On Friday December 10, 2010, Jordanian and international media reported on “clashes” after a football match between two teams that make up the biggest rivalry in the Jordanian Football Association (JFA): al-Faysali and al-Wihdat, both of which serve as the main recruiting pools for Jordan’s national team. Popular support for each of the teams is at least as indicative of political allegiances as it is of football appreciation. The al-Faysali team has popularly come to represent Jordanians of East Bank origin while the al-Wihdat team has similarly come to represent Jordanians of Palestinian origin (also known as Jordanians of West Bank). While the incident itself speaks to several dynamics that animate Jordanian history and politics, the response of government officials and a variety of public commentators (ranging from semi-official newspapers to independent bloggers) are equally, if not more, revealing about contemporary political discourse in Jordan.
The facts that everyone (including government officials, their supporters, and detractors) agrees on are as follows: the score at the end of the match was 1-0 with al-Wihdat winning; the course of the game featured neither interruptions nor incidents by fans and players; both teams returned to their locker rooms and the fans began to exit the stadium. However – and it is not clear whether this is tradition or a policy implemented at this particular game (there have been conflicting reports in the media) – the fans of al-Faysali (the losing team) exited the stadium first. Before al-Wihdat fans began to exit the stadium, rocks and other items were hurled into the stadium from the outside. At a certain point, the Jordanian Gendarmerie Force (Darak in Arabic) began attacking the al-Wihdat fans that remained in the stadium, which led to a stampede towards the fence separating the fans from the field. Eventually, the fence collapsed. Soon after, confrontations occurred outside of the stadium, which featured fans of both teams throwing rocks at each other as well as Darak attacks on the fans. By the end, between 140 and 250 people were injured, including a few members of the Darak.
While fan violence has been part and parcel of this rivalry throughout the years, many commentators have described the December 10 affair as the most dramatic given the number of those injured. Why were fans of a particular team let out first? Who was throwing debris from outside the stadium into it? Why did the Darak begin attacking the al-Wihdat fans inside the stadium? How did clashes between fans outside of the stadium begin? And what was the role of the Darak outside of the stadium? These are all questions that form the contentious facts of the incidents.
Both the Ministry of Interior (MI) and the Jordan Football Association (JFA) have created committees charged with investigating the incidents following the December 10 football match. Nevertheless, one cannot expect much from either committee given the interests they both represent. The MI’s committee is headed by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Interior and is comprised of “senior officials” from the MI as well as the Governor of Amman. The JFA’s committee – though supervised by the Vice President of the JFA – is the result of a directive issued by the President of the JFA, himself a member of the royal family. Thus both committees are closely tied to the regime and government, and both lack the necessary level of independence that a legitimate investigation would require.
More problematic than the lack of government independence are the statements regarding the missions of these committees. Representatives of both committees have stated that their primary task is to look into the “causes” of “the violence.” Throughout the many statements that have been issued, there has been little to no reference of the violence of the Darak. Rather, the focus has been on a nebulous concept of mob violence in reference to the actions of the fans of both teams. Given that the majority of injuries were sustained as a direct result of Darak attacks in the stadium and the stampede it precipitated, it is troubling (to say the least) that the terms “clashes”, “riots”, and “violence” are being deployed in ways that are meant to reference the citizens while excluding the Darak. In one of his statements, the Government Spokesperson, Minister of State, and Deputy Prime Minister (yes, all those positions are held by one person) described what transpired as a tragedy and that the Darak conducted itself from the start of the incident with a “serious and clear approach.”
The aftermath of the incident has featured a polarized discussion throughout the Jordanian media (and more specifically the major liberal newspapers and blogs with January issues of related magazines soon to follow) around the issue of the relationship between Jordanians of East Bank origin and those of West Bank origin. The polarization in this instance centers on whether the actions of the Darak were part of a broader and deliberate policy of violence towards the al-Wihdat fans or whether such actions were void of these implications and were simply a matter of maintaining order amidst the irrational actions of a depoliticized mob. Related points/discussions have included a range of related themes. These include Jordanian-Palestinian relations, the parliamentary election system, and the hiring and promotion policies of the public sector and military.
While I am critical of those who want to dismiss the implication of the December 10 incident in the longer trajectory of relations between Jordanians of East and West Bank origin, I am also critical of what seems to be a general assumption shared by those who appear to be on different sides of the debate. The statements by government officials have emphasized “maintaining security” or “identifying those responsible for violating the laws” and precipitating the “violence”, “riots”, or “clashes” (depending on which term is used). There is much that can be said about continued attempts to frame particular incidents and broader political dynamics as functions of the behavior of the Jordanian population rather than policies and institutions of governance. This is a point I hope to address in a future article.
Non-governmental public discourse, especially amongst liberal writers, have been complicit in this representation. The focus of public discussions has been on whether the violence of the Darak was legitimate crowd control or part of a broader power dynamic between, on the one hand, the regime and Jordanians of East Bank origin and, on the other hand, Jordanians of Palestinian origin. In doing so, the broader structures and policies of overt state violence are effectively rendered invisible. I am not arguing this point in order to belittle or sideline the issue of discriminatory practices (including violence) in Jordan but rather to point to the fact that such practices are enforced by a type of state violence that underlies something much broader than simply the relationship between Jordanians of East and West Bank origin or that between the regime and Jordanians of Palestinian origin. This seems to be a point that is missed by most commentators on the December 10 incident, irrespective of their position on the differential treatment of citizens of different origins in Jordan.
For those championing the rights of Jordanians of Palestinian origin, there seems to be little connection being made between their primary political concerns and a more general violence that is projected against the entire population; a violence that forms a pillar in the consolidation and maintenance of Jordan’s authoritarian system of rule. I believe we should be deeply critical of the incidents of December 10 and make sure to frame them within the longer historical trajectory of relations between different socio-political groups. But equally at stake is something much more than relations between two groups, important as that is. Such relations are embedded in deeper structures of power (both political and economic) that continue to be red lines in “public discussions” and “reform agendas.”
For those who want to argue that the December 10 incident had little do with broader socio-political divides, there seems to be little to no interest in questioning whether – independent of the identity of those who bore the brunt of the Darak’s violence – the Darak’s actions and the response of the government represent acceptable or legitimate policies. After all, it is that same violence that is brought to bear on all those who dare to challenge the the status quo (or are perceived as doing so), irrespective of their identities. There is no shortage of examples of state violence against Jordanians of East Bank origin (for examples, see here and here).
All this is not to say that what happened on December 10 and the discussion that has ensued is void of implication in broader relations between different socio-political groups in Jordan. That, however, will be the focus of a different article; one that tackles the historical legacies of those relations and the problematic attempts to render them invisible.