Jens Hanssen and Hicham Safieddine, eds. and trans., The Clarion of Syria: A Patriot's Call against the Civil War of 1860 (New Texts Out Now)

Jens Hanssen and Hicham Safieddine, eds. and trans., The Clarion of Syria: A Patriot's Call against the Civil War of 1860 (New Texts Out Now)

Jens Hanssen and Hicham Safieddine, eds. and trans., The Clarion of Syria: A Patriot's Call against the Civil War of 1860 (New Texts Out Now)

By : Jens Hanssen and Hicham Safieddine

Butrus al-Bustani (Author), Jens Hanssen (Editor and Translator), Hicham Safieddine (Editor and Translator), Ussama Makdisi (Foreword), The Clarion of Syria: A Patriot's Call against the Civil War of 1860 (University of California Press, 2019).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Jens Hanssen (JH): I have been working on Butrus al-Bustani and Nafir Suriyya since my doctoral work on Fin de Siècle Beirut. During a Thyssen-Foundation postdoc at the University of Erlangen on the sociological dimension of modern Arabic thought, I realized that Nafir Suriyya signaled not only a break in al-Bustani’s oeuvre but also the Nahda more generally. The civil war in Mount Lebanon and the massacres in Bab Tuma, the Christian quarter of Damascus, in the summer of 1860 shocked new intelligentsia in Bilad-al-Sham and turned many from literati cultivating Arabic heritage into public moralists with political commitments to the reform project of the Ottoman state. Al-Bustani’s Nafir Suriyya was a case in point. The eleven bi-monthly to monthly pamphlets that made up Nafir Suriyya are heart-felt, urgent responses to unfolding human suffering. They have received renewed scholarly and popular attention in the last two decades, but were not available in English.

The translation of the pamphlets progressed slowly, in part because I had kids and because the summers I had ear-marked for working on the manuscript saw political crises in the Middle East, usually involving Israeli military assaults. Coming to think of it, I do not know how any of us politically-committed Middle East scholars ever find the time to write. Also, the language of Nafir Suriyya was so experimental. When I once showed a particularly difficult passage to my late colleague Michael Marmura, he smiled and reassured me: “Jens, this Arabic is of an idiom all its own, namely its author’s.” Only when Hicham agreed to join the project did things start to move along more quickly. We also decided to augment the translated text with introductory chapters on the historical, historiographical, biographical, and conceptual contexts. 

We do not think the value of al-Bustani’s social analysis lies in its prophecy. Instead, we have treated it as productively flawed. It is symptomatic of a mode of cultural self-criticism that is largely blind to the emergent picture of political and economic forces at work and which we address in the introduction. If we nevertheless urge a charitable reading of Nafir Suriyya, it is because al-Bustani’s was a desperately hopeful “clarion call,” that—above all—displayed all the personal tribulations and intellectual dilemmas after civil war.

Bustani’s Nafir Suriyya is a remarkably raw historical and literary document...

J:  What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

JH and Hicham Safieddine (HS): Our book benefits from and contributes to the growing and increasingly nuanced literature on the Nahda. This is no longer the uncritical story of intellectual pioneers who are ahead of their time, nor is it the origin story of Arab “Westoxification.” Rather, the Nahda is staged in multiple and contested ways. In this sense, Bustani’s Nafir Suriyya is a remarkably raw historical and literary document that lays bare just how much Nahdawis were grappling with themselves as much as with the society they felt the burden to improve. The answers the Bustanis and others gave to the questions they faced are by no means incontestable. But to blame them for not anticipating the subsequent histories of capitalist, colonial, and sectarian violence seems unfair. As Fanon put it so generously at the height of the decolonization struggle: “[w]e must rid ourselves of the habit, now that we are in the thick of the fight, of minimizing the action of our fathers … [t]hey fought as well as they could, with the arms they possessed then.”

Our introductory chapters extract a number of key issues that Butrus al-Bustani dissects, like sectarianism, for which he did not even have a stable name yet. His search for categories of analysis is striking and a chapter is dedicated to the conceptual and semantic horizons of the Nahda in the wake of 1860. We discuss the emergence of patriotism as an emotive force of overcoming the social symptoms that Bustani claimed led to the civil warThe fact that “Syria” is invoked as the geographical reference for a new political community signals that the civil war was not just a tragedy affecting Mount Lebanon where most of the fighting took place. 

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

JH: I have been working on the Nahda for a while. This has yielded two volumes I co-edited with Max Weiss. The first was anchored in Albert Hourani’s seminal book, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, and the second, Arabic Thought Against the Authoritarian Age took the narrative up to the “Arab Spring” in 2011. Who knows, there may be a third California University Press volume in the offing that gives an account of Arab intellectual responses to the current political climate in the Middle East and the world at large.

HS: My primary research explores the formative role of Arab financial systems, including central banks, on the formation of modern nation-states with a current emphasis on Lebanon. A corollary topic is the intellectual history of post-World War II Arab economic thought. My book on Lebanon’s financial foundations, entitled Banking on the State is due out this coming July. The Clarion of Syria addresses questions of civil conflict, sectarianism, and foreign intervention that are pertinent even if not central to understanding the twentieth century socio-economic history of Lebanon. It is also a study of Arab intellectual history, my second area of interest. In terms of my engagement with translation, this book is part of my long-term commitment to translating texts of modern press culture and political thought from Arabic to English.  

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

JH and HS: This translation is an attempt at opening up the critical and comparative study of the Nahda to global intellectual historians. It makes a key historical document of Nahda accessible for the first time to an English audience in classrooms and among broader communities and publics. We are particularly pleased that California University Press has included the book in its global, open access digital series hosted by Luminos. Moreover, AUB Press is in the process of publishing a bilingual version of the translation. That will turn the book into a great Arabic language and literature-teaching tool. All this is quite timely because in November of this year, the American University of Beirut is hosting a big conference in Arabic to mark Butrus al-Bustani’s two-hundredth birthday.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

JH: Currently, I am working mainly on a large research project that explores the entanglement of Arabic- and German-speaking intellectuals in the twentieth century. The idea is to read, for example, Nietzsche with Farah Antun, May Ziyada, and ‘Abd al-Rahman Badawi; Kafka and Benjamin with Mahmoud Darwish; Hannah Arendt through her Palestinian translators, Ernst Bloch’s materialist interpretation of Ibn Sina through his Tunisian translator Mohammad Turki and other Arab leftists who have shared his particular reading of Arabic philosophy. 

HS: I am currently working on two main projects. The first, in collaboration with Angela Giordani, is another translated work, namely selected writings of Arab Marxist and Lebanese communist Mahdi Amel (Brill/Leftword). Amel, who was assassinated in 1987, examined the relationship between colonialism, underdevelopment, and national liberation. Recent Anglophone scholarship has shown keen interest in his legacy, but his own works have yet to be made available to English readers. I am also working on a journal article that explicates Amel’s conceptualization of sectarian hegemony in a colonial context. The second project is an exploration of post-World War II Arab liberal economic thought. Arab economists based in the region, like Said Himadeh, Yusif Sayigh, and Abdallah Tariqi, who also acted as state technocrats, developed models for economic development that combined elements of Keynesianism, developmental institutionalism, and in some cases socialist planning in order to address the challenges of state-building in the Arab world. Their story has yet to be told.

J: How does the work speak to contemporary conflicts in the region?

JH and HS: By the time we teamed up, the Syrian uprising had turned into a civil war and a humanitarian catastrophe, which gave al-Bustani’s clarion calls to his compatriots renewed urgency. Here was a text that tried to work through unspeakable violence and fratricide to rebuild society and envisage a future in which people transcend their particular communities. In that sense, it is an anti-sectarian text avant le mot. But it is important to note that the civil war and sectarian strife that rocked Syria and Mount Lebanon during al-Bustani’s lifetime was the outcome of social, economic, and political developments that were historically specific. They must not be conflated with contemporary conditions nor invoked as part of an orientalist or essentialist narrative of an unchanging war-torn Arab world. As we point out in the introduction, civil wars have not been a particularly common occurrence in the history of the region. But as is the case elsewhere, past conflicts, and particularly civil wars, cast a long shadow over the present. The war of 1860 is no exception. Rereading these pamphlets ithe context otoday’s politicaviolenceiwartorSyria and elsewherithe Arab worldhelpugain a critical and historical perspective on sectarianism, foreign invasions, conflict resolution, Western interventionism, and nationalist tropes of reconciliation.


Excerpt from the Book 

Excerpt from Intro:

Translating Civil War

By Hicham Safieddine and Jens Hanssen

News of the spell of atrocities and abominations committed this summer by the troublemakers in our midst has reached the corners of the earth. All over the civilized world, it has drawn pity and gloom on one hand, and anger and wrath on the other.

With these opening lines, Nafir Suriyya – “The Clarion of Syria” – launched its urgent appeal to overcome the civil war in Mount Lebanon and Damascus in the summer of 1860, and to rebuild Syrian society in the war’s aftermath. This key text of the Nahda – the 19th-century Arabic reform and revival movement – has received renewed popular and scholarly attention recently. At the time of its publication, Nafir Suriyya ran as a series of eleven pamphlets from September 1860 to April 1861. The pamphlets did not present a detailed litany of atrocities that other contemporary eye-witnesses provided. Rather, they addressed an array of universally-resonant and locally-relevant themes that render the pamphlets pertinent beyond their immediate context. With a style oscillating between Paulinian sermon and Socratic dialogue, the author ponders the meaning of civil war in relation to religion, politics, morality, society and civilization. 

The author expresses gratitude for European intervention but warns of its potential long term harm. Key passages evince a subtle understanding of the rights of “man” on the one hand, and susceptible deference to the rule of law and political authority on the other. The pamphlets also advocate the twin prerogatives of opposing separation between people of the same homeland based on religion or kinship while proposing the separation of religious and political authority; they espouse an Ottoman reformism that affirms loyalty to the imperial center but calls for the rulers to attend to the welfare of their subjects. Other passages grapple with the difficult but necessary task of refuting Orientalist stereotypes about Arabs while at the same time publicly exercising cultural self-criticism. Still others extol the value of Western civilization and the need to emulate it but warn against superficial appropriation. Above all, Nafir Suriyya was an anti-sectarian clarion call to build a cohesive and “civilized” Syrian society in place of what the author considered a community riveted by the most pernicious of conflicts, violent fanaticism and factionalism. As the author put it:

The worst thing under the firmament is war, and the most horrendous among them are civil wars which break out between commoners of a single country and which are often triggered by trivial causesand for disgraceful intentions.

Nafir Suriyya, no. 5, November 1, 1860.

Excerpt of Translation:

Chapter 9

Clarion 4

By Butrus al-Bustani

October 25, 1860 

Countrymen,

We have talked about the homeland at length in our pamphlets. We did so because the homeland is the dearest thing to those who love it, and it is the most pleasantly coined word adorning the Arabic language. Syria, which is known as Barr al-Sham and Arabistan, is our homeland with all its diverse plains, coastlines, mountains, and barren lands. The inhabitants of Syria, regardless of their religious beliefs, their physical features, their ethnicities, and their general diversity, are all our compatriots. For the homeland resembles a chain of many rings. One end of the chain represents our place of residence, birthplace, or ancestral home. At the other end lies our country and everyone in it. The center and magnet of these two poles are our heart. The homeland holds strong sway over its children. It draws and holds them within its embrace, however loose this embrace might be. It also captures their hearts and pulls them closer to their homeland so that they may return even when their lives are more comfortable abroad.

“If homelands were not to die for, the ill-fated homelands would turn into ruin.” The more we identify with the homeland’s material and moral aspects, the more we are attracted to it, and the fonder we become of it. For we deem our house to be the best of houses, our compatriots the best of people. As the saying rightly goes: “Seek the host—not the house.” For whoever travels the world sees as clearly as daylight that no matter how meritorious a homeland is, the evils of its people can ruin it. Conversely, no matter how rotten it is in and of itself, the merits of its people compensate for it.

Countrymen,

People of the homeland have rights vis à vis their country and it in turn has obligations toward them. It goes without saying that the more these rights are fulfilled, the more people grow attached to their country, and the more desirous and pleased they are in rendering those duties. Among the obligations that a country owes its people is to secure their precious right to life, honor, and prosperity. These obligations also include upholding civil, moral, and religious freedoms, especially the freedom of conscience in confessional matters. Many were the countries that were sacrificed for this freedom.

Compatriots love their country more when they sense that it is theirs. Their happiness lies in its civilizational development and comfort while their misery lies in its destruction and misfortune. Their ability to take part in its affairs and to get involved in its welfare increases their desire for its success and their enthusiasm for its progress. The more responsibility is placed on them, the more intense and resolute these feelings become. Therefore, one of the most important duties of our compatriots is to love their homeland.

It has been mentioned in a hadith“Love of the homeland is an element of faith.” Many were the people who sacrificed their lives and all that they own out of love for their country. As for those who exchange patriotism for confessional fanaticism and who sacrifice the welfare of the homeland for personal interests, they do not deserve to belong to the homeland. They are its enemies. Those who do not expend any effort to prevent or alleviate incidences harmful to the country are equally its enemies. In these difficult times, few compatriots have displayed their patriotism. The ugly deeds of those who fired the first shot and those who lifted the first stone off the mouth of the dreadful volcano that is torching the country and its people have forever left a black mark in the annals of Syria. Likewise, those who did not work hard to muzzle the barrel of that gun and the mouth of that volcano are guilty; they have fallen short in their duties toward their homeland.

Let us take this opportunity to make clear the feelings of gratitude and welcome toward our brothers who are on the other side of the Atlantic and toward their children who are guests in our country. They have shown and are still showing continuous assistance to our compatriots. Their generosity shames us.

Countrymen,

Our country is world renowned for its water, air, and soil. It is the most proud and praiseworthy. Yet for a number of generations, it has been afflicted by the corruption of uncivilized segments of its people. That is why you see it increasingly lagging behind other countries and becoming even more backward following the recent unrest. But we hope that with the help of God, with the stamina of our Sublime State and the friendly Great Powers, this current setback, whose echoes have reached the corners of the Earth, will turn into the beginning of great goodness and usher in a new age for Syria. The following may suffice as a reminder for those who are weary:

Tell those who carry a burden: burdens do not last

Happiness dies out; worries become a thing of the past

Countrymen,

We warn you of obstinacy, despotism, fanaticism, and idleness. They are devoid of goodness. And we alert you to these precious words: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” We remind you of this as well: Man’s true homeland is not in this world but in the spiritual world beyond the grave. There he shall remain till the horn is sounded and he is resurrected for Judgment. Alas, many of our brethren have gone this year to this other, everlasting homeland. Numerous are the causes but death is one. It is therefore incumbent that we prepare for that homeland and the Day of Judgement.

From a patriot                                             

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.