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How Can Egypt Get From Tahrir Square to Democracy? Lessons from Poland in 1989

[Polish Round Table 1989; Image from Wiki Commons] [Polish Round Table 1989; Image from Wiki Commons]

This article is co-written by Michael Kennedy and Shiva Balaghi

“To Husni Mubarak: leave already. Arabs around the world are trying to sleep,” read a tweet. “Leave already, my hand hurts,” read a sign held up by a man on Cairo’s streets. From Tahrir Square, we hear that protesters are facing a new pressure possibly more strong than the pro-Mubarak thugs set lose on them in recent days. Family members, neighbors and merchants in the Tahrir area are pleading with them to go home already and let life get “back to normal.” The White House has heard the message that Mubarak must go, and must go now. But what next?

On January 25, the very first day of these protests, a young Egyptian put together a montage of photos of the demonstrators and the plain clothes police who were beating them up onto youtube. He ended the short video with a quote from JFK, “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible make violent revolution inevitable.” The intensity of the protests in Cairo and throughout Egypt have had a significant impact and a vicious blowback, but no resolution. Activists have decreed a week of resistance starting Sunday, and many are committed to remaining in Tahrir.

Dangerous stalemates can lead the visionary activists to negotiated revolution. Those in Egypt can take some lesson from what Poles struggled through in 1988-89 where jailers and jailed sat at a round table to figure an exit from crisis.

Strategic concerns and the demands of the people in Tahrir Square are not necessarily at odds with one another. When President Obama came to office, he chose Cairo as the site to express his plans for a new beginning to US relations with the Muslim world. Look closely and listen to Tahrir and you will hear echoing calls for Arab democracy. Tahrir continues to chant with hope for freedom in voices growing tired and frayed but remaining determined.

Neither DC nor Tahrir wants to see an Iranian style revolution where the secular parties (small and unorganized) get subsumed by the more broadly based and organized Islamist elements of the opposition. “We do not want Iran!” and “We are not Islamists!” are common cries from Tahrir. Insightful analysts are urging Washington to take this to heart. This movement is about Egyptians and their shifting sense of citizenship, their rising expectations that their state should be held accountable to them the people.

The question remains: what to do now? Who can lead Egypt? After decades of repressive rule by Sadat and Mubarak, the secular opposition in Egypt has no clear leader with moral rectitude and popular support. Egyptians in Tahrir have drawn a red line: Mubarak must go. But why they want him to go is essential to the equation. Protesters’ anger is fed by years of crony-capitalism and corruption; by state thuggery against citizens who dared to think they should vote freely in 2005; by newspapers and state-owned television stations that spout nothing but government slogans. Accountability and freedom must be part of the equation for change in Egypt. Replacing Mubarak without instituting real political, social, and economic reform will only punt the ball and leave the Egyptian playing field open to malfeasance. Hossam Baghat and Soha Abdelaty published an essay about what Mubarak must do before he resigns in order for a post-authoritarian future to be possible.

Asking how the country can be led into a post-authoritarian era is at stake in this revolution. What Egyptians and the international community must do is set a table with room for many men and women who can sit and talk in private about building an alternative future for Egypt. And here Poland circa 1989 presents us with a road map for successful if gradual political transition.

From February 6 to April 4, 1989 the Polish government organized a series of roundtable discussions with the Solidarity Movement and other opposition groups. The street protests moved into roundtable negotiations.  The Polish Round Table made enemies into collaborators and showed the way towards radical but non-violent change. The secret meetings were chaired by the head of Solidarity, Lech Walesa, and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Czeslaw Kiszczak. The Polish government hoped the talks would allow them to coopt the opposition; instead the talks transformed Polish society, leading to the end of Soviet-style communism in Poland.

In the rush to build a new society on the ruins of communism, the imagery of collapse fit very well those who would design, or impose, institutions anew. With communists vanquished, questions of how their exit was made possible seemed best relegated to the historians, once sufficient time could intervene to allow neutral portraits to be painted. However, as more time intervened, it became clear that communist rule produced a pattern of social relations that made the communist-ruled past an integral part of understanding and creating a democratic future. Although that made analytical sense, it still left a powerful political distaste for many, especially when communists could be perceived to have profited from their own exit. The Round Table, it has been said, was a deal that privileged its attendees. There was, however, another way to see this Round Table, but it required stepping outside the stream of popular Polish history into a world of contingency and comparison. It required thinking about the Round Table as an instance of peaceful, but radical change.

When we think about radical change, we normally think about violence. For some of the negotiators at the Round Table, violence was a possibility they sought to avoid. Indeed, the struggle to avoid violence could be read as a leitmotif of recollection, but rarely a major theme of analysis. Once violence becomes a possibility in the narrative of communism’s collapse, however, its relationship to other features of social transformation becomes critical. And manifold.

In 1988, nobody in Poland wanted to negotiate with the other side. Communists ruled the state, and could count on force to prevail. However,  they also saw that Poles killing Poles was no way to create a sustainable peace. There was no way for authoritarians to live with themselves, and their families, if they committed crimes of violence against their own people. Authoritarians needed a way out.

And Solidarity needed a way out.  Those committed to democratic and peaceful change wanted to make a revolution against revolution – wanted to create a lawful state through legal means within a condition that disrespected basic human rights, civil rights, political rights.  By the summer of 1988, it became increasingly impossible to manage the protest movement as young men got sick of their elders’ compromises.  Both Solidarity’s elite and communist authorities realized that unless they negotiated a compromise, violence could be the only winner.

Why should they trust one another? They didn’t. But they also invited a transcendent power, the Catholic Church, to sit at the round table, to participate in the compromise that would likely displease most but lead the way to peaceful change.

What happened? They designed gradual change, beginning with semi-free elections.  That made everyone ready to compromise, and move ahead, but it also set up the trajectory for gradual change—what one in another generation might have called non-reformist reforms. 

Many Poles are still upset that General Jaruzelski, the communist and military leader who was responsible for the deaths of shipyard protesters, was not punished for his crimes.  Many are still critical that this was a deal somehow between those who compromised, the reds and the pinkos.  But there are few who would say today that Poland’s compromise was wrong in world historical terms.  That compromise has made democracy and freedom possible in a world once ruled by dictatorship and violence. 

Egypt’s round table should have a seat for members of the political parties represented in parliament. It should include the military, judges, unions and business leaders. It must also include members of Egyptian civil society who have been increasingly active and vocal. There are those who’ve worked with judges to fight for constitutional rights; those who have stood up for human rights, women’s rights, gay rights; those who have sought educational reform and cultural freedom; they are spending their days in Tahrir Square and their nights patrolling their neighborhoods.

I have watched ordinary Egyptians become heroes,” wrote American University of Cairo law professor Amr Shalakany. An Egyptian round table might help more heroes emerge, the kind like Lech Walesa who showed he could do more than organize protesters. An Egyptian round table might not bring about immediate justice, but it can help reconcile calls for freedom with practical concerns and help bring about radical but peaceful change. We stand with the Egyptian people who are today in the midst of “a sweet revolution” and support them in their quest for a pathway to justice, peace, and freedom.

13 comments for "How Can Egypt Get From Tahrir Square to Democracy? Lessons from Poland in 1989"

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good analysis Mica ..keep it up!!!

kaledo wrote on February 05, 2011 at 01:08 PM
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for everyone calling for "roundtable" with the regime - a quotation from Angry Arab

"Hillary insists that only the Himmler of the Egyptian regime can lead toward democracy "But she also warned that if the transition is not carried out in an orderly, deliberate way, there are forces "that will try to derail or overtake the process, to pursue their own specific agenda" - an apparent reference to the Muslim Brotherhood - "which is why I think it's important to support the transition process announced by the Egyptian government, actually headed now by Vice President Omar Suleiman.""

http://angryarab.blogspot.com/2011/02/hillary-insists-that-only-himmler-of.html

So, are you with Hillary or with As'ad? Your choice, oh dialecticans!

lidia wrote on February 06, 2011 at 01:40 AM
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Inspired by your post, I suggested the following readings as relevant to analytically and theoretically thinking about the transition "from Tahrir Square to Democracy:" http://ratiojuris.blogspot.com/2011/02/transition-in-egypt-from-tahrir-square.html

Patrick S. O'Donnell wrote on February 06, 2011 at 12:27 PM
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Greetings all... This article was written by Michael Kennedy (Watson Institute, Brown University) and myself....

Shiva Balaghi wrote on February 06, 2011 at 02:30 PM
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Polish roundtable did not lead to radical change. Yes it changed the methods of the regime from violent to non-violent but the main idea has prevailed - Gvmnt robs citizens.

from poland wrote on February 06, 2011 at 05:57 PM
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Today on NPR, Rami Khouri (editor at large of Daily Star in Beirut and the Director of the Issam Fares Institute of Public Policy and International Affairs at AUB) said the situation in Egypt is very much like Poland in 1989. He likened General Jaruzelski to Suleiman and the Tahrir protestors to Solidarity...

Shiva Balaghi wrote on February 07, 2011 at 08:16 PM
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First, a general principle about negotiated revolutions like 1989 in Poland. They are possible only when authoritarians recognize holding onto power is impossible, when movements recognize themselves in the negotiations, and when negotiators can credibly argue to constituencies that compromise is best for the long run.

Michael D. Kennedy wrote on February 07, 2011 at 08:36 PM
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Differences abound between Poland in 1989 and Egypt in 2011 of course. First, the Solidarity movement had a clear leader in Lech Walesa, whose leadership of the 10,000,000 member independent trade union in 1980-81, and in its smaller incarnation as an underground movement after martial law was declared in 1981, was undisputed. Second, conflict and negotiation both took place between Solidarity and the authorities for more than 8 years before roundtable negotiations began. Third, communist leader Jaruzelski wanted to stay in power, and no doubt saw the roundtable and subsequent semi-free elections as a method to do so. He was no saint, but Solidarity did not begin with the demand he leave. Indeed, change was more gradual -- first, Solidarity did much better in semi-free elections than anyone anticipated, and communists honored the results, contrary to the worries of some. Second, when the communists could not form a government, the communists accepted the idea that Solidarity could lead the government. And when Solidarity got that power, they kept Jaruzelski as president for a short while. In short, the roundtable negotiations were the start of a negotiated revolution, a revolution made through legal change. Poland in 1989 is thus not Egypt in 2011. But that does not mean one cannot adapt the lessons of 1989 for 2011.

Michael D. Kennedy wrote on February 07, 2011 at 08:52 PM
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The classic notion of revolutions requires that change be sudden, violent, and entail a change in socioeconomic orders and not only in political elites. Communism's end was not a classic revolution because it was, mostly, nonviolent and was based on non-reformist reforms in law. Many have lamented that this transformation increased inequalities and allowed some of the ruling elite from the old system to find positions of privilege in the new. Some have even said that this was a revolution against the revolutionary tradition, if by that we understand revolutionary history in marxist terms. If, however, we understand that revolutionary tradition to be one in which revolutionaries seek ever more substantial ways to assure the rule of the people, these transformations were powerful extensions of that tradition because they helped to rectify a horrible notion that justice can be found without pluralism, legality, and publicity. 1989 extended freedom dramatically in Poland and other countries, but it did not end injustice. It did, however, create the conditions where the peaceful struggle for justice is possible, and legal. To create that right is certainly not enough to assure justice, but without it, justice in all of its dimensions is not possible. The Polish roundtable, by making political contest legal, thus made justice more likely. That not only represents a radical change from before 1989, but it is also the foundation for continuing to improve society.

Michael D. Kennedy wrote on February 07, 2011 at 09:17 PM
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Poland a Revolution? Lech Walesa is now a multi millionaire and the Polish ruling class is friend of all Europe's fascists. And yes; if the Egyptian masses are duped into a 'revolution' that is not a revolution against Capital (but merely a means for the 'middle class' to get a bigger share of the fruits of exploitation) they will bitterly regret it.

dogdazed wrote on February 08, 2011 at 02:12 PM
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For Shiva/Michael: 1) You recount "secret" meetings in Poland and say Egyptian negotiators should talk in "private." This sets up a process of exclusion of popular demands and accountability. How about any negotiations with reps be video-conferenced into Tahrir on a big screen? No deals brokered behind the public's back, and with the behavior of reps available for all to see. 2)Hossam and Soha seek transfer of presidential power to the VP, torturer Omar Suleiman (arguing that Surur is worse). This rationale is hotly contested, and for good reason, don't you think? The Egyptian people are in the best position they are likely to be to reject both, and once in power, those 2 cannot be trusted to abide by constitutional limits. 3)Are you suggesting negotiations should possibly happen with Mubarak or with Mubarak in power, in violation of the democratic movement's number one demand? -- Thanks

Questioning wrote on February 09, 2011 at 02:33 AM
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Let us be clear: we are fully and completely in support of our Egyptian friends, who have been protesting in Tahrir Square since January 25. What is happening now in Egypt, as Amr Shalakany, has so eloquently stated in the NYT today is: "The opposition “negotiating” constitutional amendments with the regime — to bring the regime down!" No one, including us, takes the current process of "negotiation" in Egypt as a step towards the changes being demanded by the Egyptian people. It is, rather, as I wrote in a subsequent essay on jadaliyya, a sinister attempt by the Mubarak regime to subvert a popular uprising.

Shiva Balaghi wrote on February 09, 2011 at 08:52 PM
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As events in Egypt unfold, it becomes more and more clear that Mubarak is interested only in maintaining power. The Egyptian people take to the streets in peaceful hope for real change. Mubarak uses the discourse of negotiation, process, reform, and dialogue simply to retain his grip on power.

Shiva Balaghi wrote on February 10, 2011 at 04:37 PM
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