Lorenzo Vidino, The Closed Circle: Joining and Leaving the Muslim Brotherhood in the West (New Texts Out Now)

Lorenzo Vidino, The Closed Circle: Joining and Leaving the Muslim Brotherhood in the West (New Texts Out Now)

Lorenzo Vidino, The Closed Circle: Joining and Leaving the Muslim Brotherhood in the West (New Texts Out Now)

By : Lorenzo Vidino

Lorenzo Vidino, The Closed Circle: Joining and Leaving the Muslim Brotherhood in the West (Columbia University Press, March 2020).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Lorenzo Vidino (LV): While often the subject of heated debates, the Muslim Brotherhood in the West remains a mysterious entity. Scholars, security officials, journalists, and policymakers disagree on virtually every aspect of the issue, starting with the most basic questions: what the Brotherhood in the West is; who belongs to it; how one joins it; how it operates; how it finances itself; and, in some cases, whether it even exists.

Optimists argue that the Western Brothers are simply a socially conservative force that, unlike other movements with which they are often mistakenly grouped, encourages the integration of Western Muslim communities and offers a model in which Muslims can live their faith fully and maintain a strong Islamic identity while becoming actively engaged citizens. Pessimists see a much more sinister nature in the Western Brotherhood. Thanks to their resources and the naivety of most Westerners, they argue, the Western Brothers are engaged in a slow but steady social engineering program, aimed at Islamizing Western Muslim populations and ultimately at competing with Western governments for their allegiance. 

The issue has major policy implications, considering the large influence that the small yet highly organized cluster of Brotherhood-controlled and influenced organizations in the West yields within Muslim communities and in the general discourse over Islam in the West. Governmental agencies of all kinds—from those dealing with security issues to those involved in education, integration, immigration, and welfare—struggle with the issue. No Western country has adopted a cohesive assessment followed by all branches of its government. There is no centrally issued white paper or set of internal guidelines sent to all government officials detailing how Western Brotherhood organizations should be identified, assessed, and eventually engaged. This leads to huge inconsistencies in policies, not only from one country to another, but also within each country, where positions diverge from ministry to ministry, and even from office to office of the same body. This book seeks to partially fill this void.

Being part of the Muslim Brotherhood is not like belonging to a political party or an ordinary organization; it encompasses all aspects of a person’s life.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

LV: My previous book on the topic, The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West (Columbia University Press, 2010), focused on two aspects. The first was describing what the Muslim Brotherhood in the West is: how the first “pioneers” of the movement came to Europe and North America; how and why they set up organizations; and how their goals and ideology changed (or did not) once the movement was established in the West and over time. The second aspect was Western policymaking on the subject: it identified patterns and provided multiple examples of how various Western governments identify, assess, and engage with Western Brotherhood organizations. 

My new book builds on the first one and focuses on two specific aspects. The first is understanding the inner workings of the organization: how people are recruited into the group (generally after a lengthy “observation period”); how they are asked to join; the ceremony and oath of allegiance through which they join; how the usra system works (the nuclear cell of the Brotherhood, a group of five to six members that meet on a weekly basis to study Islam, discuss politics, talk about personal life, and plan Brotherhood-related activities, among other things); how it finances itself, and so on. The limited literature on the inner workings of the Brotherhood focuses on Egypt and there is no book that analyzes these dynamics in the West. Do the dynamics present in Egypt—in terms of recruitment, secrecy, hierarchical structure, internal discipline, and so on—apply also to the Brotherhood in the West? Are there differences from Western country to Western country? No literature covers this topic.

The second aspect the book seeks to analyze is how and why individuals that engage in an organization like the Muslim Brotherhood, which requires an incredibly high level of commitment, decide to leave the organization. Being part of the Muslim Brotherhood is not like belonging to a political party or an ordinary organization; it encompasses all aspects of a person’s life. The rigorous vetting and long cultivation a member undergoes to join the group gives him a sense of pride in belonging to an elite. Once he is a member, most of his personal ties and activities are connected to the Brotherhood, so that his entire life revolves around the group. Leaving the Brotherhood is not easy.

Both aspects—the group’s inner workings and the disengagement of some of its activists—are very difficult for outsiders to analyze, given the Brotherhood’s proverbially secretive nature. It is for this very reason that this book relies upon and weaves together the personal stories of several individuals who either were former member of the Brotherhood in Europe or North America or, in two cases, had extensive and intimate knowledge of Western Brotherhood networks (Swedish and American) from the inside. The various individuals profiled occupied various ranks in their organizations, from top leaders to hangers-on. They operated in different countries and at different times, and they had different reasons for joining and leaving. All, however, left spontaneously. Though some spent some of their years as members of the Brotherhood outside of the West, all lived at least a substantial amount of time there while active in Western Brotherhood networks. And all are identified by name.

I conducted the interviews with these seven individuals over eighteen months (although my dealings with some of them extend back for years, in some cases predating their decision to leave the Brotherhood) and in five countries. Each was interviewed for at least half a day; some interviews stretched over several days. These conversations were supplemented with research and interviews with related subjects in order to both verify and contextualize the information provided by those who disengaged. An additional dozen former members of various Western Brotherhood organizations and individuals, with close connections to that milieu, were interviewed for this book in seven countries. Some agreed to be quoted by name, some only anonymously. All provided important insights into joining and leaving the Brotherhood.

Each chapter is similarly structured, patterned on the three cycles of their militancy: becoming, being, and leaving. The first part focuses on how each individual joined the Brotherhood, with particular attention both to the recruitment methods employed by the organization and the psychological impulses that drove the individual to join. The second section describes his life inside the organization: the role he played; the activities he engaged in; and the organizations and the people he interacted with. The third section covers disengagement: the reasons that led each individual to leave the organization; how he did so; and what the aftermath was.   

J: What are the pitfalls and values of the book’s methodology?

LV: There are several pitfalls inherent to a scholarly analysis based predominantly on interviews with former members of an organization. Anyone would find it difficult to recall events and psychological processes that took place years, if not decades earlier, but for individuals who disengage from high-commitment movements there is the additional risk of bias—their recollections and views may be partial, distorted, or indeed deliberately fabricated. And the interviewer may introduce more problems by asking leading questions or by misinterpreting the answers; the ethical and practical concerns associated with interviews are widely recognized. I am well aware of these issues, and I have tried to address to them in several ways. I made substantial efforts to verify several claims that on their face appeared possibly untrue, defamatory, or both, omitting a few that I could not confirm.  

Nevertheless, a micro-sociological analysis based on the testimonies of former members of the Brotherhood or its larger milieu offers unique value. Their recollections about how and why they joined, what they did while members, and why and how they left constitute unparalleled sources of information over the inner workings, modus operandi, and ideology of a highly mysterious organization. They also provide useful glimpses into the psychological processes that lead some of its members to join and then disengage from the organization. Moreover, each chapter, taken on its own, tells the story of a fascinating life, the personal trajectory of an individual who went through his own complex evolution and, in some cases, played a key role in important political events.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

LV: Policymakers are my main target audience, but the style, which tells the compelling personal stories of various highly interesting individuals, makes it appealing to a broader audience. The topic is of interest in many countries, and I am very glad that we have received offers for translations in various languages. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

LV: I am currently looking at two specific aspects of Brotherhood-related activism in the West: financing (which entails funds from abroad but also self-generated, through a sophisticated network of businesses and charities) and what I call woke-Islamism, the discourse of mostly Western-born, young post-Ikhwanis that mixes classic Islamist concepts with frames and ideas from various very contemporary Western ideological trends.

 

Excerpt from the book 

The reasons that lead individuals to leave the Muslim Brotherhood are inevitably highly complex. Each former member underwent an evolution that was deeply personal, the product of a unique thought process. Nevertheless, the accounts published here and elsewhere show a number of similarities. As is common among those who disengage from other movements to which followers are intensely committed, all of them spoke of frustration with both organizational and ideological matters, showing a combination of disenchantment with how the group functioned and what ideas it espoused. Though there are important differences among them, they share many criticisms both of the organization and of its ideology. Similarly, while some specifics vary with location, many of the frustrations that have led some members of the Brotherhood in the West to leave the organization are similar to those expressed by members in the Arab world.

Regarding the organization, a common complaint is the Muslim Brotherhood’s lack of internal democracy. From Ahmed to Pierre, from Omero to a senior member like Helbawy, all agree with Mohamed’s assessment that “the big wigs can call the shots with a phone call, ignoring votes, procedures, and statutes.” While obedience to the senior leadership is taught to each aspiring member from the very beginning of his tarbiya, the lack of transparency in the internal decision-making process and the impossibility of challenging the leadership’s positions frustrates many Brothers, whether in the East or in the West. The Brotherhood’s strict application of the principle of al-sam’ wa-l-tâ’a (listening and obeying)—or, as Privot sarcastically calls it, “shut your mouth and obey, as a good soldier in submission to the great leader and to all the small middle-ranking leaders”—is often one of the first steps on the road to disenchantment and disengagement from the organization.

“The problem is about authoritarian management of power and decision-making,” lamented a Belgian Brother to Amghar and Khadiyatoulah. “We often consult with members and there is a debate of ideas, but it serves no purpose because the final decision always falls on the same individuals.” “One of the reasons that forced me to leave is the fact that each of my initiatives or decisions had to obtain the approval of the person in charge,” a French Brother explains. “Everything had to go through this person. For me, it was difficult to endure. We are of the same age and I have a Ph.D. I do have capabilities.” This democratic deficit and the opaque decision-making process have caused tensions and defections throughout the Arab world, but are felt as particularly objectionable in the West, where most of the Brotherhood’s activists have grown up in societies that encourage transparency and the expression of one’s own thoughts. Moreover, because in the West the Brotherhood has never been subjected to the repression it has long faced in the Arab world, the organization’s leadership there cannot cite what is often the main justification for this hierarchical obedience.

Another long-standing cause of friction and disenchantment within the Brotherhood, both in the East and the West, is nepotism. In Europe and North America many of the first-generation Brotherhood pioneers have propelled their wives, children, and in-laws to some of the top positions inside the milieu. While many of these individuals are unquestionably qualified and capable, the dynamic has frustrated many activists who did not belong to any prominent families and saw themselves as being, in their view, unjustly bypassed.  The fact that the wives, children, and in-laws of pioneers such as Yussuf Nada and Ghaleb Himmat, Said Ramadan, Rachid Ghannouchi, and Jamal Barzinji are overly represented in various Brotherhood-related activities reinforces the view that the Western Brotherhood is composed of a small nomenklatura of interconnected activists, an “aristocratic elite” that controls everything.

The Executive Committee elected by FEMYSO’s 17th General Assembly in June 2013 illustrates this point well, as the four most senior positions were assigned to scions of top Brotherhood families. The assembly elected as president Intisar Kherigi, the daughter of al Nahda leader Rashid Ghannouchi. One vice president was Hajar al Kaddo, who had experience working with the Islamist charity Human Appeal as deputy manager in Ireland, her country of origin, and then in Turkey and Iraq. Hajar al Kaddo is the daughter of Nooh Edreeb al Kaddo, an Iraqi who is one of the leaders of the Irish Brotherhood milieu. Al Kaddo, in fact, is a trustee of the Europe Trust and the CEO of the Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland (ICCI) in the Dublin suburb of Clonskeagh, historically the hub of the Brotherhood in the country and the headquarters of the European Council for Fatwa and Research headed by Qaradawi. The other vice president elected was Youssef Himmat, the son of Ghaleb Himmat, a Switzerland-based Brotherhood financier who is Yussuf Nada’s business partner. The treasurer was Anas Saghrouni, the son of Mohamed-Taïeb Saghrouni, one of the éminences grises of the UOIF and the man who introduced Mohamed to the Brotherhood in France. 

The issue of ethnic bias is also regularly brought up by other former Brotherhood members. For many of them, it clearly reflected not just inequalities in the internal democratic process but also a deeper, ethical, and religious problem within the organization. That a group that touted, in its own name, brotherhood and equality among members of the ummah in effect discriminated against certain ethnic groups within the Muslim community was a major red flag for individuals like Pierre, who witnessed racism against both ethnic Swedes and non-Arab Muslims. But it was even more decisive for Abdul Rahman, who had been launched on his own path toward Islam by racial consciousness. The realization that the Brotherhood milieu looked down on African Americans, and had even enshrined those discriminatory positions in a document, was a deal breaker for him. 

Lack of internal democracy, nepotism, and ethnic biases are intertwined issues that frustrate many current and former members of the Western Brotherhood, but all those profiled above and those whose stories have appeared elsewhere complain even more vigorously about a fourth, connected problem: excessive secrecy. All, without exception, agree that while the secrecy was understandable in the Middle East for the organization to survive the harsh repression of local regimes, it is absolutely unnecessary in the West, particularly in the extreme form adopted. And while they all bemoan the secrecy that envelops all aspects of the group’s life, the former members are most frustrated by the denial of the very existence of the Brotherhood in the West. 

“We are not selling opium or drugs, we are propagating dawa,” asserts Helbawy, who for decades battled to convince the upper echelons of the organization that the decision to deny the Brotherhood’s existence in the West was both immoral and strategically ill-advised. Like the others, he argues that the Brothers would actually enjoy significantly more success in their efforts at engagement if they presented themselves for who they are, as the secrecy is perceived as indicating shame or an attempt to hide dark agendas. An identical case was made by Privot, a significantly more junior Brother, who repeatedly told “several European leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood that the discourse of denying belonging to the Brotherhood was just untenable and was taking all credibility away from the members, because it made them suspected of lying, and this all the more so as every Muslim is suspected right away of taqiyya.” Abdelkrim describes this secrecy as an omerta, Abdel Rahman as a “kind of sneakiness, like you’re ashamed of something.” All agree it is a major strategic weakness and a behavior that put them off, contributing significantly to their process of disenchantment and disengagement. 

While perceived flaws in the organization have been cited by all as crucial in their decision to leave, in most cases deep concerns about the ideology of the Brotherhood had even more weight. Indeed, frustrations about the organization’s inner workings often planted the first seed of doubt, which then led individuals to examine fundamental issues with adherence to the Brotherhood’s creed. In some cases, there was trigger moment that either sparked or culminated the process. In other cases, doubts accumulated slowly, without any peak. 

The ideological issues that led each individual to disengage are complex and personal, different from case to case. All the interviewees brought up, in one way or another, their frustration at the Western Brotherhood’s prioritization of politics over religion as one major cause. Some pointed to a particular incident—for example, Mohamed’s understanding that the Brotherhood’s leadership had simply played politics with the Danish cartoons but was not genuinely incensed by them—that made them think that the Brotherhood was merely using religion to achieve political goals. Others, like Omero and Pierre, came to question their commitment after experiencing a more gradual realization that the Brothers lacked a true spiritual side and were simply engaged in politics. 

The different post-Brotherhood trajectories of the individuals analyzed above also reveal the divergent reasons that led them to leave the group. Some, like Helbawy, do not renounce Islamism altogether but simply reject the version of it adopted by the Brotherhood or, more narrowly, The Brotherhood’s current leadership, who they believe have strayed from the original teachings of al Banna. For others, like Ahmed and Mohamed, the rejection of Islamism is complete, in all its manifestations and aspects, and they have instead embraced secularism and traditional forms of Islam.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.