Distortions of Dialogue

"I've had nothing yet,” Alice replied in an offended tone, “so I can't take more.”

“You mean you can't take less,” said the Hatter, “it's very easy to take more than nothing."

Recent news reports on the current uprising in Bahrain are all talking about the talk; we hear, or read, that, “Clinton, Saudi minister support Bahrain dialogue,” and that “UAE-Qatar support Dialogue Initiative.” Days later, US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey “Feltman praises initiatives by HM King Hamad,” and according to Bahraini authorities, “Bahrain has also received support from the Governments of France, Jordan, Russia and Turkey for the national dialogue.”

So how come the protesters are not at the negotiating table? Clearly, that miserable lot munching on popcorn at the Pearl are just unwilling to talk, defiantly refusing ‘civilized’ methods of reform, right? Well, allow me to suggest that perhaps it is because the table they are being invited to doesn’t have a leg to stand on. And this is why:

Not long after the Bahraini regime gained great fortune from Bahrain’s 1932 discovery of oil, there emerged a movement for judicial reform that called for an end to employment discrimination against locals at the Bahrain Petroleum Company and to the growing disparity of wealth between the ruling family and ordinary Bahrainis. Strikers were arrested and dismissed from employment in order to quell the movement – and the government later created a Labour Committee.

Then came the 1950s. Socio-political grievances merged with nationalist and anti-imperialist street action and heralded several strikes. A Higher Executive Committee emerged and led strikes that called for political participation, an elected legislative council, a codified criminal and civil code, and the establishment of a trade union and a court of appeals. The government, with help from the British, suppressed this popular movement. Security forces killed three Bahrainis, which then led to a general strike. In a conciliatory attempt, then-ruler Shaikh Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa allowed the Committee to establish itself as the Committee for National Unity. But when spontaneous demonstrations after the British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt erupted in Bahrain in 1956, the government exiled Committee members and imposed a state of emergency.

Public discontent in Bahrain erupted again in 1965 in the face of increasing government suppression  that was bolstered by the British Royal Air Force. Not quite there yet? Following newfound independence from Britain and the March 1972 uprising, a National Assembly was established in 1972. Two sessions later, a polarizing disagreement led to the dissolution of the Parliament in 1975 and the creation of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet. Yes, the same Prime Minister that is in power today.

Soon after, winds of change in Iran inspired disenfranchised Bahrainis. In 1981 the government staged secret trials for and jailed seventy-three Gulf nationals for receiving military equipment and training from Iran. The same year, Bahrain entered a ‘bilateral security’ treaty with Saudi Arabia, and joined the (newly formed) Gulf Cooperation Council.

Following the 1991 Gulf War, intense state oppression and violence continued amid economic disparity and social tension, and a Consultative (Shura) Council of thirty men was appointed in 1992. On the streets, a  ‘petition’ movement emerged, asking for the re-institution of the 1972 Constitution and National Assembly, the release of political prisoners, and the annulment of the State Security Law. Not surprisingly, the government responded by imprisoning, arresting and exiling many. It then expanded the Shura Council membership to 40 members and increased its ‘advisory powers’.

Stifled unrest continued until 1999, when the current King inherited his father’s throne and held a referendum on a National Action Charter promising to re-instate an amended constitution, an elected legislative assembly and an appointed advisory council. Riding a wave of hopeful public enthusiasm (and US-led calls for ‘democracy in the Middle East’), he then introduced a new constitution ratified in 2002 that instated an elected legislative assembly – one that would be superseded by an appointed Shura Council. Greater freedoms of expression and assembly, the abolition of the State Security Law, re-entry of exiled Bahrainis and the release of political prisoners were, however, marred by the amnesty also granted to their torturers.

In 2002, most opposition groups refused to participate in the elections in protest of the King’s reneged promises. But in the 2006 elections, opposition groups, including the Al Wefaq National Islamic Society and the Liberal Democratic Action Society, did participate. Meanwhile, democratic reforms were consistently being either eroded or ignored. Several developments further aggravated the already mounting complaints: (1) accusations of electoral gerrymandering; (2) illegal naturalization; and (3) the leak of government documents purportedly showing a $2.7 million government conspiracy to rig elections, spy on citizens and fund NGOs and media outfits to discredit activists and rights workers.

By round three, the 2010 elections, the issues on the table were piling high. The government was accused of appropriating public land worth $65 billion; continuing illegal naturalization; and conducting mass arrests and closing down websites belonging to political societies as part of a pre-election crackdown. Twenty-three Shia citizens were arrested on accusations of a terrorist plot to overthrow the government, and assertions of rampant torture and maltreatment in jail resurfaced. Amid claims of irregularities, the Parliament was essentially hung between Al Wefaq (former opposition) representatives and supporters of the government. The general sense was that the regime could rest easy in the face of demands for change as the Parliament effectively and conveniently neutralized itself.

So back, then, to January of this year; Egypt rose once again – hot on the heels of the Tunisian revolution. Inspired, a popular call for a ‘Day of Rage’ in Bahrain was disseminated across social media forums, an event which developed into the current uprising.  The details are already known, but in summary, the Bahraini government once again answered demands for change with lethal force leading to the deaths of seven protesters, and then drew up its own agenda for reform – which brings us back to the issue of ‘dialogue’. After using violence to silence its challengers, the government’s repositioning of itself as ‘open to dialogue’ seems disingenuous, to say the least.

The implication of all this talk about ‘dialogue’ is that the government appears to be open to expression of discontent and reform, while protestors are the ones responsible for dragging Bahrain into the economic slump and high social tensions of the last three weeks. The 160-character memory of a tweet allows us to forget that Bahrainis have been expressing the desire for social change for several decades. Conventional wisdom about ‘dialogue’ now places the onus on protestors to end the current stalemate.

While popular anti-government demonstrations continue at various strategic locations, the government has effectively given rise to a new social ‘movement’ – a self described ‘Unity Gathering’ of pro-government forces which has staged mass counter-demonstrations criticizing the pro-reform protesters and calling for dialogue ‘without conditions.’

What this does is effectively de-legitimate the demands of the protesters. It forecloses the desires for change that Bahrainis have expressed time and again at least since the 1950s. It also conveniently repackages the government’s response to these demands: erasing the violence that the government has unleashed at all calls for change, and exaggerating the self-imposed, superficial changes that include little concession or sharing of power. All this is made possible, of course, with backing from the regime’s powerful neighbors and friends.

Emile Nakhleh wrote that the ruling family’s concession to form a Parliament in 1972 was “an expression of royal benevolence,” rather than the recognition of citizens’ legitimate demands for political participation. Whether in 1938 or 2011, this attitude is still the same. But what the royals need to know now is that what has changed is that people are no longer asking for benevolence; and they know, to paraphrase, that the hour is getting late, and this table just offers false talk.