Sima Shakhsari, Politics of Rightful Killing: Civil Society, Gender, and Sexuality in Weblogistan (New Texts Out Now)

Sima Shakhsari, Politics of Rightful Killing: Civil Society, Gender, and Sexuality in Weblogistan (New Texts Out Now)

Sima Shakhsari, Politics of Rightful Killing: Civil Society, Gender, and Sexuality in Weblogistan (New Texts Out Now)

By : Sima Shakhsari

Sima Shakhsari, Politics of Rightful Killing: Civil Society, Gender, and Sexuality in Weblogistan (Duke University Press, 2020).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Sima Shakhsari (SS): Since I immigrated to the United States over thirty years ago, I have been interested in activism and scholarship in relationship to the Iranian diaspora, gender, and sexuality. After volunteering and working in activist organizations in the Bay Area in the 1990s, and then later becoming disillusioned with the non-profit industrial complex, I decided to go to graduate school to think more critically about the politics of gender and sexuality among the Iranian diaspora. In my master’s thesis, I explored a few diasporic cultural productions, including an Iranian gay and lesbian magazine, and diasporic plays to think about the discursive production of queerness in diaspora. When I started my PhD studies, I was hoping to expand that research by studying the Los Angeles-based diasporic Iranian television programs that were broadcast to Iran. At that time, which was soon after the onset of the “war on terror,” these programs suddenly became extremely active in “anti-regime” programming. I started doing fieldwork in Los Angeles and Turkey to study this sudden fervor among former entertainers who had become political pundits. 

After preliminary fieldwork, I learned two things. First, the competition between these television channels over who was more anti-regime was owed to Condoleezza Rice’s proposal to spend seventy million dollars on Iran “democratization” projects. Ironically, none of these television channels received that money. Instead, the US Department of State launched the Voice of America Persian from Washington, DC. Second, except for a few old Iranians in Los Angeles, most of my interlocutors told me that they never watched the Iranian television programs, because the royalist entertainer-made-pundits were outdated and irrelevant to the Iranian politics. Instead, many people told me that blogs were “where it was at.” As one young woman in Istanbul told me, “Iranian televisions do not need to be researched. They need to be boycotted.” Incidentally, I noticed that Persian blogging was getting a lot of attention in mainstream international media, for being the fourth language of blogging in the world. The dominant narrative in these accounts about Weblogistan was, “because there is no freedom of speech in Iran, Iranians, in particular women, have finally found a voice through blogging.” According to this narrative, Weblogistan was where civil society had emerged for the first time in Iran. But, as I started reading Persian-language blogs, I learned that most of the famous/popular bloggers who were mentioned in the dominant accounts about Weblogistan lived outside of Iran, especially in Toronto. So, the narrative of the lack of freedom of speech as the reason for the proliferation of Persian blogs did not make sense. 

I decided to conduct online and offline ethnography to see what the hype about the liberatory potentials of Persian blogs was all about. In particular, I was interested in how gender and sexuality figured in blogging conversations about the future of democracy in Iran. It was through this research that I came to the idea of politics of rightful killing, which basically describes the geopolitical paradox wherein the Iranian people’s “freedom of speech” and “internet freedom” become buzzwords of “internet democratization projects,” at the same time that the Iranian population is subjected to death through deadly sanctions. Put simply, I wrote the book to explain how the Iranian population is being killed softly in the name of rights. 

As a technology of self, “practicing democracy” became the buzzword among some Iranian internet users ...

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

SS: The book engages with the literature about diaspora, internet, civil society, queer theory, biopolitics, necropolitics, and studies of governmentality. In particular, it argues that in the first decade of the new millennium, Weblogistan became the center of attention for the democratization industries and “experts” who deployed notions of international civil society, freedom, pre-emption, and security to ensure the geopolitical interests of the empire and global capitalism. The allocation of funding (by the US Department of State and the Dutch Parliament) to the Iranian diasporic media with the purported aim of promoting democracy in Iran; the proliferation of discourse about helping “opposition groups” in Iran and its diaspora to hasten regime change in the post–September 11 era; and the timely emergence of Persian blogging as a fast medium for transnational exchange of information, all brought Weblogistan into the spotlight of democracy projects. As a part of the transnational Iranian civil society, Weblogistan was a new site where heated debates about Iranian politics took place among internet-savvy Iranians in Iran and its diaspora. These debates highlighted the gendered, sexed, and racial exclusions of a futurity that was imagined through rehearsals of democracy and freedom in Weblogistan. As a technology of self, “practicing democracy” became the buzzword among some Iranian internet users who assumed their blogging world to be a microcosm of the Iranian population at large. In Weblogistan, heteronormative and homonationalist Iranian subjectivities were neither solely produced and regulated according to the Iranian nationalist discourses, nor by an assumed unidirectional neoliberal order. Rather, hegemonic forms of Iranian-ness were produced (and constantly reproduced) in a complex and multidirectional discursive, affective, and economic assemblage that included Iranians in Iran, diaspora Iranians, and competing and complicit non-state, para-state, and state entities (of several states) that operated under governmental and nongovernmental nomenclature.

Contrary to the accounts that celebrate Weblogistan as a unified, democratic, revolutionary, and anti-state online community that epitomizes the promises of civil society, in the book, I show that Weblogistan was where violent conflicts took place, inequalities that existed offline and online were reproduced, and desiring subjects (who aspired to exceptional citizenship) were normalized according to nationalist and neoliberal discourses. Weblogistan, I argue, was also a site where neoliberal self-entrepreneurs/experts produced and disseminated information about Iran, where cyber-revolutions dominated the lexicon of democratization projects of the empire. Ultimately, I argue, Weblogistan as a part of the transnational Iranian civil society was where the desire for exceptional citizenship and democratic futurity was cultivated, while the Iranian population was (and still is) subjected to the politics of rightful killing. Notwithstanding the desire for proximity to whiteness, displays of market virility, and disavowal of Arabness as strategies to survive anti-Muslim and anti-Arab racism, I argue that Iranians who aspire to exceptional citizenship constantly shuttle between rightfulness and rightlessness, as the looming fear of the Middle Eastern “terrorist” travels through contagion (to borrow from Puar), thus implicating all Iranians and marking them “risky citizens.” In other words, the risky citizen in the digital realm is a self-responsible individual, apt for democratization through bio-political and ethico-political practices that seek to normalize the (currently undemocratic) population according to the ideals of liberal democracy. However, unlike the exceptional citizen who is folded into life, this risky citizen simultaneously maintains a desire for liberal democracy, and a sense of belonging to a population that embodies a pending threat to the security of the “international community.” Living a loaned life, this risky subject can become disposable at any given moment.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

SS: As I said earlier, this book is an extension of my scholarly and activist interest in the Iranian diaspora, queer theory, and sexuality studies. In the ten years that it took for the dissertation to become a book, I wrote a few articles based on my ethnographic research among queer and trans refugee applicants in Turkey. This work builds on the concept of politics of rightful killing, which initially appeared in my dissertation and based on which this book is written. So, the book is closely related to my ongoing engagement with biopolitics and necropolitics, but it focuses specifically on the internet democratization projects. 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

SS: I hope that scholars and activists interested in the politics of “war on terror,” transnational feminist theory and praxis, anthropology, gender and sexuality studies, studies of biopolitics and necropolitics, diaspora studies, internet studies, Iranian studies, and Middle East studies will read this book. I wrote the book as an intervention in cyber-enthusiastic accounts about the “internet revolutions” in the Middle East, and to highlight the hypocrisy of “freedom projects” when the Iranian people are subjected to deadly sanctions. Hopefully, the book will engender critical conversations about these topics by encouraging a form of skepticism that pays attention to complicities in relation to the internet and diasporas. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

SS: Currently, I am working on a second book project that expands the notion of loaned life to think about queer and transgender refugees. As a scholar/activist, I am also working to raise awareness about the violence of sanctions on Iran through a billboard project and by fundraising for organizations that help those who are most affected by the sanctions in Iran. The outbreak of the coronavirus and the high mortality because of the lack of access to life-saving medicine makes this work even more urgent. I am also thinking about the devastating effects of the sanctions on social movements in Iran. In a time when the United States hawks and regime change forces opportunistically appropriate the Iranian people’s protests, social movements become almost impossible, as the Iranian state accuses activists of collusion with foreign forces. The legitimate protests to suppression of social freedoms, economic disparities, and austerity measures (which in large part are results of the sanctions) are shut down by the state in the name of national security. My recent article, co-authored with Minoo Moallem, thinks about these issues by analyzing the geopolitics of protests in Iran.

Excerpt from the book

On July 8, 2008, towards the end of my fieldwork, an Associated Press reporter asked Senator John McCain (then a presidential candidate) why, despite sanctions against Iran, U.S. cigarette exports to Iran grew more than tenfold during President Bush’s presidency. As McCain responded, “Maybe that’s a way of killing them.” Less than a year later, McCain would be paying a tribute to Neda Agha Soltan—a bystander who was shot during the protests that followed the Iranian presidential elections in Tehran in June 2009—condemning the Iranian state for repressing the Iranian people’s quest for democracy, applauding Twitter and Google for making the video of Agha Soltan’s death viral, and advocating U.S. support for democracy in Iran. Congress approved allocating $120 million for anti-regime broadcasting in Iran (Hivos 2011). President Obama’s administration established Near East Regional Democracy (nerd) in 2009 to focus “primarily on activities that don’t require an in-country presence. This included a strong focus on the support for media, technology, and Internet freedom, as well as conferences and trainings for Iranian reformers that may take place outside Iran.” Of the $40 million of nerd allocation in the fiscal year 2010, $10 million was specified for “internet access and freedom” (Hivos, 2011). In fy13, $8 million of the proposed $30 million was designated to “defend and promote an open internet” (McInerny 2012). The centrality of the internet in U.S. “liberation” projects was also reflected in Obama’s 2012 Iranian New Year address, in which he celebrated Facebook, Twitter, and other internet social networking tools for connecting Iranians and Americans: “The United States will continue to draw attention to the electronic curtain that is cutting the Iranian people off from the world. And we hope that others will join us in advancing a basic freedom for the Iranian people: the freedom to connect with one another, and with their fellow human beings.” 

The U.S. government’s efforts to “lift the electronic curtain” in Iran while imposing the harshest sanctions in the history of sanctions on the Iranian people seems paradoxical at best. On July 1, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (cisada) to amend the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (isa). cisada added new types of restrictions that Obama proudly announced to be crippling the Iranian economy. The new sanctions imposed excruciating economic pressure on the Iranian population—especially the working class—and jeopardized many people’s lives by making lifesaving medicine unaffordable. Ironically, the Obama administration added several provisions to make “it easier for American businesses to provide software and services into Iran that will make it easier for the Iranian people to use the internet.” How does one explain this aporia where the production of desire for free and democratic life is intertwined with death? What can be said about the politics of death and killing, management of life through rights, and the affective deployment of freedom in cyberspace? How do the material effects of sanctions and military intervention complicate the celebratory accounts of internet revolutions and affective mobilizations online? If mainstream representations of Weblogistan depict it as the bastion of civil society and therefore the realm of rights, what can be said about cyber civil society and rights in relation to death and disposability? This inconsistency of the U.S. policies towards Iran delineates the position that Iran holds in a militant neoliberal order, wherein the Iranian population is seen as a desiring consumer of both commodities and liberal ideals of freedom in global capitalism, while the dispensability of Iranian lives is sanctioned in the name of security.

[…] I build from biopolitics and necropolitics to suggest a form of power over the liminal state between death and life: a life that is not bare, but is instead imbued with rights. As a trope, the “people of Iran” constitute a population that is produced through the discourse of rights and for which death through sanctions and/or bombs is legitimized within the rhetoric of the “war on terror.” I call the politics of death in relationship to an unstable life that is at once imbued with and stripped of liberal universal rights the politics of rightful killing. The politics of rightful killing explains the contemporary political situation in the “war on terror” where those, such as the “people of Iran,” whose rights and protection are presented as the raison d’être of war, are sanctioned to death and therefore live a pending death exactly because of, and in the name of, those rights. Foucault argues that while “the relationship of war” (“‘If you want to live, the other must die’”) is not new, modern racism makes this relationship “function in a way that is completely new and that is quite compatible with the exercise of biopolitics” (2003, 255). During the “war on terror,” the management and optimization of protected life (populations that are worth protecting) uphold national and international security as a justification for racism. The exercise of racism in the name of democracy entails biopolitical practices at home and abroad, as well as preemptive disposability of those who threaten “our way of life” or jeopardize the interests of the “international community.” Democratization (through trainings in the realm of civil society) and protection of rights (through the work of the “international civil society”) become preemptive strategies to contain the risk of terrorism in populations that are not fully redeemable and remain suspect. As such, strategies of preemption/redemption can be revamped as strategies of killing unapologetically and with no need for justification.

The politics of rightful killing does not replace necropolitics or biopolitics, but it exists in the same political terrain where populations are disciplined, normalized, and debilitated (Puar 2017) and where “bare life” (one that is stripped of rights in the state of exception) is subjected to death. It refers to the necessary correlate of biopolitics insofar as biopolitics encompasses the relationship of the life of one depending on the death of the other (Foucault 2003, 255). Like necropolitics, however, the politics of rightful killing addresses the insufficiency of biopolitics in accounting for contemporary configurations of politics of life and death and is concerned with the living dead, the population that lives on the threshold of life and death (Mbembe 2003, 40). Unlike the living dead, however, loaned life (zendegiye nessiyeh) addresses the coexistence of dreaded yet rightful life and impending death on the same plane. Neither bare life, nor the life of the shadow slave or that of the absolute enemy (as discussed by Giorgio Agamben in the death camps and Mbembe in the colonies, the plantations, and in Palestine), loaned life is killable not just in the exceptional state of emergency, state of lawlessness, or the state of siege—although it is legitimized under those states—but in the state of normalcy. Rather than being completely stripped of rights, loaned life is imbued with and indebted to (universal human) rights. Rather than Foucault’s formulation of biopolitics (“make live, let die”) or Puar’s formulation of debilitation (“will not let die”), the loaned life in the politics of rightful killing encapsulates the conditional life of the population that has the potential to be democratized and contains the risk of terrorism. It is loaned, as it is conditional and contingent on the form of life (make live only if life aligns with the tenets of liberal democracy) and the temporality of rights (make live only as long as gifted with rights). Unlike homo sacer, loaned life cannot be expended by anyone except for the liberalizing states that protect the life-worthy population (even as the life-worthy population is eliminating its internal dangers through racist technologies of government). The loaned life holds the promise of civil society, and thus the potential of being governed transnationally, while being prone to preemptive death for the risk that it contains. In the endless state of war against the “terrorist states,” a new norm is established where the loaned life becomes the target of the sovereign’s right to kill in the name of rights and the protection of the “international civil society.”

  • ALSO BY THIS AUTHOR

    • Minoo Moallem, Persian Carpets: The Nation as a Transnational Commodity - A Review

      Minoo Moallem, Persian Carpets: The Nation as a Transnational Commodity - A Review

      While hand-made Persian carpets remain a luxury item for many, machine-made rugs with Persian carpet designs are advertised for a relatively affordable price on websites that make this commodity easily available to those who desire this object for its nostalgic value, its Orientalized meaning, or its aesthetic potential to cultivate feelings of worldliness in a transnational world. In Persian Carpets: The Nation as a Transnational Commodity (2018)Moallem deploys a Foucauldian genealogical approach to trace the cultural, political, and affective meanings of the Persian carpet from its emergence in the mid  nineteenth century—when it functioned as a civilizational and imperial commodity—to its present form as a national and transnational commodity and diasporic symbol of affective attachment.

    • The Irony of Rights: Healthcare for Queer and Transgender Refugee Applicants in Turkey

      The Irony of Rights: Healthcare for Queer and Transgender Refugee Applicants in Turkey
      The crowd in front of the police station is chatting in clusters in the brutal summer heat. Refugee applicants occasionally stop their conversation to say hello to friends and acquaintances who arriv
    • War of Position and War of Maneuver: Sexperts, Sex Pervs, and Sex Revolutionaries

      War of Position and War of Maneuver: Sexperts, Sex Pervs, and Sex Revolutionaries
      The recent issue of Foreign Policy on sex has instigated critical feedback from many who have rightly challenged racist and Orientalist representations of gender and sexuality in the Muslim

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.