Dörthe Engelcke, Reforming Family Law: Social and Political Change in Jordan and Morocco (New Texts Out Now)

Dörthe Engelcke, Reforming Family Law: Social and Political Change in Jordan and Morocco (New Texts Out Now)

Dörthe Engelcke, Reforming Family Law: Social and Political Change in Jordan and Morocco (New Texts Out Now)

By : Dörthe Engelcke

Dörthe Engelcke, Reforming Family Law: Social and Political Change in Jordan and Morocco (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Dörthe Engelcke (DE): This book is based on my doctoral dissertation which I completed at the University of Oxford. It all started with an empirical puzzle: two seemingly similar semi-authoritarian monarchies like Morocco and Jordan vary in how they engage in family law reform over the course of the 2000s. In Morocco, the process of reform became less dominated over time by actors who had received religious training, whereas in Jordan the shariʿa court administration retook control over family law reform. In Morocco it was the king who took the lead, whereas in Jordan the king was not involved in the reform process. The Moroccan law reflects more strongly the demands of women’s groups and proclaims international law as one of its sources, while the preamble of the Jordanian 2010 law states that the law is based entirely on Islamic sources. In contrast to Morocco, international actors such as UN Women play no role in the implementation of the family law in Jordan. So, this book started from the empirical puzzle of why two seemingly similar hereditary monarchies vary in how they engage in family law reform.

I was also intrigued by the reach of family law. Like most family laws world-wide, Islamic family law is gendered, but it provides more than just a lens through which to study gender relations, notably state-society and inter-religious relations as well. It is an area of law that affects every single citizen. People might never come into contact with criminal law throughout their life, but they definitely will encounter family law. I also felt that law and legal institutions in general were understudied, probably because the region is falsely perceived as lawless and law is assumed to matter less in non-democracies. In sum, I felt that family law, and law and legal institutions in general were issues of central importance.

When I started the project, I noticed that there were great in-depth studies of individual reforms but there have been few efforts to compare cases. The Moroccan family law reform of 2004 had become this shining example of reform both in the region and abroad. However, there was little effort being made to investigate whether the Moroccan case was really that exceptional. As a comparativist I naturally find the exceptionalism argument less convincing. The book thus makes a case for comparative analysis. Ultimately, comparisons caution us not to exoticize a particular case and to draw sharp lines between the universal and the culturally specific. 

... these reforms are carried out within an authoritarian context, and scholars of authoritarianism are not interested in family law.

DE: Family law reform has been a priority for women’s movements across the MENA region ever since most countries achieved formal independence after World War II. It is therefore understandable that many studies on family law focus on the role the women’s movement played in bringing about these reforms. However, the over-emphasis on the role of women’s groups has left other factors underexplored, including the impact of colonial legacies, state-building processes, mobilization against reform, the role of international law, and the impact of the legal system. The book directs our attention to the role legal systems play during reform processes. It demonstrates that the structure of the legal systems, shaped by colonial policies, had an effect on how reform processes were carried out, as well as the content and the application of family law. As a feminist, the question of women’s rights remains important to me, and I am interested in how power relations impact on family law and thereby rights and obligations.

Also, scholars who study family law reform rarely consider that these reforms are carried out within an authoritarian context, and scholars of authoritarianism are not interested in family law. In the 2000s, authoritarianism scholars have mainly been concerned with explaining the stability of authoritarian rule. They have greatly enhanced our understanding of how various institutions have contributed to the stability of authoritarian regimes. The functionalist approach often implies that all reforms undertaken by authoritarian regimes are system-maintaining. All internal processes that do not lead to regime change or that are not seen as system-maintaining are therefore considered irrelevant. This negates the possibility that there can indeed be change without regime change. I think that we miss a lot when we narrow our focus in such a way. 

Common approaches also have paid less attention to how different elements of the state interact during reform processes. I therefore adopt Joel Migdal’s state-in-society approach to counter the narrative of an active state at the center and a passive society as the recipient of state legislation. State agencies are not autonomous from society. It is relatively easy for a semi-authoritarian regime like Morocco to issue laws that express the views of politically dominant actors, since the regime controls the relevant political organs that are in charge of these processes. However, the regime then requires cooperation from both state and non-state actors to implement new legislation. In other words, actors other than the regime and the ruler shape how the law is implemented, and regimes are often unable to impose a consensus over norms and values.

My study uses Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice as an interpretative framework. It primarily focuses on the relationship between actors and how these are embedded in power relations; it combines structure and agency without seeing structural factors as deterministic. This helps us avoid repeating apologetic arguments which justify the existence of all forms of legal discrimination because of the history of European colonialism, while at the same time recognizing that colonial policies did and continue to shape reforms, attitudes, and practices. 

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work? 

DE: How and why contexts impact on reform practices has occupied me for some time. I originally wanted to write about family law in Algeria and Syria. I made an initial fieldwork trip to Algeria in 2010 and then left to Syria. Unfortunately, I had to leave Syria in May 2011. I published the data I collected in Algeria in a book chapter that analyses how colonialism, regional developments, and the civil war impacted on family law reform in Algeria. In Algeria, colonialism shaped what Algerians consider possible and acceptable avenues of reforms. How and why context shapes contemporary reform projects has remained important in my work. I have also worked on reconfigurations of Islamist and non-Islamist organizations in Morocco since 2011. How change happens without regime change has also played a role in my book.  

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

DE: I hope that the book will make those of us who study law and society in the contemporary period more receptive to how specific historical development processes and political contexts impact reforms today. I also hope that we revise common notions of reform that equate reform with linear progress. I think to understand law in any given setting it is helpful to adopt an inter-disciplinary approach. The book engages with debates in Islamic studies, law, and political science. Ultimately, I hope that there will be more conversations happening across disciplinary boundaries. 

I first presented the book during a book talk at the University of Jordan in Amman last year in April. The talk was attended by members of government institutions that work on family law reform, members of international organizations, as well as Jordanian students. I also discussed the book with members of the shariʿa court administration, the daʾirat qaḍi al-quḍat. Ultimately, I hope that it will matter to the people I wrote about and that they will find an outsider’s perspective informative. Language is, of course, a big issue in this regard, and this is why I am hoping to translate the book into Arabic. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

DE: I am currently working on a book about the personal status laws of Christian communities, comparing Jordan and Iraq, and examining issues such as filiation (nasab), adoption, divorce, and inheritance rights. Research to date has focused very heavily on Islamic family law in the Middle East, often neglecting the family laws applied by non-Muslim communities. This is particularly surprising given how much legal autonomy Christian communities enjoy across much of the region. Even at the international level, there is always a focus on Islamic law. The implementation of international conventions such as the United Nations Women’s Rights Convention exerts pressure to reform Islamic family law with a view to reducing discrimination against women. The family laws applied by Christian communities often go unnoticed in these debates even though, like Islamic law, they are gendered. This unequal treatment of different bodies of religious law also leads local actors to perceive the international system as biased and partisan. Thus, my motivation is to present law in the region in a more holistic way, but also to put Islamic family law and the family laws applied by Christian communities in relation to one another. 

 

Excerpt from the book 

The issuing of the Moroccan family code in 2004 was followed by initial approval from women’s groups who praised the new code as a milestone for women’s rights in the country. Islamists and other social–conservatives were primarily seen as the losers of this reform. Secular feminists assumed that the law would trigger social change, that is, make large numbers of people engage in relationships and practices that differ from those embraced before. By the end of the decade, however, secular women’s groups had become disappointed because the law did not function as a tool of “social engineering” to the extent that they had hoped. (...) Contrary to their initial hopes, marriage of minors has not disappeared but rather increased in the 2000s. Polygyny figures only remained stable. Also, only around twenty percent of all women now chose to marry without a marriage guardian. Islamist women’s organizations have also claimed that the 2004 law is not properly applied, but have expressed frustration about different issues. They have asserted that divorce has become too easy for women, leading to high divorce figures. They have also criticized the reconciliation (ṣulḥ) procedures, which oblige a judge to attempt to reconcile a couple to prevent a divorce, as insufficient and not working in practice, which further contributes to the breakdown of the family. 

A variety of conventional explanations are usually advanced to explain why statutory law reform often does not have the intended outcome. These include people’s ignorance of the law, insufficient enforcement capacities of the state, and people’s perception that the reformed statutory laws are in violation of their customary practices and beliefs. Moroccan women’s groups have argued along similar lines. They in particular criticized the state for not carrying out sufficient awareness campaigns, which in turn left people uninformed about the new provisions. Islamist women’s groups have made similar claims. (…) The state has taken several measures to guarantee a better application of the family code which is, among other things, exemplified by the institutionalization of the social assistant, a judicial auxiliary that was established in cooperation with UN Women. The involvement of international actors in the implementation process of family law in Morocco stands in sharp contrast with the Jordanian experience, where actors like UN Women have not been involved in this process.   

However, the sole focus on enforcement capacities leaves other factors that explain why the law works differently than expected underexplored. As will be seen, different parts of the state have taken very different approaches to the 2004 family law. Different agencies of the state have emphasized and rejected different concepts contained within the 2004 law. The state is therefore not acting as a homogeneous actor, enforcing one normative order against cultural resistance from society. Instead, different state actors are themselves actively involved in the production and preservation of multiple normativities. (…) The multiple interpretations of the 2004 law are greatly facilitated by the law’s ambiguity. Marriage guardianship has not been abolished but made optional. Minor marriage and polygyny have not been outlawed but have been made conditional in the case of the former and, with respect to the latter, put under tighter state control. (…) Two types of “street-level bureaucrats” interpreted the 2004 law differently: the social assistant (al-musāʿid al-ijtimāʿī), a judicial auxiliary, and the ʿulamaʾ of the Rabita Mohammedia des Oulémas du Maroc, a state religious institution. Beyond the state level, two women’s groups—the secular Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) and the Islamist Organization for the Renewal of the Female Consciousness (ORCF) teach the family law to their constituencies in very different ways. 

Since the mid–2000s, the Moroccan government has more closely cooperated with international actors, mainly UN Women (formerly UNIFEM), to guarantee a “better” implementation of the family law. The position of the social assistant had already been referred to in the 2004 family code, but the profession was not previously operationalized, leading to complaints by women’s groups. Many members of women’s groups have worked for the UN in Morocco. (…) By shaping the agenda of an international organization like UN Women in Morocco and due to the responsiveness of the Moroccan government to these international actors, the secular women’s movement was thereby able to implement some of its demands.

The cooperation between the Moroccan government and international actors is exemplified by the creation of the position of the social assistant (al-musāʿid al-ijtimāʿī). The social assistant is a judicial auxiliary, employed by the Ministry of Justice, who is based in the family law section of a court. According to the guidelines formulated by the Moroccan Ministry of Justice to clarify and define the tasks, qualifications, and competences of all civil servants, the social assistant is intended to facilitate the work of the judge. He or she (currently the overwhelming majority of social assistants is female) conducts social inquiries by interviewing people in cases of kafāla (a type of foster care system), the marriage of minors, the marriage of mentally disabled people, custody cases, and polygyny. The report of the social assistant is intended to give the judge a better idea of the social circumstances of the case, so that the judge can make a more informed decision. 

The institutionalization of the social assistant by the state is based on a pilot project carried out by UN Women (then UNIFEM) in 2008. UNIFEM recruited and trained social assistants to operate at the family court in Tangier. The project was then evaluated as successful, and the Moroccan government formally decided to include the position of social assistant in the 2011 national budget. The state will continue to recruit hundreds of social assistants each year until courts in bigger cities have two to three social assistants and tribunals in smaller cities have one social assistant. The social assistant is thus a street–level bureaucrat in–the–making. (…) 

It is relatively easy for a (semi-)authoritarian regime to issue laws that express the view of politically dominant actors, since it dominates and controls the political organs responsible for these processes. But it then requires cooperation from both various state agencies and non-state actors to implement these policies. This is why the law–making process is more straight–forward and often determined from above as was the case in Morocco, whereas the law–implementation process is not.  

Through family law reform, the state entered areas that it did not previously regulate and has sought tighter control over people’s lives. However, this has not been a smooth process, and the state has faced severe obstacles in fulfilling its new role. The above observation of actual state practices suggests that power is relatively decentralized. To better understand how the implementation of the Morocco’s 2004 family code works one must depart from the assumption of a homogenous authoritarian state which imposes itself on society. Instead, the boundaries between state and non-state actors are often fluid. The state is not a unified actor that simply contests norms within society that are at odds with the state’s statutory law. Instead, different state agencies emphasize different aspects of the law. Street-level bureaucrats’ interpretations of the law at times overlap with those of non-state actors who disagree with some of the norms incorporated into the law. State agencies thereby themselves help foster, at least indirectly, the proliferation of conflicting interpretations of the law, for example by funding such non-state actors. (…)

As a result of differing conceptions of the state, gender roles and family’s welfare roles, different groups emphasize or reject different concepts of the law. Islamist women’s groups emphasize reconciliation (ṣulḥ) procedures and complementary rights within the family, while ADFM shows little interest in reconciliation and instead emphasizes the new rights that women gained through family law reform, such as the right to marry without a marriage guardian. The differences in emphasis are partly related to different understanding of what social ills the family law should address—high divorce rates or women’s legal inferiority—and by whom. Many Islamists see the family as best equipped to provide support for individuals and therefore view divorce as a rupture to family relations to be avoided at all costs. Easy access to divorce (for men and women) is therefore seen as a threat to this welfare model. Most feminists, meanwhile, attribute this welfare role to the state. (…) Divergent interpretations of the law are also greatly facilitated by its ambiguity, which in turn enables different groups to bring in their own agendas. Instead of presenting a radical rupture and replacing the norms that were expressed in the previous law in their entirety, the new law coexists with and modifies some of them.

In Morocco, UN Women, an international actor, considerably shaped how family law was implemented. The impact of UN Women was mostly exemplified by the creation of the social assistant that began as a UN Women pilot project. Several structural factors explain why UN Women was able to shape the implementation of family law in Morocco but not in Jordan. In Morocco the courts are supervised by the Ministry of Justice which was more favourable to cooperating with an international actor. The Ministry of Justice was the main cooperation partner for UN Women. In Jordan the Supreme Judge Department, the shariʿa court administration, enjoys great autonomy and has chosen not to cooperate with international actors, so as to guarantee a better application of the 2010 Jordanian law. 

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.