#NeverForget: Sixteen Years into the “War on Terror” and Institutionalized Islamophobia Lives on

#NeverForget: Sixteen Years into the “War on Terror” and Institutionalized Islamophobia Lives on

#NeverForget: Sixteen Years into the “War on Terror” and Institutionalized Islamophobia Lives on

By : Maha Hilal

September 2017 marked the sixteenth anniversary of the start of the “war on terror.” While hashtags such as #NeverForget and #September11th were trending on Twitter, there was little mention of the victims of post-9/11 counter-terrorism laws and policies – namely, Muslims or those racialized as Muslims. This is because the term “post-9/11 world” is meant to center on the devastation and destruction faced by the United States on 11 September 2001. It does not acknowledge how the United States adopted a hegemonic posture of victimhood that allowed it (and still allows it) to legitimize the most brutal of policies, under the guise of “fighting terrorism.”

President Donald Trump’s speech on the sixteenth anniversary of 9/11 made this point clear when he stated, “on that day, not only did the world change, but we all changed. Our eyes were opened to the depths of the evil we face.” The evil that Trump referred to, however, is not about the unique ways that Muslims have been maligned, targeted, and dehumanized, domestically and around the world. These experiences of US state violence have been made possible and driven by the fact that Muslims’ lives are meaningless in the “war on terror.”

Muslim communities have suffered consequences ranging from surveillance to detention and even death. Physicians for Social Responsibility estimated that 1.3 million people have died in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan in the course of the “war on terror.” Meanwhile, so-called communication management units—where federal prison inmates are barred from virtually all contact with the outside world and other inmates—were built and used to warehouse Muslim prisoners. At one point, over sixty percent of inmates housed in them were Muslim, despite that Muslims make up just six percent of the prison system. In the even more extreme Guantánamo Bay prison, that number rises to one hundred percent.

Guantánamo Bay prison is a particularly cruel site of violence. At present, forty-one prisoners remained detained. Several of these prisoners have been subjected to the farcical semblance of justice that the military commissions have been designed to uphold; this includes an institutionalized lack of due process rights, admission of hearsay evidence, and surveillance of attorney-client discussions. A fair trial for those being prosecuted in this system is impossible.

However, this is not even the worst of Guantánamo, where at least nine Muslim men have died in US custody, seven by suicide. One of these men, Adnan Latif, was a 32-year-old Yemeni citizen who had spent eleven years behind bars at Guantánamo, even though he was cleared for release three times. Though questions remain about the government’s claim that he committed suicide, Latif suffered from serious mental health conditions. “Anybody who is able to die will be able to achieve happiness for himself,” he wrote in a parting letter to his attorney. “He has no other hope except that.”

But those who are released often fare no better than those still detained. Take the case of Lutfi Bin Ali, a Tunisian citizen who spent thirteen years in Guantánamo only to be released to Kazakhstan. Despite the fact that Bin Ali was subjected to egregious torture at the hands of the US government, he has expressed an eagerness to return to Guantánamo rather than face the isolation in his host country, where he knows no one. “At least in Guantánamo there were people to talk to,” he told the Guardian last September. “Here I have nobody.” For this former prisoner, the hell that he knew was better than the hell that he didn’t.

In 2014, the Senate Committee on Intelligence released the executive summary of its six-thousand-plus page report on the CIA’s Rendition, Interrogation and Detention program. This report presented, in great detail, the abuse that prisoners had suffered in CIA custody. The torture included rectal feeding, prolonged sleep deprivation, and waterboarding, among other tactics. Despite these horrific acts of torture, shortly after the report was released, the Washington Post/ABC News conducted a poll with a random sample of one thousand people which included the following questions:

Q: Which of these statements comes closer to your own opinion: It was wrong to release this report because it may raise the risk of terrorism by increasing anti-American sentiment OR It was right to release this report in order to expose what happened and prevent it in the future?

Over half the population sampled responded that it was wrong to release the report because it may raise the risk of terrorism by increasing anti-American sentiment. Thus, those responding were not concerned about the fact that the government had committed torture, but only that revealing these facts would spark anger from the Muslim community. In other words, accountability for abuses is conditional on our safety and security, even though it is the United States that perpetrated violence in the first place. 

Going back further, in 2004, when the Abu Ghraib torture scandal emerged–which served as many people’s first introduction to the violent infrastructure of torture in the “war on terror,” conservative commentator Rush Limbaugh stated, in response to the horrific photos of abuse, that, “They are the ones who are perverted. They are the ones who are dangerous. They are the ones who are subhuman. They are the ones who are human debris, not the United States of America and not our soldiers and not our prison guards.”

Limbaugh’s words might seem extreme, but their sentiments epitomize the logic of the “war on terror” which involves a cyclical process through which Muslims are dehumanized and their dehumanization subsequently turned into justification for abuse.

Torture and imprisonment have come to define the Muslim experience in the “war on terror.” So too have the endless wars in the Middle East, of which Muslims remain the primary targets. In June 2017, the Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve Monthly Civilian Casualty Report stated that it was likely that there had been 484 “unintentional” civilian deaths from coalition strikes in Iraq and Syria. Never mind the fact that this number was likely grossly understated when compared to sources such as AirWars or the fact that missile strikes can never really only target alleged terrorists. The word “unintentional” is used to specifically evade accountability–albeit through a complex process that positions faux transparency. Regardless of the language used, accountability for crimes perpetrated against Muslims in the current political sphere seems as unlikely as ever before. 

Drone warfare raises key questions about accountability. During the Obama administration, drone strikes became the strategic cornerstone of the ongoing “war on terror.” Anwar Al-Awlaki, a US citizen, was assassinated without due process of any kind. Perhaps more strikingly is the death of Awlaki’s sixteen-year-old son, who was killed in a drone strike two weeks after his father. When asked to justify Abdurrahman Al-Awlaki’s death, former White House press secretary Robert Gibbs said, “I would suggest that you should have a far more responsible father if they are truly concerned about the well-being of their children. I don’t think becoming an al Qaeda jihadist terrorist is the best way to go about doing your business.”  In other words, the rationale of collective responsibility extends to minors if they are Muslim–and can literally justify their death. 

The use of drones, critical to Obama’s counterterrorism strategy, has only increased under President Trump. Whereas the Obama administration engaged in drone strikes every 5.4 days, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trump administration has escalated their use to once every 1.25 days. Furthermore, government estimates of civilian deaths are often consistently and significantly lower than NGO monitoring organizations. For example, while the US government estimated that there had been between 64 and 116 deaths by drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya between January 2009 and December 2015, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s estimate was exponentially higher—between 380 and 801 civilian deaths. These deaths, regardless of the exact number, are merely seen as collateral damage—a term used to whitewash war crimes by positioning deaths as “unintended.”

The system of oppression that underlies the treatment of Muslims in the “war on terror” is that of Islamophobia.  I define Islamophobia as a phenomenon meant to articulate contrived hate of Muslims that is built into structures of the state and society for the pursuit of power and the justification of war and repression. Islamophobia securitizes Muslims based on the social construction of Islam as violent, barbaric, uncivilized, and opposed to normative democratic values. It positions Muslims as existing outside of the moral boundaries extended to other communities such that they are allowed to be dehumanized, with their dehumanization resulting in consequences ranging from prejudice and discrimination to detention, torture, and even death.   Intersectional identities of Muslims along various racial, ethnic, cultural, and linguistic lines make the source of Islamophobia difficult to distinctly isolate. However, Islamophobia represents a particular type of oppression as it operates at the nexus of anti-Muslim religious animus and racism, cultural racism, nationalism, and xenophobia. Islamophobia is maintained and perpetuated by white supremacy which upholds notions of dichotomous ideological values between the “West” and Islam.

This definition anchors several key concepts that I want to highlight in order to articulate a cumulative summary of how Muslims have been targeted in the “war on terror” through institutionalized Islamophobia.  The first is dehumanization.

Dehumanization is at the core of the treatment towards Muslims and performs a particular function in sanctioning abuse. To illustrate this point, Aldous Huxley, a prominent English writer, delivered a speech around the time of rising fascism in  Europe in 1936 in which he said, “Most people would hesitate to torture or kill a human being like themselves. But when that human being is spoken of as though he were not a human being, but as the representative of some wicked principle, we lose our scruples….All political and nationalist propaganda aims at only one thing; to persuade one set of people that another set of people are not really human and that it is therefore legitimate to rob, swindle, bully and even murder them.” This is a particularly relevant statement in understanding the fate of Muslims in the “war on terror.” Muslim humanity is positioned as subjective, allowing not only for justified abuse, but also a lack of accountability.

Two other and related concepts are moral boundaries and moral exclusion. Susan Opotow, who developed the theory of moral exclusion, says that it occurs “when individuals or groups are perceived as outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply. Those who are excluded are perceived as nonentities, expendable, or undeserving.  Consequently, harming or exploiting them appears to be appropriate, acceptable, or just.” This is why the horrible abuses at Abu Ghraib happened, why Guantánamo Bay is still in existence, and why there is massive support from both the state and society at large to discriminate against and harm Muslims. Muslims are not regarded as being within “our” moral communities; they exist only as dangerous adjuncts.   

Finally, the concept of securitization is essential to the functioning of institutional Islamophobia. Muslim lives become pawns of the state, only seen in security terms. Their lives and liberty depend exclusively on how the state mediates their importance to our national security. Muslim bodies, therefore, are simply a means to an end.

In Frames of War: When is Life Grievable, Judith Butler writes: “One way of posing the question of who ‘we’ are in these times of war is by asking whose lives are considered valuable, whose lives are mourned, and whose lives are considered ungrievable. We might think of war as dividing populations into those who are grievable and those who are not. An ungrievable life is one that cannot be mourned because it has never lived, that is, it has never counted as a life at all. We can see the division of the globe into grievable and ungrievable lives from the perspective of those who wage war in order to defend the lives of certain communities, and to defend them against the lives of others—even if it means taking those latter lives.”

The question that emerges clearly and forcefully is one of justice. What does justice for Muslims mean in the face of US state violence?  The answer, as you can imagine, is complex, but it is certain that endless wars, militarism, and intervention will not bring justice. Justice for Muslims would require the dismantling of institutionalized Islamophobia in all its facets. This dismantlement is necessary for Muslims to realize religious freedom, and to entitle them to equal protections of the law. Justice for Muslims means that they are incorporated within the bounds of law, not outside of it. Justice for Muslims means liberation from the global system of Islamophobia that allowed the “war on terror” to target Muslims around the world. Justice for Muslims also means swift accountability– after all, justice delayed is justice denied. 

The Un-Islamic State

Since the Islamic State (IS) movement seized control of Iraq’s second city of Mosul in early June 2014 it has achieved unprecedented levels of success in Iraq and Syria, seized territory in Lebanon, and expanded to the border regions of most surrounding states. As a result the international community, which had virtually forgotten about Iraq and was growing increasingly uninterested in Syria, put these conflicts back at the top of its agenda virtually overnight. The U.S. is once again engaged in hostilities in Iraq and considering direct, less covert means of involvement in Syria, as are a number of its partners. Regional governments, which had previously seen the IS as either a distant threat or useful proxy, seem to be overcoming their differences to confront what is perceived to be a common and growing challenge.

Much has been written about the IS’s genesis, ideology, objectives and practices. Most of these characterize it as
a puritanical movement that represents either an extremist incarnation of Islamic orthodoxy or a radical distortion of it. The more pertinent observation that the IS represents a thoroughly modern project and that explanations for its existence are primarily to be found in the political landscape in which it operates rather than Islamic theology is less frequently made.

Origins and Development of the IS Movement

The IS’s roots are located in the 2003 U.S. occupation of Iraq and the Syrian crisis a decade later. The U.S. administration in Iraq systematically dismantled the Iraqi state and its institutions and replaced them with a sectarian political system and conflict that reproduced itself throughout government institutions. Unsurprisingly, Iraqi politics gradually came to be dominated by fundamentally incompatible identity-based political forces rather than national ones competing on the basis of different political programs. While the supremacy of Islamist parties among the disenfranchised Sunni community was not a foregone conclusion, the increasingly religious milieu of the Arab world in recent decades, the increasingly Islamist character of opposition politics in the region (both of which are to some extent a legacy of the cold war), and the prominence of Islamist militias in the struggle against both the occupation and the new regime in Baghdad contributed to these parties’ ascendancy.

Similar dynamics were at work in the ranks of the armed Syrian opposition in the period 2011-13, where – as in Iraq – those with the most effective military forces also obtained the greater share of foreign funding, weapons and skilled cadres. Locally, endemic socioeconomic decay, particularly rampant youth unemployment and its debilitating impact on individual lives; a deep-seated sense of perpetual injustice; and the opportunity to redress these realities while simultaneously affirming a sense of self-worth and improved opportunities – all with a bit of adventure thrown in – ensured a steady supply of recruits.

What made Iraq and Syria, rather than more conservative societies like Jordan and Saudi Arabia or polarized polities like Lebanon and Palestine conducive to the emergence of such movements was the withdrawal and in some regions collapse of the state. A similar process can be observed today in Libya and, to a lesser extent, Yemen. Indeed, the breakdown of central authority and the absence of national institutions with sufficient legitimacy to address grievances and mediate political conflict have not only empowered subnational phenomena like sectarianism and tribalism as social defense mechanisms, but provided militias adopting such agendas with the space to develop and opportunity to expand.

Nevertheless, this does not explain why the IS in particular succeeded where others failed – or, rather, was able to seize the initiative and dominate or eliminate so many of its competitors. Here ideology and the particular variant of Islam promulgated by the IS are largely negligible factors. Rather, this phenomenon can primarily be attributed to the movement’s thoroughly contemporary rather than atavistic modus operandi. Firstly (and unlike so many of its competitors, whose raison d’etre is confrontation with the state, or what might be called a conventional guerrilla insurgency), from the outset the IS – as its name suggests – has pursued a strategy of establishing and consolidating a political entity in regions where the former state no longer functions or can be expelled. It is in this respect a fundamentally political rather than religious project – even though the IS insists the two are inseparable.

Secondly – and closely related to the first – the IS strategy has focused on obtaining the resources and means required to function as a state. For it, control of territory; the provision of governance, administration and services; and the regulation of society and the economy are core functions. Territorial expansion is not prioritized and pursued for its own sake as with many of its competitors, but rather pursued only when there is a reasonable prospect that such territory can be integrated, defended and governed. While the IS’s proclamation of a caliphate in late June 2014 was motivated by a host of factors, not least among them a determination to settle accounts with al-Qaeda, subordinate other participants in the Iraqi Sunni rebellion and Syrian armed opposition to its will, and, of course, capitalize on its spectacular successes of the previous months, its willingness to take a step eschewed by similar movements reflects the reality that statehood is germane to the IS project.

The IS Movement: Strategy and Objectives

Much has been written about the background to the IS’s recent sudden expansion and the interplay in this respect between the Syrian and Iraqi arenas, and there has been an equal amount of speculation about where it might seek to expand next. Its current response to the latter question – i.e. Arbil, the capital of the Kurdish region of Iraq – seems in light of the consequences somewhat out of character. Unless, that is, speculation is correct that it deliberately sought to provoke Western intervention in order to profit from direct conflict in the knowledge that the U.S. and its allies lack the will to repeat the invasion of Iraq and the means to defeat it in Syria. To the question “Baghdad or Damascus?” the response is almost certainly “neither”. The former is too heavily defended, the latter too distant, and both are the seats of central authority.

A no less interesting question is whether the recent vast expansion of IS territory, and therefore of assets at potential risk, might motivate the movement to deal more pragmatically with the world around it and perhaps even attempt to come to informal or other understandings with adversaries to enable it to consolidate its position and govern more effectively. In this respect some have looked to Lebanon’s Hizbullah and more recently the Palestinian organization Hamas as examples of radical, armed Islamist movements that have either achieved or seek conventional forms of legitimacy after attaining significant political power and the responsibilities of governance. An initial informal non-aggression pact between the IS and Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), which allowed the latter to seize Kirkuk and expand its territory by some 40% while the IS consolidated its hold on Iraq’s Arab Sunni heartland, seemed to suggest this could be a possibility.

Yet the IS is fundamentally different in character and agenda from these other movements, and to extrapolate IS policies on the basis of the trajectory of other militant Islamists would be akin to inferring Khmer Rouge conduct from the record of the Bolsheviks after they established the Soviet Union. The tacit alliance with Iraq’s Kurds was thus exceptionally short-lived and no more stable than the IS’s periods of coexistence with other elements of the Syrian armed opposition. To return to the Soviet analogy, the brief dalliance with the KRG might be compared to the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, although the IS’s strategic calculations in this instance more closely reflect those ascribed to Hitler, with the KRG fulfilling the role of Stalin.

Perhaps the greatest irony of the IS phenomenon is that its vision of an Islamic state that correctly applies the pristine and unadulterated practices its leaders ascribe to the religion’s inaugural practitioners would almost certainly be disavowed by the latter as a monumental parody. Indeed, from what is known about the statecraft of the Prophet, Muhammad and the first caliphs, they would in all likelihood have rather quickly run afoul of the IS’s caliphate. No less importantly, the fulfillment of the IS’s program requires the systematic dismantling (and in too many cases the physical demolition) of 14 centuries of Islamic civilization and tradition.

Few of the ideas promulgated by the IS are without theological foundation, nor are its practices entirely without precedent. Nevertheless, it can hardly claim to be rooted in well-established Muslim tradition or jurisprudence and should therefore be primarily understood as a thoroughly modern interpretation and application of a faith whose imagined past is a projection backwards of contemporary agendas rather than a revival of early Islamic rule. The IS’s reclamation of Islam’s essence is thus on a par with the Khmer Rouge’s insistence that it represented the pure soul of communism.

Similar to the Khmer Rouge, and returning once again to the comparison with other Islamist movements, IS brand- ing is in significant part based on a categorical rejection of either compromise or concession to an imperfect world, or a gradualist approach to achieving its objectives.

The pragmatism and interaction with existing states and institutions exhibited by other Islamist movements is therefore something the IS has condemned not only when in opposition, but more importantly after achieving power. Although the movement derives its theological roots from 18th-century Wahhabi doctrines that serve as the state ideology of Saudi Arabia and have for several decades been energetically disseminated throughout the Muslim world, the IS rejects the Saudi state as a distortion of Wahhabi tenets.

As attested by the rapidity and ferocity with which the IS has eliminated the presence of minorities in areas under its rule, suppressed erstwhile Sunni allies in Iraq and Syria, and criminalized tradition and local custom, initial post- combat statements reassuring populations under its control that their rights would be respected pursuant to traditional Islamic practice have proven to be nothing more than a tactic to encourage a false sense of security and thus prevent the premature emergence of significant resistance to its designs.

Conclusion: Future Prospects

Under the circumstances the assumption that history is on the verge of repeating itself and that the IS will be removed much as its Iraqi precursor led by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi was defeated by foreign-sponsored local forces seems to be far-fetched. The IS movement is no longer a clandestine insurgent group that can be evicted by stronger militias and prevented from resurrection by internal security forces, but – not unlike the KRG – an increasingly conventional military force that can only be dislodged by taking physical control of its fiefdom. The coalition that occupied Iraq in 2003 appears to have little appetite for a rematch, and should its position change it is inconceivable that a renewed foreign occupation of Iraq will not make an already catastrophic situation more so.

Additionally, the IS appears to have rather methodically put to sleep most of the leaders of the previous Awakening movement and potential kingpins of a new one. This notwithstanding, mechanisms to empower a cowed population to assert itself without exposing its members to mass slaughter need to be examined. On a related note, the risk that any operation to suppress the IS will degenerate into a sectarian campaign to blunt Sunni aspirations has already been realized and needs to be addressed. In the current highly polarized environment, subcontracting Iraqi national security functions to sectarian Shia militias is a particularly dangerous approach that is liable to have a lasting disastrous impact.

Secondly, as many analysts have pointed out, there is a fundamental contradiction in Western policy towards Iraq and Syria. Seeking to strengthen the government opposed to the IS in Iraq while acting to weaken its counterpart in Syria may serve any variety of policy objectives, but defeating the IS is not one of them. Similarly, given the near-apocalyptic perceptions of the IS that have gripped Western capitals in recent months, the approach of continued demurral and deflection concerning the extent to which the policies of regional allies have empowered and assisted IS needs to be revised. One might also note that complacency towards the propagation of takfiri thought– the Islamic counterpart of George W. Bush’s belief that one is “either with us or with the terrorists” – is particularly hazardous, given the heterogeneous societies of the Levant and Iraq.

In the short term there are no easy responses to the challenges posed by the IS. Military containment may succeed, but to do so it needs to be led by local and regional forces rather than those who have already brought Iraq to the brink of dissolution. Even limited U.S. military intervention is likely to bolster the IS at least as much as it weakens it. Secondly, policy towards the Syrian crisis requires a comprehensive review. One need not endorse the Assad regime’s brutal policies or assist with their implementation in order to recognize that the regime is

a reality in the Middle East that will continue to exist at least until a political transition commences in Syria.
Those who freely treat with Omar Bashir, Nouri al-Maliki, Binyamin Netanyahu and Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi lack persuasive grounds for rejecting engagement with Bashar al-Assad on matters of common concern.

Thirdly, neighboring states need to be dealt with as participants in a potential solution rather than part of an existing problem. This applies equally to Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, who, along with others, should be encouraged – and if necessary pressured – to revise policies that enable and empower the IS by design or default.

Finally – and crucially – political transition must be actively pursued, not only in Syria, where it has been reduced to a slogan for regime change, if not regime suicide, but equally in Iraq. Only the emergence of institutions enjoying sufficient popular – and not necessarily electoral –legitimacy can address deep-seated grievances and peacefully resolve the conflicts that allow movements such as the IS to thrive, and thereby reassert governance and authority on a national scale that ultimately forms the only durable solution to this challenge.

[This article was first published by NOREF - The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center.]