John L. Esposito and Natana J. DeLong-Bas, Shariah: What Everyone Needs to Know (New Texts Out Now)

John L. Esposito and Natana J. DeLong-Bas, Shariah: What Everyone Needs to Know (New Texts Out Now)

John L. Esposito and Natana J. DeLong-Bas, Shariah: What Everyone Needs to Know (New Texts Out Now)

By : John L. Esposito and Natana J. DeLong-Bas

John L. Esposito and Natana J. DeLong-Bas, Shariah: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

John Esposito (JE) and Natana DeLong-Bas (NDB): We have been working together on issues related to women and gender and Islamic law for twenty years. We felt that we had something to contribute to public conversations and concerns about shari‘a and Islamic law in the news and policy circles.

Most of the stories and discussions in the news and hyped by Republican presidential candidates like Newt Gingrich and Rick Santorum, as well as Islamophobic websites like Jihad Watch, generate fear—fear of “shari‘a creep,” fear that Muslims want to overthrow Western democracies and implement or impose Islamic law as the law of the land, and fear that draconian punishments, such as amputations and death by stoning, are an inherent and central part of Muslim belief and practice.

Our goal in this book is to counter some of that fear by providing factual information—an understanding of what shari‘a is and is not, how Islamic law works and has developed in many different contexts and ways over time and space, what Muslims around the world really think about shari‘a and Islamic law, and what they mean when they talk about shari‘a. At the same time, we also talk about where Western fear comes from, areas of concern in the Muslim world with respect to freedom, democracy and human rights, and what Muslims around the world are doing to reclaim and reform their faith.

The book is as much for Muslims trying to understand their own faith and history as it is for Westerners trying to understand Islam.

J:  What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

JE and NDB: We look at both historical and contemporary implementations of Islamic law and understandings of shari‘a, organized by theme. Our themes include worship and community life; women, gender, and the family; government, law, and order; freedom and human rights; war, peace, and the common good; criminal law and justice; Islamic finance; and science, bioethics, and human life. We discuss how the broad values of shari‘a, such as protection of life, property, and freedom of religion and conscience, are relevant to each of these topics and then compare and contrast that with realities on the ground today. Most importantly, we distinguish between shari‘a as eternal values, principles, and objectives, and their interpretation and application in jurisprudence/Islamic law, which is supposed to change as the context changes so that the values of shari‘a are upheld. The book is as much for Muslims trying to understand their own faith and history as it is for Westerners trying to understand Islam.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

JE and NDB: This book brings our work together full circle. Our first book together was the 2001 revised edition of John’s first book on Women in Muslim Family Law. It seemed fitting to publish another that expands beyond issues related to women to address topics ranging from politics and governance to the environment and biomedical technology. In both cases, the point is to highlight both continuity with the past and change over time and spaces to meet the current needs of Muslim communities.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

JE and NDB: Shariah: What Everyone Needs to Know will be of interest to scholars, policymakers, media, and the general public. There are daily news and social media stories about shari‘a or Islamic law, many involving the actions of religious extremists and others by anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sources that are deliberately sensationalist. This book was written as a one-stop place where basic questions are answered and information about specific topics can be found. We hope that it will serve as an antidote to the near hysteria that exists about shari‘a and the “Muslim threat.” Being Muslim and being American are not incompatible. Islam and American Muslims are part of the mosaic of America, religiously, socially, economically, and politically. Yet, Islamophobia and hate crimes have grown exponentially and threaten Muslim civil liberties and the very principles and values of our country.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

JE: I have co-authored Islamophobia & Radicalization, co-edited Islam and Politics around the World and Key Islamic Political Thinkers, and I am writing Among the Believersa Journey in Muslim-West Relations. I am also directing a major research project and website, The Bridge: Protecting Pluralism—Ending Islamophobia, which has more than a million followers.

NDB:  I have a couple of projects I’m working on. Along with this book on shari‘a, I just published Islam: A Living Faith (Anselm, 2018), which offers a basic introduction to Muslim beliefs and practices with a thematic approach (themes include: the Five Pillars, Muhammad, the Qur’an, Sunnis and Shi‘a, jihad, Islamic law, Sufism, women and gender, and a history of Muslim-Christian relations). It was written for a Christian audience trying to understand Islam and where there are similarities and differences. I am currently working on a book that brings the Bible and the Qur’an into conversation with each other about characters common to both, such as Moses, Abraham, Jesus, and the Virgin Mary, and a book on contemporary Saudi Arabia, looking at issues related to religion in the public sphere, Islamic law, women and gender, and jihad.

 

Excerpt from the Book

Why Does Shariah Carry Deep Spiritual and Social Meaning for Muslims around the World?

Although many use the terms “Shariah” and “Islamic law” interchangeably, they are not the same thing. Shariah is not a formal legal system. It refers to God’s law, sacred and unchangeable principles and values revealed in the Quran and the example (Sunnah) of Muhammad. Islamic law (fiqh) is the Muslim interpretation of those Shariah principles, the development of a vast body of laws or legal systems by jurists. While Shariah principles do not change, Islamic law is the product of human interpretations of Shariah in historical and social contexts and therefore can change in response to new challenges and circumstances.

A great deal of misinterpretation occurs when various actors hijack the term Shariah. Some associate Shariah’s divine principles and religious authority to enhance their own agendas and garner support for harsh punishments and restrictions of human rights. Others, like Al Qaeda and ISIS, use their twisted interpretation of Shariah to enlist new recruits for terrorist actions protesting Western intervention as well as to justify their violent actions. Still others use the word to express the desire for laws that ensure justice and protection. Therefore, although the terms Shariah and Islamic law are often used interchangeably, they are not the same thing. The distinction between divine law (Shariah) and its human interpretation, application, and development (Islamic law) is important to keep in mind throughout this book.

Today, Muslim reformers and scholars are giving great attention to identifying what portions of the law are Shariah and therefore sacrosanct and unchangeable and what are human interpretations (fiqh) that are subject to revision. In the face of rapid, worldwide change, debates increasingly swirl around the necessity of reforming and modernizing Islamic law while preserving Shariah values that reflect the common good (maslahah).

The meaning of Shariah, as well as the origin, development, and reform of Islamic laws through the centuries will be covered in the answers and chapters that follow. These answers address widespread misunderstandings about Islamic law in the West as well as the need for Islamic legal reforms required by the pressing political, social, and economic challenges in the Muslim world.

Is There a Need to Protect American Law from the Infiltration of Shariah?

The United States Constitution already protects against infiltration by foreign law and ensures that domestic law takes precedence over religious and foreign law. The First Amendment to the Constitution protects freedom of religion at the same time that it prohibits courts from adopting any religious code as the law of the land. There is also a precedent in American courts that foreign law is used only when its application does not violate public policy. There is therefore no possibility of Shariah becoming the law of the United States, just as there is no possibility of Jewish or Roman Catholic canon law becoming the law of the United States. In the past thirty-five years, only seven cases have come to court in which some “foreign law” (not necessarily Shariah) was honored. In another thirteen cases where Shariah law principles were introduced, they were all rejected either on trial or on appeal.

The American Bar Association has opposed as unnecessary any legislation that enacts bans on foreign or Shariah, given that safeguards against foreign law infiltrating American federal and state law already exist and protect against rules that are contrary to American foreign policy, including discrimination on the basis of gender or religion. The majority of cases involving foreign law or Shariah that have been brought to American courts have focused on contract agreement, interpreting contracts that cite foreign or religious law. Muslim Americans who want to use Shariah are not asking the American legal system to adopt Islamic rules of conduct, penal or otherwise, but rather to look at the norms to which they have already agreed to be bound in a family or business agreement.

What Are Muslims Asking for When They Call for Shariah?

While Shariah serves as a moral compass, the nature of its implementation means different things to different people. Just as there are those who are looking for full implementation of classical Islamic law and its punishments, so also there are others who want a more restricted approach— for example, giving Shariah jurisdiction in family matters but not criminal justice. Still others call for a more value-based and holistic approach to Shariah that looks at the common good (maslahah) and not punishment only. Some just want to be sure that no constitutional law violates Shariah principles and/ or that the head of state is Muslim, while others see Shariah as a path to empowerment, rights, and the strengthening of families.

The Pew Research Center Poll found that the most critical factor in determining a population’s relative support for Shariah seems to be the relationship between Islam and the constitutions or basic laws in any given country. Support runs higher in places where the constitution or basic laws favor Islam over other religions, such as in Afghanistan (99%), Iraq (91%), the Palestinian territories (89%), Malaysia (86%), Pakistan (84%), Morocco (83%), and Bangladesh (82%). In addition, support for Shariah in family matters was highest where religious courts were already in place. Ranging from a high of 94 percent in Egypt to a low of 66 percent in Indonesia, at least half of Muslims living in countries with religious courts said they believed that religious judges should decide family and property disputes. By contrast, in countries where Islam is not legally favored, one-third or fewer supported Shariah as the official law of the land. Furthermore, in countries where secular courts oversee family matters, fewer than half said they believed religious judges should decide on family and property disputes, ranging from a high of 44 percent in Kyrgyzstan to a low of 6 percent in Bosnia- Herzegovina.

The Pew report also found differences of opinion as to which specific aspects of Shariah Muslims wanted to see implemented. Most were generally supportive of implementing Shariah in the domestic sphere, such as for settling family or property disputes, but they were far less supportive of severe punishments for crimes. Support for application of Shariah in the domestic sphere was highest in Southeast Asia (84%), South Asia (78%), MENA (78%), and Central Asia (62%). Those least in favor were in Southern-Eastern Europe (41%).

With respect to the question of what implementation of Shariah would mean for non-Muslims, the majority of those polled— 64 percent in Southern-Eastern Europe, 60 percent in South Asia, 59 percent in Central Asia, 55 percent in Southeast Asia, and 51 percent in the MENA region— said that Shariah should only apply to Muslims and that non- Muslims should be free to practice their own religion. For example, in Pakistan although 84 percent of those polled favored implementation of Shariah as official law, fully 96 percent said that non-Muslims should be free to practice their religion— and that this was a good thing. Of the twenty-one countries surveyed, in only five— Egypt (74%), Kyrgyzstan (62%), Afghanistan (61%), Jordan (58%), and Indonesia (50%)— did a majority think that Shariah should be applicable to everyone.

What these statistics make clear is that while majorities wish to see Shariah implemented, there is no clear consensus about what Shariah in the public sphere should look like. Moreover, opinions range considerably by country and by issue, making it difficult to assert any blanket statement about “Muslim opinions” or what is specifically meant when Muslims indicate support for Shariah.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.