Joel Beinin, “The US-Israeli Alliance” (New Texts Out Now)

Joel Beinin, “The US-Israeli Alliance” (New Texts Out Now)

Joel Beinin, “The US-Israeli Alliance” (New Texts Out Now)

By : Joel Beinin

Joel Beinin, “The US-Israeli Alliance,” in Joel Beinin, Bassam Haddad, and Sherene Seikaly (eds.), A Critical Political Economy of the Middle East and North Africa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this chapter?

Joel Beinin (JB): I am both a co-editor of the entire volume and the author of two chapters—the “Introduction” and “The US-Israeli Alliance.” The volume as a whole grew out of several workshops organized by the Political Economy Project (PEP), a project of the Arab Studies Institute, beginning in 2015. The co-founders of PEP are Bassam Haddad and Adam Hanieh, both of whom are authors of chapters in the book. 

The purpose of the book, as my “Introduction” lays out, is to stimulate a broad discussion on studying the Middle East and North Africa using the methods of political economy. The editors of the book define political economy as the study of the mutual and historical constitution of states, markets, and classes. We adopt a pluralistic approach to the tradition of political economy. The “Introduction” addresses some of those approaches, including a version of Marxian class analysis, dependency theory, socialist feminism, and the regulation school, although not all the approaches we regard as falling under the rubric of political economy are represented in the book. 

My chapter on “The US-Israeli Alliance” seeks to counter the perceptions of many scholars and political activists that US policy on Israel/Palestine, and sometimes broader Middle East issues, are determined primarily by the power of the Zionist lobby in Congress. Of course, I do not deny that the Zionist lobby is very powerful, and its heavyweights contribute millions to both major parties. But part of the strength of the Zionist lobby is due to the fact that Israel is a key strategic partner of US imperialism in the Middle East and beyond. So, for the most part, the lobby does not seek major changes in US imperial foreign policy. 

Unlike the structure of a typical academic article, which first situates itself in relation to the broader literature, I took the approach of laying out the case as I see it.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the chapter (on the US-Israel alliance) address? 

JB: Since the 1970 Palestinian-Jordanian civil war (Black September), and even more so since the mid-1980s (during the administration of President Ronald Reagan), Israel has become a US strategic ally of the highest importance. The chapter is primarily devoted to the political economy of this relationship. It also examines some of the financial structures of the Zionist lobby. The cultural aspects of the US-Israeli relationship—such as evangelical Protestant support for Israel and the liberal understanding of Israel as a response to the Holocaust and the moral legatee of the Jewish victims of Nazi mass murder—are acknowledged in passing. Unlike the structure of a typical academic article, which first situates itself in relation to the broader literature, I took the approach of laying out the case as I see it. I do not, for example, conduct an argument with people like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, the leading proponents of the Zionist lobby explanation for US policy. One reason is lack of space. More fundamentally, Mearsheimer and Walt do not acknowledge the existence of a US empire or of political economy as a method for understanding US foreign policy. So we are operating in different universes.

J: How does this chapter connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

JB: Much of my work has been on Egypt and, more recently, Tunisia. But I have always kept a hand in both the history and current analysis of events in Israel/Palestine, often in the form of co-edited volumes, for example, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation (co-edited with Zachary Lockman) and The Struggle for Sovereignty: Palestine and Israel, 1993-2005 (co-edited with Rebecca L. Stein). The book as a whole and my "Introduction" in particular are in the same intellectual sphere as my previous book, Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press, 2001). 

J: Who do you hope will read your chapter and/or this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

JB: The book is meant to provide an introduction to political economy for both undergraduate and graduate level university students. We hope it will be used as a text in many courses. I would especially like my chapter on “The US-Israeli Alliance” to be read by political activists and strategists. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

JB: I am considering writing a book focusing on the decolonization of the Middle East and North Africa since World War II and the simultaneous rise of US hegemony in the region.

J: What kinds of research on political economy would you like to see in the near future? 

JB: Several chapters of the book—by Shana Marshall on the regional militaries and Adam Hanieh on Khaleeji capital, for example—open the door to relatively new topics that can be pursued further. I would like to see studies of the US alliances with other countries of the region—such as Turkey, Egypt, and Morocco—framed in political economy terms. 

There is also almost nothing in the book that uses social reproduction theory. There is, however, a substantial literature on women and gender in the MENA region. Indeed, Middle East women’s studies is one of the liveliest sectors of scholarly work on the region. Perhaps some of it can be rethought in the light of social reproduction theory. 

When I was in Qatar about a year ago, I visited the Bin Jelmood house in Doha, the first museum devoted to slavery in the Arab world. I learned a great deal despite the soft touch treatment of some topics. It seems to me that research on slavery in the twentieth-century Gulf (and obviously its connection to East Africa) can complement the kinds of arguments about capitalism in the region that Kristen Alff makes in her chapter.

 

Excerpt from the chapter

Israel and the United States have jointly developed weapons systems since the secret 1986 agreement on Israeli participation in research for President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”). From 1988 to 2002 Israel received about 1 billion dollars in R&D grants for the Arrow anti-missile missile produced by Boeing and IAI. In 1996, Israel began co-production of the Nautilus tactical high-energy laser with Northrop Grumman as lead contractor. But in 2005, after 300 million dollars had been spent, the Nautilus was discontinued due to its high cost and mediocre performance. 

Lockheed Martin (LMT) is the world’s largest arms manufacturer by sales volume. Lockheed Martin Israel was established in 2014. It operates offices in Tel Aviv and Beersheba, where the Israeli government is promoting military-oriented hi-tech development. 

LMT has been arming Israel since 1971. Its F-16 fighter jets have been the mainstay of its Air Force since 1980. Israel purchased an updated and customized version, the “Sufa,” in 2004. That year LMT completed an industrial collaboration valued at 1.45 billion dollars with some forty Israeli firms in the military, hi-tech, venture capital, and R&D sectors. 

LMT is the lead contractor, with Northrup Grumman and British BAE as secondary partners, for the notoriously over-budget and under-performing F-35 “stealth” fighter jets. Israel has contributed prominently to the project and will acquire at least 50 F-35I “Adirs,” with Israeli-customized avionics. LMT’s co-production agreements with Israeli enterprises for F-35 components have an anticipated value of over 4 billion dollars. In 2014 IAI opened a new production line to manufacture over 800 pairs of F-35 wing skins valued at 2.5 billion dollars. Cyclone, an Elbit subsidiary, produces F-35 aerostructures. Elisra provides its electronic warfare suite. Rafael manufactures the F-35’s advanced weapons and sensors. The F-35 and many other U.S. military aircraft use the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, a “digital eye piece” developed by Elbit and Rockwell-Collins. LMT Vice-President for Customer Requirements, retired U.S. Air Force Gen. Gary North, proclaimed, “There’s a part of Israel in every F-35 that’s ever been built.” In December 2017 Israel became the first country outside the United States to deploy operational F-35s, a good news advertisement for the much-maligned aircraft. 

LMT is expanding its R&D collaborations with Israeli institutions. Its joint venture with Bynet Data Communications Ltd. will construct the IDF Intelligence Corp’s Negev technology campus, known as the 5/9 project. In 2014 LMT and Yissum Research Development, a subsidiary of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, agreed to cosponsor joint research in quantum information and material sciences. LMT has the option to purchase exclusive licenses to products resulting from the partnership. LMT is partnering with Dell EMC and Ben-Gurion University on cyber security research.

Israel has similarly extensive relationships with Boeing, the second-largest global arms manufacturer based on 2015 revenue. Boeing has maintained an office in Tel Aviv since 1969. Israel’s national carrier, El Al, has operated an all-Boeing fleet since the 1960s, and the Israeli Air Force has used aircraft and helicopters manufactured by Boeing and its predecessor firms since the 1970s. In 2003 former IAF commander and former ambassador to the United States David Ivry became president of Boeing Israel.

Boeing’s F-15I, a dual-seat ground attack aircraft initially acquired by Israel in 1998, was the first U.S. military jet coproduced with Israeli firms: Elisra (electronic warfare suite); Elta (secure radios); IAI (structural subassemblies); Cyclone (external fuel tanks). Israeli firms supply parts for many other Boeing commercial and military products, including the Apache Longbow helicopter, and the 737, 777, and 787 airliners. In 2002 Boeing designated Elta, which manufactures the electronics support system for Boeing’s Nimrod maritime surveillance aircraft, its “Supplier of the Year.”

[...] In 1994 Rafael began working with General Dynamics, the manufacturer of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, to develop its Reactive Applique Armor Tiles for use on General Dynamics products. In 2005 General Dynamics received a 37.8 million-dollar contract modification to fit Rafael’s add-on armor to Bradley Fighting Vehicles and armored personnel carriers deployed in Iraq. 

In 2011 U.S. forces in Afghanistan began using the Israeli-manufactured Skystar-180, an aerostat reconnaissance system which demonstrated its value during Israel’s 2014 assault on Gaza. The U.S. Army approved the Skystar-180 for purchase the next year. Since 2010, five NATO countries have deployed Israeli-manufactured drones in anti-Taliban operations in Afghanistan. 

In March 2015 the U.S. Marine Corps awarded Elbit a 73.4 million dollar-contract for new laser systems. The U.S. Army uses the “Iron Fist Light Configuration” active protection system for light and medium armored vehicles designed and manufactured by IMI Systems. The Jewish Virtual Library, an Israel lobby-aligned website which may exaggerate such matters, lists over a dozen other Israeli manufactured weapons systems employed by U.S. military and domestic security forces.

[...] The conjuncture of the second Intifada, which erupted in the fall of 2000, al-Qa‘ida’s 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq elevated U.S.-Israeli military and security collaboration to a new level with a focus on radical Muslim groups and Iran. In 2008 the CIA and Mossad collaborated in assassinating ‘Imad Mughniyya, who was allegedly responsible for the 1983 Beirut embassy bombing and many other attacks on military and civilian targets. In 2010 the United States established “unusually tight collaboration” with Israel in “Operation Olympic Games,” which launched the Stuxnet computer worm that disabled some 1,000 Iranian nuclear centrifuges at Natanz. In 2017 Israeli cyber operators penetrated a cell of ISIS bombmakers in Syria and learned they could make explosives resembling laptop computer batteries that would evade detection by airport screening devices. Israel shared the information with the United States, which then banned laptops in carry-on luggage on flights from eight Muslim-majority countries.

Israel is a world leader in the “new military urbanism” - crowd control, border surveillance, and counterterrorism - that burgeoned after 9/11. It advertises its extensive experience in the post-1967 Occupied Palestinian Territories to promote its techniques and equipment to increasingly militarized police forces and the thriving homeland security market. Israel’s homeland security sector comprises 600 firms, of which 300 export training services and goods, mainly surveillance technologies, with an annual value of 3 billion dollars.

Israel is a leading global supplier of drones to armed forces, police, and security agencies. A promotional video by the American subsidiary of Elbit, the principal supplier of tactical drones to the Israeli military, advertises its “Proven Technology, Proven Security” and “10+ years securing the world’s most challenging borders.” As a subcontractor for Boeing, Elbit provided camera and radar systems for the George W. Bush administration’s Strategic Border Initiative. In 2004 Elbit’s Fort Worth, Texas-based subsidiary, EFW Inc., leased two Hermes 450 drones, along with ground control stations, operational crews, and support personnel to U.S. Customs and Border Protection for its Arizona Border Control Initiative. In 2014 Elbit won a 145 million dollar-contract from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to supply electronic sensing technology for the (pre-Trump) barrier along the U.S.-Mexico border.

[...] Since 9/11 thousands of U.S. police officers, sheriffs, border patrol agents, ICE officers, TSA, and FBI agents have trained with the Israeli military and police forces. 

[...] In addition to promoting Israeli techniques of militarized policing, underwritten trips to Israel create a strategic social base of support for Israel well beyond the “usual suspects” of the Israel lobby.

[...] In 2003 Israeli commandos and intelligence forces trained U.S. special forces at Fort Bragg, NC to use aggressive counter-insurgency tactics in Iraq “that echo(ed) Israeli operations in the occupied territories,” including “assassination squads against guerrilla leaders” and “sealing off centers of resistance with razor wire and razing buildings from where attacks [were] launched against US troops.” Israeli military consultants also visited Iraq. U.S. Army units reportedly underwent training at the IDF’s anti-terror school and subsequently returned to Iraq. 

[...] Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, Concepts, and Strategy for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Lt. Gen. Michael Vane, acknowledged, “We recently travelled to Israel to glean lessons learned from their counterterrorist operations in urban areas.” Vane considered Israel’s “experience... pivotal as U.S. forces tried to confront the proliferating urban insurgencies on the streets of Iraq’s cities.” 

[...] Israeli and U.S. commercial corporations, technology, and personnel are closely interconnected. Since 2000, Israel has been the largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East. Between 50,000 and 200,000 Israelis and over 100 Israeli firms make their home in Silicon Valley. Nearly 100 Israeli firms are listed on the NASDAQ; only China has more. Dozens of U.S. hi-tech enterprises maintain R&D facilities in Israel. Leading firms invest substantially in Israel and regularly acquire local startups. 

Intel has invested 17 billion dollars in Israel since 1974, more than any other American firm. It employs over 10,000 people, 60 percent of them in R&D. Intel is planning an additional 5 billion dollar-investment in its Kiryat Gat manufacturing facility. In 2017 Intel bought Mobileye, which makes sensors and cameras for driverless vehicles, for 15.3 billion dollars, perhaps the largest single foreign acquisition in Israeli history. 

[...] Microsoft established an Israeli R&D center in 1991 and expanded it substantially in 2006. Between 2014 and 2017 Microsoft acquired five Israeli startups for at least 550 million dollars. Paypal acquired Fraud Sciences, for 169 million dollars in 2008 and built a fraud and risk detection center around it in Tel Aviv. In 2015 PayPal bought CyActive, for 60 million dollars; it became the base for its cybersecurity center near Beersheba. 

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.