Lisa Hajjar, The War in Court: Inside the Long Fight against Torture (New Texts Out Now)

Lisa Hajjar, The War in Court: Inside the Long Fight against Torture (New Texts Out Now)

Lisa Hajjar, The War in Court: Inside the Long Fight against Torture (New Texts Out Now)

By : Lisa Hajjar

Lisa Hajjar, The War in Court: Inside the Long Fight against Torture (University of California Press, 2022).

Jadaliyya (J): What inspired you to write this book? 

Lisa Hajjar (LH): The War in Court traces the fight against US torture in the context of the “war on terror” and the complicated legacy it has left. My long-running interest in torture grew out of my curiosity about the relationship between law and political conflict. As a sociologist of law, I am especially fascinated by fights on the legal terrain over what is legal and what is not, who wins and who loses, and why. 

This began when I was doing my PhD dissertation on the Israeli military court system in the West Bank and Gaza. I came to understand that Israel’s larger strategies to control Palestinians relied heavily on coercive interrogations in order to get confessions that could be used to prosecute, convict, and imprison them. In the late 1980s and early ‘90s, Israel had the largest per capita prison population in the world. Another part of my research focused on the battles that Israeli human rights lawyers were waging throughout the 1990s in the High Court of Justice to end the state’s authorization of violent interrogation techniques. They won a partial victory in 1999 when the HCJ issued a rulingprohibiting the “routine” use of coercion. My study of how torture and the law play out in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict evolved into my first book, Courting Conflict.

Another set of events that nourished my interest in torture and the law was the arrest of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet while he was in London in 1998. A Spanish judge, Baltasar Garzón, issued an international arrest warrant and a request for the British government to extradite Pinochet to Spain to stand trial for murder and torture perpetrated in Chile during the dictatorship. This extradition request was based on an international criminal law doctrine that had not been used since the heyday of slave trading and piracy: universal jurisdiction. Garzón resurrected the doctrine by contending that Pinochet could be prosecuted in a foreign country (Spain) because his crimes made him “an enemy of all mankind,” and he had not been held accountable at home. When the British Law Lords evaluated the charges in the Spanish warrant, they decided that Pinochet was not extraditable for murder because killing people is what happens in wars. But they decided that he was prosecutable for torture because no one has a “right” to torture and sovereign immunity cannot shield even a former head of state from accountability for this gross crime. Although the British government decided, for political reasons, not to extradite Pinochet to Spain, the “Pinochet precedent” had a transformative effect on international criminal law. And for the record, universal jurisdiction is my favorite jurisdiction

Having thought about torture nonstop for a decade, by September 11, 2001, I was primed to hear dog whistles, like Vice President Dick Cheney’s September 16 interview on Meet the Press in which said that it would be necessary “to use any means at our disposal…to achieve our objectives.” He was hinting that the only way to get “actionable intelligence” from nefarious and shadowy enemies would be to capture people and interrogate them using violent means. A different kind of dog whistle was audible to me when pundits and scholars invoked Israel as a model the US government should emulate. 

For the first couple years of the “war on terror,” like the rest of the public, I had little idea what was actually happening in US detention facilities except things reported by investigative journalists and human rights organizations. Then in 2004, a trifecta of events blew the lid off the secret torture program. The first was the publication of the Abu Ghraib photos on April 28. The Abu Ghraib scandal roused Congress to start asking for information and grilling officials about the administration’s prisoner policies. That sparked the second event; between May and early June, some legal memos and policy documents pertaining to interrogations were released or leaked. They were instantly and aptly were branded “torture memos.”

The most shocking memo was authored by John Yoo who served as deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel between 2001 and 2003. Written for the CIA, this August 1, 2002 memo laid bare justifications for gruesome and violent tactics while emboldening the Bush administration to believe that using them would not violate any applicable laws. I started giving public lectures titled “What’s the Matter with Yoo?” The Nation invited me to review a bunch of books about the “war on terror,” including several collections of the torture memos, which deepened my understanding of US torture and the law.

Even more than the photos of naked prisoners being tortured at Abu Ghraib, the intellectually pathetic and ethically abhorrent contents of the August 1 memo scandalized many lawyers because it threw into question the blackest of black letter law by sanctioning practices that are universally prohibited and constitute a crime under US law. Angry lawyers found an outlet to channel their rage when, on June 28, the Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling in Rasul v Bush—the third event in the trifecta. That case, first filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights in February 2002 to challenge the president’s authority to secretly detain people at Guantánamo, was won by the challengers. The Court decided that people detained at Guantánamo have the right to have their status reviewed by a federal court. Lawyers from around the country started contacting the Center for Constitutional Rights and volunteering to be habeas counsel for Guantánamo detainees. This was the origin of the “Gitmo Bar.”

This trifecta of events was the trigger for the research that led to this book. Between 2004 and 2020, I interviewed over two hundred lawyers—military and civilian, Democrats and Republicans, corporate and human rights and small firm private practice lawyers, law professors and their students—who in one way or another played roles in challenging the government’s prisoner policies. Their stories, struggles, wins, and losses are the focus of my book.

Like the narrative arc of a military history, I narrate the war in court across time, focusing on specific battles and fighters.

J:  What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

LH: I decided to write this as a trade book for a general audience rather than an academic book for specialists because I wanted to convey information about complex issues in an accessible and interesting way. The topics addressed in this book include the Geneva Conventions, US Supreme Court jurisprudence, the workings of the Guantánamo military commissions, the doctrine of state secrets, and of course universal jurisdiction. 

Like the narrative arc of a military history, I narrate the war in court across time, focusing on specific battles and fighters. I analyze how an outcome in one battle set the ground for the next. I tell the origin stories and trace the consequences of three major cases that made it to the Supreme Court: Rasul v Bush, which opened Guantánamo to lawyers; Hamdan v Rumsfeld, which cancelled the military commissions President Bush had created by decree in 2001 (although the commissions were resurrected by Congress) and, importantly, recognized that everyone in US custody is protected by the Geneva Conventions, which forced the closure of the CIA black sites; and Boumediene v Bush, which determined that detainees in Guantánamo have a constitutional right to habeas corpus. 

Another set of cases I track involved efforts in US and foreign courts to pursue justice for victims and accountability for the US officials who perpetrated and abetted the gross crime of torture. Only a few of accountability cases were successful. Throughout the second half of the book, I take readers into the Guantánamo military commissions to understand that travesty of justice spanning four US administrations. Between 2010 and 2020, I made fourteen trips to Guantánamo.

I devote the final chapter to the 9/11 case because, more than any other cases that constitute the war in court, this one best illustrates the high costs and unforeseen consequences of torture. The case against five defendants accused of playing roles in the 9/11 plot began in its first iteration in 2007. It fell apart before Bush left office. The Obama administration, after a failed attempt to move the 9/11 case to a federal court in Lower Manhattan, restarted it in the military commissions. The defendants were rearraigned in 2012. The main (but not only) reason the case has not moved beyond the pretrial phase for over a decade is because the five defendants were brutally tortured by the CIA, and the government, one administration after another, continues to insist that much of what happened to them remains a state secret. I title this chapter “The Last Front” because torture is the nasty center of this case and the fight continues. 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have? 

LH: I hope everyone who wants a deeper understanding of the “war on terror” will read this book. I tell some stories that have not been told elsewhere and, because my research spanned almost two decades, I make connections among events and personalities that could not be made by authors who covered shorter periods of time or focused on more singular events. 

Although the subject of the book is bleak, I think readers can draw some solace by learning that hundreds of lawyers and their allies stepped up and fought against the illegal treatment of prisoners. But for their labor and struggles, there would have been nothing to stop torture. While lawyers fighting the war in court won a few important legal battles and the torture program is over, there can be no political reckoning until many Americans understand and accept that the policy choices to authorize coercive interrogations, kidnapping, forced disappearance, and sham commission proceedings and all the officials who played a hand were wrong. If that is what readers take from my book, I will be satisfied that I played my part in the fight against torture. 

 

Excerpt from the book (from Chapter 7: Trying Guantánamo)

One of the Guantánamo detainees the Bush administration attempted to prosecute early on was Binyam Mohamed, an Ethiopian national with British residency. In the summer of 2001, Mohamed, who had recently kicked a drug habit and converted to Islam, decided to go to Afghanistan to get away from temptations in London and learn more about his new religion. When the war started in October, Mohamed went to Pakistan. In April 2002, he was on his way home to England when he was arrested at the Karachi airport. During the three months he was detained in Pakistan, his interrogators included agents from Britain’s MI5 and the FBI who threatened to send him to some Arab country, implying that his treatment there would be even worse. On July 21, Mohamed and two other detainees were turned over to CIA agents wearing ski masks. They were stripped, photographed, sodomized with tranquilizers, and flown to Morocco.

In Morocco, Mohamed’s torturers were locals but the questions they were asking clearly came from British and US intelligence sources. Over the eighteen months he was held in that country, he suffered multiple broken bones, his penis was cut with a scalpel between twenty and thirty times, sometimes while stinging liquid was poured on the bleeding wounds, and he was threatened with rape, electrocution, and death. He was pressed to confess that he had associated with Osama bin Laden and others in the top echelon of al-Qaeda. If the circumstances weren’t so tragic, these allegations would be laughable, because he couldn’t speak Arabic and was a recent convert. On January 21, 2004, he was extraordinarily rendered to Afghanistan where he was held in the CIA black site known as the “dark prison.” There, he was beaten, sleep deprived, subjected to constant noise—“horror sounds”—at extreme levels, drugged, and nearly starved. In May, he was transferred to Bagram where he was forced to confess that he had plotted with Jose Padilla, a US citizen, to set off a “dirty bomb” in the United States. In September, he was transported to Guantánamo. 

Clive Stafford Smith was Mohamed’s habeas counsel. He met Mohamed for the first time on May 2, 2005. Stafford Smith described that encounter to me: “He talked for three days straight. I could barely keep up taking notes. I felt like I had PTSD, let alone him!” When the Bush administration charged Mohamed with conspiracy and material support for terrorism in November 2005, he was assigned a military defense lawyer, Lieutenant Colonel Yvonne Bradley. Stafford Smith shared his notes with Bradley. As she read through them, she realized that the charges were absurd. She wondered what these commissions were trying to achieve.

Before Mohamed’s first hearing in April 2006, he asked Stafford Smith for several items: a long cotton tunic of the sort commonly worn by men in the Arab world which should be dyed the same orange as his prison uniform, a piece of paper and a black magic marker.

Back then, the hearings took place in a small, crowded courtroom in a building that had once served as the base’s dental clinic. The journalists attending Mohamed’s hearing included the Miami Herald’s Carol Rosenberg, dean of the Gitmo press corps, and reporters from the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Los Angeles Times. Observers from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the ACLU were there. Janet Hamlin, an artist who frequently did illustrations of commission proceedings (which had to be approved by censors), was seated at the front of the room. Joseph Margulies, Mohamed’s other civilian lawyer, was there, too. 

When Stafford Smith arrived in the courtroom, he started chatting with Rosenberg. A soldier immediately cut them off and admonished the reporter, “You can’t be talking to the people taking part.” Rosenberg retorted she had been attending hearings for months and knew a lot more about how things work than he did. When Mohamed arrived wearing his orange tunic, he was half-carried to his seat by guards because it was difficult to walk in shackles. Rosenberg leaned over to ask Stafford Smith for the correct spelling of his client’s name, since it was spelled in different ways in court documents and the media. That was a good set-up for the political theater that Mohamed was about to direct. 

The proceedings started when the judge, Colonel Ralph Kohlmann, arrived. (Military judges wear a black robe over their uniforms.) The judges’ roles in these hearings were literally scripted by the Pentagon. As Judge Kohlmann started reading from his script, his first mistake was immediate: he referred to the defendant as Binyam Ahmed Muhammad. Mohamed, when it was his turn to speak, said: “Torture and they still don’t get the right name. That means you’ve got the wrong person…The man you’re looking for is not here. I am not Binyam Ahmed Muhammad…So now we have a problem.” In the back-and-forth over the name of the person on trial, Mohamed said, “I can’t call you Ralph Kallman rather than Kohlmann, can I, and arrest you and put you in jail? Because that’s not you? Four years of—what do you call it?—enhanced torture techniques, and we have the wrong person in court. I mean, that bothers me. I don’t know how it doesn’t bother you.”

Kohlmann stuck to the script and continued calling the defendant “Muhammad.” When he got to the part about a defendant’s rights, he said, “I hope your attorneys have told you…that as you come here and sit here today you are presumed to be innocent under commission law.” Mohamed responded: “What is this rights you’re talking about? Because I have been four years without rights and now all of a sudden I got rights. I am surprised.” Kohlmann, thinking Mohamed was earnestly confused, explained that his rights come from Military Commission Order 1, and one was his right to be represented by a military lawyer. Mohamed pointed out the paradox of being represented by a soldier serving a government that regarded every detainee at Guantánamo as a guilty terrorist. He said he wanted to represent himself. Kohlmann didn’t understand his point and tried luring Mohamed to say that he did not want Stafford Smith and Margulies. Mohamed punched back: “They’re my advisers.” 

Bradley stood up to explain to Judge Kohlmann that she has an ethical conflict: She was working in an office with other military defense lawyers whose clients’ cases were affected by statements Mohamed made against them under interrogation. Kohlmann pulled rank by lecturing her about correct decorum in the commission, implying that nothing should deviate from his script. Bradley pointed out the elephant in the room: “The problem is I don’t understand commission law. I mean, I don’t think anyone understands commission law.” 

Mohamed chimed in: “I’m happy that she stood up there and said she’s confused, and I can understand why…This is not a commission, this is a con-mission, a mission to con the world, and that’s what it is.” Then he pulled out the piece of paper on which he had written, in large black letters, “CON-MISSION.” He flashed it around so everyone could see. “You can execute me tomorrow, but don’t try and cheat the world of what this really is…You start playing around with con-missions here, then tomorrow we have another one in Canada, and then the next day have another in Australia, and the next day have it somewhere, another place, where certain non-citizens have to obey some rule that just got made up.” After Mohamed finished, Kohlmann said, “I am not going to let you put up signs.” Mohamed responded, “But it is not in the rules not to put up signs.” “OK, so we have a new rule,” Kohlmann said. “No more signs in court.”

The judge turned back to the task of dressing down Bradley. “With all due respect, your honor,” she responded, “I exercise my Fifth Amendment rights” to stay silent. Several minutes later, a soldier came into the courtroom and handed Kohlmann a note. He read it, then called a fifteen-minute recess. The Pentagon was monitoring the hearing by video and did not like the scene of a military lawyer being assailed by a military judge. The recess never ended. In June, the Supreme Court canceled the commissions with the Hamdan ruling.

After Congress passed the Military Commission Act in October 2006, the Bush administration restarted the process of trying to extract some retributive justice from terrorists detained at Guantánamo. That, at least, was the public relations version. In reality, the MCA was a whitewash and a workaround for torture. Military commission prosecutors would still be able to use statements obtained through coercion if they were deemed to be “reliable” and their use was “in the interest of justice.”

The administration needed legislative help to reconcile its torture policy with the Supreme Court’s Hamdan decision that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to everyone in US custody overseas. Although officials would not admit that Hamdan killed the torture program, for all intents and purposes it died but was denied a proper burial. The CIA black sites were emptied in September and fourteen “high value detainees” were transferred to Guantánamo. The administration wanted to prosecute at least some of these men and didn’t want their torture to be a stumbling block on the path to guilty verdicts and executions.

But the MCA had consequences unintended by the law’s supporters. Military and civilian defense lawyers used the trials of their clients to bring long-hidden facts to light and, in doing so, exposed government lies.

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New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

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Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.