Alma Rachel Heckman, The Sultan’s Communists: Moroccan Jews and the Politics of Belonging (New Texts Out Now)

Alma Rachel Heckman, The Sultan’s Communists: Moroccan Jews and the Politics of Belonging (New Texts Out Now)

Alma Rachel Heckman, The Sultan’s Communists: Moroccan Jews and the Politics of Belonging (New Texts Out Now)

By : Alma Rachel Heckman

Alma Rachel HeckmanThe Sultan’s Communists: Moroccan Jews and the Politics of Belonging (Stanford University Press, 2021). 

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book? 

Alma Rachel Heckman (ARH): I first traveled to Morocco in 2009 with a Fulbright fellowship to study Moroccan Jewish heritage sites. There, I volunteered at the Moroccan Jewish Heritage Foundation and Museum in the Casablancan suburb of l’Oasis, mostly cataloging archival documents. The museum was founded and directed by Simon Lévy (1934-2011), a Moroccan Jew who had been active for decades in the Moroccan Communist Party, through which he militated for national liberation from French and Spanish colonial rule (1912-1956). I was recently out of undergrad and had not heard of Jews in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) fighting for independence—I had only learned about Jews leaving their home countries in the fallout of the anti-colonial struggles of the 1950s and 1960s. I wanted to know how exceptional Lévy’s story was, so I began investigating further. These investigations ultimately led to a new narrative of twentieth-century Moroccan Jewish political history, with implications for modern Jewish history as well as the history of the modern MENA writ large. Historically, modern Jewish historiography has neglected Jewish political history of the MENA in its standard narrative while modern MENA historiography has often neglected the contributions of minorities to nationalist organizations. The history of Moroccan Jewish communists cuts across these historiographic circles.

For politicized Moroccan Jews, as well as Jews elsewhere in the world, communism provided the most persuasive and practical means of participating in the national liberation movement ...

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address? 

ARH: This book explores Moroccan Jewish participation in Morocco’s anti-colonial movement and follows the stories of politically active Moroccan Jews who remained in the country after independence in 1956 through to the 1990s. As such, it is part of a growing body of literature discussing Jews of the MENA region and patriotic projects of the twentieth century. This literature includes work by Joel Beinin and Rami Ginat on Egypt, Orit Bashkin on Iraq, Lior Sternfeld on Iran, Pierre-Jean Le Foll-Luciani on Algeria, and Kamilia Rahmouni on Tunisia. Until relatively recently, the prevailing historiography of Jews of the MENA had not considered the trajectories of Jews that fought against colonialism and sought to participate in the project of national reconstruction post-independence. Instead, most narratives emphasized Jewish mass exodus and intercommunal antagonisms. With this book, I intervene in that previously dominant narrative to uncover a history of Moroccan Jewish nationalism and political idealism that persisted well beyond traditional stopping points of the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, Moroccan independence in 1956, and regional wars with Israel of the 1960s and 1970s. For politicized Moroccan Jews, as well as Jews elsewhere in the world, communism provided the most persuasive and practical means of participating in the national liberation movement as it was one of the only political movements that did not emphasize a specific ethno-religious national identity.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work? 

ARH: This is my first book. Most articles and chapters I have published have been related to the book in some manner, emphasizing different themes. For example, I have published several chapters and articles about the Second World War in Morocco and the politicization of Moroccan Jews, notably into communist politics. The overarching concern of the book and related shorter publications is the question of Jewish political belonging in Morocco and the place of Jews in national liberation politics in the MENA.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

ARH: I tried to write The Sultan’s Communists in an approachable narrative voice, following the stories of five Moroccan Jewish radicals (Léon René Sultan, Edmond Amran El Maleh, Abraham Serfaty, Simon Lévy, and Sion Assidon), and to frame each chapter thematically and chronologically. As such, I hope the book finds readers beyond the academy, reaching all those interested in Jewish history in the MENA, the history of Jews and radical politics, the history of Jewish anti-Zionism in the MENA, and the history of anticolonial movements in the MENA and beyond. Fundamentally, I hope that readers come away from the book with an appreciation for the diverse political histories of Jews in the Middle East and North Africa, with Morocco as a case study. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

ARH: Together with Nathaniel Deutsch of UC Santa Cruz and Tony Michels of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, I am co-editing a volume on Jews and radical politics around the world. While many have noted the disproportionate involvement of Jews in radical leftist politics in different specific contexts, in this volume we seek to consider the phenomenon across these contexts, including previously neglected colonial settings of the MENA, to shed further light on modern Jewish political history. In addition to this volume, I am beginning research for a second book project. This project explores Jewish and Muslim participation in anti-fascist organizations in the MENA during the interwar period, with a particular focus on the Ligue internationale contre l’antisémitisme (LICA)—the International League Against anti-Semitism. The LICA was founded in 1928 by Bernard Lecache, a French Jew, and had branches across the MENA region with particularly robust activity in the 1930s. 

J: What were the sources for the book, and in what languages?

ARH: Sources for the book came from a several different official and personal archives, in addition to oral histories, literary materials, and political ephemera. I consulted archives in Morocco, France, Israel, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The location of the archives, as is the case with so many colonial and post-independence research topics, reflects the political and migratory patterns of the subject material, in this case Moroccan Jewish political history of the twentieth century. The personal archives of Simon Lévy were tremendously rich, and I am forever grateful to his family for granting me access to these materials, which included internal Moroccan Communist Party documents, propaganda materials, petitions, and more. Most of the materials generated by Moroccan Jews were in French, with very few published items in Arabic, symptomatic of educational policies that began in the nineteenth century and accelerated under colonial rule. Other research languages include Arabic, Hebrew, Spanish, and Moroccan Judeo-Arabic. 

 

Excerpt from the book (from Chapter 4, pp. 143-175) 

Splinters: Disillusion and Jewish Political Life in the New Morocco

“My father – may God keep his soul – always told me: ‘Morocco is a lion that must be guided with a leash. It must never feel the chain.’ […] When it pulls too much, I let go a little, and when it lets up, I pull a little. It’s a constant compromise, collective and unconscious. We are immersed in the same bath, a bath of love and a bath of conflict. This relationship transforms into perfect solidarity when the nation is in danger.” -- King Hassan II 

During the bloody uprising in Casablanca of March 1965, Simon Lévy was arrested by the police. He was tortured for eight days, while his wife, Incarnation, was stricken with anxiety. She had no idea where her husband was but feared the worst. She waited at home with their two sons until, finally, Simon was unceremoniously dumped at the doorstep of their building at four in the morning, broken and bruised. According to Ali Yata’s son and Simon’s nephew, Fahd Yata, Simon Lévy had been beaten, subjected to electric shocks, and forced to drink laundry detergent. Simon’s sons corroborated this account of their father’s torture. Simon was unable to walk when he finally made it home; he had been thrown out of a moving car and would suffer gastric problems for the rest of his life. After this incident Simon’s mother implored the family to go to France, but Simon was adamant in his loyalty to Morocco. A few months after Lévy’s release, the Hungarian Communist Party, in a gesture of kindness toward their comrades abroad, paid for the family to spend a month on the coast of bucolic lake Balaton in the small town of Siófek. Incarnation remembered hating the food.

The 1960s and 70s proved a crucible for state formation in independent Morocco. The state was dominated by the monarchy, led by Hassan II after his father’s death during a relatively minor medical procedure in 1961. The state experimented, sometimes with violent and greatly repressive outcomes, with the balance of parliament, constitutional monarchy, state of emergency, and back again. Political parties splintered, recombined, and challenged each other and central authority in a manner that was deeply disturbing to the palace. The main efforts of the palace were, as the quote above from Hassan II indicates, to guide the “lion” of the state without it feeling the hand of the makhzan and so quell, control, and ultimately co-opt any political opposition. In the absence of political collaborators, the state tortured, exiled, imprisoned and “disappeared” unruly political forces. Some parties, such as Istiqlal and the PCM, split down the middle along such lines. The Istiqlal’s left-leaning sect, under the leadership of Mehdi Ben Barka (kidnapped in broad daylight in Paris 1965 and subsequently assassinated, it is speculated by King Hassan II’s aide General Oufkir who would himself lead a coup-d’état in 1972), would form the UNFP (Union Nationale des Forces Populaires). The PCM, after being legally disbanded by court order in 1960, continued to operate clandestinely. It would resurface as the PLS (Parti de Libération et du Socialisme) in 1968 and then finally its current iteration, the PPS (Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme) in 1974. 

The left itself began to splinter in the late 1960s. In 1970, Abraham Serfaty and others, disgusted with what they viewed as a betrayal of Communist ideals on the part of the PCM/PLS, broke with the party to establish a farther left, Marxist-Leninist group Ila al-Amam (“Forward” in Arabic), taking most of the students with them. This move caused lasting ire between Serfaty and Lévy, who remained staunchly loyal to the PLS. While both factions would face persecution under King Hassan II at the beginning of the infamous “Years of Lead” – an approximately two-decade period of political repression – eventually the PLS chose a path of accommodation while Ila al-Amam advanced maximalist ideological goals. These political fractures and fusions indicate a critical choice that lay before party leaders and their members, almost regardless of political platform and orientation: to work with the regime and maintain legal status, or to go underground. The efflorescence of prison literature and work on human rights in Morocco attest to the dire consequences of the latter decision.

While leftist politics splintered, so too did the Moroccan Jewish community. In response to the political instability of the immediate post-independence period regarding Morocco’s position within the Arab world as well as growing fear for the instability of the King’s regime, Moroccan Jews left in the hundreds of thousands. Between 1948, the year the state of Israel was established, and 1956, the year of Moroccan independence, approximately 90,000 Jews departed the country. A further 92,000 Moroccan Jews left between 1961 and 1964 in “Operation Yakhin,” an Israeli directed mass migration of Moroccan Jews undertaken with the tacit approval of the makhzan. The vast majority of Jews left for Israel, but many migrated to France, Canada, as well as Latin American countries such as Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil. 

This burst in migration was in part due to internal anxieties and threats of violence as well as economic boycotting, linked to the far away and yet deeply consequential Israeli-Arab conflict. The year 1961 itself was a watershed moment for Moroccan Jewish migration for three major reasons. First, Morocco hosted an African Summit and joint Arab League meeting including Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic in 1961, and played a delicate international diplomatic game among the Cold War and Non-Aligned powers. Violence erupted against Jews in Casablanca during Nasser’s visit, adding to mounting communal anxiety. Second, an illegal ship of Jewish migrants called the Pisces shipwrecked after leaving Morocco, causing uproar and anti-Zionist-turned-anti-Semitic reprisal as well as international outcry from Jewish philanthropies. Third, King Muhammad V died unexpectedly due to complications from a minor operation, raising his widely unpopular son, Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, to King Hassan II. Uncertain of their political future and the ability of this unpopular new King to “protect” them as guaranteed, Moroccan Jews departed out of fear. As the Arab-Israeli conflict intersected with Cold War politics and internationalism, Moroccan Jewish members of leftist parties found themselves increasingly alienated from the broader Moroccan Jewish community. Devoted to Communism in its many guises during the 1960s and early 1970s, Moroccan Jewish leftists were ideologically very consistent with their positions in previous decades, if not more devoted as their nationalism was increasingly pitted against the mass migration Jewish families and friends.

This chapter covers the period of the 1960s up until the Green March to claim Western Sahara for Morocco in 1975. It traverses the tensions of Jewish and Moroccan identities, nationalism and internationalism, cooptation and post-independence dreams of revolution. Despite an increasingly murky, grim Moroccan political context, the Jewish members of leftist parties remained staunchly devoted to their Moroccanness and their hopes for their country in the face of massive Jewish migration and political repression. The first section treats political splits in the mainstream Moroccan political parties and the makhzan’s ability to control or co-opt them before 1967, discussing the bloody violence of 1965 that opened this chapter as well as the assassination of Mehdi Ben Barka. The second section examines Zionism, clandestine migration, and Hassan II’s complicated relationship to Israel and the Jewish Agency. The third section addresses developments in Moroccan leftist political parties after 1967, particularly the foundation of Ila al-Amam and connections with Third-Worldist movements, and how these and other efforts were complicated by repression following two failed coups d’état of 1971 and 1972. This is a chapter about failed hopes, accommodations, migrations and collaborations; it is also about persistence. Simon Lévy’s activism exemplifies this persistence, After Simon Lévy and his family returned from vacationing in Hungary, the activist family (it will be remembered that Incarnation’s sister, Rosalie, was married to Ali Yata) returned to its previous activities. The stories of Moroccan Jewish Communists during this period of post-independence repression are at once exceptional and emblematic, shedding light on Morocco’s political history and that of its Jews in the relief available from the margins.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.