Zaynab El Bernoussi, Dignity in the Egyptian Revolution: Protest and Demand during the Arab Uprisings (New Texts Out Now)

Zaynab El Bernoussi, Dignity in the Egyptian Revolution: Protest and Demand during the Arab Uprisings (New Texts Out Now)

Zaynab El Bernoussi, Dignity in the Egyptian Revolution: Protest and Demand during the Arab Uprisings (New Texts Out Now)

By : Zaynab El Bernoussi

Zaynab El Bernoussi, Dignity in the Egyptian Revolution: Protest and Demand during the Arab Uprisings (Cambridge University Press, 2021).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Zaynab El Bernoussi (ZE): In a nutshell, I wanted to write this book because I wanted to convey what I felt to be a resonance of the demand of dignity in the Arab Uprisings, particularly as a student of postcolonial theory and as an Arab person with keen interests in Nasserism and political development. 

In the book I talk about “karama,” which means “dignity” in Arabic, and it was one of the main slogans for the 2011 revolution in Egypt. To me what was very salient was the upsurge in Arab solidarity that I experienced while being in the United States, specifically in New York City and more specifically in Astoria, Queens, a neighborhood known for its Arab community and hookah cafes. I was there from 2009 to 2012 and went back to Morocco, my home country, in February 2011, which was the month of the “February 20” movement protests.

Prior to 2011, I had already cultivated a keen interest in Egypt for its centrality to the Arab world and what was then an almost clearly deceased pan-Arabism. I need to also say here that in the United States I met more Arabs than when I was in the Arab world, particularly because of the difficulties of traveling for Arab citizens inside the region. So, my research on Egypt started in the United States and I am much grateful to the Fulbright program, among other US cultural programs for that. I then got the chance to go to Egypt, which only confirmed my desire to write about Egypt.

I also wanted to address the concept of dignity in a postcolonial political study.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

ZE: For my research in the book, I was first interested in the crisis of “Third World internationalism” (which included the waning “pan-Arabism”) that was rocked by 2011 for me. I was also trying to think about development issues beyond poverty, governance, human rights, and security. What stood out for me were accounts of exacerbating experiences of continuous belittling and humiliation in multiple sources (novels, scholarly work, popular culture).

I also wanted to address the concept of dignity in a postcolonial political study. Dignity as a concept is often studied in ethics and there is lack of a clear discussion of dignity as a powerful social and personal concept in political study because there is more attention to institutions, structures, and procedures. In economics, on the other hand, we see increasing attention given to non-material dimensions of development, which already include the concept of dignity.

To respond to this gap, I surveyed various studies looking at a politicization of dignity. In historical studies of postcolonial Egyptian society and politics, the use of the concept of dignity benefitted from a context of feelings of humiliation and backwardness, and a sense of helplessness spread among the local population since the Free Officers’ Revolution in 1952. This negative mood was exacerbated by the increasing number of Egyptians in poverty (Khaled Fahmy, 1997Derek Hopwood, 1991Tarek Osman, 2013Steven Cook, 2011). In sociology, Barrington Moore talked about the importance of the bourgeoisie class in triggering revolutions and that they lead protest demands, whereas Asef Bayat talked about the importance of “moral outrage.” There is also the recent collaborative work of Michèle Lamont on the recognition gap that is useful to provide evidence that marginalization is damaging and could be tackled via inclusive policies. In development studies, Martha Nussbaum talked about capacity building and non-material dimensions of wellbeing, while Pheng Cheah (2007) talked about an incompatibility between globalizing capitalist contexts and a genuine expansion of a society of rights. In political study, David Kertzer’s work on how different issues and agendas can bring several political movements to intermingle in a form of “solidarity without consensus” and strengthen the momentum of a political opposition was key to my analysis. George Kateb (2014) was more explicit on the claim of human dignity to strengthen demands for human rights and democracy. Sami Zemni (2013), who wrote about the Arab Uprisings, brought an important insight on the need for what he calls a moral economy, in the context of predatory practices in business and even in public administration that we find in many Arab countries and that leads to those demands for karama. In psychology, there is the groundbreaking work of Donna Hicks (2021), who, as a conflict resolution expert, noticed the damaging power of dignity wounds, particularly when dignity is not honored. Also, studies have shown that assaulting dignity triggers the same parts of the brain as those stimulated by physical pain. 

Surveying these different studies allowed me to confirm the resonance of demands of dignity in different intellectual approaches and I wanted in the book to contrast those scholarly works with the meanings of dignity for people in action.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

ZE: My interest in Egypt went back to Nasser as a personification of karama and a leader of Third World internationalism defying the imperialist world. My work before this book was a comparative study of the 1956 nationalization of Suez and the 2011 Egyptian revolution as two moments of political demands for dignity. The comparison showed that Arab people have voiced their problem with karama in the two cases, even if the contexts are very different. So, when the Arab Uprisings started in Egypt, I was struck by the sight of young people brandishing photos of Nasser as a personification of dignity and defiance, when he was also an authoritarian leader with a regime to a certain extent inherited by Mubarak. This time, instead of targeting foreign imperial powers as the enemy, the enemy seemed to be from within, in the form of local leadership that abused its powers and oppressed and humiliated all kinds of people. 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

ZE: I hope that readers interested in a postcolonial political and social study of the Arab world in particular and the global South at large read this book. I am proposing with this book to look at cornerstone concepts of social study in practice and in the field and to take the meanings from those concerned, instead of going into the field with our “academic” understandings. I hope that this proposition of starting from the practice and the field, which is what we have with grounded theory, contributes to more methodological and epistemological diversity and impacts processes of knowledge production so we expand our understanding of the world around us. I also hope that more people in the Arab region study other parts of their region.

J: What other projects are you working on now? 

ZE: I am now looking at more understandings of dignity beyond the Arab world through a global survey, and it is again fascinating to find so many differences in the understanding of the concept. My hope is to use the data to think about a dignity index.

I am also looking at the 2014 constitution in Tunisia as one of the constitutions that mentions human dignity the most. My working thesis is that understandings of dignity in drafting the 2014 constitution of Tunisia produced both conflict and consensus among competing interest groups in Tunisian society. 

My findings so far are that demands for dignity work as a diagnosis for something else, and they have the power to propel a demand to the forefront. For example, if I say “I want to marry,” I would not draw much attention, but if I say “to allow me to marry is to give me my dignity,” then I make my demand much more important, because this tying to dignity legitimizes my expressed need more.

J: In your book you propose a new term for such calls for dignity in protests - what is it about?

ZE: In the book I propose the term “dignition”, a portmanteau of dignity and recognition to show how the demand of dignity can be tied to recognition. This amplifies how such calls for dignity in protests attract attention because they scream “I AM HERE” and they have the ability to signify many things to many and different people without the need to explain what one means by dignity. This proposition is in line with the argument that politics of dignity is a “catch-all” political demand that can serve varied interests simultaneously.

It is important to remember that in this study I was first particularly interested in the claim of karama, why it becomes important, and why there were global connections among these dignity demands. My former comparison of the 2011 revolution with the 1956 Suez Canal nationalization tried to disprove that it is only now, and the context of increasing global connections in our societies matters greatly to the resonance of such demands. 

The idea with this study was to look at dignity per context and show that karama has a meaning in context. For instance, for one worried father that I interviewed, his dignity was linked to raising a good son. Dignity as a concept can be a moment or a feeling and, therefore, it is important to reinstitute the term in a form of life.

 

Excerpt from the book (from the Foreword by Donna Hicks, pp. xi-xiii)

In the two decades that I have been researching and working with dignity as an approach to understanding and resolving conflict, I have never encountered such a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the concept as this book by Professor Zaynab provides. Her goal was to ask people who were involved in the Arab Spring uprising in Egypt in 2011, their understanding of dignity (karama in Arabic) and how it factored into the reasons for the revolution.

She did not assume a universal, shared understanding of the concept. Instead, she relied on the lived experience of the people she interviewed. She listened carefully to the stories her respondents told. She was mindful not to impose her preconceived ideas about the relationship between dignity and the uprisings. Her approach to the research, in itself, was an honoring of the respondents’ dignity. She created the space for them to be seen, heard, listened to and understood. 

The book is filled with insight about how complex a role dignity played in Egypt in 2011. She challenged the idea that there was a coherent role that it played. She revealed that it was a multifaceted word that could mean different things to different people. For some, it was associated with human rights and the universalist idea that all human beings had value and worth. One young man said about karama: Dignity is a crown over one’s head. For others, it was related to economic deprivation, unemployment, and poverty. The respondents who held these views felt that the humiliation that resulted from a lack of resources robbed people of their dignity. One response that I particularly liked was an interview with a man who lived on the streets with his wife and children who told her: I want my three-year-old child to grow up with dignity and to find a job just like the President. Others made connections with Islam and the belief that karama is a gift from God. Another common theme centered on karama as an “Arabs’ problem.” Arabs suffer from a perceived lack of dignity and identity confusion, largely because of their colonial history. 

All of the examples point to the necessity of understanding the deep cultural historical, economic, social and religious factors that influenced Zaynab’s respondents’ understanding of what lead to the 2011 protests. To be sure, she will convince the reader that the role karama played in the Arab Spring, in Egypt and elsewhere, was complex and nuanced. 

Zaynab referred to the “emotional” dimension of dignity, particularly as it connects to Egyptian identity. The emotional toll of being treated as “less than” or inferior to others because of some aspect of one’s identity is immense. My research (from neuroscience) shows that when peoples’ dignity is violated, no matter how one understands it, it is experienced in the brain in the same area as a physical wound. It is traumatic to have one’s dignity violated even once. Humans react strongly to it. The anger and resentment are a normal reaction to being treated badly. Add to it the repeated and chronic denial of dignity, day after day, and the anger and resentment turn into protests and even revolutions. The way we treat one another matters. It behooves anyone in a leadership position, especially political leadership, to be sure that all citizens are treated with the dignity they deserve. There are serious consequences for not doing so, and Zaynab has so beautifully chronicled the lived experience of her interviewees, giving voice to the voiceless.

More generally, the price states pay for the failure to recognize the role karama plays in the lives of its people, no matter how one chooses to explain it or experience it, shows the powerful relationship between failed neoliberal postcolonial policies and the oppression that is felt along with economic deprivation. These political failures to deliver dignity are not unique to the uprisings in Egypt in 2011. Zaynab shows that these are global concerns. Indeed, her argument holds up in explaining the recent politics in the United States. Many argue that unemployment and economic hardship for a large number of people who felt humiliated and ignored by the political elite gave rise to a wave of populist sentiment among many angered citizens. Add to it the protests against racism that filled the streets of every American city, even during a pandemic, and it is clear that people will put their lives on the line to preserve and protect their dignity.

The price that any government pays for trampling on people’s dignity is not one to be ignored. Dignity matters and it matters that we understand it, protect it and promote it if democracy is going to survive. There is no democracy without dignity.

It is with great clarity, conviction and keen scholarship that Zaynab presents the results of her profound research to the world. I am proud to be able to contribute this foreword to the book. No matter whether you are a scholar or someone curious about how dignity was experienced during the Arab Spring, this book will not disappoint. As the champion of karama that I know her to be, this book will likely lead the way to future explorations of the concept. Thank you, Zaynab, for your commitment to raising our consciousness about the one thing all of us want: To experience the political, cultural, social and psychological conditions that promote and protect dignity so that we can all live together in peace and harmony.”

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.