Ella Shohat, On the Arab-Jew, Palestine, and Other Displacements: Selected Writings (New Texts Out Now)

Ella Shohat, On the Arab-Jew, Palestine, and Other Displacements: Selected Writings (New Texts Out Now)

Ella Shohat, On the Arab-Jew, Palestine, and Other Displacements: Selected Writings (New Texts Out Now)

By : Ella Shohat

Ella Shohat, On the Arab-Jew, Palestine, and Other Displacements: Selected Writings (London: Pluto Press, 2017). 

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Ella Shohat (ES): In concrete terms, this project, spanning four decades of writing, came into existence over five years ago thanks to the initiative of Pluto Press. In conversation with colleagues, students, and activists, I realized that such a collection could serve to document the trajectory of a debate. This collection hosts texts drawn from diverse sources and belonging to divergent genres: essays, lectures, conversations, and memoir pieces. The basic impulse that threads through all the texts is a critique of the conceptual “separation fence” that has segregated struggles, stories, and possibilities. A key concern revolves around two questions: “the question of Palestine,” which has been debated passionately for over a century; and “the question of the Arab-Jew,” which has only more recently come into the glare of the journalistic, artistic, and academic spotlight. While in the scholarly realm the two subjects have been discussed in isolation, in the public sphere one history has been used to negate the other, for example, in the recent campaign for “justice for the forgotten Jewish refugees from Arab countries.” Yet in many ways, the two questions are intimately entangled, even if that entanglement has been mobilized for conflicting political ends. At the same time, the book addresses the two histories within the wider context of violent post/colonial displacements, highlighting the scars of partition burnt into the flesh of the present.

Throughout the book the prism of cultural politics offers opportunities for an expanded notion of the very geography of “the Middle East"

J: What particular topics and issues does the book address? And how did you approach/engage the central topics and questions of the book?

ES: The book is organized around four sections: “The Question of the Arab-Jew;” “Between Palestine and Israel;” “Cultural Politics of the Middle East;” and “Muslims, Jews and Diasporic Readings.” The narrative begins with the Arab-Jew not because it is the most urgent issue in the region but because it offers a particular entry into the narrativization of Israel /Palestine and the Middle East more broadly. Historically and conceptually the question of the Arab-Jew is embedded in the question of Palestine as the collateral damage of the European Jewish question, impacting the position, belonging, and very definition of Jews within Muslims spaces. Probably without the designation of Jews as “a problem” in post-Enlightenment Europe, we would not have today the two other Middle Eastern questions. What began in Europe as the idea of “the Orient” shaped the ways Zionism conceived of “East” and “West,” especially its vision of an Occidentalized “new Jew” fecundating a “virgin land.”

However, even prior to Zionism, with colonialism, I have argued, the Arab-Jew came to occupy an ambivalent position within the bifurcation of the Oriental figure into a negative pole (Arab) and a positive (Jewish) pole. Divide-and-rule imperial policies, furthermore, enunciated a new racialized grammar for the Judeo-Muslim religious cultural matrix that had existed for over a millennium. A kind of anticipatory rupture-before-the-Rupture led to the first serious splitting of “the Arab” and “the Jew,” a splitting that became more pronounced, as we know, with the unfolding translation of the Zionist idea into a political reality. Against this backdrop, “Arab” and “Jew” came to form mutually exclusive categories, becoming an ontological oxymoron and an epistemological subversion. The historically related yet distinct instances of Arab-Jewish and Palestinian dislocations are not at all equivalent or symmetrical yet remain closely linked within the logic of partition. The visual culture component of the book displays the black-and-white photos of dislocated Arab-Jews in tents that echo, in a haunting specularity, photos of Palestinians refugees. Examining the linked analogies, the book also highlights the way in which both “Palestine” the “Arab-Jew” come to form tropes of dis/placement.

The third and fourth sections encompass a reflexive methodological dimension. Rather than conceive “culture” as an epiphenomenal side-effect of material infrastructure, the book stresses the significance of studying culture and politics as co-imbricated. This cultural studies approach, which upsets traditionally hermetic academic disciplines, has implications for debates within Middle East studies. For example, the still ambivalent reception of Edward Said’s Orientalism teaches us something about the state of cultural studies, and about the related field of postcolonial studies, within Middle Eastern studies. Although Said’s book generated an epistemological crisis, a lower-grade resistance to Orientalism simmers even within anti-Orientalist circles. Such scholars may applaud Said’s critique of Orientalism as an ideology, but they also may not feel attuned with Said’s method of reading, expressing dismay from an “academic” standpoint. These sympathetic critics of Orientalism, usually from the disciplines of history, anthropology, or political science, are ill at ease with the “coverage” of divergent geographies and histories as well as with the engagement of various texts, genres, and institutions.

The related notion of “diasporic readings” in the book also helps us examine the question of the Arab-Jew, and of Jewish pasts within Muslim spaces. While the positing of a singular “Jewish History” (with a capital H) has been seminal for the Jewish nationalist narrative, I have argued for the plural—“Jewish histories.” And while “Jewish Diaspora” (with a capital D) has been perceived as originary and unique, I have tried to narrate multiple diasporas, scattered across various geographies. Every history of demographic dislocation involved diaspora or better diasporization. By emphasizing diasporization in relation to Palestine/Israel, one implicitly contests an originary narrative that sees all Jews as a homogenous unit necessarily going back—in the biological and geographical sense—to the Holy Land. The story of the dislocation of Arab-Jews can be read within experiences of multiple post/colonial diasporas inside and outside the Middle East. One can re-read the trajectory of Middle Eastern Jews not as “the Jewish Return” but rather as one more traumatizing cross-border movement, their dislocation from those spaces as itself act and enactment of diasporas. A return has actually become an exile. (Hence, my reversal of the Biblical lamentation phrase: “By the rivers of the Zion, there we sat down and wept when we remembered Babylon.”)

However, more crucially, the emphasis on the notion of “diasporic readings” alludes to multiple kinds of diasporization, not only demographic and historical, but also textual and epistemological. Here I shift emphasis away from “diasporas” as a demographic designation for population movement into a larger framing based on a methodological concept of “diasporic readings” which contests any ethno-nationalist originary understanding of identity as well as of nation-state determination of belonging. Itineraries of dislocation become also relevant to the multidirectional movement of ideas, for example, the ways anti-Semitic/Judeophobic discourse about European-Jews became ironically relevant to the discussion of Islamophobia. As a method, “diasporic readings” allow us to understand the movement of ideas from one place to another as emerging within a situation of already co-implicated multiple geographies. A diasporic polycentric perspective, for example, situates post-partition Arab-Jewish/Mizrahi cultural practices within a constellation of palimpsestic and porous cross-border movements. Indeed, throughout the book the prism of cultural politics offers opportunities for an expanded notion of the very geography of “the Middle East;” its culture, knowledge, and affiliations viewed as mediated and shaped beyond national and regional boundaries, within transnational, transregional and cross-border frameworks. 

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

ES: Together the essays gathered in the book continue my earlier effort to blur the dividing lines between “inside” and “outside” regions and thus correspond to my ongoing interest in a transtextual and transdisciplinary prism through which to explore entangled ideas and debates usually approached in isolation. Despite the various contexts and issues treated in this book, they are all addressed within a broader decolonizing perspective that “un-thinks” Eurocentrism. I began this critique in relation to Zionist discourse in my 1989 Israeli Cinema: East/West and the Politics of Representation. Engaging the historical and philosophical issues around Arab-Jews, Palestine, Israel, and the Middle East more broadly, this book’s selection offers an overall trajectory from anticolonial critique to diasporic readings, striving to transcend essentialist nationalist paradigms. The texts evoke, for example, the longue durée relationship between Jews and Muslims, critiquing the way this history has usually been invoked in the public sphere. To narrate differently a syncretic Judeo-Muslim culture is of vital significance to offering an alternative to what the book sees as the pogromization of Jewish history in “Arab lands,” and in the case of Iraq, its farhudization.

This book is especially closely related to Taboo Memories, Diasporic Voices. The notion of “taboo memories” clarifies the project of re-membering Jewish pasts within Muslim spaces, highlighting the counterpoint of “diasporic voices.” I articulated the hyphen in “the Arab-Jew” thereby casting doubt on the master narrative that produced the categories of “the Jew” and “the Arab” as mutually exclusive; and, thus against the partition logic of the Zionist de-Arabization of “the Jew.” In doing so, I have tried to transcend not only the material boundaries which are obvious to all of us, but also the conceptual separation wall, as it were, between the two categories. In the book, I try to explain what is at stake in speaking about “the Arab-Jew”—first in terms of its historical existence—in other words, as an empirical classification of Jews who spoke Arabic throughout millennia; and secondly, as a trope full of potentialities that conjures up a relatively convivial past. As examples of Walter Benjamin’s “revolutionary nostalgia,” the entwined concepts of “the Arab-Jew” and “Palestine” point to a shared future precisely because in the present impasse imagining those contours seems so terribly difficult.

The texts here are also related to my co-authored book with Robert Stam, Unthinking Eurocentrism, which defined “Eurocentrism” not necessarily as a stated ideology or a conscious perspective but rather as a buried epistemology. Taken together, the texts destabilize the conventional dichotomous historical, geographical, and cultural framing that Eurocentrically posited Arab-versus-Jew and East-versus-West. The present book is also related to Race in Translation (also co-authored with Stam), which tries to look beyond a particular ideology to the ways in which discourses around race have travelled from one place to another, thus shaping understanding of how the US multicultural debates, for example, have been translated in France through its anxiety around its Arab minorities, while the debates over Palestine/Israel have impacted the move to the right of some Jewish leftist intellectuals. In the case of Palestine/Israel, Zionist discourse emulated the tenets of colonialism, imaging Palestine in ways analogous to indigenous America, while positioning Middle Eastern Jews as Blacks. Palestinian critique, meanwhile, has dialogued with other anti-colonial struggles, and Mizrahis have borrowed from the US Black Panthers. Hence, my argument about the triangular analogy which I began to address in Israeli Cinema and further explored in the early 1990s in: "Staging the Quincentenary: The Middle East and the Americas," “Columbus, Palestine, and Arab-Jews” (included in Taboo Memories) and "Rethinking Jews and Muslims" (included here). The cross-regional circulation of both hegemonic and resistant discourses suggest that we must go beyond the borders set by partition, and rather develop a cross-border analysis to examine the multi-directional flow of ideas.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

ES: I am exploring “the question of the Arab-Jew” from other related but distinct angles. Two recent essays, “The Invention of Judeo-Arabic: Nation, Partition, and the Linguistic Imaginary” and “The Question of Judeo-Arabic” address the issue of linguistic belonging as invented within colonial and national itineraries. More specifically, this larger project explores the notion of “Judeo-Arabic language” and its axiomatic definition as a cohesive unit separate from Arabic. Does the concept of “Judeo-Arabic” proposed by contemporary linguists correspond to the indigenous naming within the community and within the language itself, or rather to a paradigm influenced by post-Enlightenment Judaic studies and Jewish nationalism? In contrast to the idea of “the Arab-Jew,” the emergence of the category “Judeo-Arabic language” tends to evoke a partition logic of the presumed non-Arabic-ness of the language as used by Jews. Examining memoirs by Arab-Jews, meanwhile, I continue to position “the Arab-Jew” within a relational mapping of complexly plural Arab/Muslim space, one which transcends the Eurocentric narratives of both “Jewish History” and the “Arab-versus-Jew” divide. Evoking the hyphenated Arab-Jew (or for that matter, Jewish-Arab) has offered, it seems to me, a way to: (1) complicate the neat Orientalist division between the Hebrew/Jew and the Arab/Muslim whether before or after the bifurcation into negative and positive poles; (2) rearticulate the nuanced spectrum between “the Arab” and “the Jew,” especially given the historically vibrant presence of indigenous Jews of the Middle East; and (3) reframe the perennial enmity narrative so as to stress a thoroughly syncretic Judeo-Muslim culture. The Arab-Jew, both as an empirical category and as a critical trope, has embodied not merely a mutually constitutive cultural past but also an imaginative future potentiality. This overall argument forms part of my current work in progress entitled The Question of the Arab-Jew.

  

Excerpt from the Introduction:

When addressed together in the public sphere, the dislocations of Palestinians and Arab Jews are usually deployed against each other, in the combat over the monopoly on historical suffering. Addressing both—the cross-border movements of Palestinians, on the one hand, and of Arab Jews on the other—involves more than a simple exercise of comparison. Both the linking and the de-linking of the Nakba (catastrophe) and the tasqit (referring to the revocation of the citizenship of Iraqi Jews) have been marshalled for radically divergent purposes. The diverse and significantly distinct grids that guide the historical reading of these dislocations have serious legal, political, and cultural implications. The more common way of linking the two questions has taken the form of the “population exchange” rhetoric, which has attempted to assuage Israeli responsibility for “the Palestinian Exodus” by pairing it with the presumably equivalent case of “the Exodus of Jews from Arab countries.” In its updated version, in a kind of “narrative envy” usually projected onto Palestinians, each argument used to criticize Palestinian dislocation is echoed with a similar argument and phrasing with regards to Arab Jews. The tragedy of “the Palestinian refugees” is answered with the tragedy of “the forgotten refugees from Arab countries;” “the expulsion of Palestinians” is cancelled out by “the expulsion of Jews from Arab countries;” “the transfer” and “ethnic cleansing” of Palestinians is correlated with “the transfer” and “ethnic cleansing” of Jews from Arab countries; and even “the Palestinian Nakba” is retroactively matched with a “Nakba of Jews from Arab countries.”

Some versions of the “population exchange” rhetoric embed the assumption of Muslims as perennial persecutors of Jews, absorbing the history of Jews in Arab/Muslim countries into a “pogromized” Jewish History. In its most tendentious forms, this rhetoric incorporates the Arab-Jewish experience into the Shoah, now projected onto a Muslim space that did not produce, or even propose, a Final Solution. We see an example of this tendentiousness in the campaign to include the 1941 farhud attacks on Jews in Iraq in the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. One can denounce the violence of the farhud without instrumentalizing it to forge a discourse of eternal Muslim anti-Semitism. One could provide, as some historians have indeed done, more intricate political contexts that engendered the vulnerable position of Arab Jews within Arab spaces. More critical forms of discourse and scholarship have delineated the complex positioning of ethnic and religious minority-communities throughout the region, taking on board such issues as: the colonial divide-and-conquer tactics and strategies that actively endangered various “minorities” including Arab Jews; the implementation of Zionism as an exclusivist project toward the Arabs of/in Palestine; the hostile rhetoric of some forms of Arab nationalism that deemed all Jews Zionists; the massive arrival of desperate Palestinian refugees in Arab countries; and the various “on the ground” activities, some violently provocative, to dislodge Iraqi, Egyptian, Egyptian, or Moroccan Jews from their homelands. Without engaging the consequences of nationalism for Arab Jews, the recent campaign for “justice for the forgotten Jewish refugees from Arab countries” silences the violent dispossession of Palestinians summed up in the word Nakba, as if one event annulled the ethical-political implications of the other.

The cross-border movements of the Palestinians and those of the Arab Jews are different in nature, manifested in the very question of naming. Departing in various waves, largely from the late 1940s to the 1960s, Arab Jews left their respective countries at different times (from Yemen, largely in 1949, from Iraq, 1950–51, from Egypt, 1956, etc.), each of which reflected divergent circumstances. Some Jews departed early on, while others remained for decades afterward. Given the anomalies of the situation of a community trapped between two nationalisms—Arab and Jewish—it is not a coincidence that many of the terms used to designate the displacement seem simplistic and problematic. Nationalist paradigms hardly capture the complexity of this historical moment of rupture for Arab Jews. Many of the terms—‘aliya (ascendancy), yetzia (exit), immigration, emigration, exodus, exile, expulsion, transfer, population-exchange, and refugees—seem in one respect or another inadequate or incongruous. The very proliferation of terms (as elaborated in my “Rupture and Return” in Taboo Memories, Diasporic Voices) points to the ambiguities. In the case of the Palestinians, the forced mass exodus easily corresponds to the notion of “refugees,” since they never wished to evacuate Palestine and have maintained the desire to return, or at least a desire to have the “right” to return. In the case of Arab Jews, the question of will, desire, and agency—as invoked for example in the memoirs of Arab Jews—remains highly ambiguous and overdetermined.

[…]

The induced diasporization of the Palestinians was linked to the project of the diasporization/ingathering of Arab Jews, at times even performed in collaboration with opportunistic Arab regimes who also benefited in different ways from the departure of Jews. Culturally Arab and religiously Jewish, Arab Jews were caught up in the contradictory currents of British and French colonialism, Zionism, and Arab nationalism. Even Jews who participated in various Arab anti-colonial and nationalist movements, who saw themselves primarily as Iraqis, Egyptians, or Moroccans, had to confront a dramatically changed landscape with the unfolding events in Palestine. The reconceptualization of Jewishness as a national identity had profound implications for Arab Jews. The Orientalist splitting of the Semite was now compounded by a nationalist splitting. The meaning of the phrase “Arab-Jew” was transformed from being a taken-for-granted marker of religious (Jewish) and cultural (Arab) affiliation into a vexed question mark within competing nationalisms, each perceiving the “Arab-Jew” as “in excess.” In a different fashion, the two nationalisms came to view one side of the hyphen suspiciously. In the Arab world “the Jew” became out of bounds, while in the Jewish state, “the Arab;” hence, the “Arab-Jew,” or “the Jewish-Arab,” inevitably came to seem an ontological impossibility.

From the outset, the utopian altneuland vision rendered the Palestinians superfluous and irrelevant to the project of the Jewish “Return into History.” In fact, the Herzelian idea of dislodgment and resettlement was first applied to Eastern European Jews, the Ostjuden. As a modern cure for an enduring pathology (anti-Semitism), the movement away from Europe to another site (be it Uganda, or Palestine) was meant to remedy the Jewish predicament. An approach that links the dislocations engendered by the restoration-of-the-Jews project in the lives of all those impacted by it was deemed therefore necessary. To re-inscribe the Palestinian and the Arab-Jew as the subjects of their own histories mandates the replacing of a single national History with a constellation of inter-connected histories, in the plural. This approach requires articulating together the various exiles produced by the modern transplanting of populations in accord with newly drawn maps. Against this backdrop, claiming a false equivalence between the mass exoduses of Palestinians and Arab Jews reproduces the same nationalist Arab-versus-Jew splitting, which had been stirring regional turmoil from the very outset.

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New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

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Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.