Julie Peteet, Space and Mobility in Palestine (New Texts out Now)

Julie Peteet, Space and Mobility in Palestine (New Texts out Now)

Julie Peteet, Space and Mobility in Palestine (New Texts out Now)

By : Julie Peteet

Julie Peteet, Space and Mobility in Palestine (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Julie Peteet (JP): My first sight of the separation wall in the West Bank launched this book project. In 2004, I attended a conference in Ramallah and had to pass through the Qalandia checkpoint; it was then that I caught my first stunning view of the impending wall. In a way, this experience echoed the inspiration of my second book, Landscape of Hope and Despair, based on fieldwork in Palestinian camps in Lebanon in the aftermath of the camp wars. In 1992, I entered Chatila camp after a hiatus of nearly a decade to find this small space absolutely transformed. In each instance, a new ethnographic project and book resulted, not from a planned field project based on a well-thought out research question, but from a serendipitous visit and the impact of overwhelming and destructive change in places I had once known rather intimately. In Space and Mobility, I describe the sense of being lost in spaces once easily traversed in Palestine. I think in both instances, first in Lebanon and then in occupied Palestine, it was that sense of space radically transformed—not just in terms of the political landscape, but of meaning and mobility and its impact on daily life and subjectivity—that inspired and connected the two books.  

I explore how a modern settler-colonial regime works to transform space to conform to a narrative of its desired demography and foundational history.

J:  What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

JP: The book is concerned with mobility and space under the Israeli policy of closure and its mechanisms: the wall, checkpoints, the permit system (the paper wall), the identity card, and the segregated road system. I explore how a modern settler-colonial regime works to transform space to conform to a narrative of its desired demography and foundational history. I ask: What range of mechanisms are deployed by a modern colonial regime to expand the state spatially and replace an indigenous population with its own? How have Palestinians responded to, made sense of, and continued to live with extreme restrictions on their mobility and under the constant threat of displacement, dispossession, and the ever-present reality and potential for violence? The past decade has seen mobility emerge as a key lens through which to explore inequality and the distribution and enactment of power and control over others. Palestine is the perfect setting to explore the intersection of space and mobility because it is where an elaborate policy of calibrated chaos through spatial transformation and immobilization of the population unfolds in pursuit of domination and, over the longer term, anticipated displacement.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

JP: My first book, Gender in Crisis, explored questions about gender in conflict. I probed the at times tense relationship between the women’s movement and the national struggle and the possibilities and limitations that conflict and national struggle held for women and gender relations. My second book, Landscape of Hope and Despair, is when I began to approach Palestine through the lens of space and mobility. This third book, Space and Mobility, argues that mobility has become part of the arsenal of war and in this case, control and eventual displacement. I connect a sometimes seemingly fragmented understanding of Palestinian history into the temporal slots of 1948, 1967, post 1982, Oslo, post-Oslo, and now, closure. Of course, these remain heuristic devices, and they do capture the essential temporal outlines of specific transformations or ruptures. However, I seek to hone in on the continuity in the Zionist project to seize and transform Palestine. Thus, through the lens of space, I seek to illustrate the relationship between Palestinian refugees in camps in Lebanon and Palestinians in the enclaves formed by the wall and the checkpoints in Palestine. What spatial strategies and policies on mobility tie them together as devices in a massive displacement and replacement scheme by an expansion settler-colonial state?

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

JP: I try to write for a range of audiences within the academy. Undergraduates, graduate students, and faculty across the social sciences and humanities should be able to read an ethnography. I have always tried to avoid the jargon, obtuse language, and convoluted arguments that some academics deem necessary for their work to enter the scholarly canon. I want my work to be read. My goal for the past forty years has been to bring Palestine out of the shadows. When I first started working on Palestine in the late 1970s in Beirut, I was one of only two or three anthropologists working on Palestine. The impact I seek is two-fold: to bring research on Palestine into theoretical discussions. For example, in the literature on colonialism, Palestine was for a long time simply missing. I think that has now changed. Scholarship on space and mobility can no longer ignore the work coming out of Palestine. Indeed, Palestine is a perfect place to explore mobility and power, and a lot of good ethnographic accounts are now emerging as scholars begin to gauge the negative impacts on mobility and people’s daily lives that have resulted from this latest period of closure and checkpoints.

When we write on Palestine, I think many of us still operate in a ‘writing against’ mode as we seek to overcome a dominant narrative, to overturn the taken-for-granted, and to challenge an imposed silence. We have now gone beyond the need to ‘write against.’ So I would like my work to be placed in both the period of challenging dominant narratives and of Palestinian studies as standing on its own and contributing to larger, more encompassing, and exciting theoretical and methodological discussions.

Writing on Palestinian still constitutes a sort of documentary stance whereby the writer documents everyday life under an occupying colonial regime bent on dispossession and displacement. I anticipated that Space and Mobility in Palestine would give readers a real-time unfolding of modern colonialism and the mechanisms it deploys. It is my hope that the book joins the body of literature on colonialism as well as that on mobility and its weaponization.  

J: What other projects are you working on now?

JP: Currently, I am finishing a Fulbright year in Turkey where I engaged in research on the history, reinvigoration, and meaning of the hamam (bath); the problematics of cultural flows, circulation, and directionality also figured prominently in this project. This project is obviously quite a departure from my previous research in conflict zones. I felt it was time to focus on another aspect of daily life in the area, one that involved pleasure, sociality, care of the body, aesthetics, heritage, tourism, and ‘living traditions,’ and one that addressed the mobility of places and practices across vast expanses of time and territory.

On Palestine, I am currently working on two projects. One is a chapter in an edited volume on the concept of evil in a settler-colonial occupation setting. It is part of an evolving conversation among anthropologists on morality and evil. The other project is an article on indigeneity and Palestine. I explore the origins and political context of the concept in anthropology, its circulation in the discipline, and then explore the limitations and possibilities it offers to the Palestinian struggle.

J: What sorts of challenges do researchers encounter when they work on Palestine?

JP: One cannot deny that working in Palestine remains a challenge. On an immediate level, from entering occupied Palestine, to moving around in ways necessary for ethnographic field research to the protection of subjects remain a formidable challenge. On the home-front, well-orchestrated campaigns to deny tenure to scholars of Palestine, un-hirings, blacklists, lawsuits targeting faculty who teach on Palestine, silencing, harassment of organizers of Palestine-related events and groups, and free trips to Israel offered to higher education administrators means that Palestinian remains a fraught field. Faculty warn graduate students not to base their research on Palestine. While I understand the need to be realistic with graduate students about their job prospects and the perils of working on Palestine, we will capitulate to the campaign to diminish the already limited presence of Palestinian in the academy if we actively dissuade students from the study of Palestine. Another issue concerns publication and the problems that can be encountered. For Space and Mobility, I had a contract with a university press with whom I had previously published. The book had been reviewed, revisions were completed, and we were set to go to copy editing. Without warning to either the editor or me, the press broke the contract based on the advice of its faculty advisory board who suddenly deemed the book too biased. Luckily, the savvy editors at IUP took the book and we went to press.

 

 Excerpt(s) from Space and Mobility:

Within the framework of global neoliberalism(s), separation and closure join other forms of structural and spatial management of racialized inequality and expulsion. The new era of immobilization and incarceration takes many forms—from the US prison system and its military prison at Guantanamo Bay to the wall in Palestine. In Palestine, physical separation mimics and carries forward the distinction between ruler and ruled, citizen and noncitizen, Israeli and Palestinian, as the wall concretizes identities. Separation resembles Jim Crow America: the dominant sector of society is unable to imagine life in which the other is equal, and the other inhabits a world hedged with restrictions and boundaries whose transgression can elicit a swift and violent response.

Closure’s most immediate effect has been to obstruct Palestinian mobility and access to employment, education, health care, political organizing, commerce, and family and social relations. Most significantly, closure disrupts the notion of a schedule, or trust in a daily temporal rhythm. In trying to grasp this lived reality ethnographically what came to mind for me was the notion of “calibrated chaos.” Chaos began to crystallize as a planned, observable, and lived pattern. …Control through the creation of calibrated chaos, the changing of rules and procedures with no warning or explanation, is enacted daily at checkpoints and in applying for permits. Intermittent and prolonged curfews punctuate these measures. Unpredictability is the new norm. The common expression inshallah (God willing) has political resonance; its utterance in the context of this unpredictability makes it much more freighted than usual.

On a late spring afternoon, I met Muna, an elegant woman approaching her seventies, for lunch. I ask “how are you?” and she replies, “’aisheen” (“We are living” or “We are still breathing”). Muna’s collective use of “’aisheen” points to an unlivable life in which breathing, the state of being alive, is hedged with uncertainty that underscores a subjectivity characterized by a profound awareness of the simple, yet life-sustaining, act of breathing. This brings to the fore the questions: What is it like to live in a state of exclusion and confinement? What are the implications of this for shaping subjectivity?

From her apartment in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Abu Dis, Fatima Fayyad, a 26-year-old engineer by training, cannot avoid seeing the wall, just twenty or so meters from her house. For Fatima, her husband, Hasan, and their three young children, the looming shadow blocks the natural sunlight that once warmed their home. Most of their relatives live on the West Bank side. When I visited her on a dreary, rainy winter morning, she summed up the meaning of separation and the wall:

The idea of the wall has been there for a long time. Some Israeli writers and politicians used to say the best thing is to put the Palestinians behind walls so the new generations will have no images of Israelis and thus they will be afraid of them—the enemy—we will be afraid of them. The new generation would not be as strong as the generation who fought in the intifada and struggled for years. So what can Palestinians see now? They don’t know Jerusalem; they don’t know the West Bank—only their own village or area. They live in terrible economic and social conditions and the situation is deteriorating every day. So these people—it is easy to deal with them, it is easy to destroy them or kill them or perhaps they will kill each other. So, this is what they want, I think. They, the Israelis, always feel they are living in a state of war, that they are targeted so they are always afraid. They are afraid from inside. Perhaps, some of them, they know they have done something wrong and that this land is not theirs and that is why they have to act strongly to keep what they have achieved. So for them it is a good idea to put us behind walls and then they can forget about us. But I don’t think this will work. I don’t think walls will work in our world now. It is a different world. If the wall were built in 1967—perhaps. But now it is different. The world is so small. You can easily talk and what you say reaches everybody in the whole world via the internet.

Enclavization is more than simply a spatial by-product of colony building or a tool of expansion; enclaves spatially demarcate an “us” and a “them,” making the colonized legible and manageable. In addition, enclaves make daily life unlivable and stifle political opposition. Enclavization imposes another level of spatial and social disconnection much as did the occupations and legal regimes accompanying the 1948 and 1967 wars. Palestinians are literally stranded in space. With enclavization, social life contracted and a localization of politics is discernable. In effect, spatial fragmentation and immobilities can rupture the possibility of collective action and identity.

With carceral politics, Palestinians under occupation join a global coterie of those expelled from the social order. Enclaves share features with the camp, the prison, reservations, Bantustans, and ghettos in intent, effect, and experience while retaining qualitative differences. Each is distinctive, but they do constitute, I would argue, a field of analysis bound together across time and space with discernable continuity.

The wall was a new pillar in the construction of the mobile, sovereign, and rights-bearing Israeli citizen and the immobilized, rights-deprived Palestinian. In a fortressed world, time and space become unbearably stretched as distances of a few miles can take on paramount scale and each side of the wall experiences distinct temporalities and mobilities.

In the small space of Palestine-Israel, mobilities are actively relational—on one side constrained, managed, and decelerated, and on the other, accelerated and spatially expansive. Categories of identity, themselves imposed by the colonial regime, have been instrumentalized as an axis around which mobility is allocated. To travel in Palestine is to be caught in a slow-moving vortex of filtering by the permit system and funneling through the ubiquitous checkpoints, and to move among spaces with varying forms of sovereignty and power.

As the workday draws to a close, Selma tells everyone in the office where she works to take their laptops because “none of us really knows if we will arrive here tomorrow.” Daily life lurches forward in crisis mode; its sequencing enveloped in uncertainty. Selma’s comment underscores the way the pragmatics of daily life—ordinary coming and going—are unknowable and contingent on others. At checkpoints, the state’s structures and protocols for mobility are vividly displayed, publicly enacted, and viscerally experienced. Checkpoints are structured around an embodied and sequential course of movement with corresponding demands on demeanor and speech. Movement is ordered by a disciplinary and ritualistic, although often ambiguous sequencing. Enacting the script publicly reaffirms and reproduces the formula of subordination and domination, yet its strangling effects have prompted resourcefulness and improvisation….

Palestinians complain yet accommodate….. They speak of suffocation and imprisonment, of the desire for a “normal” life: “We want to enjoy the simple pleasures of life—go to movies, to a café in Jerusalem, to travel, to feel safe.”…Checkpoints assume an aggregate, unitary Palestinian body defined by its collective potential for opposition, and thus they violate international law prohibiting collective punishment as well as freedom of movement. Security is the fetishized rationale in which immobilization is cast: “we do this because they are terrorists.” In the post-9/11 world, mobility has been securitized and subjected to ever-evolving surveillance techniques. As part of the WoT, mobility is now a matter of national security globally, reaching an extreme in Palestine where the ability to move is openly and unequivocally distributed according to ethno-religious and national identities. The inequitable allocation of mobility and space crafts an expanding Jewish space/time and a shrinking, fragmented Palestinian one. Israelis move with ease… while the spatially constrained Palestinian only moves with permission.

Checkpoints’ immobilizing effects have seriously eroded their ability to produce space. Human mobility figures prominently in the way landscape is produced, reproduced, and endowed with meaning. A new lexicon of topographic names and spatial locators peppers daily conversation: checkpoints, flying checkpoints, terminals, underground passages, gates, areas A, B, and C, and bypass roads. Landscape is constantly being reconfigured through interdictions of access and mobility, new forms of the built environment, and linguistic changes, evident in Hebrew signage, that can render it nearly unrecognizable. In other words, landscape is always in an emergent state, produced by human design ranging from the banal and subtle to the grandiose and spectacular.

If place acquires definition and meaning through the social activities people engage in and the social relationships they craft and pursue in them, then Palestinians are increasingly constrained in their place-making capacity. They can only craft and give meaning to place in very delimited areas.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.