J. Andrew Bush, Between Muslims: Religious Difference in Iraqi Kurdistan (New Texts Out Now)

J. Andrew Bush, Between Muslims: Religious Difference in Iraqi Kurdistan (New Texts Out Now)

J. Andrew Bush, Between Muslims: Religious Difference in Iraqi Kurdistan (New Texts Out Now)

By : J. Andrew Bush

J. Andrew Bush, Between Muslims: Religious Difference in Iraqi Kurdistan (Stanford University Press, 2020).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Andrew Bush (AB): I love the way this question displaces the author as master and asks how other forces made me write a book. I write within an ethnographic tradition of researchers who are transformed, transfigured, and replaced through research and the relationships that remake researchers. So I hope that it is my interlocutors who made me write the book—at the very least, they remade the “me” who wrote the book. They shared lives with me that unsettle the common sense in popular and scholarly discourse about the relationship between Islam and piety. A lot of ethnographic work in the past fifteen years has sought to understand how contemporary Muslims carry out projects of piety in their everyday lives in relation to a range of other social and material factors. But an unintended side effect has sometimes been to write off those who do not take up the path to piety as self-evidently “secular” or “secularized.” Over many years of fieldwork (beginning in 2004, culminating in 2008-9), I came to know many Kurdish Muslims who spurned both the path to piety and the vision of an autonomous self that is characteristic of secular thought. I wanted to describe that ethical sensibility without explaining it away. I wanted to write a book that made some of the paradoxes of that ethical life palpable and relatable for readers, without forcing it into the familiar historical narratives of secularization or of nationalist movements—which often frame research in Muslim ethics or Iraqi Kurdistan, respectively.

It asks what people do with poetry and what that reveals about what people do with religion, kinship, and sexuality.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address? 

AB: Within the anthropology of Islam, the book examines the space that Islamic traditions make for those who do not take up the pious path of diligent commitment, but neither become self-avowed atheists or apostates. It also looks at the space those Muslims make for themselves on the margins of Islamic traditions, especially in the wake of the revivalist movements that have sought to make Islam a “whole way of life” in a very modern sense, in Kurdistan as in other places. More broadly, it asks how particular ethical orientations emerge in the course of interacting with others in everyday life. So rather than responses to interview questions about their abstract views of revivalists, the book studies how Muslims respond to those tendencies when they appear in the actions of concrete others—in the family and also in public spaces. And here it is not only a question of how public discourse shapes intimate life, but also a question of how fragments of public discourse are reshaped when they are absorbed into the rhythms and relations that make up everyday life. 

The book also touches on questions on gender, sexuality, and kinship at every turn. It is sometimes “about” gender as an analytic category, but it more often includes gender as a part of everything it addresses: from the subtle dynamics of the brother-sister relation to that of the father-daughter relation in everyday life, from the effort to gender the poetic voice in the early twentieth century to the effort to radically reshape gender relations in the wake of British colonialism. It is a fragmented way of taking up questions of gender that tracks a variety of instabilities in how Kurdish Muslims learn to be fathers, mothers, daughters, husbands, or poets. 

Finally, the book addresses poetry. It asks what people do with poetry and what that reveals about what people do with religion, kinship, and sexuality. But more importantly, it takes poetry as an analytical framework for ethnography, looking at poetry’s way of holding together paradoxes—which Kurdish poetry shares with other Sufi poetic traditions—not merely as something to be understood in the language of claims and propositions, but as also as a mode of expression that is itself expository or descriptive of a way of living.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

AB: Even for a first book, I suppose the final draft inevitably feels like a departure from all the previous drafts, so I will answer the question in those terms. Some of the last literature I was reading was the recent burst of scholarship about Christians in Iraq and Kurdistan. I only interacted with a few Iraqi Christians during my fieldwork, and it was only in the late stages of research that I began thinking about the new English scholarship alongside the accounts I heard from Kurdish Muslims. The book problematizes the relationship between the historical actors of Christians in Iraqi Kurdistan, and the figuration of Christians in Kurdish ghazal poetry, suggesting that different ways of understanding that relation reflect differing ways of relating to Islamic traditions across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Some really exciting work in Iraqi studies in the past few years helped me to think about these issues in the last stages of writing, and I am looking forward to more of it.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have? 

AB: I love teaching and I tried to write a teachable book that includes necessary introductory material for non-experts and touches on many of the topics one would include in an Introduction to Islam or the Anthropology of Islam. It is also a write-able book, in the sense that it contains layers within itself, unfinished connections, and begs to be set alongside other works in writing assignments. For example, I take up some of the definitive texts in the anthropology of Islam and its articulation as also necessarily an anthropology of secularism, so the book fits neatly into that kind of undergraduate course. But it can also be taken up in a broader comparative study of religion and anthropology, such as courses in the ethnography of texts, religion and everyday life, or religion and gender.

Thinking of an audience of students, I also thought about all the diversity that the category of “students” entails. So I asked, what does it mean to write an introductory-level book that is just as challenging and novel for Muslims students already familiar with many aspects of Islamic tradition, as it is for students who know little of those traditions? Related to this, I think, the book itself envisions conversation as its goal. Rather than a “grasp” of ideas, or a theory that might be applied elsewhere, the book grapples for a way forward in conversations where religious difference appears tangled up with moment that might be awkward, difficult, violent, joyful, secretive, or surprising. I hope it is the kind of book students continue talking about outside of class: not just a book about ordinary life, but a book that speaks to ordinary life. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

AB: I am finishing a long stint of fieldwork and remote research for a project I call A History of Husbands in Islamic Law. It began with extended observations of a Fatwa Council in Kurdistan in 2014, where among the questioners were husbands and wives who were uncertain about the validity of their marriage after the husband had evoked his right to divorce in some capacity. I then went back in 2019 to take up a study of the classical texts in Islamic law, as they are studied by jurists-in-training in contemporary Kurdistan, the history of fatwas in Kurdistan as they are collected and printed in a few important volumes, as well as a course in Iraqi personal status law, observations of court proceedings and interviews with lawyers, judges, and others active in the civil legal tradition. Across all of these forums of legal action, I want to understand how giving, withholding, retracting, using, regretting, regulating, and adjudicating the right to divorce have shaped men as husbands. Instead of stable subjects who rely on the law to support their “interests” (themselves not always self-evident), it seems that Muslim men often find themselves caught up by the law, confronting moments of uncertainty and trying to navigate legal procedures and competing senses of manhood, fatherhood, and masculinity that they find layered within and across legal forums.

J: This first book revolves around poetry in some ways, and your second book appears to revolve around law. Is there a connecting thread there, or is it a new departure? 

AB: There is an empirical link insofar as the fact that, at least until well into the twentieth century in Iraqi Kurdistan, the caretakers of poetry and law were the same people, trained in the same Islamic educational institutions. But more provocatively, maybe, there are analytical and methodological links: the only genre of speech I can think of that would match poetry’s capacity to make or remake a world by speaking is law. Law and poetry both empower people to speak the world into being, to make and break worlds in utterance. And both law and poetry thrive on a dialogue of the written and oral word, which is a crucial research methodology for me across both projects. For the first book I studied poetic texts under the tutorship of master poets and readers of poetry, in order to then track how those texts are taken up and transformed in conversations in daily life; for this new project I have been studying legal texts in similar way, tracking how fragments of text circulate across time and transform different contexts by that circulation.

 

Excerpt from the book (from the Introduction, pp. 16-18) 

A Kurdish Exception? 

During my research and writing, I encountered many voices insisting that there is nothing surprising about the fact that many Kurdish Muslims might turn away from piety. When the emphasis falls on the modifier Kurdish, it implies that Kurds are exceptional, uniquely unlike other Muslims. Two very different lines of reasoning could be at work in this idea. 

The first appears most obviously in the writings of Orientalist observers—travelers, missionaries, and military personnel. But I also heard similar versions in and beyond Kurdistan, including from Kurdish nationalist intellectuals. This line of reasoning relies on ideas of racial or ethnic difference and broadly associates Islam with Arabs. According to this logic, the historical origin of Islam among Arab tribes has meant that fidelity to Kurdish identity is incompatible with fidelity to Islamic traditions. Thus, some question whether Kurds’ acceptance of Islam was ever actually sincere or complete. Others suppose that even if Kurds did convert in large numbers, they nonetheless retained fidelity to some pre-Islamic traditions. This idea is often attached to the notion of ethnically or racially distinct “culture,” in which it is minorities, tribes, and ancient peoples that have culture. By implication, contemporary urban Arabs, Turks, or Persians are less influenced by culture and have more direct access to religion. This line of reasoning is often at work in the English phrase “Kurdish Islam,” which suggests that Islam is a broad, universal noun modified by a local, particular, ethnic adjective. 

In most versions, this idea relies on the notion that a human being’s capacity for commitment to Islamic traditions is determined or qualified by the person’s racial or ethnic identity. It therefore often harbors subtle—or not so subtle—forms of racism. Furthermore, this idea implies that those who consider themselves fully Kurdish and fully Muslim live in some sort of illusion or self-deception. But as the following discussion begins to show, there is no question that Kurdish Muslims have been deeply engaged with Islamic traditions for centuries. And the forms of their engagement are not unique or isolated but interwoven with the ways that Arab, Turkish, and Persian Muslims have engaged Islam. 

To avoid that line of reasoning, instead of the phrase “Kurdish Islam,” I speak of “Islamic traditions in Kurdistan” to describe a wide range of debates about what counts as Islamic. These debates have happened in, around, and about the region called Kurdistan (itself historically shifting) and have happened in, in conversation with, and about Kurdish language. Within this framework, it is no less puzzling when an Iraqi Kurdish Muslim turns away from piety than it is when other Muslims do. 

A second line of reasoning that attributes an exceptional status to Kurdish Muslims is much more thoughtful and relies on observations of general political trends that connect Kurds to the wider region. According to this view, the marginalization of Kurds following the establishment of the four major nation-states (Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey) in the twentieth century has created fertile ground for leftist political movements. Because leftist political thought often values scepticism toward religion, it is unsurprising that many leftist Kurds have turned away from piety. This view has recently been magnified by the global interest in the female guerrillas in Iraq and Syria who fought the “Islamic State” and other Islamist militias beginning in 2012. By depicting leftist, feminist revolutionaries as an antidote to Islamist militants, global media have often also regarded Kurdish leftists as an antidote to Islamic traditions more generally. Leftist thought is widely perceived to have had a negative impact on piety in Iraqi Kurdistan. But two points are important to bear in mind.

First, Iraqi Kurdistan has a political history distinct from that of other regions of Kurdistan. Thus, the female guerrillas have predominantly come from Syria and Turkey, where leftist movements have evolved dynamically throughout much of the twentieth century. But during my fieldwork up to 2013, the vast majority of Iraqi Kurds were much more concerned with the political possibilities (and impossibilities) of the local parties (PUK and KDP) in charge of the KRG than with leftist revolutionaries in Syria and Turkey. Even though leftist ideas have moved across the borders of nation-states with Kurdish movements, political dynamics of Iraqi Kurdistan should not be confused with (or equated with) the political dynamics of Kurdish movements in Turkey, Syria, or Iran. 

Second, the goal of this book is not to establish a singular cause for a diverse and variegated orientation to Islam but to explore the affiliations and associations of that orientation in the contentious present. My research has not shown a one-to-one correspondence between leftist politics and the turn away from piety. Many Kurdish communists retained a commitment to the pursuit of Islamic piety, and many who turn away from piety do not evince sympathy for communist-inspired critiques of Islam. But more important, my research shows that those who turn away from piety have been disappointed or exasperated in some way with Islamist political movements in Iraqi Kurdistan. Thus, if Islamist movements have turned many toward piety, they have also had a significant impact in the lives of Kurdish Muslims who turn away from piety. So rather than ask whether leftist movements prompted a turn away from piety, this book asks about the contemporary relations between Islamist movements and those who turn away from piety.

Milena B. Methodieva, Between Empire and Nation: Muslim Reform in the Balkans (New Texts Out Now)

Milena B. Methodieva, Between Empire and Nation: Muslim Reform in the Balkans (Stanford University Press, 2021). 

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book? 

Milena B. Methodieva (MM): Between Empire and Nation: Muslim Reform in the Balkans tells the story of the transformation of the Muslim community in Bulgaria in the period between 1878 and 1908.  It explores how these former Ottoman subjects, now a minority under Bulgarian rule, navigated between empire and nation-state, and sought to claim a place in the larger modern world. At the same time the book traces the history of Bulgaria in its formative decades as a modern state, but from the perspective of its Muslim minority population. Finally, it looks at the Ottoman Empire at a time when territorial losses, foreign encroachments, and the influx of migrants contributed to a shift in ideological and political orientation. At another level, with this book I wanted to challenge the historiographical boundaries between the post-Ottoman Balkans and the Middle East. The experiences of communities, such as Bulgaria’s Muslims, during this period transcend such historiographical limits.

My work on the topic began as I questioned the accepted narratives about this Balkan Muslim minority in the aftermath of Ottoman rule that portrayed it as a conservative, inert, and isolated entity. I was aware of landmark studies that demonstrated the vibrant intellectual, political, and cultural activities among other Muslim societies during this period. I also had glimpses of the life of Bulgaria’s Muslims in those years through the few popular history style publications authored by members of the community. As I delved into the primary sources, Ottoman and Bulgarian archival documentation, but above all sources produced by the Muslims themselves, a strikingly new picture began to emerge. These sources revealed a community gripped by a sense of crisis and anxiety. But at the same time, they showed that many local Muslims actively sought to find a way out of their predicament. To them crisis became a catalyst for action. Such figures argued that if the Muslims were to stand up successfully to the challenges, they needed to thoroughly reform their society and institutions. Muslim reformist activism found various expressions. The local Muslim press reflected the lively debates within the community. Muslims struggled to reform their schools and education organization. They founded reading societies, organized theater performances, attempted to reorganize the vakıfs (waqf). They also made efforts to participate in Bulgarian parliamentary politics. At the same time, many local Muslims were drawn into the realm of Ottoman politics as supporters of the Young Turk opposition movement. Just as importantly, they showed remarkable interest in the world around them. Through the press they engaged with audiences beyond Bulgaria, with contributions from the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and Ottoman political émigré groups in Europe. The debates among them reverberated among other Muslim communities around the world. This is a far cry from the picture of a conservative and isolated community.

I stress that the subject of Muslim engagement with modernity is enriched by examining the experiences of minority populations ...

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address? 

MM: The book revolves around the question of reform and modernity. At the same time, it looks more broadly at the experiences of a minority in an emerging nation-state. I wanted to strike a balance between these themes. Similar to other post-Ottoman nation-states, Bulgarian national ideology and nation-building endeavors developed in explicit juxtaposition to the Ottoman past and the Ottoman Empire. The Muslims, a living legacy of Ottoman rule in the country, found themselves in a particular position compared to other minorities as they encountered the Bulgarian national project. I discuss these developments in some detail as they are important to understand the sense of crisis among the local Muslims. Exploring the question of Bulgarian nationalism and the Muslims in this period would be enough to make a book by itself. But to me, this was just the beginning of the story.

What I really wanted to emphasize was the activism among the Muslims, as well as their agency, stories that had remained neglected and underappreciated. Consequently, the book brings the focus on how the Muslims sought to negotiate a place in the modern world. This was the question over which they agonized and struggled, and which emerges so vividly from the sources produced by the community. 

Studying Bulgaria’s Muslims within the framework of such questions opens possibilities for exploring aspects of the history of this community that minority studies style works cannot adequately address. At the same time, I stress that the subject of Muslim engagement with modernity is enriched by examining the experiences of minority populations. So far, attention has been concentrated on Muslim-majority societies. However, the experiences of Muslim minorities in this period are a very important part of the larger story. 

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MM: This is my first book. It was inspired by my studies of Ottoman and Balkan history. It also reflects my interest in demonstrating that these are overlapping and interconnected fields.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MM: I hope that this book will be read by a wide range of scholars and students of Middle Eastern, European and East European, and Islamic history. This book seeks to bridge and engage with all these fields. Above all, I hope that this book will generate discussions and dialogue among scholars across these areas. I hope to encourage scholars to think beyond the traditional regional and historiographical boundaries. Certain subjects, like the one addressed in my book, defy strict classifications. At the same time, I hope that when scholars discuss topics such as modernity, reform, or politics with regards to Muslim societies they also include such minority communities. They deserve to be part of common discussions on these topics rather than being treated as peripheral populations.

J: What other projects are you working on now? 

MM: One of my current research projects deals with migration and mobility. I am looking at Muslim migration from the Balkans to the late Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish republic. This project is partly inspired by my book. As I was working on it, I came upon some very interesting figures. I wondered what happened to these people after 1908. When I began piecing together their life stories, I realized that their trajectories often transcended Bulgaria and the Balkans. Many moved to the Ottoman Empire and later the early Turkish republic, even though they had previously agitated against emigration. Some had very eventful lives—they were active in Europe, the Middle East, and beyond. I plan to trace their experiences and activities in the late Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, and through them explore the history of the region in this turbulent period. In such a way, I would like to provide a different perspective to the history of the Ottoman Empire, its successors in the Balkans, and Turkey, which goes beyond the narratives focusing on state actions and diplomatic dealings. 

J: What would you want to highlight to scholars and students interested in minority populations and transnational connections?

MM: Over the past few years, scholarship of the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East has dramatically expanded to explore history within a variety of new framework, such as gender, the environment, disease and epidemics. Such works have produced important and fascinating insights and opened new directions in research. In a somewhat similar vein, I would be interested in reading more works that look at history as experienced and made by minorities and marginalized groups. My curiosity, of course, very much resonates with our current preoccupations and sensitivities. Also, quite frequently, such groups were simultaneously part of different worlds—social, political, and intellectual.  Their experiences can provide us with insights into different histories, which we cannot gain through narratives that focus exclusively on majorities or state actions. Finally, I want to stress that even small minorities can have a disproportionate imprint on their times. Of course, studying such groups, and their transnational connections, requires mastery of a few languages and knowledge of a very broad range of historical material. So, this is a lot of work—but what one learns in the end makes the effort worthwhile!

 

Excerpt from the book (from Chapter 7: Homeland, Nation, and Community, pp. 211-213, 218-221).

During the period under consideration, the Muslims of Bulgaria developed new notions of identity and community. Many came to see themselves not simply as a minority but part of a larger entity – the nation, or millet. The Bulgarian context where expressions of nationalism were rife, the sense of vulnerability – of the local Muslims and of the Ottoman Empire, and the various mobilization endeavors contributed to changing ideas about the boundaries of community. At the same time, with the expansion of communications and travel, Bulgaria’s Muslims increasingly became part of a larger interconnected world in which they found new notions of solidarity with Muslim communities elsewhere but also related to the experiences of various people.

Homeland, Nation, and Identity

“What is the thing that everyone must love most of all,” asked one clue in a crossword in the entertainment section of Uhuvvet. The following issue published the key with the answer: the homeland (vatan). Love for the homeland and patriotism were among the most exalted feelings, reformers often asserted, as they tried to impart their convictions in every possible way - from didactic pieces to theater performances. And one had to be conscious of it even when engaged in leisure activities, such as solving crosswords. The frequently repeated hadith “Love for the homeland is part of the faith” added further legitimacy to their arguments. The greatest and most admirable deeds in human history were the result of selfless patriotism and zeal, they asserted. Reformers themselves argued that their endeavors were led by patriotic sentiments and often referred to those working for the common good as patriots. 

In Ottoman Turkish, vatan originally meant one’s native place, a particular city or region. The term, however, assumed a different meaning in the 1860s in the ideology of the Young Ottomans, particularly in Namık Kemal’s writings, for whom it came to signify the homeland. Bulgaria’s Muslims continued to use the concept in its traditional meaning, but more often they came to utilize it in its sense of homeland. The common good of the nation and the homeland were the ideals guiding them in their struggles.

But what was the homeland for Bulgaria’s Muslims? Their writings reveal that while it commanded utmost devotion, the homeland was imagined in different ways. The homeland could be Bulgaria, the Ottoman empire, or both of them. The Muslims were conscious as well that the Bulgarian lands used to be part of the Ottoman empire. At times the homeland was real and palpable; at others – an idealized abstract notion. Such complex loyalties were not an exception at the time or particular to the Muslims. As one study has skillfully demonstrated, the Greeks of Bulgaria similarly espoused and debated varying notions of belonging.

Bulgaria, where the Muslims felt they had their roots and continued living, was one of their homelands. They did not explicitly elaborate on their attachment, yet such sentiments are evident from numerous discussions, as well as their actions. The fact that Muslims worked to reform their institutions and sought to claim a place in Bulgarian political and public life is the most compelling evidence that they regarded the country as their homeland. In line with such convictions reformers harshly condemned emigration to the Ottoman Empire. The solution to the Muslims’ problems was not leaving their native places for lands that they hardly knew, but attaining the necessary qualifications to stand up for their own rights. Some Muslims mistakenly believed that going to the Ottoman empire was akin to a hijra, a reference to the act of joining a community of people of the Muslim faith, but they were wrong, reformers argued. Bulgaria was their country and the country of their ancestors. Leaving it was equal to obliteration. In a similar vein, they underscored the significance of learning Bulgarian if one was to live as a full member of Bulgarian society.

The Ottoman Empire was another homeland. Bulgaria’s Muslims also explicitly identified as being part of the Ottoman nation. “It is known that we, the people along the Danube, … [who] belong to an exalted religion are Ottomans, Muslims,” wrote one Muslim from Russe. The fact that Muslims migrated to the Ottoman state was an example of such sentiments but their loyalties were demonstrated in various other ways. Local Muslims marked Ottoman state holidays, such as the sultan’s birthday and the anniversaries of his accession to the throne. On these occasions delegations of muftis, Muslim members of parliament, and other dignitaries visited the Ottoman Commissioner in Sofia, the Second Secretary in Plovdiv or the offices of the Ottoman trade representations in Bulgaria to present their congratulations. After Abdülhamid II survived an assassination attempt in 1905, scores of Muslims visited the Ottoman representations or the mufti offices to offer prayers for his survival. Muslims from Bulgaria also showed solidarity with their co-religionists in the empire in difficult times. After a destructive earthquake hit Istanbul in 1894, they sent donations to help people affected by the catastrophe. […] 

Muslims critical of the Hamidian regime showed their commitment to the Ottoman homeland through their involvement in Young Turk activities whose ultimate purpose was the salvation of the Ottoman Empire. Dozens of Muslims, for example, sent congratulatory cards and telegrams to the Young Turk daily Ahali on the occasion of Muslim holidays, in which they expressed wishes to each other to see the homeland, clearly envisioning the Ottoman state, liberated from tyranny.

[…]

Global Communities

At the same time that Bulgaria’s Muslims were elaborating ideas of national community and identity locally, they increasingly turned their attention outside as they began to imagine their place in a larger, globalizing world. In “the age of steam and print,” the world drew closer, allowing new kinds of interactions that had not been possible before. Bulgaria’s Muslims avidly followed international political developments. News and discussions of topics, such as European alliances, imperialist rivalries over Africa and Central Asia, conflict in the Far East, Japan’s achievements, and the rising wave of revolutionary upheaval filled the pages of local Muslim journals. Their implications for the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans were fervently discussed. Among Bulgaria’s Muslims these developments contributed to a sense of living in a larger, interconnected world and a new age which was full of possibilities but was also charged with crisis. They approached this world through the lens of their own experiences. 

Religion, shared fate, and struggles became major sources of solidarity with other Muslim communities. The period from the 1880s until the outbreak of the First World War saw a peak of the idea of a Muslim world, a notion held by Europeans and Muslims themselves. This phenomenon, as a recent major study has eloquently argued, was the product of a combination of factors such as the racialization of Muslims in European discourses, imperial globalization, and the advance of communication technologies. It was also at this time that the juxtaposition of the notions of a Muslim world and a Christian West took place.

Bulgaria’s Muslims were also part of this trend. Print was one of the means that allowed them to imagine themselves as being part of this Muslim world and to establish connections with others. They became increasingly aware and compared their experiences to the fate of their co-religionists elsewhere. Their own vulnerability, problems, and disunity seemed to be mirrored among the Muslims in other parts of the world. Just like them Muslims elsewhere, from North Africa to Bosnia to Central Asia and India, suffered under the rule of their Christian colonial masters, wallowed in misery, and struggled for improvement. The Ottoman Empire, the target of Great Power ambitions, too was also part of this trend. Bulgaria’s Muslims responded with intensity and visceral understanding partly because of their own experiences. Such awareness elicited ideas about common Muslim action. Yet arguments about joint action and transnational Muslim solidarity remained mainly ideas rather than becoming realities.

Many Bulgarian Muslims argued that unity based on common religious bonds and experiences was the solution to overcoming their precarious existence. In such endeavors the Ottoman Empire and the Ottomans were deemed natural leaders. Such views were shared by the sympathizers of the Hamidian regime, as well as its Young Turk critics. The difference was that the latter made no mention of Abdülhamid II as the leading authority. Gayret and Rıza Pasha were among the boldest advocates of the idea which garnered them considerable popularity among other like-minded Muslims in Bulgaria and the Ottoman empire. According to Gayret, Islamic unity was possible even between the Ottoman Empire and Iran, although the former was predominantly Sunni and the latter Shi‘a. In such a way the Muslims could claim what rightfully belonged to them. Eventually such efforts would lead to the establishment of “United Muslim States” spreading to India and Central Asia, the journal dreamfully mused. In this endeavor the leadership of the Turks or the Ottomans, who were deemed more advanced than the other Muslim nations, was only natural. 

[…]

Arguments about Muslim solidarity were likewise shared by Young Turk sympathizers. Ali Fehmi dismissed the Hamidian regime’s talk of Islamic unity as empty posturing but he underscored its benefits. All three hundred million Muslims around the world were repressed in some way, he contended, but if they united, they would be able to end domination. When a Bulgarian newspaper mockingly suggested that Abdülhamid II should marry the widowed Chinese empress so that the two greatest tyrannies on earth could unite, Ali Fehmi saw the idea of dynastic marriage useful. If Ottoman sultans concluded well-negotiated dynastic marriages with members of the Iranian, Egyptian, and Afghan royal houses, they would establish valuable strategic alliances beneficial to all Muslims. In this spirit Muvazene’s radical successor Ahali portrayed Pan Islam as a spontaneous defensive response to European imperial encroachments. Abdülhamid II though was seen as the culprit for preventing the Muslims from coming together, rather than as the legitimate leader in such endeavors.