Mikiya Koyagi, Iran in Motion: Mobility, Space, and the Trans-Iranian Railway (New Texts Out Now)

Mikiya Koyagi, Iran in Motion: Mobility, Space, and the Trans-Iranian Railway (New Texts Out Now)

Mikiya Koyagi, Iran in Motion: Mobility, Space, and the Trans-Iranian Railway (New Texts Out Now)

By : Mikiya Koyagi

Mikiya Koyagi, Iran in Motion: Mobility, Space, and the Trans-Iranian Railway (Stanford University Press, 2021). 

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Mikiya Koyagi (MK): I wrote a book that weaves stories of mobilities with particular attention to various scales of movement from provincial and national to transnational, but this idea developed only gradually as I conducted a series of research trips to collect documents.

When I started graduate school in the mid 2000s, many excellent social and cultural histories of the Reza Shah period (1921-41) were being published, including works by Camron Amin, Touraj Atabaki, Stephanie Cronin, Afshin Marashi, and Cyrus Schayegh, to name a few. So I knew that I was interested in writing a social or cultural history of the late Qajar and early Pahlavi periods, but I was not sure exactly what I wanted to write about in my dissertation. When I began to read the Iranian press of the period more extensively, it struck me that there were hundreds of articles about the Trans-Iranian Railway, Iran’s first long-haul railway completed by the Pahlavi state under Danish supervision in 1938. While all the articles praised the project as a manifestation of national progress under Reza Shah, they said nothing about what this massive infrastructural project meant for various groups that other historians have studied, such as workers (Atabaki), tribes (Cronin), and the middle class (Schayegh). Having discovered that there was no in-depth study about the railway project, I thought that it would be a great way to connect various social and cultural histories of modern Iran that tend to be narrated discretely.

When I dug deeper into published and archival sources, I realized that the dominant emphasis on national integration through the railway project tells a only small part of the story. Qajar travelers frequently encountered railway technology in Iran’s neighboring countries, such as Russia and India; early railway workers had often gained prior industrial experience in the Caucasus, the Ottoman Empire, and Iraq; many traveled by train to perform pilgrimage to the shrine cities in Iraq or to organize communist networks that linked Iran with the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf. Finding these sources pushed me to think of my book not simply as a history of a particular national railway project, but instead as a larger history of mobilities and spatial imaginaries. It also helped me to read a large body of literature outside of Middle Eastern historiography that discusses how infrastructure produced national/imperial space (the works of Manu Goswami, Kate McDonald, and Eileen Kane, for example).

On a more personal level, I worked for a Japanese railway company after graduating from college in Tokyo. I wanted to work for the railway company because I was always fascinated by how large railway stations in Japan produced various forms of mobilities and immobilities around them. I did not expect that I would one day write a book about rail infrastructure in Iran, but I find it amazing that I somehow came back to a topic that interested me so much before entering academia.

... the Trans-Iranian Railway project reorganized the movement of the nation both spatially and qualitatively.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

MK: Iran in Motion traces contested imaginations and practices of mobility from the conception of a trans-Iranian railway during the nineteenth-century global transport revolution to its early years of operation in the late 1940s. As such, it follows many phases of the project, from imagining and planning to building, operating, and using the railway, focusing on a particular group in each phase. Readers will learn about all sorts of groups, including British imperial officials, Qajar-era diplomats, Iranian parliamentarians, technocrats, landowners, nomadic tribes, workers, and railway travelers. 

The book argues that, rather than simply fostering national integration, the Trans-Iranian Railway project reorganized the movement of the nation both spatially and qualitatively. It redirected the flows of people and goods on multiple spatial scales, while seeking to convert “unruly” mobilities such as tribal and pilgrim mobilities into tamed labor and tourist mobilities. In so doing, the project brought the provinces closer to Tehran while also pulling them away from it, producing provincial, national, and transnational encounters along the route. This condition simultaneously fragmented and homogenized Iran.

In this sense, this book builds on scholarship on Iran’s nation formation and transnational connections (especially with India, the Caucasus, and Russia) in the last few decades, but it attempts to depart from the larger trend in three ways. First, I did not want to make the book only about ideas and identity. By tracing mobility networks formed around the railway, including regulations, institutions, skills, and knowledge, I explore the material underpinnings that interacted with nation formation and transnational connections. Second, many of the interactions that I discuss took place not in Tehran, but in the provinces, borderlands, and outside of Iran. By shifting attention away from the capital, I show how the nation as a unit was constantly in transition as mobile citizens became linked to multiple spatial imaginations. Third, despite my starting the project as a way to study the Reza Shah period, the book includes extensive discussions of the 1940s. By examining the politics of mobility after the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941, I point out that a state-funded project of the Reza Shah period acquired a path of its own and shaped the sociocultural transformations of post-Reza Shah Iran. Seeing 1941 only as a moment of rupture obscures the contingencies of early Pahlavi projects. 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MK: I would love to have scholars outside of Iranian studies read the book. In particular, scholars of mobility, space, and infrastructure would find the book relevant. I also hope that scholars in transport and mobility studies read the book, as the Middle East is largely absent in the field. 

Outside of academia, I hope that many Iranians are going to read this book because there are so many myths about the Trans-Iranian Railway project. For example, Iranian school history textbooks portray the project as a British ploy, erroneously noting that the British preferred a north-south route, while the book debunks this myth by showing how British officials never had a consensus about the most desirable route of the railway. Likewise, the nostalgic imaginations of the Pahlavi period take state propaganda at face value and view the project as a visual manifestation of technological modernity under Reza Shah, completely ignoring the massive scale of displacement and destruction brought about by the project. Especially as the book is published in the centennial of the 1921 coup that brought Reza Khan to power, I hope that it satisfies the intellectual curiosity of Iranian readers and provides a nuanced interpretation of the project.

J: What other projects are you working on now? 

MK: I am presently working on two projects. The first one is about Iran’s eastern borderlands, a region that is generally neglected in the area studies paradigm. Iran’s eastern borderlands were linked to Central Asia, Afghanistan, India, and the Indian Ocean through both land and sea transportation routes, making this project a natural evolution from Iran in Motion. In writing this history, I want to be attentive to Clapperton Mavhunga’s critique of transport studies’ narrow focus on mechanized modes of transport. This is especially important in the Middle East, where older modes of transport continued to coexist with automobiles.

The second project evolved out of my interest in spatial imaginaries. I am examining a particular strand of Japan’s spatial imaginary of Asia that emerged in the late nineteenth century. This imaginary is fascinating because it incorporated Islamic West Asia into the concept of Asian civilization, drawing on perceived cultural affinity between Japan and West Asia. Instead of repeating the well-known history of Japan’s political project of pan-Asianism (as scholars like Cemil Aydin and Selçuk Esenbel brilliantly tell), I am exploring what Japanese travelers to West Asia, including diplomats, traders, converts to Islam, scholars, and artists, had to say about the “western core of Asia” that corresponded with Japan as the eastern core.

 

Excerpt from the book (from Chapter 6: Workers of the Victory Bridge)

In 1946, Mardan-e Ruz printed a letter from railway workers in Arak. The workers noted that they had been living “away from families for four years” to operate the railway and argued that they felt entitled to “go back to their home regions” or receive a higher salary. The movement away from family to an unfamiliar city was a key component in narrativizing their experience of the occupation and encapsulating the profoundness of their sacrifices. Because they had endured separation from families during the occupation, they considered themselves to be more entitled to receive rewards—even more entitled than native workers from the south who had not moved across the nation. If the IRO’s housing and socialization programs were indeed predicated on the assumption that workers were heads of nuclear households, shouldn’t the organization reward workers for making the ultimate manly sacrifice of moving away from their families? 

Railway workers often incorporated marriage and family into their life stories to express disillusionment with their postwar socioeconomic circumstances and to implicitly or explicitly critique the IRO leadership. When “Get to Know Railway Workers” featured Eskandar Ranjbaran, a fifty-one-year-old welder in Bandar-e Shah factories, he talked about his difficult childhood in Ardabil. Born into a modest merchant family, he received no education until he took adult literacy courses through the IRO late in life. He started working when he was eight, eventually manufacturing samovars in his native city. His life took a drastic turn when he left his family and relocated to the new port city of Bandar-e Shah in 1931 to take advantage of railway construction there. Living in a tent in malaria-ridden Mazandaran to work in the railway industry had not been easy. During the early phase of railway operation, he had been involved in a tragic accident when his train crashed into a mountain. Over the next twenty days, he and his fellow workers had tried to recover pieces of the locomotive and bodies of the victims. The nightmarish experience remained vivid in his memory. After all the sacrifices that he had made along with thousands of other Iranian railway workers, however, Ranjbaran’s present life remained difficult. With a monthly salary of 2,300 riyals and various benefits, which would probably bring his total salary to around 3,500 riyals, he had to support nine family members. No other source of income was available. He considered marriage a man’s obligation, but it was a difficult financial commitment.

As Ranjbaran’s interview illustrates, many railway workers’ self-narration in “Get to Know Railway Workers” had three distinct components. First, many workers had been born into poor families so that they ultimately left their hometowns to seek better economic opportunities. Leaving their familiar homes to work on railway construction at places like Bandar-e Shah was more than a spatial move to an unfamiliar geography. For these workers, it was also a mental move that marked the beginning of the profound sacrifices they would make throughout their careers as railway men; it also marked the beginning of the upward socioeconomic mobility it seemed to promise. 

Second, many interviewees celebrated the valor of railway workers in creating the Victory Bridge legacy. As one worker stated, “My biggest attachment as a worker to this company comes from our contribution during World War II in advancing the Allies’ cause and our gaining the name ‘The Victory Bridge.’” Particularly for old-timers like Ranjbaran, the Victory Bridge finally gave a name to all of the sacrifices they had made for the national railway since the construction period had begun. Interviewees often cited the grave physical dangers they had exposed themselves to in order to build and operate the railway. Some, like Ranjbaran, vividly recalled witnessing terrible accidents as defining moments while working on the railway. The experience of accidents, including witnessing the deaths of fellow workers, rescuing the injured, and suffering injuries in the rescue process, captured the essence of their sacrifices.Thus, the intensity of physical danger inherent in Iran’s largest national industry formed the basis of a peculiar masculine self-image. Again, workers participated in constructing the Victory Bridge legacy around their own very personal sacrifices. 

Finally, after describing their sacrifices, they discussed marriage and family. As Ranjbaran’s interview typified, railway workers emphasized their difficult economic circumstances. They stressed that they were the sole breadwinners for their families. As such, they claimed that they struggled to make ends meet, sometimes by having to take second jobs, eating mostly bread and vegetables, or even by receiving financial support from their own fathers. Having embraced a middle-class nuclear family ideal, they valued its hallmark of sending children to modern schools, stressing that they prioritized expenses for their children’s education. This was at the expense of spending in other areas. Lamenting the difficulty of supporting a family of four with his monthly salary of 3,000 riyals, one worker asked rhetorically, “With my income and the kind of expenses that I have, what kind of leisure could I enjoy? It’s not even enough to buy newspapers, which is like food for the brain. How could I be interested in cinema, theater, music and so forth?”

Nonetheless, workers were in unanimous agreement about the general desirability of marriage as man’s essential duty (vazifeh) and service (khedmat). Claiming that marriage was obligatory and that whoever did not get married was committing a grave sin, one worker asserted, “Marriage is the basis of population growth and the foundation of family.”Others qualified their general statements about marriage, as one worker noted, “From a religious perspective, being single is a major sin. For state employees like us, however, being single is better since we have such a low salary.”Yet another worker went even further by stating, “In Iran, marriage is a grave sin for the poor but a blessing for the rich. Either case, one should get married.”

Taken altogether, despite the purported goal of introducing a diverse yet united Iranian railway workforce, self-narrations in “Get to Know Railway Workers” had a subversive subtext. They revealed workers’ deep ambivalence resulting from the gap between the masculine ideals their line of work embodied and the emasculating reality of not earning sufficient money to provide for their families. They were unable to secure a comfortable life for their children, and some had to rely on parental financial support. The argument was always the same: as workers who had created the Victory Bridge legacy, they felt entitled to be rewarded. But in postwar Iran, railway workers’ dreams of upward socioeconomic mobility as the patriarchs of nuclear families remained largely unfulfilled. Ironically, they had embraced middle-class nuclear family values implicit in the housing and socialization programs promoted by the IRO only to become acutely aware of the impossibility of living up to those values. For that, they blamed the IRO leadership while trying to prove that they were more sacrificial than all other railway workers. Thus the contestation over who truly owned the legacy of the Victory Bridge had both unifying and fragmenting effects among railway workers. As events soon proved, the issue fostered differentiation within the IRO’s national workforce on the eve of the mass political movement that erupted during nationalization of the oil industry. 

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.