Gustavo Barbosa, The Best of Hard Times: Palestinian Refugee Masculinities in Lebanon (New Texts Out Now)

Gustavo Barbosa, The Best of Hard Times: Palestinian Refugee Masculinities in Lebanon (New Texts Out Now)

Gustavo Barbosa, The Best of Hard Times: Palestinian Refugee Masculinities in Lebanon (New Texts Out Now)

By : Gustavo Barbosa

Gustavo Barbosa, The Best of Hard Times: Palestinian Refugee Masculinities in Lebanon (Syracuse University Press, 2022). 

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book? 

Gustavo Barbosa (GB): I guess a book is the momentary and complex coalescence of various motivations: personal and academic, intermingling, sometimes conflicting, always disturbing and demanding to be expressed. My first contact with Shatila, the Palestinian refugee camp on the outskirts of Beirut where I lived for one year and conducted research, dates back to my teenage years. I wanted to be a journalist and pressed my parents to subscribe to Brazil’s leading news magazine. Having anxiously awaited the first issue, when it arrived the cover was a photo from the Sabra and Shatila massacre of 1982. That photo is still vivid in my memory.

Later as an adult, I worked for a short while in Tel Aviv, where I asked a Brazilian friend of Palestinian origin to arrange for me to visit Gaza. She did so. Gaza was a punch to my stomach. Gaza is unacceptable: we only live with it because of the effort to make it invisible. In a sense, I am still stuck in Gaza. And I had to do something to come to terms with this fact.

During my doctoral work, I knew I wanted to conduct research among Palestinians. When I started visiting Shatila, before moving there, and as I got to know the shabāb, the lads from the camp, it became obvious to me that I wanted to write something about them. As men with no economic or political-military power, the shabāb are often made invisible by both the feminist literature and the literature on Palestinian nationalism. Yet they very much deserve to be heard, including when they sing. One of the chapters of my book is precisely dedicated to their rap music.

My research question, then, turned into the following: how do today’s shabāb come of age and display gender-belonging?

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

GB: On various levels—academic, personal, and political—I am committed to those people, interlocutors in the field or in the “bibliography,” that is, other scholars, whose existence is obliterated and whose voices are silenced by dynamics of power, academic or otherwise. This is not to say I am in a position to speak for them, but rather that their voices deserve to be heard and their presence recognized. 

Before moving to London for my PhD at the London School of Economics, I studied anthropology in the less secure waters of Brazilian academia. Brazilian anthropology is highly influenced by philosophy because our indigenous populations are philosophical; like Palestinian refugees, existence is not something to be taken for granted also for them. In the United Kingdom, I was exposed to what might be called “hardcore” disciplines, whose influence and power are already consolidated: Marxism, statistics, and feminism. I became increasingly convinced that the latter also deserves to be described as a “hardcore discipline”: moreover, one of a very disciplining nature.

And then I found my way to Shatila, where the foundations of my three canonic disciplines— Marxism, statistics, and feminism—were shaken. I began my investigation with a Marxist-inspired question: what happens to men who cannot provide for their future families? Such is the case of the Shatila shabāb. In Palestine, before 1948, a man came of age and displayed proper gender-belonging by marrying at the appropriate age and bearing a son. When it comes to the Palestinian diaspora in Lebanon, throughout the 1970s, acting as a “freedom fighter,” or a fidāʾī, became an alternative way to come of age and mark proper gender-belonging. My research question, then, turned into the following: how do today’s shabāb come of age and display gender-belonging?

The answer to this question is not obvious, particularly given two aspects. First, Palestinian refugees, due to what I call the “institutional violence” resulting from Lebanese legislation, have neither free access to the labor market nor the legal right to acquire real estate in Lebanon. Unemployment rates remain high, hitting the shabāb particularly hard. So, the economic path for coming of age and displaying gender-belonging has ceased to be as straightforward as it was before 1948. Second, the political-military path also no longer provides an alternative solution for coming of age and displaying gender-belonging, as it was for the fidāʾiyyīn, because the Palestinian Resistance Movement, in its military dimension, has been demobilized in Lebanon. 

At this juncture, I was asking myself: what happens to men with no economic or political-military power? The literature’s traditional answer is that these men live a “crisis of masculinity” that transforms them into terrorists-in-the-making. But none of this holds true for the shabāb from Shatila. So, instead of framing them as emasculated, I decided to promote another crisis, one of an epistemological nature: the crisis of “gender” itself. What happens to gender as a concept—informed as it is by differential access to power by men and women—when we are in the presence of men with no or limited power? 

Gender, as an analytical tool, very much works to depict the biographies of the fidāʾiyyīn. They were all power, all gender as precisely a discourse on power, all public, all spectacle. Their narratives amalgamate everything for which the heroic 1970s stand: territorial nationalism, Third-worldism, socialism. But certain tropes and fantasies from the 1970s have become an impossibility for those coming after, like the shabāb or myself. 

Accordingly, I became very interested in instances of manifestations of gender—if we still wish to keep the word—that do not necessarily imply manifestations of power as well. This was when my attention was drawn to the shabāb’s engagement (dare I say, love?) towards their pigeons. I provocatively named the chapter dedicated to their pigeon-raising “noncockfights.” Indeed, for the shabāb, much more than power struggles is at play in these engagements with animals that can fly and are free. Not all fights have to be about cock.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

GB: My first lengthy academic investment was bibliographical, exploring the books and articles of Pierre Clastres, an ethnographer who had been an adolescent passion of mine and whose work had been largely obscured in academia, submitted to a pitilessly (and, I believe, unduly) strict Durkheimian reading. One of Clastres’ main arguments is that some South American indigenous societies mobilize themselves to prevent the state’s emergence: they are societies against the state. 

Although not looking for this correspondence as such, I was surprised by the functioning of the Shatila polity, which I think can also be described as an anti-state machine that, today at least, does not allow any one political faction to become dominant and impose its will on others. Indeed, there is no single source of recognized and institutionalized authority in Shatila. 

This led me to an interesting question: does gender as a concept—dependent as it is on power— have links to state-machines? What kind of dangerous liaisons may exist between gender and states? And what happens to the concept when the state is not obvious and cannot be taken for granted, as in Shatila?

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

GB: I would be happy for the book to be read by those considering ethnography as a career, feminist scholars and activists, and students of nationalism, including Palestinian nationalism. I frame The Best of Hard Times as an ode to the power of ethnography, and, in very accessible language, show how it can be mobilized to force our opening to difference and to dismantle some consolidated discourses and practices, including those pertaining to liberal feminism. Because the book shows that gender—as a concept informed by important but nonetheless geographically circumscribed political struggles—does not travel well or function everywhere, it challenges some of liberal feminism’s canons and, I believe, may be an interestingly provocative reading for some feminist scholars and activists. Finally, the book also complexifies the notion of a univocal Palestinian nationalism and, in this sense, may constitute a useful bibliographic source for scholars of nationalism.

Above all, I try to render human the shabāb, these men brutalized by the media and some of the academic literature. If the impact of the book, through this humanization, is that people in Lebanon and elsewhere feel less anxiety and fear towards these men and understand some of their predicaments, then The Best of Hard Times will have achieved its political goal.

J: What other projects are you working on now? 

GB: I am taking my first steps towards a new research project: assisted reproduction among gay men in Israel. Again, I will be dealing with men who are left out, in this case by Israeli policies on assisted reproduction, which still hinder their access to this modality of reproduction and force them to pursue transnational surrogacy.* Differently from the shabāb, Israeli gay men do have power, both economic and political—so I will have to engage firmly with power this time—and yet they are still left out.

I have also been grappling with hope for a while now. However elusive, hope still seems to capture shabāb’s imaginaries, as attested by their pigeon-raising and flying. Even though I have not yet begun any fieldwork with Israeli gay men, I predict that hope will inform their reproductive journeys, when they cross borders in search of much desired children. I have tried to obtain funding to organize a seminar on hope but so far have been unsuccessful: it may be telling that I can get money to investigate people’s misery and predicaments, but not their engagement with hope. Now that the pandemic has turned our worlds upside down, and hope has also ceased to be obvious for the richer part of the world, perhaps I will finally be able to secure those funds… 

J: What was the most rewarding and the most demanding feature of your fieldwork?

GB: People are bewildered that I lived in a refugee camp, but that is usually because they think of it only as a miserable place. I do not want to romanticize life in Shatila, at all, because it is challenging. But for me the camp was also a space of possibility and political invention which enabled a vista onto other (non-sovereign) futures.

And, in a sense, this brings us back to hope. Engagement with the future was never obvious in Shatila. Some of the shabāb told me that they lived on a day-to-day basis, their lives over-determined by features beyond their control. This fact—their difficulty, owing to present-day circumstances, of engaging with a sense of futurity—troubled me. And that was the reason I left the camp after a year: I fell victim to what the shabāb describe as mara nafsī, soul-sickness. One of them predicted I would leave the camp, painfully remarking on our differences: “You like Shatila, Gustavo, but actually you can’t stand it. You like Shatila because you know you can leave. For me, Shatila is not a game I can easily get out of.”

 

*This interview was given on November 2021, prior, thus, to the recent change in Israeli legislation allowing gay men to have access to surrogacy in the country.

 

Excerpt from the book (from Chapter 5, pp. 236-242)

A Workshop on “al-Gender” 

“I hate having to do it, Gustavo.” 

My good friend Jihad, twenty-eight, was complaining about yet another workshop on “gender” that he had to facilitate. Jihad was a social worker at a local Palestinian NGO, which was hosting a series of lectures on reproductive health for young Shatila residents, both boys and girls, in cooperation with its Italian counterpart. The Italian NGO financing the exercise provided the social workers with supporting material - a DVD and a guidebook in both Arabic and English - that set out the procedures for the workshop. Jihad thought it best to make some adaptations to the general guidelines in order to render them more culturally appropriate: “I tell the participants that one of Prophet Mohammed’s wives was his boss and that it’s not a problem to have women in leading positions. The local director of our center here in Shatila is a woman. But it’s true that it’s taken even me forever to understand what ‘gender’ is.”

Jihad also used another strategy to help participants grasp the elusive concept of “gender.” He wrote the word in English on a whiteboard, Arabicizing it by placing the article “al-” (equivalent to the) in front of it: al-gender. He then invited the participants to share with others what they understood by the concept: “People come up with the most unbelievable definitions. During one workshop, a participant said that ‘gender’ is a terminal disease.” 

I regretted not having taken part in Jihad’s activity: as happened all too often during my period in Shatila, it seemed I had missed yet another golden opportunity. So I did what an ethnographer has gotta do: I invited myself to the next workshop on “gender” that Jihad was due to facilitate in a couple of months.

*****

This chapter is written from the premise that the participant in Jihad’s workshop who defined “gender” as a terminal disease may have had a point, even if the remark was probably unintentional. Although the notion of “gender” may correspond to the power relations known by the older male refugees, who acted as fidāʾiyyīn […], its utilization is less appropriate when dealing with their offspring, the shabāb of today, with their very limited access to power. In this chapter, I make use of the workshop conducted by Jihad, the one I eventually attended, as illustrative of the highly stereotyped and moralized views that NGOs hold of so-called gender systems in settings considered conservative, such as Shatila. I then present an arena of sociality where the Shatila shabāb displayed sex roles until recently: the raising and hunting of pigeons. I explore the differences between this “noncockfight” - pigeon raising among the shabāb - and the Balinese cockfights (Geertz 2000): though both involve men and birds, they diverge profoundly, among other reasons because Shatila today houses several anti-state trends, whereas Bali is very much a “state machine.” Thus, I ask what happens when a state is not present to “organize” a “sex-gender system” at the local level and suggest that more studies are needed to clarify the exact relation between “gender” and “state machines.” 

“Gender Troubles” 

In contrast to what happened in Jihad’s previous workshop, no dramatic definitions were offered when he wrote al-gender on the whiteboard during the workshop I attended. The guidebook prepared by the Italian NGO did anticipate that participants may not be sufficiently acquainted with the concept and reported that in pilot sessions some guessed that “gender” was a telephone model, a name, a law, a provocation, and a competition - though, again, in the latter three cases I suspect that the participants may not have been entirely wrong. Jihad confided to me that his own organization’s contribution to the workshop was half-hearted at most. His boss, a Shatila resident too, once expressed to him her frustration with the topic: “Oh, these Europeans! They should give us their lives so that we can implement their agenda. We lead lives very different from theirs!”

Some twenty camp residents took part in the workshop, both boys and girls, some of the latter wearing head scarves, ranging in age from fifteen to twenty-four. The boys clustered at the two ends of the table, with the girls in between; a female facilitator, Rola, worked with Jihad to direct the discussions. Only one of the participants, a boy, volunteered that al-gender was about roles (al-ʾadwār), which Jihad diligently wrote on the whiteboard. The others were somewhat more candid, stating that they simply did not know what it was, that it was the first time they were hearing the term, and that al-gender was the same as al-jins (sex).

[…] For my present analytic purposes, it is the workshop’s third activity that is particularly relevant. Jihad and Rola distributed blue and green cards to the participants, irrespective of sex. He explained: “Those with the blue cards can’t do anything except remain seated. Those with the green cards can do whatever they feel like.” A […] male green-card holder opted to tease an unlucky girl holding a blue card. “Now, you’ll swap your cards,” Rola instructed. It was the girl’s turn to take her revenge. 

Once the activity was over, Jihad prompted the participants to share with others how they felt when in possession of the differently colored cards. Faithfully observing the manual’s guidelines, Jihad once more divided the whiteboard into two columns, labeled “No Power” (aʿīf, literally meaning “weak”) and “Power” (Quwwa). Participants stated that while in the quwwa position they felt special (mumayyazīn), gained their rights, and were able to express themselves. […] The content under the heading “No Power” was considerably more dramatic. When holding the blue cards, the Shatila boys and girls reported that they experienced al-malal (boredom), al-dhill (humiliation), al-quyūd (restrictions), al-ʾinfiʿāl (emotional stress), al-ghaḍab (rage), al-ʾiḥtiqān (frustration), and al-ṣamt ([enforced] silence). In the end, Jihad and Rola had conducted the activity precisely as intended, and the Italian NGO’s objective had been attained. Indeed, the manual reads: “Make the point that gender relations are power relations and that subordination (power-over) should be replaced by cooperation (power-with) and empowerment (power-to).” 

On my way out of the center, I bumped into another friend, Omar, a twenty-eight-year-old greengrocer, in the alleys of Shatila. He had grown up hearing about workshops similar to Jihad’s and asked where I had spent the morning. 

Me: I’ve attended a workshop at an NGO.

Omar: Oh, what was the workshop about?

Me: Al-gender.

Omar: And what’s that?

Me: [Under the influence of Jihad’s workshop, replying with an expression probably even more bizarre in Arabic than it is in English] It’s the “social sex” [al-jins al-ʾijtimāʿī].

Omar: [In English] “Ah, that bullshit.” 

***** 

Difference does not necessarily lead to the establishment of hierarchy, and even when it does, the ranking of superiority may contradict the outsider’s expectations and change over time and context, even within the same community. Shatilans do not require a workshop to teach what is tautological to them: that men and women are different, both physically and socially, whether they have a word for the latter or not. Rather, it may be the case that some of us need a workshop to understand how Shatilans conceptualize and practice that difference. 

During a previous meeting I attended at Jihad’s NGO, a group of Norwegian photography students came to make their first acquaintance with camp residents before wandering around Shatila taking shots for an exhibition back home. After making us wait for a couple of hours, the students, some fifteen boys and girls, finally arrived: to general bewilderment, almost embarrassment, all the Norwegian girls were veiled, while barely half of their female Palestinian hosts were dressed the same way. Awad, in his midtwenties, could not resist the obvious joke and whispered to me: “I didn’t know that Norway is a Muslim country!” At a certain point, a female organizer discreetly encouraged one of the Norwegian girls to remove the ḥijāb: all the others followed, revealing a fiesta of different haircuts and colors---including pink---much to the amusement of the Shatilans.

For its part, the workshop on sex/gender described earlier is indicative of some of the international NGOs’ expectations concerning sex/gender systems. First, the workshop was part of a series on “reproductive health”: it medicalized sexuality in a setting considered conservative, such as Shatila. Second, all the activities of the workshop followed a strict dichotomizing logic---sex/gender, Jad/Hala, power/no power---as if difference necessarily entails an opposition and the creation of a hierarchy. Last, the utilization of the colored cards introduced the idea of gender as a disparity in terms of access to power. This is a hasty transposition of a notion of gender informed by important but nevertheless geographically circumscribed political struggles in Euro-America. The automatic transplantation of the notion into settings such as Shatila, where both women and men today have very limited access to power, raises serious issues. Indeed, not all fights are about cock.

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New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

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Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.