[The following is the latest from Open Society Foundations` Regional Policy Initiative on Afghanistan and Pakistan on night raids in Afghanistan.]
Executive Summary
Nighttime kill and capture operations (“night raids”) by international military have been one of the most controversial tactics in Afghanistan. They are as valued by the international military as they are reviled by Afghan communities. Night raids have been associated with the death, injury, and detention of civilians, and have sparked enormous backlash among Afghan communities. The Afghan government and the Afghan public have repeatedly called for an end to night raids. International military say they have addressed many of the past concerns with night raids, including improved intelligence and conduct. They argue that night raids are a way to reduce civilian casualties and are an essential part of their military strategy.
The Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office published an in depth study of night raids in February 2010. Since that time, some night raids practices have improved, but the overall number of night raids has multiplied, bringing this divisive practice into more Afghan homes. This policy paper will summarize the impact of these changes from both a human rights and a policy perspective.
Increased night raids spark backlash
The number of night raids has skyrocketed: publicly available statistics suggest a fivefold increase between February 2009 and December 2010. International military conducted, on average, 19 night raids per night—a total of 1700 night raids—in the threemonth period from roughly December 2010 to February 2011, according to the NATOled International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF has not released more up-todate figures; however, interviews conducted for this report suggest a continuing trend of large numbers of night raids, possibly at even higher rates. In April 2011, a senior U.S. military advisor told the Open Society Foundations that as many as 40 raids might take place on a given night across Afghanistan.
International military officials argue that the increase in night raids has been their most successful strategy in the last year, although they have offered no evidence to support these claims. They argue that absent the ability to continue night raids, insurgent attacks would increase significantly. However, these touted gains have come at a high cost. The escalation in raids has taken the battlefield more directly into Afghan homes, sparking tremendous backlash among the Afghan population. The Afghan government calls the raids counter-productive to reconciliation efforts with insurgent groups, and a threat to Afghan sovereignty, given the limited Afghan control of night raids. Complaints over night raids have marred Afghan relations with international partners, particularly the United States, and have complicated long-term strategic partnership discussions.
Impact of the tactical directives and other policy reforms
ISAF has repeatedly rejected demands by the Afghan government and public to reduce or cease night raids altogether, and instead has focused on addressing some of the most common complaints about night raids practices. ISAF has issued two night raids tactical directives since the beginning of 2010, as well as other operational guidance. This guidance has resulted in significant improvements including reduced risk of civilian casualties, greater accuracy in selecting targets, reduced property damage, increased use of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and more respectful treatment of women.
However, many of these improvements have been undermined or overshadowed by the surge in night raids. Although intelligence improvements have reduced mistaken night raids on civilian homes, the increased number and scope of night raids put many more civilians at risk than past intelligence flaws ever did. Many more activities may lead individuals to be detained in night raids, including the provision of food or shelter (under duress or not). In many cases, non-combatants appear to be subjected to night raids due to their proximity to insurgent activities, or incidental information about insurgent groups, rather than due to their actual conduct or status. As a result, far more non-combatants are detained in a year. Though the majority of non-combatants are soon released, the experience may result in lasting physical, financial, and emotional harm. International military typically release individuals by first handing them over to Afghan custody, where they can suffer poor conditions or even abuse rising to the level of torture.
In addition, although civilian casualties have been reduced significantly, they still occur, many as a result of mistaken interpretations of “hostile intent.” Further, the increase in the number of raids has not been matched by strengthened accountability or redress mechanisms, such that when wrongful or mistaken detention or civilian casualties do occur, there is often no meaningful response by ISAF. The lack of transparency or strong accountability mechanisms have reinforced Afghan perceptions that international military use night raids to kill, harass, and intimidate civilians with impunity.
Finally, ISAF has made significant efforts to try to satisfy 1) Afghan government complaints about not having control over night raids, and 2) Afghan community requests that international forces take greater account of cultural sensitivities about women’s privacy. However, these reforms have done little to alter Afghan opposition to night raids. In some cases, this is because the measures were under-implemented or did not go far enough. The larger failing, though, has been that these reforms are an inadequate substitute for Afghans’ demands that night raids be significantly reduced, if not halted altogether: demands that are regularly echoed by the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai.
Are night raids worth it?
Without more transparency or supporting evidence, it is difficult to balance the purported benefits of night raids with their very real and obvious costs. What is clear, however, is that tactical and operational tweaks to night raids practices are not enough to counter dissatisfaction with the practice as a whole. Although significant improvements have been made in the conduct of night raids, public recognition of these improvements has been overshadowed by mounting anger over the higher number of raids. Given the extreme opposition by both the Afghan public and the Afghan administration, the current pace of night raids is not sustainable. While militant extremist groups pose an enormous threat to human rights and security in Afghanistan, the human, political, and strategic costs illustrated by this policy review raise questions about whether over-reliance on night raids is the most effective long-term strategy for effectively countering militancy.
Recommendations to ISAF and U.S. Forces
1. Cease raids that do not discriminate between combatants and civilians; ensure that night raids, which are military operations, are only used against combatants or civilians directly participating in hostilities.
2. Ensure that night operations—in particular mass detention operations at night—target individuals based on their presumed status as a combatant, rather than based on their age, gender, nationality, ethnicity, tribal affiliation, or the geographic area in which they live.
3. Ensure night raids and other night-time military operations are not used as substitutes for criminal proceedings or other methods of intelligence gathering. Ensure that operations that aim to detain non-combatants adhere to law enforcement standards governing the use of force.
4. Implement tactical directive guidance to consider alternative methods of detention wherever possible. Detentions that adhere to regular law enforcement practices are preferred in areas where there is strong government control, or other areas in which Afghan partners have strong capacity to conduct more regular law enforcement detentions.
5. Continue to enforce existing guidance on night raids that have resulted in reduced civilian casualties and improved conduct.
6. Improve outreach and consultation with local communities to the extent possible, before and after night raids.
7. Improve transparency over the criteria for when night raids may be used (as opposed to other means of detention) and over the conduct of night raids themselves. Reinforce accountability measures, including ways for families to find out information about those detained, and the status of investigations into allegations of civilian casualties.
8. Improve compensation standards and procedures with regard to night raids, including compensation for wrongful detention.
9. Work with ANSF to improve their conduct and accountability, in particular with Afghan Special Forces, whose role in night raids may become more prominent after transition.
10. Ensure that Afghan militias or other irregular forces are not used in night raids given their lack of mandate, weak accountability, and history of abuse.
[Click here to read the full Open Society Foundations report.]