Seyed Ali Alavi, Iran and Palestine: Past, Present, Future (New Texts Out Now)

Seyed Ali Alavi, Iran and Palestine: Past, Present, Future (New Texts Out Now)

Seyed Ali Alavi, Iran and Palestine: Past, Present, Future (New Texts Out Now)

By : Seyed Ali Alavi

Seyed Ali Alavi, Iran and Palestine: Past, Present, Future (London: Routledge, 2019).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Seyed Ali Alavi (SAA): The book is based on the doctoral dissertation I completed at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. My doctoral research centered on theories of international relations, with the main focus on the relations between Iran and Palestine—the first scholarly project on the subject matter. The question of Palestine, and the Iranian role in it, lingers as one of the most vital dynamics in the contemporaneous international politics of the Middle East. Before I started working on my research, I was astounded that there was no single authored and academically written book about the subject matter. Despite its uniqueness, and the propaganda being nurtured by well-nourished media outlets allied to the right wing in Israel, there is no structured examination of Iranian-Palestinian relations out there. With this book, I aim to initiate a crucial inauguration to a new deliberation about Iranian-Palestinian relations, which is necessary in terms of both scholarship and wider public dialogue.

The book transforms the notion of solidarity into a concept of desire for justice.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

SAA: Examining the nature of relations between Iran and Palestine, this book investigates the relationship between the state and authorities in the Middle East. Analyzing the connections of the Iranian revolutionary movements, both the Left and the Islamic camps’ perspectives are scrutinized. To provide a historical background to the post-revolutionary period, the genealogy of pro-Palestinian sentiments before 1979 are also traced. The book contextualises the events from the beginning of the Palestinian predicament to the post-Arab spring era.

In demonstrating the pro-Palestinian stance of post-revolutionary Iran, the study focuses on the roots of the ideological outlook and the interest of the state. Despite a growing body of literature on the Iranian Revolution and its impacts on the region, Iran’s connection with Palestine has been overlooked. This new volume fills this literary gap and enables readers to unpack the history of the two states. Such unique and comprehensive coverage of Iran and Palestine’s relationship is a key resource for scholars and students interested in international relations, politics, and Islamic and Middle East studies. Ultimately the project aims to answer the question as to what the roots of Iranian pro-Palestinian tendencies are. The book transforms the notion of solidarity into a concept of desire for justice. In order to complete the book, I conducted valuable interviews with Palestinian high representatives in Iran and some Iranian prominent academics active in the sociology of the Palestinian cause. 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

SAA: I hope that students, researchers, historians, and everyone interested in the politics of Iran and the Arab world, particularly Palestine, would pick up this book. In terms of impact, this book tries to initiate a new discourse beyond sectarian dichotomy in the Middle East. It aims to highlight the conception of solidarity between the nations in the region beyond ethnic and sectarian attachments. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

SAA: I have started working on a second book project on the role of regional and global rivalries in shaping today’s Iraq. I am interested in examining the impact of international relations post-2003 on Iraq’s political fabric. I find it fascinating how media outlets attempt to dichotomize Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic decoration and its connection with Iraq’s neighbors.  

 

Excerpt from the book

The Islamic Republic’s projection of power and influence: the dream of leading the Islamic Ummah 

It is perhaps stating the obvious that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a state underpinned and infused by revolutionary values and Islamist politics. Anti-Zionism, suspicion towards the United States, and the Ummah-centric approach of Iran sit comfortably alongside the Islamic Republic’s strategic interests and ideological outlook. In other words, strategic interests complement the identity of the state. I would add, however, that the primary reason for why Iranian revolutionaries from diverse political backgrounds have comfortably reached a consensus on supporting the Palestinian cause is the universal acceptance of the need to defend what is perceived to be a just cause. The depth of this was registered during the Islamic revolution with the introduction of the words mastazaafeen (oppressed) and mostakbereen (oppressors).

At the same time, this study has suggested one must add that like all states, the Islamic Republic of Iran aims to expand its political and ideological hegemony throughout the region. In this regard, the Islamic Republic perceives that it has the right and the might to lead the Islamic Ummah in its ideological struggle against so-called global arrogance, a term routinely used to refer to the United States. Support for Palestine serves Iran’s strategic interests of projecting power and expanding its ideological and political influence throughout the Muslim world. In other words, the expansion of influence and struggle for hegemony within the region complements the Islamic Republic’s beliefs about leading the Ummah. By amplifying its pro-Palestinian rhetoric, the Islamic Republic attempts to extend its reach into the Arab world in order to maintain its position within the Ummah as its “leader”.

Hence, the Palestinian cause has become strategically advantageous for the Islamic Republic in the sense that it has allowed Iran to convey its political discourse of resistance and emancipation throughout the region, which in turn has given Iran power and influence herein. Various factions in the Islamic Republic underline the Islamic revolution’s ideas in an attempt to boost Iran’s credibility as a “leader” of the Islamic Ummah. Iran’s leadership has likewise constructed the Palestinian cause as a yardstick for quantifying Muslim resistance against “global arrogance”. This logic is echoed by Yvette Hovsepian-Bearce, who argues: 

The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khamenei perceives Iran to be the leader of the Muslim World and foster parent of Palestine. As such, he regards Palestine’s and Iran’s interests as one. According to the leader, Iran’s ability to export its cultural revolution and vigorously fight as Palestine’s champion against Israel is part of Iran’s global appeal to oppressed nations. He will continue to assert this militant stance against all internal and external criticism of Iran’s support of the Palestinian cause.

While the Islamic Republic does not credit itself with having solely ushered in the Muslim resistance groups of Palestine, it does regard Palestine as the main front-line against Zionism and imperialism. Although the emancipation of Palestinian land is respected first and foremost as a Palestinian obligation, the Islamic Republic has remained a major supporter of the Palestinian resistance within the convenient legitimating framework of “Islam”. Since the Islamic revolution, the Iranian leadership seems determined to avoid bargaining over its commitment towards its principled support for Palestine and resistance against Zionism.

For the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Palestinian cause transcends geography and thus sits comfortably with its strategic objectives due to the ease with which it reflects its revolutionary ideological values. The trajectory of Iran’s pro-Palestinian position provides a number of vital analytical lessons. First, ideological principles – such as the desire for independence, resistance against the hegemony of superpowers or solidarity – are not simply imaginary constructs but strategic preferences that appeared and materialised due to Iran’s contemporary history. Second, ideology and national interests can be conjoined. In the Islamic Republic’s discursive fabric, revolutionary values are synchronised and conciliated with the state’s national interests and therefore can be mutually reinforcing. This approach helps us to understand Iran’s aims to widen its outreach towards the Arab world, particularly towards the Levant. Some of the Islamic Republic’s strategic aims – particularly those related to Palestine and the Ummah – can be complex for some to comprehend unless we are able to position them within a proper ideological context. The decisive objectives of the Islamic Republic are the renunciation of Zionism and the rejection of dependency on foreign powers. If we return to the conceptual framework followed in this study, we can safely deduce that there is a continuity in how Iran expresses its pro-Palestinian stance and its actual policies. Iran’s policy towards Palestine did not, however, simply develop only after the Islamic revolution. The pre-revolutionary era demonstrates that many opponents of the Shah’s regime also expressed solidarity with the people of Palestine. Hence, this study has also suggested that Iran’s relations with Palestine cannot be simply reduced to opportunism or a desire to exploit the Arab world for material benefit. While some in the Western world and even within Arab states may regard Iran’s pro-Palestinian stance as solely opportunistic, such analyses overlook six decades of solidarity demonstrated by Iranian activists – including those with left-wing ideological tendencies – towards the Palestinian cause.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.