Najam Haider, The Rebel and the Imam in Early Islam (New Texts Out Now)

Najam Haider, The Rebel and the Imam in Early Islam (New Texts Out Now)

Najam Haider, The Rebel and the Imam in Early Islam (New Texts Out Now)

By : Najam Haider

Najam Haider, The Rebel and the Imam in Early Islam (Cambridge University Press, 2019).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Najam Haider (NH): When I first began graduate school back in 2001, I was obsessed with debates in early Islam over the nature of the early sources. This was a time when a new school of historians was calling into question the reliability of historical sources concerning the earliest period of Islamic history. Suddenly “facts” that were generally accepted about the first century of Islam were contested. I was motivated to defend the veracity of the source material but struggled to find a method that would withstand scrutiny. This eventually led me to write my first book, which attempted to validate historical narratives through a different corpus of material, namely texts dealing with ritual. It was a small intervention, but it did not get at larger questions about historical writing. It was only in the last few years that I have returned to this topic with the hope of shifting the very nature of the debate that first interested me.

We often implicitly assume that the intellectual constructs that inform the modern world are universal.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

NH: The book is mainly concerned with what it meant to write history in a different time and place. We often implicitly assume that the intellectual constructs that inform the modern world are universal. In the case of the early Muslim world, I contend that the rules and epistemological assumptions that governed “history” privileged meaning (or “truthiness”) over a documentary rendering of the past. Such an approach was not singular to the early Islam but rather a continuation of a “rhetoricized” historical tradition that permeated Late Antiquity (and even the Classical period). In addition to Late Antique studies, I draw heavily on literary studies that are interested in the construction (and meanings) of historical narratives.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

NH: In my first book, I tried to test the validity of sectarian origin narratives (taken from standard historical works) through a method that relied on ritual sources. The idea was that the ritual sources—if mined properly—could provide evidence for the reliability of chronicles which were then being critiqued by a number of skeptical scholars. In the ten years since, I have begun to think of Islamic history in different terms. Specifically, I have come to the realization that questions about veracity/fabrication are fundamentally problematic in that they view early Islamic historical material through the lens of a modern European understanding of history. The better question is how early Muslim writers understood the project of history. So, in a sense, I have gone from being a pawn in the debate over the reliability of early Islamic historical writing to a critic of the very nature of this discourse.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

NH: The first and last chapters of the book are very much a call to rethink the way we approach historical sources in the early period of Islam. This is a very general discussion that I think can be grasped by anyone interested in Islamic history. At the end of the first chapter, I propose a model for tackling historical sources that I feel better reflects the nature of the sources themselves. The middle chapters are probably better suited for specialists. Here, I try to demonstrate the utility of my model. These are primarily intended as proofs of concept. In terms of impact, my real intention is just to shift the nature of the debate over this material and encourage scholars to ask a different set of questions. I would very much like someone to come along with a better model! I am more invested in changing the conversation than in being absolutely correct. 

J: What other projects are you working on now? 

NH: My current projects involve raising two children. Hamza is three, and Fizza is one. But seriously, I have written three quite different books over the last nine years and I am taking a little break to read and really consider what I would like to do next. The idea that most interests me at the moment involves a reconstruction of the social geography of Zaydi Shi‘i communities in the third/ninth century in Kafa through a set of legal sources that remain relatively unstudied.

J: Is this a book about Shi‘ism?  

NH: Given the fact that a lot of my scholarship focuses on Shi‘ism and that my previous book was an introductory work that examined Shi‘ism through the lens of memory, it might be a little puzzling that this current book makes no mention of Shi‘ism in the title. The reason is that I have come to be less comfortable with scholarship that isolates Shi‘ism from the larger study of Islam. This is a tendency that—in my opinion—marginalizes Shi‘ism as an object of study. Having said this, the second and third case studies in my book spend a lot of time on Shi‘i historical sources in order to demonstrate their similarity to non-Shi‘i sources. The point here is that the dichotomy between Sunni and Shi‘i history is a very modern construct that does not withstand any careful scrutiny.

 

Excerpt from the book

Chapter Five: Reconsideration 

Imagine wandering through a bookstore on a lazy Saturday afternoon. The books are arranged on the shelves under different subject headings. A quick glance in the fiction section reveals stories drawn from the imagination, while the popular science section promises complicated truths in accessible form. The history section contains considerable ambiguity, with books documenting events through the perspectives of historians. It is understood that these authors reproduce the past through the lenses of their own experiences, but their work is still evaluated based on their fealty to facts. In other words, history, a scholarly construct, is evaluated against a standard of accuracy.

This modern European understanding of history has permeated contemporary scholarship on early Islam. In the past half-century, it has helped produce remarkable insights into premodern Muslim societies. Scholars – myself included – have devoted countless hours to disentangling contradictory reports of a given conflict or incident. Much of this work has involved tracing accounts back to their sources, with figures such as al-Wāqidī (d. 207/822) and al-Madā’inī (d. 225/840) occupying a central place in the reconstruction of early historical narratives. Questions pertaining to chains of transmission and mechanisms for the transfer of knowledge have spawned complicated and passionate debates between historians. This kind of careful, detailed research has allowed scholars to peek into the early Muslim community in its formative stages. More recent iterations of this approach have further complicated and enriched our understanding of this period through the introduction of novel sources such as non-Arabic texts and archaeological evidence. These are all welcome developments, with great potential for the advancement of the field as a whole. 

This book, however, is concerned with a different set of issues. If we place our hypothetical bookstore in Kūfa in the third/ninth century, what assumptions could we make about the content of specific categories of writing? In the case of science, for example, contemporary scholars have challenged longstanding claims about the plague in the early modern Muslim world while also documenting differences in the categorization of certain types of knowledge. This sensitivity reflects a fairly obvious truism: societies conceptualize information in distinctive ways. In light of this fact, it is unlikely that modern European understandings of history match the attitudes of early Muslim historians. This disconnect raises a number of important questions about the craft of historical writing in the early period. What were the underlying assumptions and rules that governed the composition of historical works? Did historians place a premium on the verbatim, almost photographic, preservation of past events? Did they differentiate between multiple genres of historical writing? It is easy to imagine that precision in reports of the Prophet’s actions or of the circumstances surrounding the revelation of Qur’ānic verses held a particular significance, but can we say the same of a conversation between an Umayyad caliph and a captured rebel? The former carried normative weight in myriad fields, whereas the latter represented a struggle for political and perhaps religious legitimacy.

Another set of pertinent questions concerns the audience for historical writing. Were historical texts aimed at a broad public? In the case of the tales of storytellers (quṣṣāṣ), they clearly were, but what about the grand historical narratives constructed by al-Ṭabarī or al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī? If we assume – as seems likely – that these latter works were composed for scholarly elites, did historians assume a baseline of knowledge in their audience? This appears to have been the case in late antique historiography, where writers played off the ubiquity of certain narratives among the elite. For such an audience, was it permissible, or even expected, that historians would create meaning by embellishing existing reports and creating new ones? Again, in the late antique world, it was fairly common and accepted for writers to rework meaningful narratives for polemical ends. 

A final set of questions involves the methods employed by early Muslim historians. Did they create their reports wholesale, or did they have access to sets of preexisting reports that they then altered or embellished? The pervasiveness of key figures such as al-Madā’inī in the historical tradition supports the latter possibility, with authors making their own interventions through the addition of small details, the insertion of dialogue, or the creation of context. Such changes could lead to dramatically different interpretations of a given event. The repurposing (literally) of these reports became more apparent after the fifth/eleventh century, as historians wove existing accounts into new, composite narratives. It is also possible, however, that early historians felt authorized to create reports that conveyed the importance of a given event instead of documenting its exact details. An exchange between a court official and a prisoner, for example, was meant to establish the stakes at a critical moment. It was not a verbatim reproduction of an actual conversation. It is unlikely that audiences expected such a reproduction. 

These questions have no clear or easy answers. The prospects for reconstructing the scholarly presuppositions of a preindustrial Near Eastern society a thousand years ago in the absence of abundant source material seem bleak. But this alone should not prevent us from considering such issues, which are routinely discussed by historians of other periods. In this book, I attempt to address this lacuna for the study of early Islam by proposing and modeling a different way of thinking about early historical writing. Its aim is not to replace other kinds of scholarship, but rather to provide an alternative space for interrogating the material that is perhaps more resonant with premodern attitudes toward historical writing. 

The model presented in this book embodies an understanding of history that was prevalent in the late antique period and bears similarities to ideas in other premodern societies. Specifically, it rests on the premise that early Muslim historians were more concerned with preserving the meaning of a given event than they were with recording its specific details. In practice, this focus meant that authors were free to embellish and elaborate narrative elements (within certain bounds) in order to endow an event with significance. The baseline for such elaboration was the shared core structure of an event or a biography that was familiar to the scholarly audience. In the context of late antique studies, this kind of meaningful and ubiquitous narrative might be referred to as a myth. As described in Chapter 1, the core structure provided the skeletal outline for a story that was then populated with narrative elements either created by the historian or taken from existing sources and embellished appropriately. The resulting text was shaped by an interpretive framework that conveyed the author’s purpose. This was neither a “fictional” account nor a “factual” rendering of the past. It was simply historical writing. 

The most striking aspect of this model is its fluidity. The individual steps (core structure, narrative elements, and interpretive framework) function as malleable guidelines applicable to a range of approaches that operate outside the binary of fact vs. fiction. This flexibility is evinced by the diversity of structures and analytic methods utilized in the three case studies. These differences, in fact, embody one of the central premises of this book: namely, the rejection of a singular explanation or approach to early Muslim historiography.

[…]

The three case studies gesture toward a few important observations about our view of historical writing in early Islam. Most importantly, they demonstrate the value of new approaches to the source material that transcend the methods and assumptions embedded in many contemporary studies. In other words, they point to a need for creativity, emerging from a realization that our particular notions of history do not necessarily translate to other societies in different periods. It is exceedingly difficult to reconstruct the scholarly presuppositions of the early Muslim world, but this difficulty does not make the exercise meaningless. A basic consideration of these complications has proven invaluable to scholars in other disciplines. This book provides a first foray in this direction for early Islam, anticipating that others will follow suit with innovative and – hopefully! – better methods and models.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.