Maya Mikdashi, Sextarianism: Sovereignty, Secularism, and the State in Lebanon (New Texts Out Now)

Maya Mikdashi, Sextarianism: Sovereignty, Secularism, and the State in Lebanon (New Texts Out Now)

Maya Mikdashi, Sextarianism: Sovereignty, Secularism, and the State in Lebanon (New Texts Out Now)

By : Maya Mikdashi

Maya Mikdashi, Sextarianism: Sovereignty, Secularism, and the State in Lebanon (Stanford University Press, 2022).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book? 

Maya Mikdashi (MM): A convergence of so many things, starting with a conversation in a grad school class about religious conversion in the Middle East. The consensus in class was that this was considered apostasy, and not only illegal but dangerous in most of the region. I said that I knew people who had converted from Islam to Christianity in Lebanon, and that they were all alive and well, and that it was not illegal. The conversation that ensued inspired my interest in conversion, which was originally what I went to Beirut to research: conversion, citizenship, secularism, and religion.

When I got there, however, three things happened. First, I unexpectedly was granted access to the archives of the Court of Cassation, specifically to its Plenary Assembly. This access allowed me a systemic, state-centric view of the personal status laws and how they are nested within other bodies of law, specifically through conversion cases that resulted in conflict between personal status institutions. Working in the Plenary Assembly archive also allowed me to circumvent some of the gendered and sectarian obstacles I faced trying to access Christian and Muslim personal status courts. These obstacles are interesting in terms of the political economy of knowledge production on personal status laws and institutions, and on sectarianism in Lebanon.

Second, I arrived during the 2008 clashes and just as a broad-based social movement for civil marriage and the right to remove your sect was taking shape. Many of the lawyers I was in conversation with were involved in this movement, and activism for secularism in Lebanon became one of my research foci. I began to follow lawyers, activists, plaintiffs, and social movements dedicated to this cause.

Finally, while conducting both ethnographic and archival research it became obvious that sex and sexuality were inextricable from the subjects I was researching. Almost all the conversion cases I researched in the Plenary Assembly archive revolved around sexual difference: either informed by or informed the different rights granted to men and women in personal status courts (religious and civil). When it came to secular activism, sexual difference shadowed discourse on secularism and on sectarianism. When people would elaborate on what they called “the culture of secularism,” women’s rights and equality were central. On the other hand, the subject of LGBTQ rights and marriage informed activism for civil marriage and a culture of secularism in often contradictory and toxic ways. Discourse on civil marriage and LGBTQ rights was and is expressed through sextarianism. I became very interested in the presence/absence of sexual difference in academic and non-academic conversations about sectarianism. An animating question became: how can something so obvious in law, bureaucracy, discourse, and experience—the mutually constitutive relationship between sex and sect—be almost absent in dominant accounts of sectarianism? I had similar questions about sovereignty and state power: what could Lebanon—where people believed the state was basically absent—teach us about how and when states invest in juridical power and securitization? 

Sextarianism differs from my dissertation mainly due to two ongoing events that have shaped Lebanon and the broader region since 2011. First, the Arab uprisings, including in Lebanon in 2019, and their aftermath. Today, one third of Lebanon’s residents are refugees or migrants from regional wars and/or colonial projects. I had to rethink citizenship laws and bureaucracies as a system of racialized sextarian securitization. Second, Lebanon imploded politically, socially, materially, and economically as I was writing this book. The affect of the book shifted along with my state of mind. 

Finally, this book had to be written to get tenure and keep my job, which I like and need. I think it is important to discuss the material realities and incentives of academic knowledge production alongside our intellectual interests.

Sextarianism draws out how sex and sexuality structure and inflect citizenship, bureaucracy, and the concerns of social movements.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address? 

MM: Sextarianism is an ethnography of state power, focusing on the experience of the state’s aporias. It is anchored in three sets of academic literature: on law, sovereignty, citizenship, and the state; on secularism and religion; and on sexual and political difference. Individual chapters focus on the regulation and experience of religious conversion; the archives of the Plenary Assembly; the relationship between sovereignty and the making and management of sexual difference; the relationship between violence and sovereignty as seen through the legal framework and experience of hymen and anal exams; and practices of what I call evangelical secular activism—including activism for civil marriage and anti-sectarian organizing more broadly. 

Sextarianism draws out how sex and sexuality structure and inflect citizenship, bureaucracy, and the concerns of social movements. I theorize how biopolitical citizenship is constituted through the regulation of sex, sect, and sexuality and foreground heterosexuality as a securitized disciplinary project, with different stakes for men and women. The book also rethinks the history and experience of the nation state in the Middle East by focusing on war, displacement, and resistance as recursive temporalities rather than “crises.” I explore, for example, how refugees and citizens are made and unmade in Lebanon. This perspective allows me to theorize political sectarianism as a technology of securitization that centers sectarian demographics, women’s sexuality, racism, classism, and violence. Sextarianism engages with the literature on secularism in part by arguing that secularism is not monolithic; ideological differences exist between state secularism (the management and transcendence of sectarian difference into sextarian difference) and what many imagine and desire “secularism” to be, namely anti-sectarian but still deeply sextarian. 

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MM: Sextarianism is my first book, but I have been writing on these subjects for years, both in academic journals and in non-academic publications. I co-founded Jadaliyya, where I have done much of this writing, while conducting dissertation research. So, in some ways, this Newton brings us full circle! 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have? 

MM: Inasmuch as Sextarianism explores and generates methodological approaches to archival and ethnographic research in area studies, anthropology, and gender and sexuality studies, I hope the book appeals to academics, graduate students, and undergraduate students interested in these fields. Moreover, I hope the book will be read by non-academics who are interested in Lebanon, in the nation state, in feminist and anti-sectarian activism, and in the Middle East more broadly.

Sextarianism is a theorization of the relationships between sexual and political difference. It suggests that producing, erupting, securitizing, and traversing the borders between the supposedly private and public spheres are key to understanding how secularism is operationalized, imagined, and desired in a world of nation states. While it emerges from archival and ethnographic research in Lebanon, my book offers transnational frameworks for understanding the relationships between sovereignty, secularism, violence, sexual difference, religious pluralism, law, and the state. For example, Sextarianism offers a language to think about bodily rights or trans rights in the United States, or the regulation of sexual difference more broadly, comparatively with the regulation of sexual difference in Egypt, Turkey, India, or France. It does so by focusing on technologies and ideologies of power that nation states share regardless of location: bureaucracy, law, archives, and the structuring, binary mythologies of the public and private on the one hand, and the religious and the secular on the other. In fact, as a term, “sextarianism” has also been used in the context of how religious discourse inflects political debate on LGBTQ and abortion rights in Ireland. This demonstrates that the term invites comparative, transnational work.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MM: I am currently working on two book projects. The first shifts to the United States and builds on my publication and teaching record on settler colonialism, archival power, and family history. It is essentially a history of one of my ancestors, Eliza Morrison, who was Ojibwe. Eliza died in 1920, which was also the year the British Mandate over Palestine was established. I am fascinated by the conversational timelines of settler colonization in the United States and in historic Palestine, precisely because we imagine them to be operating on different timelines. We recognize the British mandate over Palestine as part of “modern” history, and yet the imagination of US settler colonization is always anchored backwards, towards the past. How can we think about settler epistemological power through area studies and its writing, and dating, of American empire? I am eager to start conducting research this summer.

My second project writes the contemporary, sextarian history of Lebanon from the vantage point of five court cases, beginning in a WWI era case and ending with a case that is currently being heard.

J: You alluded to the affect of Sextarianism in relation to current events in Lebanon. Can you elaborate?

MM: Writing, publishing, and publicizing the book as Lebanon was being broken all around my family and loved ones were very difficult. The bulk of the book was also written during the first Covid lockdown. In some ways, having a project I had to finish helped with depression, but it also led me to seriously question the value of what I was doing in relation to the crumbling world around us. For example, Sextarianism focuses on the Plenary Assembly at the Court of Cassation, the same Assembly that is currently hearing cases related to the investigation of the Beirut Port explosion. I am learning from watching how those cases are playing out and find myself revisiting the people and cases I know from the court repeatedly. The book being published and publicized at this moment feels bittersweet. I am sure that many of my colleagues also had these ambivalent feelings, especially those whose work is centered in a home currently on fire. The affect of Sextarianism reflects my anger, sadness, and ambivalence about being a Lebanese academic publishing a book about Lebanon in the United States where I live and work. I take comfort knowing that so many authors also live and work with these feelings, but in some ways, the common-ness of this experience also reflects a sad truth about our world. 

This affect of ambivalence continues post-publication. For example, in Lebanon the list price of my book, twenty-eight dollars, is, depending on the day, is essentially a full month’s minimum wage. I want my book to be read by in Lebanon, but how? Professors’ salaries at the Lebanese University are currently less than $150 a month in real value. Many government employees at the Judiciary, who in many ways made my work possible, cannot afford to buy a book published, shipped, and priced in US dollars. As of this writing, Sextarianism is priced at 850,000 LBP in Beirut. Three years ago, before the financial and economic meltdown, it would have been priced at 45,000 LBP. Academics and publishers who extract value from research on Lebanon should find ways to make their work accessible and affordable, in book form, to independent libraries and bookstores, people, colleagues, and students who live and work there. These are small ways to help build and sustain ethical and collaborative research and academic publishing practices. 

 

Excerpt from the Introduction 

SAMERA DIED IN January 1975. I met her, and the multiple lives she led, through an archived court case related to her estate and her marital status. The case file contained more than a century of evidence and presented a material history of the court system and of Lebanon itself: hundreds of pages, stamps, documents, and references from and to the Ottoman Empire, the French Mandate, and the first and second postcolonial Lebanese Republics. The stamps alone wrote a history of colonialism, war, currency, and inflation. But all of that material history—from Greek Orthodox courts and churches in Lebanon and in Syria, from Lebanese courts and the country’s highest court, from imperial, colonial and postcolonial bureaucracy—sharpened into one question: Did Samera have a son? If so, was she married at the time of his birth, or was she an unmarried, single mother? The evidence presented proved that she had been both married and unmarried, and that she had a son who was “legitimate” in some documents, “illegitimate” in others. In yet another set of documents this son, Jean, did not exist at all. Samera contained multitudes.

Three months after Samera died, the Lebanese Civil War began, and Jean presented himself as Samera’s son and heir. Other would-be heirs, a group of distant cousins, argued that Jean was lying. Samera had never been married. Even if Jean was Samera’s son, he was born out of wedlock and was thus barred from inheriting. To “recover his mother’s honor,” and her estate, Jean turned to the courts. After Jean died, the case was reopened and amended twice by his children, in 2005 and in 2008. The intergenerational fight over Samera’s estate presented a vantage point to think about the apocryphal origin stories of nation-states and the citational logic of sovereignty—a logic that folded the colonial within the postcolonial via the mediums of law and bureaucracy. More than anything, however, the case highlighted the intergenerational, financial, and affective stakes of being an “illegitimate” child. “It was fundamentally about what I term “sextarianism”—how sex, sexuality, and sect structure legal bureaucratic systems, as well as how citizenship and statecraft are performed at the mutually constitutive intersections and suffusions between sex and sect. Sextarian-specific inheritance laws—laws that are central to capital accumulation—determined which courts would hear the case, and sextarian laws and bureaucracies made children “legitimate” or “illegitimate” heirs. Decades before her death and the subsequent court case over her estate, Samera’s actions regarding her marital status were informed by the knowledge of how sextarianism structured gendered, sectarian, and financial procedures for divorce. In trying to evade one aspect of a sextarian system, however, she, her son, and her grandchildren were caught in another: the census bureaucracy and its afterlives. 

This book rethinks state power and resilience; elaborates political difference at the site of religious and sexual difference; and traces how secularism is staged nationally and transnationally as both a structural form of power and as a set of values, practices, and aspirations. It introduces sextarianism as a concept and theorizes it across different sites that include law and bureaucracy; the archives of the Plenary Assembly at the Court of Cassation; court decisions related to religious conversion and the experiences of converts themselves; social movements and activists that advocate for a culture of secularism and new laws and bureaucracies; and finally, the regulation of sex and sexuality through the state’s courts and interrogation rooms. The book introduces two companion concepts to sextarianism; evangelical secularism and the epidermal state. 

Sextarianism emphasizes how state power articulates, disarticulates, and manages sexual difference bureaucratically, ideologically, and legally. Statecraft is fundamentally practiced as the disciplining of sextarianism into its component parts: sex and sect. Sovereignty is performed at the intersections of sexual and sectarian difference. As a theory and method, sextarianism helps us understand how rule through discrete and abstract regulatory categories distributes the spoils and underbellies of liberal democracy along the same exclusions that liberalism was founded through in the first place, “property, sex, race, and law. Making visible the intersectional experience and distribution of power and its effects within any given system is key to understanding and dismantling the promises of liberal abstraction and universalization. Lebanon is exemplary, not exceptional, in how it ties sect and sex. It represents an intensification of the foundational relationship between political and sexual difference.

Sextarianism builds on Joan Scott’s theorization of the constitutive nature of sexual difference to the history of secularism. It is indebted to Saba Mahmood’s argument that sex is a key technology through which secular state power produces and manages religious difference. I follow Scott’s understanding of sexual difference, emphasizing the relationship between sexuality, sex, and the secular. Sextarianism foregrounds the secular state’s role in both structuring political society through sexual difference, and gendering and personalizing the stakes of sexual difference. Sexual difference is political difference, to repeat Carole Pateman’s foundational claim, and it is also a term for power relations. Sexual difference is a process through which sectarian, gendered, and sexual positions are structurally produced, in addition to being represented, imagined, desired, and managed. In other words, sexual difference is a vector of state power. Thinking from Lebanon allows us to trace colonial and postcolonial modes of producing and regulating religion, secularism, and political/sexual difference. Colonial French Mandate laws, practices, and administrative rules, building on and in some cases doing away with Ottoman precedents, grounded the legal, bureaucratic, and secular political legitimacy of sectarian groups in the regulation of sexual difference. Criminal and civil laws as well as the state’s bureaucratic practices were and are grounded in sexual difference. Ideological, bureaucratic, and legal “crossing,” as M Jacqui Alexander puts it, between imperial, colonial, and postcolonial eras, as well as between “religion” and “the secular,” is key to how sextarianism operates. Thus sextarianism draws attention to the relationship between modern forms of secular state power and colonial forms of indirect rule.

A central point in Samera’s case concerned differences from three historical iterations of Lebanon: Ottoman-era Mount Lebanon, the colonial French Mandate over Lebanon, and postcolonial, independent Lebanon. Jean’s distant cousins showed evidence that Samera first identified herself as “single” in the 1932 French Mandate. She was identified as “single” in state bureaucracy until she died. But Jean had his own set of documents. He presented religious and civil courts with copies of the first French Mandate land census of 1925, his 1940 French Mandate–issued identification card, and a certificate of his 1922 baptism from the Greek Orthodox Church. He also presented evidence that his parents were married in 1917, in the midst of World War I, a devastating famine, and the final year of Ottoman rule over the territory that became Lebanon. All of the documents Jean presented to the court listed him as the legal son of his mother and his father, although no marriage certificate had ever been registered with the colonial or postcolonial state. Jean did not dispute the presence or veracity of his cousins’ set of documents. Instead, he offered a narrative explaining how two contradictory sets of state documents could both be true.

In 1932 Jean’s mother and father were separated and living in different areas of Lebanon. She did not have the money to obtain a divorce from the Greek Orthodox Church. When the census takers came to Samera’s home, she saw an opportunity to get out of a bad marriage. Samera told the census takers that she was single, seeing this as a free and efficient way to leave her husband. A bureaucratic do-over instead of a divorce. It was as if she had never been married at all. Jean, in accordance with the patriarchal bureaucratic system organized under colonial rule and still in place today, was listed only under his father’s census entry. Samera died as a “single/unmarried” woman rather than as a “single/divorced” or “single/widowed” woman—the only possible bureaucratic categories for unmarried women in Lebanon. Samera used the 1932 census to begin a new life as an officially “single” woman. In doing so, she lost legal and bureaucratic ties, and claims, to Jean. She answered the door and the census takers’ questions, but while she danced to the song of the census and of state power, to paraphrase James Scott, she may have been humming a different tune in her head. 

The 1932 national census, conducted under French Mandate, is the only census that has ever been published in Lebanon. It performed, and continues to perform, the colonial conditions under which the state was founded and the violence and sovereignty of the postcolonial state. The system of census taking under the French Mandate, based on the legal categories of sex, sect, and kinship, remains largely in place today. The sectarian demography of the area that became the Lebanese nation-state was produced and made legible through it. The 1932 census identified, organized, and enumerated sects and determined the nascent body of citizens, which were recorded, managed, and produced through the national registries also forged at that time. It was a biopolitical technology of securitization, where sexuality—as that which ties the individual to the population —was key. The census staged an origin story: a land where sect, religion, and region were the primary and inherently competing markers of political difference that had to compromise their autonomy by contracting into the newly founded state. The methodology of the census scaffolded both the religious personal status system and political sectarianism, a system of political representation based on religious and sectarian quotas. The claim that the Lebanese state is a zone of compromise for preexisting political communities is central to an ideology and a self-fulfilling prophesy: Political sectarianism was and is a representative system that channels an underlying sectarian reality.

…..

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New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

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Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.