Sammy Zeyad Badran, Killing Contention: Demobilization in Morocco during the Arab Spring (New Texts Out Now)

Sammy Zeyad Badran, Killing Contention: Demobilization in Morocco during the Arab Spring (New Texts Out Now)

Sammy Zeyad Badran, Killing Contention: Demobilization in Morocco during the Arab Spring (New Texts Out Now)

By : Sammy Zeyad Badran

Sammy Zeyad Badran, Killing Contention: Demobilization in Morocco during the Arab Spring (Syracuse University Press, 2022).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Sammy Zeyad Badran (SZB): I initially became interested in exploring protest dynamics in Morocco after conducting an interrupted time series analysis to test the effect that reform and repression had on protest levels in two monarchies that fared well during the Arab Spring: Morocco and Jordan. I found it interesting that both regimes tended to initially respond to protests with concessionary measures; however, I found that although protest levels quickly abated in Jordan after reforms were announced, in Morocco they tended to increase. This led me to decide to take a qualitative turn and investigate protest dynamics in Morocco on the ground by interviewing activists from an array of different political organizations and ideological backgrounds. A Fulbright fellowship allowed me to conducted interviews throughout Morocco from May 2016 to June 2017. I conducted forty-six semi-structured elite interviews with civil society activists from the February 20 Movement (F20), political party leaders, MPs, and independent activists throughout Morocco. I found that the Moroccan case presents the unique argument that regime coordination of repression and concessions can trigger social reactions which lead to relatively peaceful movement demobilization.

... when do organizations and individuals decide to no longer participate in contentious politics on the streets?

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

SZB: The book’s main theme is concerning why and how social movements demobilize. In other words, when do organizations and individuals decide to no longer participate in contentious politics on the streets? The main literature the book addresses is social movement literature, especially concerning demobilization, along with literature concerning authoritarian resilience and upgrading. My in-depth research and interviews in Morocco with the main organizer of protests within the country, the F20, reveal that the Moroccan regime did use reforms and concessions, but still resorted to violence and repression as a dual response to protests. This book demonstrates how this dual response demobilized protests and led to the internal fracture of the F20. This mixed policy of reforms and limited repression also broke public support for the movement that was initially reformist in nature. In essence, the movement fractured internally and was portrayed by the regime as intensely revolutionary and radical. The book shows how the regime pushed this narrative alongside unprecedented reforms to effectively convince the public that the social movement was dangerous and no longer needed.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work? 

SZB: The book directly connects to previous papers published in the Journal of North African Studies and the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies and parts of some chapters from the book were based on the findings in these papers. My previous work also concerned social movements and contentious politics, one of which investigated the roots of contentious politics leading up to the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. This book, however, departs from my previous work since it specifically addresses the underreached question of “why social movements die” or demobilize. Killing Contention adds nuance to previous literature both specific to Morocco and, more broadly, social movement theory by analyzing the stories and opinions of those who participated in the F20.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have? 

SZB: I hope the book will be read by anyone interested in gaining intimate insights into contentious “street politics” in Morocco and the larger MENA region. This book is also intended for students and academic audiences. It will be useful for students of MENA politics and social movements since it addresses three primary topics that will prove valuable in courses on social movements, democratic development politics in the MENA region, contemporary MENA politics, and qualitative methodology. The narratives of this book are grounded in the lived experiences of activists throughout Morocco and from diverse perspectives and offer a comprehensive account of contentious Moroccan politics. Academics focusing on social movements will find the book useful since it engages with and challenges various theories of contentious politics and social movement studies. Finally, feminist research methodologies are important to the book, and I provide research notes throughout that will offer future feminist researchers guidance on doing fieldwork in the Maghreb region.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

SZB: I am working on multiple projects at the moment. One project is looking into the role of humor during the Algerian “Revolution of Smiles.” The project is attempting to reveal what role, if any, humorous framing has on social movement mobilization. Another project is looking at the role of framing in relation to the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement on various Palestinian social movements. This project will show how movements that may share little in common can transcend borders and affect framing techniques. Another project I am working on concerns how North African regimes have used the Covid-19 pandemic to consolidate and upgrade authoritarian control. A recently published paper in the Journal of Human Rights is based on a content analysis of emergency legislation in both Egypt and Morocco to better understand how the pandemic served as means to consolidate power for some authoritarian regimes.

J: Chapter One of the book offers readers “lessons from the field.” Can you tell us about what fieldwork was like in Morocco?

SZB: The first chapter of the book engages feminist methodology to better understand the role of a researcher’s identity, and how it can lead to both open and closed doors in the field. In Morocco, I quickly found that interviewees tended to almost immediately ask about my ethnic background and highlight my Palestinian identity. Some interviewees allowed me access to otherwise closed networks because of my identity, while on other occasions responding the wrong way to questions about the sensitive political issue led to closed doors. I offer lessons from the field in this chapter and suggest that clarifying how to present one’s identity is very important for future researchers wishing to conduct fieldwork in Morocco.

 

Excerpt from the book (from Chapter 6, pp. 143-146)

Shortly after the death of Mouchine Fikri on October 28, 2016, the F20 slogan of “Freedom, Dignity, and Social Justice” was chanted on the streets throughout the Rif region and eventually throughout the country. The Hirak-al-Rif movement, again, led to solidarity protests by Islamists, leftists, and the Amazigh cultural movement (Oumlil 2017). Prime Minister Benkirane urged members of the PJD and the Moroccan public not to protest. Even Fikri’s father appealed to protesters to go home and stated that Moroccans want “reform and stability” and that his son’s death should not “be the cause of sedition in Morocco.”

Many of my planned interviews were canceled in the weeks that followed Fikri’s murder; however, I was able to meet with one of Morocco’s most well-known human rights activists, Reda. Reda is an outspoken critic of the regime and has faced an array of charges by the state for his activism. Reda unsuccessfully attempted to leave the country and was detained. He was eventually charged with receiving foreign money to diminish the state’s image. Two days before, Reda gave an interview and asserted that he would take to the streets to protest Fikri’s death.

In spite of the heightened threats against Reda, he agreed to meet me at a café in the wealthy neighborhood of Agdal in Rabat and insisted that he not remain anonymous in the interview. Once I arrived at the café, I called Reda and was informed “another person would meet me.” After waiting five minutes, a young university student and another middle-aged man who was sitting in the café briefly introduced themselves and told me to walk with them. We walked a few blocks away from the café, and they informed me that the police wanted to either arrest or speak with Reda. After a few more minutes of waiting, Reda arrived and introduced himself and said jokingly that “you are really doing fieldwork now”—an apparent reference to the unexpected situation I found myself in. Eventually, we walked another three blocks together to the same café. Reda mentioned that it was not the best time for an interview, but insisted I stay.

When we arrived at the café, Reda told me that he was waiting for two journalists to arrive. I thought that it was maybe to report his arrest. Reda lamented that he was, again, not allowed to leave the country and, again, on trial for various charges. I was told by the law student that these recent charges stemmed from a protest that Reda partook in two days before. I offered, repeatedly, to reschedule our meeting, but Reda insisted that I stay and ask what I could. About twenty minutes into the interview, I could tell that Reda was expecting to be arrested. He gave around two hundred euros to his older friend, along with his credit cards. At that moment, a police officer entered the café, and Reda said, “Here they are,” and pulled out his ID—apparently assuming the officer was going to arrest him. The police officer walked past us and went upstairs to another section of the café. Reda indicated that this encounter may have been a coincidence, since “they always come in pairs when they arrest someone.” Later, the police officer left the café, and the young university student and his friend kept an eye on him when he left. The fear was palpable at that moment.

When the journalists came, I was told to turn off my recorder. Reda left with the journalists, and I was left alone in the café with the young university student. The young man expressed the obvious: “everything has changed” since the protests that occurred two days earlier. I did, indeed, quickly realize that after the Hirak protests, some interviewees were harder to get in touch with and that the fear of arrest, repression, or public smearing by the state was, again, an imminent reality for many well-known F20 activists. 

Hirak-al-Rif: Revolt from Periphery to Nation

The F20 changed Moroccan activism. However, the roots of the Hirak-al Rif date back to the marginalization of the Rif region since independence and arguably since the anticolonial struggle for a Riffian state. Indeed, shortly after Moroccan independence, King Hassan II (then crown prince) crushed the 1958 Riffian Revolt. Thousands were killed through indiscriminate bombings of villages, while women were raped by the Forces Armées Royales (Maddy-Weitzman 2011, 86). Rebellions have continued in the Rif since 1958. Notably, in 1984 students and the unemployed rioted throughout Morocco, but especially in the Rif.4 King Hassan reminded the Rif of the state’s reaction to Riffian dissent by threatening that “the people of the North have previously known the violence of the crown prince; it will be best for them not to know that of the king’s” (Mouline 2015, 1). Repression and regional neglect were the centerpiece to King Hassan II’s stance toward the Rif. King Hassan II avoided visiting the Rif and downplayed past atrocities by the state (Maddy Weitzman 2011, 86).

King Mohammed VI assumed the thrown in 1999 and took a different approach to the Rif. Unlike his father, King Mohammed frequently visited the Rif and, after a 2004 earthquake ravaged the region, invested money into infrastructure projects (Maddy-Weitzman 2011, 156). Moreover, Maddy Weitzman notes that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission formed by the king did not have an explicit “Berber agenda,” but indeed most victims were Amazigh (2011, 155). Even prior to Tamazight being made an official state language in 2011, Amazigh history and the Tamazight language were introduced in school textbooks. Despite the increased attention paid to the Rif, the region remains neglected, and unemployment is high among youth compared to other parts of the country (Masbah 2017).

As may be clear, the Riffian region is rooted in historical marginalization and neglect and is distinct from the central goals of the F20. Nevertheless, many activists do believe that the F20 paved the way for the Hirak-al-Rif by demonstrating that the Rif’s marginalization is not solely a regional issue but a national one. Some attribute this opinion to a growing distrust in state institutions and a recognition that state institutions beyond the palace are powerless (Diouani 2021). Others note that the Hirak-al-Rif resonated with all Moroccans through the concept of al-hogra—an Arabic term that broadly highlights contempt, degradation, and injustice (Ilahiane 2019). This contention is evidenced by the fact that protests against al-hogra continued throughout Morocco until 2018. Unlike previous waves of dissent in the Rif, the 2016 Hirak-al-Rif uprising tended to resonate with activists throughout the country, with sit-ins and demonstrations in solidarity with the Rif occurring throughout Morocco (Rachidi 2017). In essence, it is clear that the Hirak-al-Rif is historically a regional struggle; however, activists highlight an important link between the F20 and the ongoing Hirak-al-Rif. As we will see, activists namely highlight a new “culture of street politics” along with a recognition by Hirak-al-Rif activists that their movement should move away from the decentralized social movement structure adopted by the F20.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.