Mustafa Kabha and Nahum Karlinsky, The Lost Orchard: The Palestinian-Arab Citrus Industry, 1850-1950 (New Texts Out Now)

Mustafa Kabha and Nahum Karlinsky, The Lost Orchard: The Palestinian-Arab Citrus Industry, 1850-1950 (New Texts Out Now)

Mustafa Kabha and Nahum Karlinsky, The Lost Orchard: The Palestinian-Arab Citrus Industry, 1850-1950 (New Texts Out Now)

By : Mustafa Kabha and Nahum Karlinsky

Mustafa Kabha and Nahum Karlinsky, The Lost Orchard: The Palestinian-Arab Citrus Industry, 1850-1950 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2021).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Mustafa Kabha and Nahum Karlinsky (MK & NK): It was a mixture of scholarly and personal reasons. From a scholarly point of view, the British Mandate period (1918-1948) is a major focus of our research. So, even before we embarked on this project, we knew in broad terms that the citrus industry played an important role in the social and economic life of the Palestinian people before 1948. Tens of thousands of Palestinians were engaged in the citrus industry, which was a major capitalist undertaking and the leading export industry of the entire country. Consequently, it served as a key source of economic growth and social mobility for pre-Nakba Palestinian society, and the engine that led the country’s major seaport, Jaffa, to tremendous growth.

Hence, although the details of that story had yet to be unearthed, it was clear to us even then that this capitalist venture stood in sharp contrast to the prevailing image of pre-1948 Palestinian society as an underdeveloped, peasant-based society, an image that was cultivated by many (pro-)Palestinian and (pro-)Israeli scholars, however for diametrically opposite reasons. We were eager to uncover those facts and find out the true story.

Personally, the story of the Palestinian citrus industry struck a close chord for us. 

For Mustafa it was his father’s experience living in Jaffa for fourteen enjoyable and profitable years, from 1934-1948, which like the Palestinian people itself, ended with the tragic events of the Nakba.  His father, Daʾud Ibrahim Kabha (1913-1982), owned a coal store in Jaffa, a product that was an important source of energy for heating and for use in various dining establishments and restaurants. His father told him many stories about those years, like the concerts by famous singers Umm Kulthum and Mohammed Abd el-Wahhab he attended when they performed in Jaffa in the 1940s. Mustafa was particularly enchanted by stories of the special intoxicating aroma of the citrus blossoms whose perfume would envelope Jaffa in the spring. Whenever he visits Jaffa, Mustafa is painfully aware of its lost Palestinian glory and importance.

For Nahum it was the historical lacunae and the officially led forgetfulness of the Palestinians that are imbedded in the Israeli meta-narrative. This meta-narrative erroneously presents the citrus industry as a Jewish Zionist industry, mythically created ex nihilo by the pre-1948 hegemonic Labor Zionist movement, echoing the Zionist tenet of “making the desert bloom.” The citrus industry, according to this erroneous narrative, was first established by Zionists during the Ottoman rule over Palestine, expanded during the British mandate, and reached full glory during the State of Israel's first decades of existence. This meta-narrative does not even mention Palestinian citriculture which, in fact, predated Zionism and Zionist immigration to Palestine.

We met for the first time at a conference. And after a short exchange of perspectives about the pre-1948 Palestinian citrus industry we decided to work together on this understudied topic.

Palestinian and Zionist growers shared the responsibilities of managing and directing the country’s citrus groves and of marketing their famous fruit, the Jaffa oranges, equally.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

MK & NK: The most surprising discovery of the book is the unprecedented bi-national organization that the two national sectors of the country’s citrus industry, the Palestinian-Arab and the Jewish-Zionist, formed at the outbreak of WWII. This bottom-up bi-national framework lasted for seven long and trying years, well into the 1948 war. 

Its success stood in sharp contrast to the many top-down initiatives that were brought up during the British Mandate to form political bi-national organizations, which never materialized. Yet, in contrast with the dichotomous and inherently hostile picture portrayed by the conflictual paradigm that dominates research about the Mandate period, Arabs and Jews did cooperate and share responsibilities in other spheres beyond the citrus industry. The most noticeable example is Palestine’s bi-national urban space in cities like Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, or Tiberias. There, Arabs and Jews served in the same municipalities and ran the day-to-day life of these cities collaboratively. However, they did not establish a structured bi-national framework. In addition, a temporary ad-hoc bi-national structure was established in the early 1930s during a country-wide drivers’ strike. But this structure was dismantled after a few short weeks of existence. 

Thus, the citrus bi-national framework was the only such organization that operated for a considerable period of time during the Mandate. Palestinian and Zionist growers shared the responsibilities of managing and directing the country’s citrus groves and of marketing their famous fruit, the Jaffa oranges, equally. Importantly, the citrus growers’ bi-national framework was created with the consent and cooperation of thousands of the industry’s growers, and with the approval of their leaderships.

Our initial goal was to reconstruct the repressed story of the pre-1948 Palestinian-Arab citrus industry. However, in the course of our research it became clear to us that the two national sectors of the country’s citrus industry were entangled in complex and fascinating reciprocal relationships. While the two sectors competed, they were also compelled to cooperate with one another due to the unique structure of the industry and the contexts within which they operated. 

Significantly, this bi-national framework was a well-known feature of life before 1948. After the war, however, it was completely erased from the collective consciousness of both Israelis and Palestinians. It was only after the two Palestinian Intifadas, the signing of the Oslo Accords, and Israel’s ongoing decolonization of territories it captured in 1967 that repressed histories of both peoples began to surface and garner renewed attention.

Our book joins the work of scholars who challenge the conflictual narrative that dominates most studies of the British Mandate period. We demonstrate how despite the tension and violent outbreaks between Arabs and Jews that took place during the Mandate, there were also multiple dimensions of Arab-Jewish life in which people and groups chose not to follow the conflictual path.

Theoretically, our main perspective is relational. A strong influence is Zachary Lockman’s relational approach, claiming that Arabs and Jews did not live in isolation from each other, and that—moreover—the two societies shaped and were shaped by each other. We see the Palestinians as the country’s natives, and we understand mainstream Zionism as a diasporic national movement that used settler-colonial means and worldview to implement its national ideology. Yet, our findings correspond with the conclusions of other scholars of European settler-colonialism who challenged the image of a strict dichotomy. They show that in-between and hybrid forms of relationships, cooperation, and even shared institutions were created between natives and the European newcomers. 

However, for a true bi-national organization to be forged, Zionist and Palestinian growers had to overcome the imbalanced relationship imbedded in the British Mandate system, which favored the Zionist movement. We used Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action and Gordon Allport’s The Nature of Prejudice to analyze the specific conditions that allowed the citrus bi-national organization to be formed and persist well into the 1948 war. 

The book also describes and analyzes the Palestinian sector’s economic performances and the important social mobility the industry brought to Palestinian fellahin. We devote a special chapter to the Nakba. Based on a census that the newly founded Israeli government conducted in 1948-1949 of Palestinian-Arab orange groves that came under its control, we were able to reconstruct a detailed map of the Palestinian industry at the end of the British Mandate. The census lists about 3,800 Palestinian growers who became refugees and their specific groves that were confiscated by Israel. 

The last chapter of our book deals with memory and forgetfulness. It reconstructs the ways Palestinians remember the citrus industry and its hub, the city of Jaffa. And it shows the ways in which the Israeli establishment and the public successfully dis-remembered the Palestinian-Arab sector and fully appropriated the “Jaffa Orange” as Israel’s prized and symbolic export industry.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MK & NK: This book continues our common interest in pre-1948 Palestine. It departs from our previous research because it is a joint project, based on shared research. Our shared work on this complicated topic, which relates to our own identities and family histories, made this research project special and emotional.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MK & NK: We hope that scholars and lay people alike who are interested in Palestine/Israel and in the crucial period of the British Mandate will read the book. We hope it will open a window to a non-conflictual and mutually friendly reality that existed during the Mandate, which had the potential of averting the tragic results of 1948. We believe that this path is even wider and much more promising today than before if people will choose to take it.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MK: I am currently working on the toponymy of Palestinian locations and places, examining their geographical, social, and linguistic histories.

NK: I view recent upheavals in Israeli society as an outcome of Israel’s continuing decolonization of territories it captured in 1967. Thus, this is the topic of my current research project.

 

Excerpt from the book (from the Preface)

The genesis of this book was an encounter between its two authors in the Naqab/Negev desert. The occasion was a research workshop, held at the Ben-Gurion Research Institute, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. The workshop brought to­gether Arab and Jewish scholars with the objective of exploring the state of research on Palestinian-Arab and Israeli-Jewish relations, both collab­orative and conflictual. Our personal meeting and the following encounters that ensued launched our joint research project. 

Now that we have completed the research and writing of this volume, we wish to reflect upon our professional and personal journey. Our pri­mary scholarly objective was to use rigorous research methodologies and sources in order to present, examine, and analyze the untold story of the pre-1948 Palestinian-Arab citrus industry. 

Even as we pursued the research itself with the utmost professional care and methodological rigor, the topic we chose to investigate carried deep personal significance for both of us. 

Kabha relates the following memories: 

For me, Jaffa [the hub of the pre-1948 Palestinian-Arab citrus industry and the country’s main marine port] is not simply a time-honored city where remnants of ancient buildings attest to a magnificent past. I was raised on stories of the city’s splendor, glory, rich markets, beach, mosques and churches that back onto each other, narrow alleys, and new modern quar­ters. I grew up in the small village of Umm al-Qutuf (located in Wadi ‘Ara and far from any signs of urbanization). As a child, I reveled in my father’s stories of Jaffa, where he had lived in its heyday, during the years 1934–48. I was particularly enchanted by stories of the special intoxicating aroma of the citrus blossoms whose perfume would envelope Jaffa in the spring. 

My father, Da’ud Ibrahim Kabha (1913–82), owned ten camels that were used to transport coal from the region of Wadi ‘Ara and the al-Khattaf Mountains to the towns of Tulkarm and Jaffa. In time, he opened a coal store in Jaffa, selling coal that served as an important source of energy for heating and for use in various dining establishments and restaurants. Dur­ing the long winter nights, he would tell us stories of cafés, cinemas, and the theater. He was very proud of having attended concerts by famous singers Umm Kulthum and Mohammed Abd el-Wahhab when they performed in Jaffa in the 1940s.

I first visited Jaffa with my father at the age of eight. I was very disap­pointed to find almost nothing of what I had imagined. My father’s explana­tions were not convincing, and I did not find them very helpful because they were short and vague. We visited Jaffa together again eleven years later. At that time, he was more open and told detailed stories that I had never heard before. I was particularly impressed by the story of his last day in Jaffa before it surrendered [to Jewish forces] in May 1948. At that time, my disappoint­ment morphed into sorrow and pain. Whenever I visit Jaffa I am overcome by emotion and I try to reconstruct bygone sights, bygone lives, amid the lost orchards, the scent of the markets and of the fragrant citrus blossoms. 

Investigating the lost orchards of Jaffa and of the other Palestinian cit­rus towns is no easy matter. It is, in essence, a transition from vague memo­ries and scents to dusty archival documents as well as uprooted trees or rebranded fruits, stamped with a new identity and new owners. The once fertile lands, wells, and pools now groan as bulldozers uproot the orchards and cement trucks pour solid foundations for high-rise buildings that have changed the skyline forever.

The vivid collective memories of pre-1948 Palestinian society that informed Kabha’s childhood, as well as his professional desire to recon­struct the past, differ radically from Karlinsky’s experience of historical lacunae, “forgetfulness,” and repressed memories. 

The Zionist Israeli metanarrative grants the Israeli citrus industry in the first decades after 1948 a similar role to that awarded at present to Isra­el’s high-tech industry. Namely, citriculture is presented as the economic power that propelled the Israeli economy forward, as it was Israel’s major export industry in the first decades after the State was established. This metanarrative erroneously presents the citrus industry as a Jewish Zion­ist industry, mythically created ex nihilo by the hegemonic Labor Zionist movement, echoing the Zionist tenet of “making the desert bloom.” The citrus industry, according to this narrative, was first established during the Ottoman rule over Palestine, expanded during the British Mandate, and reached full glory during the State of Israel’s first decades of exis­tence. Needless to say, this metanarrative does not even mention Palestin­ian citriculture.

Hence, when Karlinsky embarked on his previous research project, devoted to the study of the Zionist citrus industry in pre-1948 Palestine, he was surprised to discover that the metanarrative he had been taught was doubly flawed. First, he discovered that the Jewish sector of the citrus industry was not established by the Labor Movement but rather by the oft-maligned private Zionist entrepreneurs. But the second discovery was even more significant. Karlinsky’s research brought him face to face with the Zionist narrative’s penultimate “blind spot”—the existence of the well-established and flourishing Palestinian citrus industry that preceded the Zionist enterprise. 

Recognizing the existence of a repressed and/or deliberately erased Palestinian past, our initial objective was to use the historical tools at our disposal to dig up and retrieve the “lost Palestinian orchard.” As our research progressed, we realized that this is but one case study of a broader phenomenon that has profound metaphorical dimensions. We became engaged in a two-pronged project that confronted and exposed the oblit­eration of Palestinian memory and identity on the one hand, and, on the other, also attempted to bring about the “return of the repressed” and the re-collection of the Arab histories of Palestine/Israel. 

Two unexpected discoveries emerged from the primary sources uncovered. First, while there were tensions and obvious economic and national rivalries between the Arab and Jewish sectors of the citrus indus­try, we were surprised by the concurrent intensity and lengthy duration of the strong mutual relationships between the sectors. The pinnacle of these steadfast dialectical relationships, which began in 1900, was the establish­ment of an official countrywide binational organization of the industry in the first year after the outbreak of World War II. The organization lasted until April 1948, when the politics of nationalism quashed any option of binational partnership. 

The second discovery relates to the fact that the relationship between Palestinian Arabs and Zionist Jews deepened and became most pro­nounced during the long six years of World War II. This is surprising given the fact that most scholarship related to the Mandate period is based on the assumption that by 1939 the social, political, and cultural foundations that eventually culminated with the realities of 1948 had already been set in place. Hence, more often than not scholars of the Mandate period either ignore the war years and end their research in 1939 or gloss over this period as an insignificant hiatus preceding the inevitable 1948. Our book joins a growing number of studies that challenge both that assumption and the tendency to ignore the war years.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.