Faisal Husain, Rivers of the Sultan: The Tigris and Euphrates in the Ottoman Empire (New Texts Out Now)

Faisal Husain, Rivers of the Sultan: The Tigris and Euphrates in the Ottoman Empire (New Texts Out Now)

Faisal Husain, Rivers of the Sultan: The Tigris and Euphrates in the Ottoman Empire (New Texts Out Now)

By : Faisal Husain

Faisal Husain, Rivers of the Sultan: The Tigris and Euphrates in the Ottoman Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).      

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Faisal Husain (FH): The time and place of my graduate training made me want to write an environmental history of the Ottoman Empire. Shortly after I started grad school in 2011, Alan Mikhail’s and Sam White’s groundbreaking books appeared, bringing to my attention a field that most Middle East scholars had not heard of until then—environmental history. I was one among many young students to embrace the new method and the countless possibilities it offered to study the history of the region. As an MA student at Yale, I was also incredibly fortunate to meet Alan Mikhail in person, who introduced me to my future dissertation advisor, J. R. McNeill, a renowned environmental and world historian. Ever since, Alan and John have been a constant source of support and inspiration, in their research, writing, and impeccable character. Had I gone to a different grad program at a different time, I would not have written this book.

Out of all environmental topics, I decided to write a history of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers to grapple with questions to which I could not find answers in the literature. Namely, why do the Tigris and Euphrates feature so prominently in surveys of the ancient Middle East, while they receive a cursory treatment in the historiography of the post-classical period? If the twin rivers were critical to Sumerian and Akkadian states, what role, if any, did they play in the history of the Ottoman state in the same region? I also realized that in the early sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire brought virtually the entire Tigris-Euphrates basin under its control, a feat only a handful of states have ever accomplished throughout history. I wanted to make better sense of this political oddity—how it happened, and what it meant.

How could the Ottomans accomplish what Rome and Byzantium could not?

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

FH: The book addresses the most discussed issues about the Tigris and Euphrates in Ottoman archival sources: river transport (to which Chapter 1 is devoted), boat construction (Chapter 2), irrigation agriculture (Chapter 3), animal herding (Chapter 4), wetland exploitation (Chapter 5), and river channel shifts (Chapters 6 and 7). Within the timeframe of the book (1534-1780), those are the issues that were most at stake for the Ottoman state and for the riverine societies it had to deal with. The book, therefore, adopts their priorities as topics of discussion instead of imposing its own anachronistic agenda.

At the same time, the book engages with ongoing conversations about Ottoman and environmental history. One such conversation concerns Ottoman eastward expansion from the early sixteenth century. The literature on this subject portrays Iraq as yet another domino to fall under Ottoman rule after the fall of Egypt and Syria. But from a deep historical perspective, Ottoman expansion into Iraq was a political oddball and begs the question of how it was possible. Anatolia, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean coastlands had experienced imperial rule from Istanbul before the rise of the Ottoman state, during the Byzantine period to be more specific. Iraq, on the other hand, was never ruled by Istanbul in its millennia-long political history. Both the geographical pressures of distance and the political pressures of Iran prevented Roman and Byzantine armies from keeping Iraq under their fold for any meaningful stretch of time. In the early sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire from Istanbul defied both the geographical and political odds to rule Iraq, with brief interruptions, until World War I. How could the Ottomans accomplish what Rome and Byzantium could not? The book argues that they did in part because of an unprecedented imperial system of waterborne communication along the Tigris and Euphrates that kept Ottoman garrisons in Iraq well-armed and well-fed a thousand miles away from Istanbul.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

FH: The articles I published before this book in Environmental History and the Journal of Interdisciplinary History dealt with the same theme, but they were more narrative driven because they relied heavily on chronicles written in Ottoman Turkish and Arabic. Most of the book, on the other hand, is concerned less with narrative and more with long-term political, environmental, and economic patterns—how did farmers cultivate wetlands? How did soldiers acquire their ammunitions? How did shipwrights build boats? To mention just a few patterns. This departure was made possible thanks to the additional time I had to incorporate Ottoman archival sources, particularly the cadastral surveys (tapu tahrir defterleri), which offer a precious insight into the daily lives of ordinary people that urban-based chroniclers often disparaged and ignored. 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

FH: The book is based primarily on sources written in Ottoman Turkish, so scholars and students of Ottoman history will likely be its core audience. At the same time, I tried my best to make the book comprehensible and interesting to readers with no background in Ottoman history. In particular, I hope environmental historians interested in river systems, regardless of their geographical focus, will find the book useful.

River systems today often feature in public policy discourse as sources of discord. Think of the conflict between China and its southern neighbors over the Mekong, between India and Pakistan over the Indus, and between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq over the Tigris and Euphrates. If there is one real-world impact that the book will have, I sincerely hope that it will show that rivers are not destined to be tinderboxes ready to ignite. When managed cooperatively and holistically, they can promote economic and political cohesion, as the Tigris and Euphrates did during the early modern period.

J: What other projects are you working on now? 

FH: I am working on a new book project on the environmental history of Ottoman frontier expansion during the sixteenth century. Historians have studied the political and cultural dimensions of Ottoman expansion into the Middle East, but the environmental dimensions have been largely ignored. My first book focused on one overlooked consequence of Ottoman expansion—its political unification of the Tigris-Euphrates system. But the enormous trove of written records we have from the period—particularly the cadastral surveys—allows for a broader story that considers other policies and subsistence strategies that could be pursued independent of river resources.

J: Where do you see the field of Middle East environmental history headed?

FH: I am optimistic. Environmental history is one of the most vibrant fields in Middle East studies today. Its vibrancy reflects a growing interest in our relationship with the rest of nature among humanities scholars across the board, regardless of their regional specialization. My book is just one entry in a rapidly expanding list of books on Ottoman and Middle East environmental history. Just before my book came out, Andrea Duffy (Colorado State) and Michael Christopher Low (Iowa State) published their wonderful books on the Mediterranean and the Hijaz, respectively. Onur İnal and Yavuz Köse (Vienna), meanwhile, published a handy introductory volume on the field. Soon, Chris Gratien (Virginia), Samuel Dolbee (Harvard), Elizabeth Williams (UMass Lowell), Graham Pitts (George Washington), Zozan Pehlivan (Minnesota), Dale Stahl (CU Denver), Camille Cole (Cambridge), Isacar Bolaños (CSU Long Beach), among others, will publish their books. Every year since Mikhail’s and White’s books came out in 2011, environmental history has been attracting more interest from Middle East historians and improving our understanding of the region’s past.

 

Excerpt from the book (from the Introduction, pp. 5-9)

Writing a history of the Tigris and Euphrates is an attempt to piece back together a jigsaw that time has torn apart. Even though natural scientists take the physical and biological unity of river systems as an article of faith, the twin rivers appear in most historical works as dismembered bodies. In Ottoman historiography, for example, different portions of the drainage basin feature in national and provincial monographs in isolation from each other. Studies framed around administrative units illuminated the adaptability of imperial governance in different localities but rendered invisible the total fluvial system. The Tigris and Euphrates, as a result, have leaked through the cracks of monographs about Anatolia, Syria, and Iraq as well as their cities and provinces.

One aim of this book, therefore, is to overcome the historiographical dams that have divided the Tigris and Euphrates into artificial basins and to demonstrate the utility of adopting a hydro-scale that considers the fluvial system as a continuous whole. Unified under Ottoman hegemony, the natural drainage pattern of the twin rivers fostered intimate bonds between upstream and downstream provinces, transporting not only water and sediment but also boatloads of men, guns, and grain that cemented the Ottoman presence in the east. The hydro-scale clarifies the magnitude and significance of these movements. It reveals, moreover, how the Tigris and Euphrates could expand the reach of natural and political disturbances happening anywhere in their basin. For instance, drought in the highlands of Sivas and Diyarbakır could trigger floods in the lowlands of Baghdad, and security anxiety in the Persian Gulf could spur the construction of riverboats upstream in Birecik.

Long before the “river basin” came into vogue as a concept during the twentieth century, human perceptions and institutions presupposed its natural unity.  Ottoman officials considered the Euphrates to be an interconnected environmental system when, for example, they floated timber downriver, leaving it to its fate, knowing that flow could carry it over 800 miles to their downstream partners. Ottoman geographers, furthermore, gave expression to the spatial unity of the Tigris-Euphrates basin. One of the earliest Ottoman panoramas of the river system is a remarkable eleven-foot-long map drawn in the middle of the seventeenth century. The map features the entire river system, from the Taurus Mountains to the Persian Gulf, and indicates the major routes, settlements, and holy sites in-between. By the standards of the time, the map is an impressive cartographic achievement. Even travelers flying over the Tigris and Euphrates today cannot see the rivers in their entirety at one time. The magnitude of the landscape, however, could not defy the anonymous cartographer’s sense of dimension, which recognized that settlements along the Tigris and Euphrates all belonged to a single fluvial system that could be represented in a single map. 

Operating on an unconventional spatial scale invites an unconventional vocabulary. The area of land drained by the Tigris and Euphrates lacks a general historical name. This book will refer to it as the drainage or river basin, a geographical term synonymous with watershed in North American usage and with catchment area in other parts of the world. Within the drainage basin, most irrigation and navigation activities before the age of fossil fuels could not break free from a micro-geography that is referred to here as the alluvial plain. If the Tigris-Euphrates basin before the nineteenth century were a concert hall, the alluvial plain would form the center stage; thus it attracts the lion’s share of attention in this book. 

Nature throws the alluvial plain into stark relief. Geologically, it is an extensive depression filled with thick sediment deposits south of Hit on the Euphrates and Tikrit on the Tigris, boxed in by the rocky scarps of the Arabian desert along the southwestern flank, the marshes of Basra and Khuzistan on the southeastern boundary, and the Jabal Hamrin hill range on the northeast. Topographically, the alluvial plain is exceptionally flat, largely sitting at an elevation lower than 165 feet and less than 1 percent gradient. In the middle of the seventeenth century, Ottoman traveler Evliya Çelebi compared it to the Kipchak steppe in the Ukraine. His French contemporary, Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, thought it looked more like the terrain in Holland. Coming from the Mediterranean, travelers could recognize their arrival in the alluvial plain from changes in the vegetation cover. Here the date palm dethrones the olive tree and rules the plant kingdom. Historically, the alluvial plain roughly corresponds to the ancient lands of Sumer and Akkad, the Ottoman provinces of Baghdad and Basra, and Arab Iraq (Irak-i Arab), as the region was referred to in early modern Ottoman literature. To the Tigris and Euphrates, the alluvial plain is what southern Louisiana is to the Mississippi. To avoid prolixity, it will often be referred to as the alluvium or Iraq.

From a purely materialist perspective, the Tigris and Euphrates are modest rivers. If the drainage basin area and the annual discharge volume are used as metrics for global comparison, the twin rivers would rank low, overshadowed by the fluvial heavyweights of the world such as the Amazon and the Congo. Despite their humble geographical standing, they could still play an outsized role in the political affairs of Eurasia when a central administration based in Istanbul coordinated their exploitation with upstream and downstream settlements. The energy of river flow expanded the combat radius of Ottoman armies in West Asia and supported the stability of the eastern frontier as they fought in Central Europe. The twin rivers in this way helped the Ottoman Empire balance its military engagement between the Asian and European fronts.

Their historical influence disproportionate to their geographical size, the Tigris and Euphrates remind us to appreciate the small things in nature. Small rivers can be as complex and as enchanting as large ones. In the words of Henry David Thoreau, writing in 1852, “A brook need not be large to afford us pleasure by its sands & meanderings and falls & their various accompaniments. It is not so much size that we want as picturesque beauty & harmony. If the sound of its fall fills my ear it is enough.”

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New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.