Ondrej Beranek and Pavel Tupek, The Temptation of Graves in Salafi Islam: Iconoclasm, Destruction and Idolatry (New Texts Out Now)

Ondrej Beranek and Pavel Tupek, The Temptation of Graves in Salafi Islam: Iconoclasm, Destruction and Idolatry (New Texts Out Now)

Ondrej Beranek and Pavel Tupek, The Temptation of Graves in Salafi Islam: Iconoclasm, Destruction and Idolatry (New Texts Out Now)

By : Ondrej Beranek and Pavel Tupek

 

Ondrej Beranek and Pavel Tupek, The Temptation of Graves in Salafi Islam: Iconoclasm, Destruction and Idolatry (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Ondrej Beranek (OB): It was a combination of several factors. Besides a pure curiosity about a phenomenon difficult to grasp from the outside, as it were, I have an interest in the evolution and broader impact of Salafi Islam. Also, Pavel and myself both had an opportunity to study in Saudi Arabia, which engendered an abiding interest in Saudi history and religiosity. Furthermore, one needs to consider the destructive behavior of various actors in the Islamic world in recent years and decades as well as the cynicism with which certain groups use such incidents for their propaganda and to promote a plethora of other aims: to cause sectarian strife, to terrorize the local population, or simply to allure sympathizers and patrons and humiliate local communities. This is often carried out while destroying various forms of cultural and religious heritage. So in writing this book, I wanted to provide a broader context for understanding the etiology of this historical situation.

Pavel Tupek (PT): For me, there were also multiple reasons for writing this book. First, I have been researching different aspects of Salafism for many years now, especially theological issues (but not exclusively). My research overlaps with Ondrej’s work on certain topics, particularly as it pertains to the visitation of graves and their destruction. Considering that Ondrej and I were both pursuing these areas long before the virulent attacks on funeral architecture in the Middle East and the rise of ISIS (Islamic State, Daesh), it was natural that we would write this book considering that these issues have risen to prominence. Publishing with Edinburgh University Press, which has a strong tradition in Middle East and Islamic studies, was also a great motivation.

In general, the book contextualizes the current destruction of graves and the ideology and motivation behind it in various parts of the Islamic world.

J:  What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

OB: The study is based on long-term research and uses vast data from primary sources. Also, despite the current relevance of the topic, it was quite apparent that current scholarship on the issue was lacking in both detail and complexity. In general, the book contextualizes the current destruction of graves and the ideology and motivation behind it in various parts of the Islamic world. It also traces the roots of Salafi iconoclasm and its historical shifts.

PT: I would add that the veneration of graves has been considered by some Muslims (whether traditionalists or Salafis) as the cause of polytheism (shirk). In order to defend monotheism, one must—according to this line of thought—prevent fellow Muslims from being tempted by the idea to venerate graves. Temptation stands for the Arabic fitna, and it explains why some graves are being destroyed even if they are not venerated. Hence, the book focuses on traditionalist (Salafi) attitudes toward funeral architecture. It explores the diversity of views across time and space, and it demonstrates how the issue has been simplified, which, in this case, is the praxis of iconoclasm. The core of the book addresses the most influential ideologues such as Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Ibn al-Amir al-Sanʿani, Muhammad al-Shawkani, and Nasir al-Din al-Albani. From an academic point of view, the book also provides the reader with a new perspective on Salafism as such.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

OB: In my previous work, I focused on various themes—from the political and social history of Saudi Arabia after the end of the Cold War and the internal mechanisms of the official Saudi religious establishment to medieval Islamic thought. So, in a way, this book is a culmination of all these interests. In fact, we first tackled the topic of Salafism and its stance towards religious monuments some ten years ago, in an article published while I was a postdoctoral researcher at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University. Since then, we have been developing our view on the topic and have continued sifting through some extremely rich material, mostly concerning medieval Islam and the emergence of modernity. Then, of course, ISIS happened, and its destructive activities gave our research new meaning and purpose.

PT: The book both connects and departs from my earlier research. My previous monograph (in Czech) addressed Salafi theology in general, not focusing on the issue of graves in particular.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

OB and PT: Frankly, anyone who is interested in the Middle East or the Islamic world, whether they are scholars or students of related fields (e.g., Islamic Studies, Middle Eastern Studies, Religious Studies, among others) or the general public.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

OB: My current work is largely connected to the general topic of the book, as I am part of a project called Monuments of Mosul in Danger, which was launched in response to a serious threat to the Mosul architectural sites from ISIS, who seized the town in June 2014. Since then, dozens of historical monuments of diverse types, such as mosques, madrasas, mausoleums, graveyards, churches and monasteries, have been subjected to deliberate vandalism and destruction. So within this project, we have been monitoring destructive activities in Mosul (mostly by means of satellite imagery), while carrying out architectural and historical analysis of the destroyed monuments and creating 3D virtual models. If any of your readers are interested, they can find out more information at www.monumentsofmosul.com.

PT: Currently, I am very busy with administrative work and teaching, but I hope to return to serious research soon. Some avenues I am pursuing include the Salafi reinterpretation of the Ashʿari dogma of al-ʿAqida al-tahawiyya in the sense of takfir as well as the history of Salafism in the Czech Republic, to name only two.

 

Excerpt from the Book:

Over the course of Islamic history, there have been many unsuccessful attempts by various religious authorities and scholars to eradicate all traces of a possible cult of the dead from Islamic rites. The main goal of these attempts to change funerary practices was to prevent the temptation presented by graves (fitnat al-qubūr), because it was seen as possibly leading to polytheism, as well as to clearly differentiate Islamic rituals from those of other religions, most notably Christianity and Judaism. It is important to note that such attempts – if we are to believe in the authenticity of the Sunni tradition – were already being made in the early days of Islam. Muhammad himself feared that Muslims might imitate Christians and Jews in venerating the dead. As a result of traditionalist opposition to any religious practices that were not distinctly established by Muhammad, a wide gap soon arose between the traditionalists’ high ideals of ‘pure’ morality and faith unaffected by other religious traditions, on the one hand, and everyday popular practices, on the other.

The majority of ulama tried to adjust to the widespread popularity of grave visiting and condoned it, but a vocal minority of scholars has always claimed that such practices constitute an unlawful religious innovation (bidʿa), contradicting the principles of Sunna, the true Muslim path one must follow. What is more, these practices could also constitute shirk, threatening the pivotal pillar of Islamic identity as the only true monotheistic religion. These ulama came to the conclusion that some behaviours related to funerals resembled non-Muslim practice far too closely, and that a distinct funerary style could help to distinguish the identity of their religious community, while deepening the existing (and, they believed, desirable) boundaries between men and women. Nevertheless, despite these efforts, to this day many Muslims still flock on a regular basis to saints’ graves, asking for blessings or intercession and making vows and sacrifices. The cult of saints is a widespread phenomenon throughout the Islamic world, despite many regulations, and the practice of visiting graves has developed over time into a firmly established form of pilgrimage.

Historically, the most critical voices opposing the construction of funerary architecture and unregulated practice of visiting (ziyāra) the graves came from traditionalists, who emphasised the importance of emulating the practices and beliefs of the early Muslim community (salaf), and re-evaluated the role of taqlīd and ijtihād. These critical voices were especially common among Hanbalis, who adhered the most to hadith, both in law and theology. The most influential critic of funerary architecture and necrolatry was Ibn Taymiyya, although he thought of himself as a rather moderate critic of these practices, because he did not forbid ziyāra as such. Ibn Taymiyya was mainly concerned by the possibility that the monotheistic religions might converge if such veneration of graves or visits to them too closely imitated the habits of the other religions.

After Ibn Taymiyya’s death, Sunni criticism of necrolatry and heretical ziyāra practices further evolved with Muslim reformers who tried to re-evaluate the madhhab system and the role of hadith and ijtihād, mainly following Ibn Taymiyya’s example. Among the most influential of these scholars who shaped later Salafism was the Yemeni scholar Muhammad al-Shawkani. Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab also left a strong imprint in the shaping of later iconoclasm and anti-Shiʿi hatred. In his attack on ziyāra practices, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab incorporated many of Ibn Taymiyya’s characteristic ideas, and set an example for future Wahhabi grave destruction. The zeal with which his followers attacked ziyāra seems to have far exceeded Ibn Taymiyya’s original criticism, and expressed a far more simplistic view of the issues involved.

Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s followers in the three Saudi states monopolised the interpretation of history, suppressing any ideas or writings that deviated from their own views. On a more ambitious level, Wahhabi ulama, who perceived themselves as being part of the broader Salafi trend, strived to shape collective memory and construct an all-embracing and Islamised ideology. By destroying the graves of legendary ancestors and saints or monuments attesting to local religious, cultural and popular history in general, the Salafis attempted to establish their own authority through a monopolised network of new institutionalised mosques and Islamic institutes. Their doctrinal views, firmly rooted in the textual traditions of Prophetic Sunna and the way of the salaf, collided with the non-dogmatic rituals and beliefs of popular localised versions of Islam, including the veneration of ancestors. This tendency can also be observed in other parts of the Islamic world under the growing Salafi influence.


 

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.