Judith E. Tucker, ed., The Making of the Modern Mediterranean: Views from the South (New Texts Out Now)

Judith E. Tucker, ed., The Making of the Modern Mediterranean: Views from the South (New Texts Out Now)

Judith E. Tucker, ed., The Making of the Modern Mediterranean: Views from the South (New Texts Out Now)

By : Judith E. Tucker

Judith E. Tucker (ed.), The Making of the Modern Mediterranean: Views from the South (University of California Press, 2019).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book? 

Judith Tucker (JT): The book grew out of a conference held by the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University back in the spring of 2013. We wanted to commemorate the work of our late colleague, Faruk Tabak (1954-2008), most notably The Waning of the Mediterranean, 1550-1870: A Geohistorical Approach (2008), his magisterial contribution to the field of Mediterranean studies. We had invited a number of scholars who approach the history and culture of the Mediterranean from the southern and eastern shores to participate, and the quality of the papers they delivered made it clear that a published volume was in order. Of course, as is often the case, most of the papers were conference presentations and the road from the conference to the published volume was a long one, as the various contributors needed time to revise and expand. I was excited about this project from the beginning as it overlapped with my own forays into the history of the early modern Mediterranean, so I happily served as editor.

The central concern of the volume is to explore how changing the angle of vision can help us revisit the historic place and space of the Mediterranean.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address? 

JT: The central concern of the volume is to explore how changing the angle of vision can help us revisit the historic place and space of the Mediterranean. The view from Europe has long been the dominant one in Mediterranean studies, although there have been some recent attempts to reorient the field. Many of the questions that are asked in the volume are not new: What are the borders and defining characteristics of the Mediterranean? What forces of nature, politics, culture, or economics have made the modern Mediterranean? Has it been a site of conflict or connection? How does the history of change in the Mediterranean help us understand the transition from early modern to modern times? The novelty lies in the answers when given from the southern and eastern shores. 

Three chapters explore the tensions between space and place. Nabil Matar examines Arab views of the Mediterranean in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and questions the extent to which it was a meaningful or even coherent space for Arab thinkers. Julia Clancy-Smith looks to the Mediterranean from the Maghrib in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with a focus on what marginal people and things, the kidnapped and the shipwrecked, have to tell us about both fragmentations and connections in sea space. Edmund Burke III makes his own argument for connections of identity and ideology in the long nineteenth century that owe much not only to the southern shores but also to broad Eurasian trajectories. 

Two other chapters look to the semi-licit world of piracy in the south and east as key to the forging of business and legal ties that could alternately be connectors or destabilizers. Joshua White traces a practice of “slave laundering” that took place in the seventeenth century and depended on cooperative networks, but also gave rise to tensions. My chapter on the law governing Mediterranean piracy in the eighteenth century suggests that southern and northern laws and practices of piracy converged to create a shared legal culture that could, however, be subject to challenge from inside and out. 

The final two chapters address the imagining of the Mediterranean from its southern shores in colonial and postcolonial times as a critical and contested project. Osama Abi-Mershed discusses the utopian vision of a prominent St. Simonian based in French Algeria who saw Mediterranean space as a location for reform and cooperation under the aegis of a benevolent France. William Granara, looking to colonial and postcolonial Tunisian Arabic literature, traces the struggles of Arab writers to take back Mediterranean space. The overall thrust of the volume is a rethinking of centers and margins, and a complicating of linear Mediterranean stories in which Europe has been the star player. 

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

I have been mainly a historian of women and gender, and Islamic law, in Egypt, Syria, and Palestine in the Ottoman period, so this is a big departure for me. By chance I became intrigued a few years back by the history of piracy in the eighteenth century, and everything we do not know about it, and so I began to look into it in relation to questions of gender and law, in particular.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

JT: I do hope it has some impact in the field of Mediterranean studies and invites scholars to pay more attention to the “other shores.” It is an invitation of sorts to future researchers to do their work on as many littorals as possible, as well as the sea itself. More broadly, the Mediterranean is a problematic space today—a political, economic, cultural, and psychological barrier, a place of danger, inhumanity, and death. I like to think that engagement with its complex history might put this moment in perspective, might help us to remember and then reimagine the Mediterranean as a shared space of connection and intertwined communities of land and sea.  

J: What other projects are you working on now?

JT: I am still engaged with the history of piracy, although I would like to integrate this interest with my longstanding commitment to gender history. It is not proving an easy task, but I am still trying. I have a couple of other projects on various burners—a historical novel that, yes, incorporates some pirate action, and also a team plan to write a history text for women and gender in the Middle East. One of the real perks of being at my stage of career is the freedom to follow your interests wherever they lead without having to give much thought to the requirements and pressures of publishing in and for the academy. It is liberating!

 

Excerpt from the book 

From the introduction 

Finally, political agendas have also made their mark on the field. The imperial dreams of modern Europe could take a Mediterranean form, most famously in the case of France and its territorial expansion into the lands of North Africa. After its invasion of Algeria, France began to trumpet itself as the heir of Rome, a destiny that would reestablish and improve on Roman glory in the Mediterranean by restoring the physical integrity of the region. Such ambitions could not but influence scholarly production, and a French colonial environmental history arose that shaped this imaginary, as well as related policies. To be sure, it was no accident that Braudel’s sojourn as a high school teacher in Algeria for nine years in the 1920s drew his attention to the Mediterranean world and helped incubate his ideas about Mediterranean connections in an earlier period—and that French scholarship has maintained a record of continuous engagement with Mediterranean studies ever since. In the Mediterranean of much European scholarship, however, beginning in the late nineteenth century, Arabs and Muslims were shadowy presences, marginalized or even excluded from membership in a Mediterranean identity.  

Anticolonial and postcolonial nationalism eschewed this Mediterranean of imperial imagination in any case, and the national narratives of most states on the southern and eastern shores have had little to say about a Mediterranean identity. Looking east to other Arab lands, south to African connections, and above all within territorial boundaries, nationalist historians of North Africa, for example, wrote the history of the state without much reference to a Mediterranean past or to a connection to Europe outside of resistance to colonialism. In Kenneth Perkins’s essay on historiography in North Africa, which appeared in a volume focused primarily on indigenous historians and the decolonizing of history, the Mediterranean as a meaningful site or concept does not make an appearance. The same holds true for most of the other essays that discuss North African historiography. The impression that the Mediterranean as a historical frame is treated by those from the southern and eastern shores with a certain amount of reticence is reinforced by the fact that the lion’s share of academic journals focused on the Mediterranean World are European publications, and there is no comparable journal published in Arabic. 

The Mediterranean enjoyed another upsurge in Europe as a concept and a theater of action in the 1990s, when European policy makers came to embrace it as a delineated place that made sense for the political agendas of the time. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or “Barcelona Process” initiated in 1995 envisioned new forms of cooperation in the realms of politics, security, and economics as well as social and cultural affairs among the Mediterranean countries of the northern, southern, and eastern shores, and interest in these cooperative projects gained new momentum after 9/11. Isabel Schäfer argues that such initiatives were a direct response to European concerns about what it saw as a variety of threats to its security coming from the south and east: migration, radical Islam, and economic crisis drew attention to the Mediterranean as a zone of instability in need of guidance and reform, fostering the notion of cultural unity to legitimize European pursuit of its interests in the region. The theme of an inclusive cultural heritage did not originate in the 1990s; rather, it drew on an existing strand of scholarship, as well as on French utopian thought about a “Mediterranean dream” of concord and harmony. The Saint-Simonians of the late nineteenth century; French intellectuals such as Albert Camus in the 1930s; and more recently Jacques Berque, with his formulation of the “Mediterranean of two shores,” all spoke to the richness of a shared Mediterranean identity. French political discourse has, on occasion, continued to incorporate this theme: the minister of foreign affairs, Dominique de Villepin, gave a speech in 2002 in Rabat titled, “The Dream of Two Shores.” 

Ideas about Mediterranean cultural commonalities developed in uneasy tension with impulses to differentiate and confront. Schäfer portrays European Union policy as wavering between a “Mediterraneanism” that promotes a shared Euro-Mediterranean identity and a “delimitation” that constructs the south and east as dependent “antechambers to Europe” in need of protection. Ambivalence and ambiguity haunt the European approach to the Mediterranean: “the common cultural heritage continued to be invoked while firm policies on security, migration and enlargement are pursued, which draw a clear frontier in the middle of the Mediterranean.” Fabre notes the ongoing purchase of “paradigms of discord,” à la Pirenne and Huntington, alongside the more utopian visions, and characterizes Euro-Mediterranean relations as a “hegemonic peace” of inherent instability. At this writing, as a mood of anti-Muslim sentiment appears to be escalating in Europe, and the refugee crisis calls into question claims of a shared Mediterranean fate, European political agendas seem to be swinging hard toward policies of difference and the solidification of borders—this Mediterranean dream is in retreat.

The Mediterranean has proved elusive as a place. Scholars and policy makers alike have disagreed about almost everything of importance—its physical boundaries, its primary characteristics, its unity, its connectivity, and the value of its past and future as a space for political projects, economic ties, cultural connections, and meaningful identities. We have seen that angles of vision make a difference. The Mediterranean has been viewed from environmental, economic, political, and cultural perspectives, with a resulting variety of outcomes and judgments on its utility as a unit of analysis for intellectual or political projects. The Mediterranean has lent itself equally to the development of different themes in various historical contexts; those who study ancient, medieval, early modern, or modern periods are preoccupied with distinct topics, some of which may or may not travel well over time. And as with all academic fields, Mediterranean studies is located in a broader context of political and economic power imbalances and struggles. Few would quarrel with the notion that the intellectual center of gravity has been located in Europe, and studies of the Mediterranean have privileged the European experience of the place. In this book, the hope is to contribute to a growing body of scholarship that is fostering a more inclusive study of the Mediterranean by taking the experiences of the southern and eastern shores into account.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.