, absent accountability, “tactics like torture and disappearance remain policy options, disfavored by the current president, but lying around ‘like a loaded gun’ for the next.” David Cole, “Breaking Away,” The New Republic, December 30, 2010.
[5] “Transcript–Barack Obama on MSNBC,” New York Times, April 4, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/04/us/politics/04obama-text.html?pagewanted=all (accessed June 20, 2011)
[6] Barack Obama, interview by George Stephanopoulos, This Week, ABC News, January 11, 2009, transcript at http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/Economy/story?id=6618199&page=1 (accessed June 24, 2011).
[7] “Attorney General Eric Holder Regarding a Preliminary Review into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees,” US Department of Justice press release, August 24, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-0908241.html (accessed June 21, 2011). In June 2011, Time magazine reported that Durham was looking into the death in Abu Ghraib of Manadel al-Jamadi, an Iraqi prisoner known as "the Iceman" because his body was cooled in ice. Adam Zagorin, “Haunted by Homicide: Federal Grand Jury Investigates War Crimes and Torture in Death of `the Iceman` at Abu Ghraib, Plus Other Alleged CIA Abuses,” posted by Mark Thompson to “Battleland” (blog), Time.com,http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2011/06/13/haunted-by-homicide-federal-grand-jury-investigates-war-crimes-and-torture-in-death-of-the-ice-man-at-abu-ghraib-and-other-alleged-cia-abuses/#ixzz1PkuG5q8S (accessed June 17, 2011).
[8] “Statement of President Barack Obama on release of OLC Memos,” White House press release, April 16, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-of-President-Barack-Obama-on-Release-of-OLC-Memos/ (accessed June 25, 2011).
[9] Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Public Law 163-109, 119 Stat. 3136, January 6, 2006, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ163.109.pdf (June 21, 2011), sec. 1404 (a).
[10] The reports are: Central Intelligence Agency Office of Inspector General, “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001-October 2003),” May 7, 2004, http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/052708/052708_Special_Review.pdf (accessed June 15, 2011) (“CIA I‑G Report”);
Vice Adm. Albert T. Church, III, US Department of Defense, “Review of Department of Defense interrogation operations – Executive Summary,” US Department of Defense, undated, http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050310exe.pdf (accessed June 21, 2011) (“Church Report”);
Brig. Gen. Charles Jacoby, Department of the Army, “CFC-A AO Detainee Operations: Report of Inspection,” June 25, 2004, http://action.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/061906/JacobyReport.pdf (accessed June 15, 2011);
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “US Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,” Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004, http://intelligence.senate.gov/108301.pdf (accessed June 14, 2011);
Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba, Department of the Army, “Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade,” May 2004, http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/TR3.pdf, (accessed June 14, 2011);
Lt. Gen. Paul T. Mikolashek, Department of the Army, “Detainee Operations Inspection,” Department of the Army Inspector General, July 21, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/iraq/abughraib/detaineereport.pdf (accessed June 21, 2011) (“The Mikolashek Report”);
Maj. Gen. George R. Fay, Department of the Army, “AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade,” and LTG Anthony R. Jones, Department of the Army, “AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade,” August 23, 2004, http://www.defense.gov/news/aug2004/d20040825fay.pdf (accessed June 21, 2011) (“Fay/Jones Report”);
James R. Schlesinger, Department of Defense, “Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations,” August 24, 2004, http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf (accessed June 21, 2011) (“Schlesinger Report”);
Brig. Gen. Richard P. Formica, Department of the Army, “Article 15-6 Investigation of CJS-OTF-AP and 5th SF Group Detention Operations,” November 8, 2004, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/OathBetrayed/Formica%20Report.pdf (accessed June 21, 2011) (“Formica Report”); and
Army Brig. Gen. John Furlow and Air Force Lt. Gen. Randall M. Schmidt, “Army Regulation 15-6: Final Report: Investigation into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility,” April 1, 2005 (amended June 9, 2005), http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2005/d20050714report.pdf (accessed June 21, 2011).
[11] Senate Committee of Armed Services, “Report on Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in US Custody,” November 20, 2008, http://armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/Detainee%20Report%20Final_April%2022%202009.pdf (accessed June 21, 2011) (“SASC Report”).
[12] US Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, “A Review of the FBI’s Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan and Iraq,” May 2008, http://www.aclu.org/national-security/justice-department-office-inspector-general-review-fbis-involvement-and-observatio (accessed June 21, 2011) (“DOJ I-G Report”).
[13] US Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility, “Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s use of ‘Enhanced Interrogation Techniques’ on Suspected Terrorists,” July 29, 2009, http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf (accessed June 21, 2011) (“OPR Investigation”).
[14] International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Regional Delegation for United States and Canada, “ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody,” February 2007, http://www.nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/22/icrc-report.pdf (accessed June 15, 2011).
[15] Human Rights Watch also endorses, without repeating here, its 2005 conclusions regarding Lt. Gen. Sanchez and Maj. Gen. Miller. See Human Rights Watch, Getting Away with Torture? Command Responsibility for the US Abuse of Detainees,” vol. 17, no. 1 (G), April 2005, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/04/23/getting-away-torture-0.
[16] The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9-11 Commission) was an independent, bipartisan commission created by legislation in late 2002 to prepare an account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks, http://www.9-11commission.gov/ (accessed June 15, 2011).