Farid Hafez and Enes Bayraklı, eds., European Islamophobia Report 2020 (New Texts Out Now)

Farid Hafez and Enes Bayraklı, eds., European Islamophobia Report 2020 (New Texts Out Now)

Farid Hafez and Enes Bayraklı, eds., European Islamophobia Report 2020 (New Texts Out Now)

By : Farid Hafez and Enes Bayraklı

Farid Hafez and Enes Bayraklı (eds.), European Islamophobia Report 2020 (Vienna, Leopold Weiss Institute, 2021).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you edit this book?

Farid Hafez and Enes Bayraklı (FH & EB): Farid had established the Islamophobia Studies Yearbook, originally in German and today bilingual, as the first academic journal dedicated to the study of Islamophobia back in 2010. While the academic world has become more conscious of this issue, many people in policy circles across Europe still underestimate the problem. That is why we came up with this idea in the first place. Both of us have been publishing this annual project since 2015. This is the sixth volume of the European Islamophobia Report. We started this project together with more than one hundred authors from all across Europe and covering more than thirty countries to provide data on Islamophobia in Europe to help anti-racist as well as Muslim organizations make more people aware of Islamophobia in their respective countries.

... we are interested in identifying important moments and developments within a year that define the state and development of Islamophobia.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

FH & EB: The report has the character of a policy paper, showing how Islamophobia manifests in different fields, from the labor market to media, politics, the justice system, hate crime, and the internet. By providing this structure, one can easily compare the situation in across different European nation states, as well as within one country, over the course of many years. In addition, every single country report concludes with recommendations for policy makers and civil society actors to tackle general as well as very specific problems that pose a challenge in those countries.  While other institutions such as the European Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe have produced reports that provide huge quantitative data, we are interested in identifying important moments and developments within a year that define the state and development of Islamophobia. 

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

FH & EB: There are several aspects unique to this project. First, it was intended as an annual report. Second, it was the first report to cover not only the West of Europe, but also many countries in the East. Before 2015, most of the academic literature discussing Islamophobia had focused on Western Europe. But we have also included countries with a sizeable native Muslim population, such as Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania, as well as countries such as Estonia, Lithuania and Poland, where Muslims represent very small minorities; we have thus been able to broaden the discussion on Islamophobia in Europe.

The European Islamophobia Report is more a policy oriented work, while most of Farid’s previous work has been academic and dedicated to the study of very specific questions such as Islamophobia in parliamentary debates, Muslim civil society activism, antisemitism and Islamophobia, and the institutionalization of Islam in Europe. Enes in the past has been engaged in think tank work a lot, covering a wide range of topics from German politics to Turkey’s foreign policy.

Together, we also published a book in 2019 dedicated to research on Islamophobia in Muslim majority societies, which was important for us since we wanted to show how Islamophobia is not a phenomenon geographically limited to the Western world, but rather—as many decolonial scholars have argued—a manifestation of the expansion of a racial global hierarchy that is deeply rooted in colonial structures of oppression.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have? 

FH & EB: We produced this report on one hand to help the marginalized Muslim communities in Europe and on the other hand to support all the anti-racist forces in Europe, as well as well-intended people in bureaucracy and politics, who want to change the world for the better. We believe that we have already achieved something in this regard, having observed conferences and governmental as well as non-governmental reports drawing on our expertise. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

FH & EB: Farid Hafez is currently working on a book with Naved Bakali with the title “Global Islamophobia in the War on Terror: On Coloniality, Race, and Islam.” Enes Bayraklı is currently working on the first comprehensive anthology on Islamophobia in Turkey. 

J: How do you define Islamophobia in your report?

FH & EB: In our report, we have suggested the following working definition of Islamophobia: “Islamophobia is about a dominant group of people aiming at seizing, stabilizing and widening their power by means of defining a scapegoat – real or invented – and excluding this scapegoat from the resources/rights/definition of a constructed ‘we’. Islamophobia operates by constructing a static ‘Muslim’ identity, which is attributed in negative terms and generalized for all Muslims. At the same time, Islamophobic images are fluid and vary in different contexts, because Islamophobia tells us more about the Islamophobe than it tells us about the Muslims/Islam.” What is important is that we see Islamophobia not only as manifested on an interpersonal relationship, but also on a structural level. At the same time, we are aware that there are many different approaches to the study of Islamophobia.

 

Excerpt from the book (from Chapter 1, pp. 9, 21-23)

The year 2020 was an eventful year for Islamophobic developments, even setting the global spread of COVID-19 aside. The cover of this year’s report shows French President Emmanuel Macron, who have severely cracked down on Muslim civil society and anti-racist activists and scholars in France. With the “Law Confirming the Principles of the Republic” (originally entitled “Law against Separatism”), the Macron government further institutionalized Islamophobia and adopted an authoritarian style. France witnessed an increasing number of police searches, threats of eviction, as well as mosques and school closures, including the dissolution of a humanitarian NGO and a human rights organization defending Muslims in France against racism and discrimination. All together these threatened the fundamental freedoms of Muslims, in specific, and more broadly reveal a shift towards a restriction of citizens’ rights and freedoms. France has arrived at a state where the French interior minister Gérald Darmanin even singled out the long-time Islamophobic far-right party leader Marine Le Pen for “being too soft on Islam.” Similarly, in Austria a raid against pro- ponents of alleged “political Islam” was made one week after the murderous attack on November in Vienna. The home of several civil society activists were also raided and their bank accounts and assets were frozen on the suspicion of being terrorists that want to topple the Egyptian regime, destroy Israel, and create a worldwide caliphate. The raid was based on a report written by Lorenzo Vidino that argues that Islamophobia is a combat term used by political Islamists “to foster a siege mentality within local Muslim communities, arguing that the government and Western societies are hostile to them and Islam in general.” Hafez had already criticized this report as a method used in a systematic way to “produce knowledge to define vocal and representative actors of the Muslim civil society as potentially radical and Islamist, which then should lead to state and civil society exclusion.” (…)

Politics 

Islamophobia has become quite mainstream in the political discourse of many European countries. As several studies reveal, especially the racist discourse of the far right, even if in opposition, has an impact on the overall debate about Islam and Muslims, and continuously extends the boundaries of reasonable and acceptable speech. Far-right politicians, such as the member of the Swiss SVP Andreas Glarner, claim to mobilize against an alleged “preference for Islam.” When the far right is in power, Islamophobia becomes legalized. In Staffanstorp and Skurup, two municipalities of Sweden, where the far-right Sweden Democrats are governing, the hijab was banned. When a school principal resisted, he received death threats by anti-Muslim and racist groups.

Still, it is not only the obvious and blatant Islamophobic speech by far-right politicians like the Austrian FPÖ chairman Norbert Hofer, who said during a party convention “Corona is not dangerous. The Koran is much more dangerous,”that exacerbates the public discourse on Islam and Muslims. It is also the - nominally speaking - mainstream politicians that have fully embraced an anti-Muslim agenda, al- though in a much more subtle way. Following a police raid on November 9, 2020 that targeted Muslim civil society and not alleged “terrorists,” Chancellor Sebastian Kurz stated, “We have to fight two challengers: First, the corona pandemic and second to fight even stronger against terrorism and radicalization in Austria and Europe.” Similarly, other governing parties that do not belong to the far-right political camp, are supporting an anti-Muslim discourse. An MP from the governing Nea Dimocratia (New Democracy) in Greece spoke about the niqab as “violating women’s rights,” raising the question of regulating it by the state. Following a discussion on migration in Brussels with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbán stated publicly, “We don’t think a mixture of Muslim and Christian society could be a peaceful one and could provide security and a good life for people.” Finnish Minister of the Interior (Greens) Maria Ohisalo pointed out, “Freedom of speech also comes with responsibility. Speech about immigration turns into hate speech when it is directed at individuals or certain groups in a derogatory way.” This is what we are witnessing on a wide scale by several politicians in power. 

Following Brexit, the European Parliament currently counts 705 members. While the far-right political group Identity and Democracy (formerly Europe of Nations and Freedom) did not become the fifth-strongest party group in the elections for the European Parliament in 2019, after Brexit, it became the fourth-strongest party, passing the Greens.With 76 seats, Identity and Democracy represents the most successful political group whose members share an anti-Muslim agenda.

Note: The report can be read online for free here.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.