Gerasimos Tsourapas, The Politics of Migration in Modern Egypt: Strategies for Regime Survival in Autocracies (New Texts Out Now)

Gerasimos Tsourapas, The Politics of Migration in Modern Egypt: Strategies for Regime Survival in Autocracies (New Texts Out Now)

Gerasimos Tsourapas, The Politics of Migration in Modern Egypt: Strategies for Regime Survival in Autocracies (New Texts Out Now)

By : Gerasimos Tsourapas

Gerasimos Tsourapas, The Politics of Migration in Modern Egypt: Strategies for Regime Survival in Autocracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Gerasimos Tsourapas (GT): The book started as a radically different research project that aimed to examine the political trajectory of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, an endeavor that was cut short by the 2013 coup d’état in the country. I was living in Cairo at the time, experiencing first-hand the military-imposed state of emergency and the strict nighttime curfew that accompanied it for months. The book emerged in this context of regime (re)consolidation and repression: how are ruling elites able to target citizens’ mobility as a way of maintaining control?

Even more fundamentally, this type of question spoke to me emotionally: the exodus of the Greek-Egyptian community before and during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s rise to power in the 1950s left deep scars across Greece’s social fabric. Another part of my family had been forced to leave Anchialos (what is now Pomorie) in the early 1900s, during the anti-Greek pogroms that followed the liberation of Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, my great uncle fled Asia Minor during the 1923 Greek-Turkish population exchange that marked the emergence of modern Turkey.

For my family, as well as many others in the Eastern Mediterranean, cross-border population mobility has always been linked to the emergence and consolidation of new states; growing up, therefore, I always had a deep connection to the inherently political dimension of migration and diaspora.

In my work, I examine how Egypt and other autocracies in the Middle East pay particular attention to migrants...

J:  What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

GT: As I started interviews and delved into archival material in Egypt, I would reshape the research project to reflect the layers of migration politics that I was uncovering. In the end, the book came to discuss the multiple ways that human mobility and labor migration have been central to the strategies conducted by autocracies that aim to cling to power. It focuses on the Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak regimes and their cynical use of migration policy in order to further their own political ambitions. The book weaves together an intricate web of evolving policies, laws, political discourses, informal norms, and popular culture elements to demonstrate this.

The book is interdisciplinary by default, bringing work on authoritarianism in conversation with work on Middle East studies, labor migration, and demography in order to foster a new research agenda: how may regimes use migration to project political power abroad? How does migration work as a “safety valve” against pressures for democratization? To what extent does intra-Arab migration feature in relations of cooperation and coercion between Arab states? How can we understand the outbreak of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution via the lens of migration?

In my work, I examine how Egypt and other autocracies in the Middle East pay particular attention to migrants: they prevent them from leaving in order to repress political dissent; they use citizens as instruments of soft power; they employ them as bargaining chips against target states; or they employ a range of strategies to silence their voices abroad.

I also aim to add to the nascent literature on the politics of emigration and South-South migration, which contrasts starkly with voluminous work on European or North American immigration, diaspora, as well as refugee and asylum processes. I have just concluded a research project on the politics of emigration states with Maria Koinova, and I am keen to carry this conversation forward. I have always thought that we should strive to examine the importance of studying migration outside the Global North, both across the Middle East as well as the broader non-West. I hope the book is a very small contribution to this.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

GT: My previous work mainly consisted of research articles, op-eds, and shorter policy papers. In this sense, the book constitutes my first self-contained research project that departs from my previous work with regard to its scope and ambition. At the same time, while I have always been interested in the workings of autocratic regimes, I have moved away from earlier work that relied on Gramscian and Foucauldian understandings of political power.

The book also builds on a wider range of primary sources, from interviews with key Egyptian policymakers—including a former prime minister, as well as current and former ministers—to previously-inaccessible data drawn from Egyptian and British state archives. Given the work that has gone into this fieldwork, I am very proud that parts of this book were previously awarded the Middle East Studies Association’s Graduate Student Paper award (2015), as well as the American Political Science Association’s Best Dissertation Award on a topic of migration and/or citizenship (2016).

Importantly, I aim to use such primary sources in order to have key personalities come to life. For instance, I examine how Nasser’s insistence on Egypt-led Arab unity leads him down the costly path of dispatching thousands of Egyptians professionals abroad; I focus on Sadat’s penchant for opulence, detailing how unrestricted labor migration in the 1970s formed part and parcel of the Infitah policies; I also draw on Mubarak’s public speeches to show the anxiety of a regime that was, gradually, losing control over the country’s finances as emigration became a panacea for unemployed and under-employed Egyptians. 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

GT: I wrote this book with a view towards making it accessible to a wide audience. It raises questions about how we may reconsider the historical evolution of Egypt, and the wider Middle East, from the 1950s onwards via the prism of labor migration. It discounts a number of myths, from the perception that Egyptians did not migrate before the 1970s, to that which understands labor migration as of economic rather than sociopolitical significance. It also constructs a new history of modern Egypt, in which the regime alternates between controlling and encouraging its citizens’ international mobility.

Read today, the book sheds light on numerous contemporary issues: domestically, the arbitrary arrests or travel bans for Egyptian citizens under Sisi today mark a return to Nasserite-era strategies; the state’s discourse on overpopulation and the need for more space mirrors debates of the 1970s and 1980s; and, of course, the reliance on migration as a “safety valve” against political unrest remains true today.

In its external relations, the Egyptian regime has always aimed to benefit materially from cross-border mobility—either via closer cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states in the 1970s onwards or, nowadays, as a strategic partner of the European Union in tackling irregular migration across the Mediterranean.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

GT: I am working on two research projects. The first one builds on a British Academy/Leverhulme Small Research Grant to examine the political importance of forcibly displaced populations for host states of first asylum. I examine how Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey have responded to the post-2011 influx of Syrian refugees, and I identify how all three states have leveraged their position as host states of displaced communities for material gain. I argue that this constitutes a novel type of state, a “refugee rentier state,” which seeks to extract revenue from other state or non-state actors for maintaining refugee groups within their borders. I demonstrate how “refugee rent-seeking behavior” affects both domestic and foreign-policy decision-making.

The second research project builds on generous funding awarded by the Council for British Research in the Levant, which has allowed me to examine how migration features in states’ bilateral and multilateral diplomatic strategies. Together with Fiona Adamson, we examine the workings of migration diplomacy in world politics. The interplay of migration and foreign policy-making is surprisingly under-researched, and we seek to theorize this emerging field in international relations.

 

Excerpt from the Book

Egypt’s permissive labour emigration policy under Sadat aimed to appease Arab host states’ concerns by demonstrating that Egypt was committed to a new role as a regional provider of de-politicised migrant labour. Sadat would repeatedly signal that the era of dispatching Egyptian professionals abroad to serve as political agitators was gone. This was linked to the process of de-Nasserisation discussed in Chapter 4, and was made obvious in the state’s newly implemented permissive emigration policy. Prominent journalist ‘Ali Amin underlined that ‘Egypt will [now] never think of interfering with the internal affairs of any Arab state. Neither will it impose an opinion, a certain person, policy, or form of government on them, be it Beirut, Amman, Damascus, Tripoli, Kuwait, or the Arabian Gulf’. While, in the past, ‘Arab states’ suspicion of Nasser’s political motives was reflected in a reluctance to encourage the emigration of Egyptians’, Arabs were now urged to abandon such scepticism. As Anis Mansur, the later editor-in-chief of the regime mouthpiece October, explained:

‘[An] Egyptian was looked upon as the man with the ‘ugly face’ throughout the Arab world. For twenty years, every Egyptian had seemed to turn into a spy or saboteur. Every Egyptian teacher was thought to have come to overthrow the standing rule and to distribute subversive literature. Every Egyptian doctor was considered a spy acting for Egyptian Intelligence Service to set one class against another . . . Now he is not interested in other peoples’ affairs. ‘Give and take’ is his motto … Egyptians abroad form a ‘working army’ for the sake of Egypt and all Arabism.’

What explains this shift in discourse on labour emigration, and the abandonment of a decades-long tradition of political activism outside Egyptian borders? For one, these statements, which were commonplace in Sadat-era Egypt, buttressed the new president’s internal legitimation strategy of distinguishing him from Nasser in the eyes of Egyptians. At the same time, they contributed to Sadat’s external legitimation tactics by signalling a shift in Egyptian foreign policy in the eyes of Arab elites. Former Minister of Migration and Manpower Nahed Ashry confirmed this strategy: ‘Presidents Sadat and Mubarak did not wish [for] Egyptian workers’ involvement in politics abroad’. In a similar tone, al-Akhbar’s Mostafa Amin, in a column entitled ‘“Ugly Egyptian” Image Removed’, argued that the Egyptian regional migrant was formerly considered as ‘a hooligan holding a knife in his mouth and a heavy club in his hand. Unfortunately, the Egyptians helped maintain that ugly picture by their behaviour, and this explains to a great extent the pleasure that the world showed upon our 5 June 1967 defeat. Today the situation is totally different’. The use of regional migration as a signal that Egypt is ready to aid, rather than antagonise, its Arab neighbours is evident in Sadat’s introduction of the term ‘temporary migration’.

Law 111|1983, still valid today, explains the difference between ‘temporary’ and ‘permanent’ Egyptian migrants, first highlighted in the 1971 Constitution: a ‘permanent’ emigrant is one who ‘stays abroad permanently by obtaining the nationality of a foreign country and/or a permanent residence permit, stays abroad for a period of at least ten years, or obtains an immigration permit from one of the countries of destination. A ‘temporary’ emigrant, on the other hand, is ‘someone (not a student or seconded worker) who works abroad for twelve consecutive months’. However, in practice, this differentiation has been based upon migrants’ country of destination: Egyptians living in Arab countries are invariably considered temporary emigrants, or temporary workers abroad, even when they have lived there for decades. All those emigrating to Australia, Europe, North America, or elsewhere, on the other hand, are considered permanent emigrants, even if they just arrived in their host countries.

As I have shown elsewhere, by emphasising the “temporary” aspect of regional migration, Egyptian elites wished to increase the flow of migration towards oil-exporting countries of the Arab world. The invention of Egyptian migrants’ non-permanence was aimed at mollifying Arab countries’ misapprehensions about opening their borders to potentially millions of Egyptian immigrants. This is best understood through, firstly, the politicised nature of Egyptian regional migrants in the pre-1970 period, and, secondly, the regional political climate of the 1970–71 period. In terms of the former, Sadat did not hesitate to signal the transience and depoliticisation of Egyptian regional migration as another distinctive feature that differentiated Egypt under his rule from the Nasserite era. Post-1970 migration was depoliticised, driven by economic rather than ideological reasons, and, above all, “temporary”. This coincided perfectly with host states’ wishes. ‘The intent of Saudi Arabia’s policies are as straightforward as those of Kuwait’, writes Sell. ‘The Saudis wish to keep migrants temporary and have them return home when their labour is no longer wanted’ […] By the early 1980s, Hosni Mubarak would emphatically declare that ‘[t]he days when a citizen [of Egypt] residing abroad was viewed with suspicion, as if he had not fulfilled his national duties, are over . . . we must all guarantee, in actions and not in words, that an Egyptian working abroad is a good citizen, who has not renounced his identity’.

Beyond its utility in distancing Sadat from Nasser, the choice of emigration as an instrument for signalling Sadat’s wish for rapprochement was not incidental, for it caught the attention of labour-poor, oil-rich Arab states. In essence, Sadat ensured that Egypt would provide continuing trained and untrained labour for Arab states’ rising labour needs. To drive this point home, the Egyptian regime employed the October 1973 War. As a result of the 1973 War, according to the Egyptian regime’s rationale, ‘Saudi Arabia and all the Gulf emirates were awash in surplus earnings from oil exports. Sadat was not at all reticent in claiming his share’. Securing increased financial aid from Saudi Arabia was a chief goal of Sadat, and promoting Egyptian migration became an intrinsic part of this strategy. This was justified in two ways: first, Egyptian efforts during the Arab–Israeli Wars carried a moral implication that Arab states contribute to its economic well-being; second, the heightened need for migrant workers in the oil-producing Arab countries, combined with Egypt’s labour surplus, suggested a mutually beneficial, honourable solution that allowed Sadat to save face – bypassing a main problem that had dissuaded Nasser from espousing labour emigration. The conflation of these two elements occurred through a strategy that linked Egypt’s “extraordinary” sacrifices during the various conflicts with Israel to continued Arab aid, albeit in an indirect form, through the absorption of its excess labour force.

Egyptian labour, in its perceived importance for the Arab–Israeli Wars and its potential utility to labour-poor Arab countries, gradually dominated the Egyptian elite’s discourse in the post-1973 period. ‘Egypt is the Arabs’ fortress’, prominent journalist Musa Sabry wrote, referring to the Arab–Israeli Wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. ‘She has sacrificed 100,000 martyrs over 4 wars’. Implied here was an economic quid pro quo: according to Sadat’s rationale, Egypt’s sacrifice in labour necessitated not only closer cooperation between the Arab states, but also concrete aid. ‘We believe that Egypt should call for an immediate Arab meeting, and that the Arab countries should be frankly told that Egypt has shouldered the burden of the Arab cause for 30 years and, as a result, has suffered hunger, become impoverished and made sacrifices’. Sadat, according to journalist and confidant Anis Mansur, ‘considered his preoccupation with Egyptian affairs too onerous for him to add any Arab problems to them, and [felt] that to manage the affairs of the 37 million Egyptians is too heavy to be made heavier by the misery of 70 million more Arabs. Egyptians abroad’, Mansur claimed, ‘form a “working army” for the sake of Egypt and of all Arabs’. ‘We do not want gratuities’, Hegazy declared; ‘we do not state our needs and ask for aid. Egypt has huge trained manpower potential…Egyptian manpower is the most precious capital we possess’. It is in this light that Egypt’s decision to have the ‘export of labor become an officially recognized policy objective’ should be understood. As Saddam Hussein graciously acknowledged, Egyptian wartime sacrifices needed to be repaid through cross-regime coordination on migration:

‘There is not a single Arab citizen or a single Arab country that is not indebted to the Egyptian people, and the Egyptian soldiers, for their sacrifices at all times ... It is nationally incumbent on every true Arab to hasten to repay part of that debt so that giant and generous Egypt should continue to stand on its feet in full grandeur. We in Iraq are prepared to contribute to that duty, and that honour. Our doors are flung open to Egyptian farmers, workers, and intellectuals. They will be assured here of the same treatment as their Iraqi brothers, without the least discrimination.’

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.