Why Syria Is not Next . . . so far [With Arabic Translation]

Dear Razan, thank you for your note. I appreciate your enthusiasm but If you re-read the sentence you're commenting on, it refers to both February 4th "and during the few days prior," including the February 2nd incident in Baab Touma-- the link in the post takes you to that story but you have to click on it.

The sentence also reads "harassed and/or beaten," whereby beaten refers to the Baab Touma incident, and the small numbers who showed up on the albeit problematic "day of anger" were indeed harassed. It is hateful to say "no one showed up" just because one thinks it was a sectarian call, and equally inaccurate to say "many did" (as some opposition members claimed).

As to your claim that I did not demonstrate why there are no demonstrations in Syria thus far, that's a bit unfair. First, you can't "demonstrate" a negative. One can try to speculate about the reasons why we have not seen large-scale demonstrations, which includes the threat of reprisal (in term of individual calculus) and the question of collective action, both of which are addressed in this short piece which, admittedly, aimed at starting a discussion not ending it. مش رح نفتيها هون‫ ب ٩٠٠ كلمة‬

‫Finally, regarding your last "correction," I would like to encourage you to take pause when you level critique especially at a public text. The post does not make a blanket statement about the president being popular, it refers to segments of the population who view him as such. Anyone familiar with Syria knows that there is support (often intense) among various groups for Bashar al-Asad, regardless of the reasons now. The mention of "the Syrian people" is too often appropriated by the regime or the opposition to ends that do not serve good analysis. I am not interested in bombast. The comment in the post was made in reference to a particular comparative context. The whole point of the post, Razan, is that the domestic policies of the regime are problematic, and that's not something that happens when the the leadership is popular across the board.

‫If you would like to enrich the discussion by adding your observations regarding the lack of mass demonstrations in Syria, please do not deprive us. We are all ears dear.

Please Note: in my comment above the word "hateful" appeared as a typo in the second paragraph, as i meant to write "hasty." Thanks to Sara for alerting me as the sentence did not make sense with "hateful" in it. Also, apologies to Razan who must have read it as "hateful."

Thanks Tarek for your note. I am not sure you recognized the purpose of this ~900-word piece, which is certainly not to provide "the possible scenario of change (or lack thereof) in Syria, based on an analysis of the internal dynamics" of "its poltical structure, economic and social mechanisms, etc." This would take, well, a very long piece. But that does not mean i'm not responsible for what i wrote. I stand behind it as statement about Syria not likely to be "NEXT." This does not rule out change--which is imminent. It is primarily a response to what was circulating a few weeks ago about Syria following Egypt.

I have no idea what to make of some of your critiques (i.e., "rather mechanical and one-sided"), as i don't know what you mean by "one-sided," especially when you explicitly reduce what i'm saying to "Syria will not rise." As stated clearly above, and certainly in the piece, I am not saying that. Again, i'm not sure what to make of this reductionism, but perhaps it helps make your portrayal of my argument legitimate. There are better ways to do that. For instance, one can challenge my claim about the overlapping authorities in Syria, as opposed to Tunis, or that Syrians are less inclined to demonstrate en mass without prior violent provocation, as did the Egyptians. I tried to learn from what you would like a good argument to look like based on a critique of my argument, not your portrayal of it.

Finally, the tired refrain that we can't tell who's going to be next is true, but that does not mean that all contenders are equally likely to be next. This collapsing of analysis in the name of denying the ability to predict is paralyzing and unimaginative. I addressed that in a back and forth on Syria Comment, where Josh Landis re-posted this piece. I'm not just saying that Syria will not follow Egypt, as you gather below, I'm saying it is not likely to do so, and here's why . . . If my reasoning is inadequate, it would appreciate your constructive commentary, from which i can benefit, whether or not you are an "expert" on Syria.

I am sure you noted the demonstrations on Friday. They are quite significant. My argument is that unless the regime suppresses these demonstrations in a quite violent and brutal manner (far more than what the Egyptian regime dealt the protesters), the demonstrations will not lead to a successful Egypt- or Tunisia-like revolt for the reasons i stated. I could be wrong, especially that a good deal of psychological factors play a role that is not always accessible/visible.

And please tell me who is "Mr."