Irene Weipert-Fenner, The Autocratic Parliament: Power and Legitimacy in Egypt, 1866-2011 (New Texts Out Now)

Irene Weipert-Fenner, The Autocratic Parliament: Power and Legitimacy in Egypt, 1866-2011 (New Texts Out Now)

Irene Weipert-Fenner, The Autocratic Parliament: Power and Legitimacy in Egypt, 1866-2011 (New Texts Out Now)

By : Irene Weipert-Fenner

Irene Weipert-Fenner, The Autocratic Parliament: Power and Legitimacy in Egypt, 1866-2011 (Syracuse University Press, 2020).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Irene Weipert-Fenner (IWF): I was living in Egypt in 2005 when the Muslim Brotherhood won twenty percent in the parliamentary elections. Everyone discussed why the Mubarak regime had allowed the Brothers to gain so many seats: was it to show to “the West” what democracy would look like in the MENA and to play the game of “the Islamists or us”—hoping for Europe and the United States to prefer the secular authoritarian option? At the same time, there was so much state violence involved, particularly in the second and third round to keep voters away from the ballots, on the one hand, and new records in electoral campaign spending, on the other. Private businessmen invested a lot to gain a seat in the People’s Assembly. On top of that, media reported about internal conflicts within the ruling party between a new and an old guard. 

As I had seen the many facets of parliamentary elections, I was puzzled by a relatively simple functionalist perspective I found in the literature on how legislatures in autocracies work once they are elected: a parliament stabilizes an authoritarian regime by imitating democracy and generating legitimacy, as well as co-opting relevant elites. Full stop. So, I became curious about what actually happens inside parliament, and I started to follow media reporting on parliamentary activities.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work? 

IWF: The second and ultimate trigger for my book was my master’s thesis, within which I wanted to write about imperialism and the question as to why an imperial power decides to shift from informal to formal imperialism. I looked at the historic case of the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 in the context of the Urabi revolt. Ahmad Urabi was an army officer and the revolt he led against the monarch (controlled by the British and the French) raised demands for better conditions for soldiers; it also called for a new constitution and the re-institution of parliament. 

I became curious about the role of parliamentarians in that revolt and found a highly dynamic development from a relatively toothless institution for rural notables (created in 1866) to an autonomous, powerful, and even contentious body. I developed my findings into my first book (so far only in German: Strong reformers or weak revolutionaries? Rural notables and the Egyptian parliament in the Urabi revolt, 1866-1882, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2011). I decided that if I had found such an unexpectedly fascinating role of parliament in the nineteenth century, there had to be more to a parliament in an autocracy today than the existing literature would tell us.

... parliamentary debates in autocracies are much more than window dressing or a safety valve.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

IWF: The Autocratic Parliament deals with institutional development and policy-making in autocracies and offers novel insights into Egypt’s modern history and contemporary politics, particularly in connecting political and socioeconomic developments. Regarding the first aspect, the book engages intensively with the debate about political institutions in authoritarian regimes, a debate that has been mainly informed by rational-choice approaches. I argue in favor of constructivist historical institutionalism, as it helped me to combine a bird’s eye perspective on long-term institutional development (including incremental change and ruptures such as revolutions and military coups) with a micro analysis of parliamentary activities. From this perspective, the autocratic parliament can be seen as an indicator, catalyst, and an agent of change within an autocracy.

One aspect is particularly important to me: parliamentary debates in autocracies are much more than window dressing or a safety valve. Within the red lines, different actor groups, mostly second-tier elites, fight over policies. Although decisions are taken behind the scenes, the debates offer incredible insight—particularly into intra-elite tensions and conflicts. Power relations and asymmetries become visible, but also shown is how a violation of widespread norms in one realm can cause a loss of legitimacy beliefs and even lead to a legitimacy crisis that spills over from policies to political identities and institutions. All of this, however, is only visible through the actors’ perspectives and the norms that guide their actions. The book, therefore, is also a call for more interpretive analyses in comparative authoritarianism, in order to get a better idea of how actors in autocracies make sense of what they do and the tensions that arise between the rules and procedures of a liberal institution, a democratic façade, and authoritarian power asymmetries. 

Finally, throughout the centuries I found that socioeconomic topics are particularly important to members of parliament. This has to do with the logics of co-optation: only relevant actors are co-opted, and importance to the regime can be based on economic wealth, but also a social status that is tied to channeling resources into their constituencies. “Na’ib al-khidmat” (deputy of services) was a nickname for MPs in Egypt. Socioeconomic crises therefore were reflected in parliament and used to criticize the government. In my close analysis of the last five years under Mubarak, I delved deep into the struggle around social justice and the role of the state in the context of crony capitalism. 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

IWF: My sincere hope is that the book will lead to a wave of new research on parliaments in autocracies, both in the MENA and beyond. Throughout the years, whenever I have presented my thoughts and preliminary results at conferences and workshops, I have always received the feedback that people had made similar observations for other countries: from Morocco to Iran, parliaments are active parts of the regimes, contentious but not rebellious. Focusing on intra-elite dynamics (while factoring in opposition forces) and on policy-making, the identified agency of the autocratic parliaments helps to de-construct the idea of an omnipotent ruler or core elite. It shows the complexities of autocracies that we cannot see when we stick to concepts ex-negativo, as widespread labels like “non-democratic” or “nominally democratic” institutions evoke. I even could find similar “image problems” of parliaments in both democracies and autocracies—of being powerless, or of only representing particular interests and not “the common good”. 

I therefore try to establish the term “autocratic parliament” as a starting point for a truly comparative agenda across regime types based on practices and social meanings ascribed to parliament.

Another fascinating point of entry for comparative studies would be the emergence of parliamentarianism. In Egypt in the nineteenth century, this was a result of domestic power struggles, not something “implanted” by the West and also not a sign of democratization. The processes rather resembled feudal assemblies of medieval, pre-democratic Europe: influential individuals representing social classes or local constituencies had the opportunity to bargain with the monarch, who in turn sought to secure access to their money and military conscripts.

I also aim to see this book published in Arabic. Political norms are shaped by previous experiences; the political culture of a country is embedded in them. I therefore find it crucial to understand the political past when trying to build a new future. The greatest success of my book would be to contribute to the Egyptian discourse on political rule and transformation—as much as it is possible now, but also in the future. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

IWF: While I was working on The Autocratic Parliament, I was intrigued by the importance of socioeconomic topics for the political development under authoritarian rule including its breakdown. Since 2014, I have been directing an international research grousffp, which has explored how socioeconomic protests developed after the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, and what impact they have had on the political transformation processes (as different as they have turned out). In 2018 we started a second phase with a focus on the socioeconomic (and mostly neoliberal) reforms that governments in democratic Tunisia and autocratic Egypt have started to implement since 2016, and the conflicts (intra-elite, state-society) they have caused. It has brought me back to parliamentary activities and the links to social mobilization and organizations, as well as to external actors (such as the IMF)—but now in comparison between different regime types. 

Excerpt from the book (p. 7, pp. 224-226)

Introducing the Autocratic Parliament 

This book identifies five characteristics of autocratic parliaments across various authoritarian regime subtypes:

1. Autocratic parliaments work according to the logic of an authoritarian regime (and should therefore not be regarded as a dysfunctional democratic institution).

2. Autocratic parliaments can grow stronger within a given political system (either incrementally, driven by internal processes, or quickly in the case where rights are granted by the executive).

3. Autocratic parliaments can become contentious when norms. regarding policies, political actors, and institutions are violated on a large scale or at a fast pace. These fields of legitimacy beliefs are interconnected, meaning that negative evaluations in one field can spill over to others. (Most important, a parliament can turn against the executive when parliamentary rights are withdrawn or when socioeconomic norms are violated.)

4. Institutional as well as interinstitutional actions are shaped by asymmetric power distribution but never by a power monopoly held by one side. They involve constant bargaining processes based on power assessments of actors and institutions (which can be incorrect or have unintended consequences).

5. Low parliamentary responsiveness to broadly shared norms can contribute to a regime crisis. […]

Building on these five characteristics, the autocratic parliament can be an indicator, catalyst, and an agent of change within an autocracy. As such, it can also provide additional insights into democratization, yet not as a prodemocratic force. As the intermediary between different political groups and the executive, the autocratic parliament can shed light on fault lines within the ruling elite as well as legitimacy crises, hinting at “windows of opportunity” for regime change. At the same time, there is no inherent determinism that leads parliaments to evolve into democracy. Authoritarian regimes are flexible and can deal with crises. Still, it is important to distinguish extraordinary times of conflict and imbalance between different elite groups from a “normal” level of dispute regarding policies, political actors, and institutions. Departures from this “normality” allow us to detect and assess developments that may indicate change within a regime or even the potential for a change of regime. As observed in several cases here, political “business as usual” took place when parliament and the executive respected a certain consensus on major norms with regard to policies and political actors and institutions. This consensus, however, was never static but always developed, usually in a steady and incremental manner. Breaches of such consensus have caused contestation and even led to regime destabilization. Parliament, as an institution, allows us to observe and detect when a new consensus has been found, when a group that has violated norms returns to the old established order, or when the regime has been shaken as a whole, leading to a major political reconfiguration.

Once such a rupture does occur, the autocratic parliament can help us better understand the ensuing political transformation processes. By studying institutional practices before and after major events such as the ouster of an autocratic ruler, we can learn much about the continuity and change of political norms and practices and better explore the gray areas of democratization. Regime change is never a clear-cut shift from one state of equilibrium to the next; how new and old political actors behave is shaped by their prior experiences in the authoritarian regime, as is the new institutional order they create. Bargaining processes and institutional practices learned and developed in the autocratic parliament may also be applied to other political systems and regimes. Oversight rights, committee work, plenary debates, and similar practices within an authoritarian parliament can serve as a toolkit for democratic parliaments; some tools might require democratic readjustment while others might simply continue to work in the new regime. A number of institutional developments under authoritarian rule—such as greater legislative participation or increased oversight rights—might retrospectively be interpreted as the evolution of democracy. While we know that these liberties can be reversed by the authoritarian elite, the rights and the practices that evolve around them may present themselves as a pool of established political procedures for a democratic regime once, and if, transformation takes place. 

When comparing the “before and after” of parliamentary practices and trying to judge whether a “real” process of democratization is underway, it is crucial to remember that a number of shortcomings ascribed to autocratic parliaments happen to also be general paradoxes of any parliament. There will always exist a certain degree of tension within the parliamentarians as representatives who serve both their own constituencies and the people’s interest in general. Moreover, informal power hierarchies among the members of parliament, whom we deem to be equal, will always persist. Party politics can heavily influence the behavior of parliamentarians once elected, even if the member of parliament is formally independent. Finally, decision making always proves a messy endeavor: it is a quid pro quo bargaining process that does not accord to the idea of the parliamentarian as a gentleman or lady who only pursues higher aims (Loewenberg 2016). Keeping these inevitable tensions in mind should prevent us from using an idealized version of democratic parliaments as a benchmark for evaluating their counterparts in autocracies or regimes in transformation. Formal rules, both in autocracies and democracies, only grant us limited insights into how parliaments actually function and why they matter. We must always compare them to their institutional practices, which evolve over time and which shape the regimes we seek to better understand. This is the only way that we can engage in a truly comparative study of democratic and autocratic parliaments, and of the gray areas in between.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.