Yemen's Turn: An Overview

To begin to understand the trajectory of recent political developments in Yemen, it is necessary to cast one’s eye back further than the heady days of 2011. Undoubtedly, events in Egypt and Tunisia have lent considerable force to demonstrations in the capital, Sana’a. However, it would be unfair to the thousands of Yemenis who for years have organized daily protests throughout the country and the thousands who have been killed, imprisoned, injured and tortured by the state to say that the widespread popular organizing against the regime of `Ali `Abdullah Salih had its genesis anywhere but Yemen.

There have been street protests throughout Yemen, and especially in the south, since 2007. While the southern protesters are now demanding secession, their initial demands included grievances similar to those articulated in Egypt and Tunisia, including complaints of unemployment, increasing economic destitution, as well as political repression and underrepresentation. It was unsurprising that the grievances articulated by the southern protesters became anti-northern and secessionist in nature. A majority of Yemen’s resources flow from oil fields, fisheries, and ports in the south into the coffers of the national government that largely favors infrastructure projects and government patrons based in Sana’a. Eager to isolate southern grievances from similar rumblings in the north, the government framed the southern protests as a regional nationalistic agitation held over from 1994, when the former north and south Yemen states fought a post-unification civil war. The government’s efforts were successful as southern grievances slowly evolved into calls for secession and popular northern reaction was anger and defensiveness against the southerners who came to be perceived as people who sought to destroy national unity and who “have wanted to secede since 1990.”

While there have been sporadic protests throughout the north (and a rebellion north of Sana’a that has been ongoing for almost a decade), it was the protests in Tunisia and then Egypt that triggered the larger and more persistent protests in Sana’a and Taiz (the second largest city in the north), which have been primarily organized by university students and other middle class activists. The protests in Sana’a overtly seek to learn from and replicate the protests in Egypt, including calling themselves “the youth movement”, the use of slogans (“the people want the fall of the regime,”), the emphasis on peaceful protests, setting up a public projector screen to broadcast Al-Jazeera (in Taiz) and the use of Twitter, Facebook, Youtube and other sites to publicize protester actions and government responses.

The emphasis on non-partisanship is also an important feature of the protests in Yemen. While early protests in January were organized by the opposition coalition, the larger more recent protests have emphatically denied partisan affiliation. Most significantly, members and supporters of Islah, the Islamist/reformist party and largest opposition party in Yemen, have largely refrained from the use of their regular Islamist slogans.

Regime Responses

The government has been closely watching developments in Egypt and Tunisia. The day after Ben Ali fled and only hours before Yemen’s first planned “Day of Rage,” Saleh convened an emergency session with Parliament and the Shura council where he offered several major concessions: he would not amend the constitution to effectively permit him to be president for life; he would not run for president in the September 2013 elections, he was “against hereditary rule” (referencing what was widely expected to be his eventually handing power over to his son Ahmed); and he would increase civil service wages and cut income taxes. The government also reached out to the coalition of opposition parties, the Joint Meetings Parties (JMP) -- made up of Islah, the Socialist Party, and a number of other minor parties) -- urging them to accept a dialogue on terms that the government had previously refused.

Days after the fall of Mubarak, as protests in Yemen, and the north in particular, began to gain steam, the regime also sent out “balataga,” soldiers and thugs hired to be the “pro-ruling party protesters”, to attack anti-Saleh protesters with sticks, knives and guns. The government has also continued to use its regular tactics of arresting and harassing activists and journalists. They are targeting Al-Jazeera news crews in particular, and one rumor is that an Al-Arabiya journalist was attacked because he was thought to be an Al-Jazeera reporter.

One of the most vulnerable of activists has been Tawakul Karman, a female activist, chairperson of Women Journalists Without Chains, and one of the most high-profile protest organizers. In protests of hundreds or thousands of people, mostly men, Tawakul is often leading the protesters’ chants. While her high profile may have provided her some security thus far, she has been arrested, threatened, and harassed by the government on numerous occasions and it seems that the balatiga have been targeting her for attack.

The Transformation of Protests

There have been several key developments in the protests so far (in addition to the events described above). A day after large protests started in Taiz, a major city located in the central highlands, the regime commanded its balatiga in Sana’a to chant slogans against the “burghuli” or “baraghila” (pl). This is a pejorative term that was used by northern tribesmen in the 1960s and 1970s to refer to the people of the central highlands after large numbers of people from these areas moved to Sana’a to work as civil servants and businessmen. The government’s effort to sow regional strife between the peoples of the northern highlands and the central highlands (as was successfully done between the peoples of the former north and south Yemeni states) seemed to backfire as public opinion against the regime was further inflamed in Sana’a and Taiz, the latter becoming a major flashpoint for protests in the north.

Another key development is the declaration by Hussein Al-Ahmar, the head of a major tribal grouping, that his tribe would protect the protesters in Sana’a against a government crack down. Other tribes in Marib (home of several major tribes) also declared that they would be joining the protests and/or shielding protesters in Sana’a from attack. Hussein Al-Ahmar has not yet fulfilled his promises to the protesters of Sana’a, and he, his brothers and his late father (whom they succeed) have played a crucial role in supporting and perpetuating Saleh’s regime. Nevertheless, the Al-Ahmar brothers, their late father and their constituents have historically been a key ally of Saleh and a true defection would be a significant blow to Saleh.

Lastly, and probably most significantly, is the decision by the groups composing Al-Hirak, the southern secessionist movement, to abandon the call for secession and join the call for a revolution. Al-Hirak has been organizing for secession for years now, and they are arguably as close as they have ever been to achieving this goal. Nevertheless, certain leaders within Al-Hirak and the Houthis, the latter of which have been fighting a rebellion in the north of the country, have declared their support for a unified nation-wide revolution to overthrow the Saleh regime.

The protests in Yemen have not yet reached the critical mass tipping point that was reached in Egypt and Tunisia. Foremost among the barriers to a surge in the number of protesters, particularly in the north, is the widespread fear of the political vacuum that would follow Saleh’s removal. There is no single institution in Yemen with a monopoly of power and violence, like the Egyptian army. The armed forces are split into several factions, two of which have already faced off against each other while fighting the Houthi rebellion in the north. One faction is the army led by Saleh’s rival Ali Mohsen, two significant others include the republican guard and internal security forces led by Saleh’s son and nephews, respectively. In the north, the third major player is the Hashid tribal confederacy, which is both politically and militarily powerful, and is commanded by the sons of the late Shaykh Abdullah Al-Ahmar (described above).

The Question of Unity

As of writing, there is no unified protest movement. The most significant division is that between north and south, but the gap seems to be narrowing as the southern movement becomes convinced of the north’s commitment to regime change. There is a formal opposition (the JMP, referenced above), but it does not seem that the protesters consider the JMP representative of their interests and demands. On February 13, while the largest of protests were being organized in rejection of the regime and its call for dialogue, the JMP announced its acceptance of the government’s terms to enter into dialogue. The JMP has since then retracted its acceptance.

Generally, the protesters seem to be composed of members of formal opposition parties, large informal activist groups that have been organizing for years throughout the south, unions, small activist groups that have been organizing in the north, and regular people who have not previously been involved in political organizing but have participated in the protests.

However, thus far, beyond the demand for Saleh’s resignation, the protesters have not yet formulated a concrete set of shared demands. The impetus for the protests in each of the various regions have been grievances related to political and economic disenfranchisement, but it is not clear that they would all agree on the nature and degree of the restructuring that would be required to adequately address their respective demands.