In 2007, in response to a request by the 2005 Lebanese government, the United Nations (UN) Security Council established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). Based in the Netherlands, the STL seeks to prosecute those responsible for the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and twenty-two others on 14 February 2005, as well as for a select number of other attempted assassinations in Lebanon between 2004 and 2006. Though Lebanon and the UN established the STL by treaty, the Lebanese parliament never ratified it due to political divisions. This prompted then Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to send a letter to then UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon that included a petition with the signatures of seventy Lebanese MPs, asking the UN to establish the STL. The tribunal was then created after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1757 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which governs UN actions with respect to threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression. The STL has a renewable three-year mandate which is up for renewal in February 2012.
The STL released its initial indictment, targeting four members of Hizbollah, in June 2011. As Lebanese authorities have been unable to detain these individuals, preparations are underway for a trial in absentia. The tribunal has become a lightening rod for criticism, given several well-publicized leaks, evidence of politicized actions, false arrest, its destabilizing effect on fragile Lebanese politics, and the charged geopolitical context surrounding the proceedings.
In the lecture below, sponsored by the American University of Beirut`s Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs (IFI), Omar Nashabe, a criminal justice expert, columnist, and founder of the Research Unit at Al-Akhbar newspaper, and Nidal Jurdi, AUB lecturer in international law and organizations, discuss whether the STL is a case of international justice or international intervention? Karim Makdisi, AUB international politics professor and IFI`s associate director, moderated the discussion.
Jurdi considered the STL a step towards bringing international justice and ending impunity and Nashabe considered the Special Tribunal as an unwanted form of international intervention that relied on selective justice and posed a threat to Lebanese sovereignty.
Despite some shortcomings, “the STL remains a model for fair trial and procedural guarantees,” said Jurdi, “and will contribute in the long run to end impunity and create a culture of rule of law in Lebanon and a legacy for establishing truth and accountability.”
When Makdisi asked him if he thought this long-term gain was worth the strain on the Lebanese political system and people, Jurdi answered affirmatively.
“Will it contribute to re-establishing the rule of law in Lebanon?” countered Nashabe. “Will it be the beginning of granting everyone access to justice in Lebanon? Or is it just a one-time case, a heavily politicized selective matter to serve the interests of international powers?”
Some Key Points Discussed
• Jurdi: The STL was created because Lebanon was pervaded with a culture of impunity and lacked the mechanisms for truth seeking and reconciliation, in addition to the incapacity and unwillingness of the Lebanese judiciary – the natural authority in this scenario – to prosecute this case. For Jurdi, the legal nature of the STL began as a treaty-based “hybrid” following Lebanon’s request to the UN, but it eventually became “international” and based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
• Nashabe: The STL is an example of selective justice, given Lebanon’s history of political assassinations, starting with Riad Solh in 1951 and continuing throughout the civil war, Israeli invasions and even beyond ex-PM Hariri’s assassination in 2005. Yet, none of these other assassinations—even those that were carried out post-2005—had prompted an international tribunal. Ironically, a number of the amnestied Lebanese militia leaders some of whom had “savagely killed entire families,” were the first to support the STL, noted Nashabe.
• Jurdi: Although the crime only killed twenty-two people, its gravity was such that it could still be considered a threat to international security and peace, hence justifying UN action. Moreover, the tribunal was created at the request of Lebanon.
• Nashabe: Resorting to Chapter VII of the UN Charter is only justified in such cases when severe human rights violations take place—not the case in this political assassination. He alluded to the case of former Pakistani leader Benazir Bhutto who was assassinated after Hariri, but where no UN tribunal was formed. Moreover, the STL was created by the UN Security Council whose motives and voting process are heavily influenced by politics, not international justice. This compromises Lebanese sovereignty since, he said, it bypasses the Lebanese Constitution.
• Jurdi and Nashabe: The tribunal adheres to international criminal law to prosecute a domestic crime which poses a complexity.
• Jurdi and Nashabe acknowledged that the tribunal and its precursor, the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) whose mandate was limited to finding facts and assisting the Lebanese government in investigations from April 2005 to February 2009, both suffered from practical and logistical problems. Jurdi noted that practical problems for UNIIIC members included being confined to their headquarters in Monte Verde due to national insecurity, which led to high turnover in its staff, thus delaying the investigation process and increasing the possibility of information leaks. Nashabe questioned the professional and ethical standards of both UNIIIC and the STL , noting for example that former UNIIIC commissioner Detlev Mehlis had leaked the names of twenty-five witnesses, including Gibran Tueni who was assassinated six months after the disclosure. Mehlis was never held accountable, Nashabe said. For Jurdi, since the tribunal was UN-mandated, staff members who breached confidentiality clauses could only be reprimanded administratively, such as having their contracts terminated, but are not subject to legal or criminal penalty.
• Jurdi noted that the STL and UNIIIC suffered from legal complexities. For instance, he said, it was unclear who had the authority to prosecute witnesses who give false testimonies as neither the STL nor Lebanese law has a mandate in this matter. Nashabe agreed , noting also that the four Lebanese officers who were arbitrarily detained for four years in connection with the crime were denied access to justice and to information that would help their defense.
• Jurdi considered that both UNIIIC and STL failed in their outreach to the Lebanese population to raise awareness about their activities, noting that perception of justice was vital to such cases.
• Nashabe proposed several actions that would “contribute to local ownership of the international judicial mechanism,” including the formation of a high commission of Lebanese and international judges that would monitor the STL. He also proposed that a truth and reconciliation commission could be established to account for the many thousands of ordinary Lebanese killed, injured or that remain missing from the civil war period, arguing that access to justice is the fundamental right of all citizens, not just the political elite.