Ramazan Kılınç, Alien Citizens: The State and Religious Minorities in Turkey and France (New Texts Out Now)

Ramazan Kılınç, Alien Citizens: The State and Religious Minorities in Turkey and France (New Texts Out Now)

Ramazan Kılınç, Alien Citizens: The State and Religious Minorities in Turkey and France (New Texts Out Now)

By : Ramazan Kılınç

Ramazan Kılınç, Alien Citizens: The State and Religious Minorities in Turkey and France (Cambridge University Press, 2020).              

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Ramazan Kılınç (RK): When I started my PhD in 2003 at Arizona State University, two years after 9/11, there was rising Islamophobia in the West, especially in Europe. I wondered about the policy implications for Muslim minorities in European countries. When I compared the European state attitudes toward religious minorities, I found that France had the most discriminatory policies in the 2000s. One dominant reason for this was that France’s far right had been able to utilize the rising Islamophobia to execute its anti-Muslim policy agendas. 

While this was happening in France, the Turkish parliament passed reformist laws around the status of Christian minorities in the 2000s—part of the conditions of EU membership. Turkey, at the time, was governed by Islamists who were also passing reforms to liberalize the Turkish system, limit the power of the military, and survive within that system. Christian minorities thus benefited from the reforms that helped Turkey start membership negotiations with the European Union.  

As a comparative politics scholar, these two experiences intrigued me and pushed me to study the interaction of international and domestic level factors in producing state policies toward religious minorities. 

... policy change toward minorities becomes possible when strong domestic actors find a proper international context to execute their policy agendas.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

RK: Using parliamentary proceedings, court decisions, newspaper archives, and interviews with government officials, politicians, and community leaders in Istanbul and Paris, Alien Citizens examines how the international context interacted with domestic politics to produce state policies toward religious minorities in Turkey and France in the 2000s. 

Comparing Christians in Turkey and Muslims in France, the book argues that policy change toward minorities becomes possible when strong domestic actors find a proper international context to execute their policy agendas. The Turkish Islamists used the European Union to transform Turkish politics and thus bring a reformist moment for Christians in the 2000s. The far right in France utilized the rise of Islamophobia in Europe to adopt restrictive policies toward Muslims. 

I hope my book offers a new perspective to literature, namely how international and domestic politics combined can explain state policies toward religion. While other scholars have compared Turkey and France on their religious policies, policies toward religious minorities have been understudied. The book discusses how the framework developed in the study can be used to address other state policies, such as those toward the Jewish community in Turkey, and sects in France. 

The book also contributes to democratization and authoritarianism literature by showing the influence of these processes on minorities. Turkish democratization in the 2000s created more space for Christians, while its turn toward authoritarianism stalled the reform process. 

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work? 

RK: This book is in dialogue with my previous work in many regards. In a recent co-authored book with Carolyn Warner, Christopher Hale, and Adam Cohen, Generating Generosity in Catholicism and Islam: Beliefs, Institutions and Public Goods Provision (Cambridge University Press, 2018), we examined how religions, in general, and Catholicism and Islam, in particular, contribute to public goods provision. This book also included an analysis of the Christian minority in Turkey and the Muslim minority in France. Alien Citizens continued comparisons of these two groups in a different issue area. 

In my other research, I addressed the relationship between religion, secularism, and democracy in Turkey with a framework that takes domestic-international interactions seriously. I explored the impact of Islamic actors on regime change by examining their interactions with the international context, domestic socio-structural factors, and political institutions. My 2014 article published in Political Science Quarterly (2014) focuses on the complicated relationship between Islam, secularism, and democratic consolidation in Turkey, focusing on Turkey’s relations with Europe. In another article, published in Uluslararası İlişkiler/International Relations (2016), I examined the conditions under which domestic ideological shifts produce ideology-based foreign policy. Alien Citizens shifted the framework of domestic-international interactions to the issue of state policies toward religious minorities. 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

RK: My motivation to write this book was mostly theoretical: to examine domestic-international interactions in explaining state policies toward religious minorities. To my knowledge, my book is the first study that does this. I expect that scholars working on religious minorities can expand this theoretical genre and use the framework in other contexts. 

However, with this book, I also wanted to reach a broader audience. I did not use academic jargon for my book and so I hope it engages easily with public debates. I would like my book to make an impact on two grounds. 

First, I would like the book to facilitate a dialogue on religious freedoms globally. Although there has been an increased awareness of religious freedoms recently, we have seen little interaction across different themes and groups in public discourses. Those who complain about rising Islamophobia in the West are less willing to talk about Christian minorities’ status in Muslim-majority countries. Those who complain about Christians’ problems in the Muslim world are less willing to address Islamophobia in the West. I hope that my book can facilitate a dialogue between these two groups and make them understand that religious freedoms are for all.

Second, I would like the book to increase knowledge of religious minorities and create awareness on minority rights. In the wake of the global rise of populism, the protection of minorities has become a prominent human rights issue. Populist movements usually put a hierarchy between the majority population and the minorities, with the latter emerging as one of the first victims. Supremacism is inherent in populist movements, and vulnerable people need more protection than ever. The status of minorities is a good measure of a pluralist democracy. Pluralist democracy requires all citizens to be equal. When democracy starts to shatter, minority rights are usually the first to give away.

J: What other projects are you working on now? 

RK: I am working on a new manuscript, tentatively titled Two Tales of Islamism: The Rise and Fall of Muslim Democracy in Turkey. In the wake of the Arab Spring in 2012, many commentators, politicians, and scholars suggested Turkey as a model to the Arab world for finding the elusive formula that creates a Muslim democracy. Within a few years, Turkish politics took an authoritarian turn that limited civil and political liberties and embraced Islamist populism, falling behind some of the Arab Spring countries it was supposed to lead. This book manuscript aims to analyze the rise and fall of Turkey’s Muslim democracy in the 2000s and 2010s. By doing so, it draws conclusions about religion, democracy, and authoritarianism in the Muslim world.

J: Based on your book’s framework, how do you evaluate the current status of Christians in Turkey and Muslims in France?

RK: In Turkey, the conditions that produced the reformist moment between 2000 and 2010 radically changed in the 2010s. In contrast to many expectations, the Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) government reversed its liberal policies and took an authoritarian path. The changing international environment enabled the AKP government to gear toward an authoritarian direction. Turkey's Islamists, encouraged by their increased political power, calculated that they would gain a leadership role in the Middle East in the wake of the Arab uprisings, which they thought would bring Islamists into power in several Arab countries. As a result, they implemented populist-Islamist policies that eventually brought Turkey into a cycle of authoritarianism. The new international and domestic environment negatively influenced the status of Christian minorities, and the freedoms they had gained in the previous decade became under threat. Rising populist Islamism made non-Muslim minorities a target at the discursive and policy levels. 

In France, the conditions that produced anti-Muslim policies between 2000 and 2010 did not change in the 2010s. With the rise of new extremist movements in the 2010s, Islamophobia continued to gain ground and the radical right grew even more potent. The leader of the National Front (FN, Front National), Marine Le Pen, became a front runner in the 2017 presidential elections. However, as opposed to the early 2000s when the center-right and center-left parties shifted toward an anti-immigrant stance to compete with the gradually nationalistic public, Emmanuel Macron, who defended a pro-immigrant and pro-EU stance, won the run-off elections. Nonetheless, Marine Le Pen won one third of the votes in the election. This result indicated the growth of an Islamophobic and anti-immigrant social base in France. All in all, both international and domestic factors have not dictated a rapid change in policies toward Muslims in France, and anti-Muslim policies may well continue for the foreseeable future.

Excerpt from the book (from Chapter 1: Rethinking State Policies toward Religious Minorities) 

On May 21, 1903, as an act of gesture, the Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II joined the Greek Orthodox Patriarch Joachim III to celebrate the grand opening of the Büyükada Greek Orphanage, which served to the Greek orphans of both late Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey until 1964. When Turkey had a tension with Greece over Cyprus in 1964, the state’s General Directorate of Foundations (GDF, Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü) closed down the 20,000-square-meter wooden historic orphanage, which is located in a touristic island in the Sea of Marmara. The GDF did not repair the building since then and left it to destitution without any restoration. In the 1990s, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate started a legal process against the Turkish state to register the ownership of the property under its name. The Turkish state denied the claim and argued that the GDF had the right to seize the property because it had not fulfilled its original function for more than ten years. When the Council of State, the supreme administrative court in Turkey, dismissed the Patriarchate’s claim in 2003, the case was carried to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In 2010, the ECHR ruled in favor of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and transferred the ownership of the property to the Patriarchate. 

In October 1989, Leila and Fatima Achaboun and their cousin Samira Saidani were expelled from Gabriel-Havez High School in Creil, a suburb outside Paris, for wearing headscarves on the school premises. The school principle, Eugene Chenière, claimed that he expelled the girls to implement the constitutional principle of secularism. Their expulsion drew extensive media attention, but very few supported the girls’ dismissal from school. The students returned to the school after the Council of State, the highest administrative court in France, decreed that the principal overstepped his authority. In its decision, the Council stated that the school could dismiss the girls only if they disrupted the order at school. To the court, wearing a headscarf in itself was not incompatible with the principle of secularism. This ruling would set the precedent for headscarf cases for the next fifteen years until the passage of a new law in 2004, which banned wearing of ostentatious religious symbols at public schools.

The story of the Büyükada Greek Orphanage is just one of many cases in which the Turkish government discriminated the Christian minority. This case illustrates the traumatic consequences of Turkey’s nation-building process for minorities. The official Turkish national discourse, based on a vision of a homogenous society defined by secularism and nationalism, made life difficult for minorities. In France, the story of the three Muslim girls at Gabriel-Havez High School is one of many cases in which the French courts protected Muslims’ religious freedoms when their rights were violated. Despite its unfriendly stance to religion as compared to other European countries, French secularism provided religious minorities with religious freedom, including students’ manifestation of religious symbols at schools.

However, by early 2000s, state policies toward religious minorities took a different trajectory in both Turkey and France. Turkey implemented new reforms that expanded the rights of religious minorities between 2000 and 2010 while France passed new laws that restricted religious freedoms for Muslims. International context played a significant role in these policy changes in both countries. While Turkey implemented new laws under the pressure of its European Union (EU) membership bid, France enacted new restrictions within the context of the rising Islamophobia in Europe in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks. These developments raise a significant question: How does international context influence state policies toward religious minorities? To answer the question, I examine the shifting state policies toward the Christian minority in Turkey and the Muslim minority in France between 2000 and 2010.

Scholars have explained state policies toward religious minorities by referring several factors including modernization process that undermined the power of the majority religion, historical legacies shaped in extended periods of time, competition over ideology, and strategic interaction among religious and political actors. Although these approaches provide valuable insights to explain the Turkish and French cases, they cannot account for the importance of international context that played a crucial role in the passing of new regulations in both countries. I argue that given structured relationships among sets of domestic groups competing over different policies, the presence of an international context that can favor particular groups over others, shifts the domestic balance of power, and makes some policies more likely to be implemented than others. The adoption of new policies depends on the availability of strong domestic actors who would benefit from international context and support the reforms due to either their material interests or normative commitments. International environment structures domestic politics through actors that mediate between external factors and domestic policies.

The reforms in Turkey became possible because stronger domestic actors, who would benefit from the reforms required to join the EU, emerged. The repressive political environment dominated by the military in the late 1990s left no option for Islamic actors with relatively large social bases but to devise strategies through which they could enhance political space at the expense of the authoritarian bureaucracy. They utilized Turkey’s relations with the EU and implemented the reforms to decrease the power of the military in Turkish politics. The government instituted religious rights for Christians as part of its democratizing agenda that would bring Turkey closer to the EU. Liberal groups, social democrats, and some Islamic groups contributed to this outcome by justifying pluralism through their civil society activism. In short, the international norms on religious freedoms diffused into the Turkish political system only after stronger domestic actors facilitated their adoption, either instrumentally or normatively. 

Similarly, the restrictive policies toward Muslims in France were an outcome of the interaction of international context and domestic politics. The proponents of the restrictive policies in France utilized the rising Islamophobia in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001. Due to the rise of anti-Muslim sentiments globally, the proponents of the headscarf ban were able to portray wearing headscarves as a symbol of anti-republicanism and anti-secularism in France. By doing so, it became easier for them to engender strong popular support for their policy agendas. The rise of the far right in France led centrist parties to embrace the anti-Muslim rhetoric. As a result, a social coalition emerged to pass the ban in the parliament.

In the rest of this chapter, I first present the research puzzle with a brief background on Christians in Turkey and Muslims in France. Then, I review the previous explanations of religious freedoms, identifying their strengths and weaknesses. Next, I provide my explanation that combines international context and domestic politics. I introduce strategic and normative mechanisms that connects international context to domestic politics. Finally, I discuss the methods of analysis through which I demonstrate this argument. I explain my case selection, basic concepts, variables, and their measurements. I present the methodologies of comparative case studies and process-tracing with the justifications of why I choose them in my analysis.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.