Dana El Kurd, Polarized and Demobilized: Legacies of Authoritarianism in Palestine (New Texts Out Now)

Dana El Kurd, Polarized and Demobilized: Legacies of Authoritarianism in Palestine (New Texts Out Now)

Dana El Kurd, Polarized and Demobilized: Legacies of Authoritarianism in Palestine (New Texts Out Now)

By : Dana El Kurd

Dana El Kurd, Polarized and Demobilized: Legacies of Authoritarianism in Palestine (Hurst Publishers, October 2019). 

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Dana El Kurd (DEK): As a Palestinian, the conditions of stagnation and malaise that seemed to be increasing in Palestine were obviously at the forefront of my mind. So, I knew I wanted to research some aspect of that stagnation. I was most interested in why Palestinians were not able to mobilize like they had done in the past, and why their ability to face the occupation had weakened to such a degree.

I traveled to Palestine to start sketching out my project. There, while conducting an interview during preliminary fieldwork, one Palestinian Authority (PA) official interrupted the proceedings to insist that I “write how we got here.” I took that very seriously. I wanted to write a book outlining exactly the causal mechanisms linking international involvement to the PA’s authoritarianism, and how that externally backed authoritarianism in turn affected and stunted Palestinian society.

... the PA is having a specific impact on Palestinian society’s mobilization capacity.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

DEK: The book focuses on international-domestic linkages and authoritarianism, and then the impact of authoritarianism on society. The first part of the book looks at the former, and the second part the latter. For the first part, I did interviews with PA bureaucrats and decision-makers. I also conducted a nationally representative survey in the Palestinian territories to see how international involvement impacted public opinion differently from political elite opinion. I argued that political elites were divorced from their public precisely because of international intrusion into that relationship, and that was what made the PA more blatantly authoritarian overtime. The survey analysis and interview data confirmed this argument. 

In the latter portion, the book addresses the impact of the PA’s indigenous authoritarianism on, specifically, polarization and protest. I analyzed how the PA’s repressive strategies had polarized Palestinian society, rendering society incapable of coordinating across partisan lines. I also used an original dataset (covering protests in the West Bank from 2007 to 2016) in conjunction with interviews conducted with activists to examine how this polarization impacted protests. I found that the PA’s selective repression strategies—targeting some groups while coopting others—was creating grievances between groups in Palestinian society, and insularity within them. This explains why we see rising levels of polarization and an inability to coordinate across party lines. Specifically, the most impacted groups were the Islamist parties, given the conditions of repression they have faced in the West Bank following the 2006 legislative elections. As for the protests, I found that they were most likely in non-PA areas, despite the ongoing repression of the Israeli occupation and, often, a lack of organizing institutions in those areas. This proves that the PA is having a specific impact on Palestinian society’s mobilization capacity.  

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

DEK: This is my first book, and it is my first project on Palestine. But, overall, it is connected to the themes of authoritarianism, repression, and mobilization, as well as international involvement in the Arab world, which my other projects (past and present) also focus on.  

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have? 

DEK: I hope this book will be read by academics interested in authoritarianism in the Arab world, as well as academics specifically interested in Palestine. But, perhaps more importantly, I hope this book is read by those who work with or in Palestinian civil society. Ideally, I would want the takeaways of this book to help emerging Palestinian leaders pinpoint where things are going wrong, and also to help formulate alternative plans to mobilize Palestinian society once again. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

DEK: I am currently working on a second book project, concerned with the impact of Israel on authoritarianism in the Arab world. I hope to look at the diffusion of authoritarian technologies, as well as the impact of Israeli-Arab relations on state-society dynamics in normalizing states.

J: What is the impact of current American pressure (particularly Trump’s “Peace for Prosperity” proposal) on Palestinian leadership and society?

DEK: In my book, I have shown how an American and Israeli-backed PA—specifically following the 2006 legislative elections—has had a profound impact on Palestinian social cohesion. The PA was pressured to overturn democratic elections, crack down on legitimate dissent, and generally disrespect civil rights and the rule of law for the sake of Israel’s security. But, given the role of international funding, the PA has also been the strongest player in town; it has employed a large segment of Palestinian society and has had the capacity to get involved in grassroots organizations and their mobilization capacity. This has had the impact of crowding out other vehicles for organization. 

Given that the Trump administration has just taken steps to cut funding to Palestinian security (in an attempt to strong-arm Palestinian leadership into cooperating with the peace proposal farce), this might lead to a scenario where the PA can no longer control and repress Palestinians to the degree they once did. This means Palestinians may have an opportunity to express their dissent to a larger degree than in the recent past, both against the occupation and against the Oslo paradigm. 

Moreover, as I have written before on the subject, this moment represents an opportunity for the PA to finally restructure their relationship to society. Instead of being at odds with the will of the Palestinian people, now Trump has provided PA leadership with the excuse to realign themselves with the aspirations of everyday Palestinians. This would mean their complete rejection of the Trump proposal, the cessation of security coordination with Israel, as well the harnessing of Palestinian political will to mobilize against the current state of affairs. For a leadership without authority, presiding over a “state” without sovereignty, the biggest asset the PA has is the Palestinian people. They should therefore take the opportunity that Trump has presented, in the form of this plan, to finally represent their people, and to reject the Oslo paradigm which has left them stagnating since 1991. Given recent circumstances, this would seem quite reasonable to the international community, and Palestinian leadership can finally start finding a new path forward. 

 

Excerpt from the book

Ayed is a political activist from a modest background. He grew up in a West Bank village under occupation, and did not have the opportunity to immigrate for work or higher education. He was in his late teens when the first intifada erupted. As a member of Fatah’s political arm, Ayed organized protests against the occupation. For his efforts, he was imprisoned in Ofer military prison with a 30 year sentence. But in the late 1990’s, Ayed’s luck turned around. As a part of a deal with the Israeli government, the Palestinian Authority – the new Palestinian government – was able to secure Ayed’s release.

Ayed returned to Palestinian society, but realized soon that much of the conditions of occupation remained exactly the same. He attempted a return to activism, and was involved for some time in organizing protests and sit-ins. He could not, however, find institutional support for his activism. There were few organizations in place to facilitate coordination, and Ayed felt like he was getting nowhere. The PA itself did not seem interested in getting involved in support of such actions, and encouraged him to take a bureaucratic position in their interior ministry instead. Facing economic hardship and unable to find alternative work, Ayed agreed. Today, Ayed talks of the past, and looks at his personal stagnation as symptomatic of the Palestinian struggle. “We come here and pretend to work,” he says, “but we are only pencil pushers.” He is unhappy with the PA’s policies, but can do little to challenge them, especially because he is dependent on them as a source of income. 

This pattern of stagnation is not exclusive to Ayed; Palestinian society as a whole struggles with this general malaise. Prior to 1994, Palestinians were highly politicized and organized, despite a sustained loss of land and military occupation. Many Palestinians participated in a number of organizations throughout their daily lives – organizations that arose organically and functioned based on democratic practices. This not only had to do with the highly educated nature of Palestinian society, but also the reaction of Palestinian society to the effects of the occupation.  Palestinians organized themselves in order to better provide services to their communities and coordinate effectively in their political objectives. Many of these organizations were highly responsive to their members, and the overall nature of Palestinian civil society was democratic and robust. Thus, when the first intifada erupted in the late 1980’s, dense civil society was one of the main reasons that Palestinians were able to sustain a diffuse, mostly non-violent uprising despite the heavy cost imposed on them by Israeli repression. The first intifada was locally organized and effective in its objectives, and sustained itself for four years. Although coordinated with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, a representative of the Palestinian people in the diaspora, local forces took the lead on organizing the uprising.

Following the intifada, the PLO entered into talks with the Israeli government and international powers including the United States and European nations. From these negotiations, the Palestinian National Authority emerged as a governing entity, intended to facilitate the transformation of the occupied Palestinian territories into a viable state within 5 years. Considering the context in which the PA was created – one which featured a highly organized population with robust civil society – it should have been the case that the PA would develop in a democratic and responsive manner, in accordance with the society they governed. Indeed, the development of democracy was a key stated objective according to the PA’s leadership and its international donors. As it turned out, however, the actual trajectory of the PA’s political development drastically departed from this objective. 

Over time, the PA grew more authoritarian and began to erode the democratic underpinnings of Palestinian society. For example, scholars have noted the effect that the Palestinian Authority had on civil society organizations: civil society organizations became less effective, more isolated, and reported lower levels of trust amongst members.  Throughout the 1990’s, the PA served to co-opt Palestinian institutions. Where cooptation did not work, the PA used repression. Palestinians began to recognize that the authoritarian nature of the new regime hindered their ability to mobilize.  

For instance, when the five year deadline for statehood passed, Palestinians launched a second intifada. This uprising was very different from the first in terms of character and outcomes; it was much less organized, and achieved few of its political objectives. The disorganized nature of the second uprising also meant greater violence, as groups within Palestinian society found it harder to coordinate on common strategy and sanction spoilers.  The authoritarian nature of the PA seemed to have wide-spread implications on how society functioned, and the political stagnation that has characterized Palestinian society since 1994. 

International patrons were heavily involved throughout this process. The EU, Israel, and the United States were all engaged in setting the parameters of development and imposing pressure when the PA attempted to stray from their objectives. For instance, when the Islamist party Hamas won a plurality in the legislative elections of 2006, the US urged the outgoing party to launch a coup, and prevented the democratically elected members from taking power.  The US in particular was also heavily involved in funding the PA’s security projects, and the EU provided technical support for the PA’s bureaucracy. When international patrons did not get their way, sanctions would follow and the PA’s funds would be withheld. In certain circumstances, Israel would intercede militarily and assassinate or imprison PA leadership. Over time, Palestinians have found themselves in gridlock, as the PA’s institutions cease to function as intended, and the grass-roots organizations that once mobilized Palestinians disappear from the scene.

How did the Palestinian Authority demobilize society, when years of Israeli occupation failed to do the same thing? I argue that the PA’s repression is more effective, and more damaging. The PA more successfully demobilized Palestinians because it is an indigenous authoritarian regime, rather than an external occupier. Despite Israel’s greater resources and international backing, the PA was able to utilize its ties within society and covert authoritarian strategies to accomplish what Israeli repression was unable to do:  polarize and demobilize the Palestinian population. 

Crucially, the PA developed in an authoritarian fashion in large part as a result of international involvement. International involvement, led by the US, encompassed a wide range of behavior including foreign aid and diplomatic pressure. This involvement created a disjuncture between the PA and Palestinian society. As a result, Palestinian leadership was insulated from their domestic constituency, consumed with addressing international pressures rather than negotiating with their own society. This insulation strengthened authoritarian practices. Not only did the role of international patrons becomes a polarizing issue amongst the public, but so did the practice of authoritarianism itself. My research demonstrates that certain authoritarian strategies used by the PA increased societal polarization. Rising polarization, in turn, affected a number of key outcomes, including patterns of mobilization and the capacity for collective action. 

This dynamic is not unique to the Palestinian Authority. Across the Arab world, repressive regimes backed by international support have been able to polarize opposition forces and demobilize their societies. International involvement is a highly salient variable in the region. Where the interests of international patrons have been at odds with the interests of the domestic public, regimes deduce that accountability to their publics – or for certain segments of their publics – is no longer viable. Overall, international involvement that results in the insulation of the regime, thus facilitating the increased use of authoritarian practices, has profound societal impacts.

 

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.