Matthew Hedges, Reinventing the Sheikhdom: Clan, Power and Patronage in Mohammed bin Zayed's UAE (New Texts Out Now)

Matthew Hedges, Reinventing the Sheikhdom: Clan, Power and Patronage in Mohammed bin Zayed's UAE (New Texts Out Now)

Matthew Hedges, Reinventing the Sheikhdom: Clan, Power and Patronage in Mohammed bin Zayed's UAE (New Texts Out Now)

By : Matthew Hedges

Matthew Hedges, Reinventing the Sheikhdom: Clan, Power and Patronage in Mohammed bin Zayed's UAE (Hurst&Co, London / Oxford University Press, London, 2021).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Matthew Hedges (MH): Reinventing the Sheikdom is the culmination of my doctorate at Durham University in the UK. I completed this research over five years and the published version is a near total copy of my research. I simply condensed some theoretical chapters to ease the reading.

The UAE is a strategically important global partner for most states. It has increasingly shown its capability and interest in global affairs, yet its internal dynamics are hardly known or spoken about. I was driven by several years working in the country to shine a light on shifts in power that had been going on. I believe Reinventing the Sheikdom is the most nuanced analysis into how power has been centralized within the UAE. This support observations into the UAE’s foreign policy and shows what motivates its international engagements.

Due to the oil reserves residing nearly entirely in the capital emirate, it has been able to shape the state in its image.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

MH: Fundamentally, Reinventing the Sheikdom examines how Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) has risen to power. The UAE is a federal state. Constitutionally, there is supposed to be a “democracy” or sorts that share power across the seven emirates. Due to the oil reserves residing nearly entirely in the capital emirate, it has been able to shape the state in its image. When the UAE is analyzed, this fact is barely mentioned and as a result observations are often limited and do not highlight the reality.

Reinventing the Sheikdom is oriented around the Arab Spring and uses this as a departure for the increased consolidation of power that occurred. MBZ is the driver of this change, and while until this year he was the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, he had in effect been the head of state. He has used his position to develop his own independent power base and construct a powerful network that has gradually consumed the state. This is a patrimonial network that is directly coupled to him. His allies and agents share personal ties but also show inherent social qualities that evidence an appreciation for social ties, such as tribalism, which underpin the social political architecture of the state.

There are five main sections to the book. This is built around my framework of neo-corporate praetorianism that splits power between its enforcement and maintenance. The first is a historical exploration of how previous ruling elites managed power. The subsequent four sections analyze developments within the military, surveillance, economy, and industry.

The first section is a historical examination of regime security within the UAE. This crucially provides a foundation from which to understand why internal threats have always held the most prominent focus for rulers. Since 1761, eleven rulers have been deposed or murdered by a family member and four have died from natural causes. Supported by comparative examples, the UAE shows that the most prominent threats to elites come from other elite family members. It is for this reason that the founder of the UAE, Sheikh Zayed, and his sons Khalifa and Mohammed have delicately balanced the array of social factors to manage elite personnel and enhance the stability of their rule.

The second section analyses changes to the UAE armed forces and traditional security architecture. This process has been one of evolution, from establishing military bases within the city of Abu Dhabi to protect the ruling family from external threats, through to redeploying facilities further away to reduce the potential of a coup d’état. Militaries and their soldiers represent a traditional bastion of power for political elites, and given MBZ’s professional experience within the institution, he has used this as a vehicle for national unity and to ensure his central position in the future of the UAE. 

The third section identifies surveillance practices and internal security measures. This takes a structuralist approach due to the difficulty in sourcing material. It shows that in step with technological developments, life within the UAE is persistently observed and attributable. When strengthened by broad legal remits, surveillance is prevalent.

The fourth section examines how economic organs have been strategically managed around MBZ and his allies. This shows a direct connection to him and acknowledges the requirement for the recruitment of tribal allies so that they are not only loyal, but loyal to him. The development of economic assets is to provide increased revenue and to bind this success to the state building project undertaken by MBZ. 

The fifth and last section analyzes industrial development. While economic assets are largely political in nature, industry is by comparison tangible. This builds upon the strength of the UAE’s oil reserves and helps to exploit its current progress to build for a more resilient future. This is, however, tightly controlled by MBZ and his allies, so that ownership and credit can be taken for any successful investments.

It is important to note that the book is an objective and analytical examination of the UAE’s consolidation of power and its subsequent strengthening. The UAE does not profess to be a democracy and can therefore not be judged by its liberal equivalents. For this reason, the book aims to illustrate how these changes have occurred and why. It contributes to knowledge to help readers understand how the UAE has become so powerful. The book is, however, particularly sensitive, due to the fact that the UAE is a federal state, and that my analysis of primary source information shows this to be a fallacy.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MH: Reinventing the Sheikdom represents my first major research endeavor. I have previously examined the foreign policy of the UAE and how it takes a networked approach to its international engagement. In this way, many of the same observations about domestic politics are seen in their foreign operations. The book builds upon my observation of the UAE being driven by security interests, with my papers on The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood in the GCC a clear example of how claims of security/insecurity drive its endeavors.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MH: I hope that Reinventing the Sheikdom will be read by anyone interested in the Middle East and authoritarian governance practices. As I mentioned, there is little knowledge on the UAE’s domestic political scene. I would like to see it as recommended reading for anyone, from an undergraduate student through to a foreign diplomat. While the political scene in the UAE has direct comparison with many of its neighbors in the GCC, there is still little academic focus on it. The impact of my work shows a clear centralization of state power. This means that nothing can be undertaken without the knowledge or authority of the highest levels of power within Abu Dhabi. This not only helps readers understand the UAE today, but also its future. 

J: What other projects are you working on now? 

MH: My future work will examine state security organizations. These do not have a democratic equivalent due to their political direction and legal freedoms. Due to the growing adaptation of authoritarian governance, I hypothesize a growing utilization of state security organs, which—if history has anything to say—is a dangerous signal. My exact focus is on the commercial engagement of state security authorities, and my case studies are China, Iran, and Russia. They all share multiple factors and possess self-defined state security organs. Historically, these have all been involved in commercial enterprises, but this has become more prevalent due to the influence of neo-liberalism. As a result, while the activities of these organs were largely secret, they have been exposed through their involvement in commerce.

J: What happened to you in the UAE when you were undertaking fieldwork research, and did it affect your doctorate? 

MH: I was abducted by the UAE’s State Security Authority when attempting to leave to return to the UK. I was held for nearly seven months in solitary confinement and subjected to torture. I was forced to sign a confession and subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment under the charge of espionage on behalf of the UK Government as an alleged member of the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service, “MI6”.

This, of course, impacted me mentally and set my research back, due to my inability to concentrate and lack of confidence to continue my work. I am proud to say that this experience did not, however, impact my ability to objectively analyze the UAE. It was my priority to ensure the legitimacy of my research. In my foreword I show that following my return to the UAE, the UAE changed its legal definitions and interpretations of secretive information to incorporate anything as far as “news and other media.” 

 

Excerpt from the book (from Chapter 6, pp. 71-74)

Due to the speed of technical innovation, information is more readily accessible than it has ever been. This has provided avenues for empowerment but also for control. The Iranian Green Movement of 2009 and the Arab Spring have shown how groups have used technological innovation for political gain. The backlash from the Iranian regime and other regional states to these movements illustrate how the state has wrestled back power in times of instability. In an authoritarian state, the regime seeks to maintain control of forces that can potentially threaten its ‘absolute authority’; in this sense, surveillance can be interpreted as a modern and updated expression of sultanism.

While the regime’s control of the military was previously examined, this chapter will explore how surveillance capabilities have developed to maximise the regime’s control of surveillance since the outbreak of the Arab Spring. This will therefore illustrate the importance of surveillance for a successful regime security strategy.

Initially, the recording of information was, according to Anthony Giddens, a mode of administration notation’. The single direction of information and its control by the recording administration empowered governors to solidify their authoritative positions. Anthony Giddens further clarifies that ‘the concentrated focusing of surveillance as “governmental” power is largely, if not completely, a phenomenon of the modern state’. With the advent of the internet and mobile technology, people’s access to information and international social interaction has served as a medium of empowerment, liberation, and control. The global proliferation of information has even prompted scholars such as John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt to claim that alongside the political, economic, and military elements of power, information is emerging as an equal within the field of national security. This book agrees with this postulation.

In step with technological developments and the increased scope of information ownership, is the concept of surveillance. The field of surveillance is vast, incorporating issues ranging from state led mass surveillance, through to the collection of individual data required to process institutional requests (e.g. individuals health records). As a result, surveillance can be viewed negatively, positively, or neutrally.

Negative concepts such as those hypothesised by Jeremy Bentham, Max Horkheimer, and Michel Foucault are often defined through the perceived relationship between information collection, societal discipline, and coercion. At the forefront of this debate is the orthodox perception of panopticon - and its modern reinterpretation superpanopticon -, and it is through this lens that Michel Foucault defines surveillance: ‘a person that is under surveillance “is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in communication” ’. Within the modern context, Michel Foucault’s definition is inaccurate, and the negative connotations of surveillance are an oversimplification of the potential benefits generated by surveillance. Furthermore, the limitation presented by Michel Foucault in this instance critically underplays the understanding that surveillance can be a multifaceted notion; due to technological developments hypothesised by Web 2.0, it is claimed that surveillance now consists of the collection and control of information, and the potentially unintentional behaviour of the individual who owns and distributes such information. 

Stuart Armstrong counters and explores the ways and means by which society directly benefits from forms of surveillance. His contextual examples showcase how crime, medicine, research, and even human behaviour can benefit from heightened forms of surveillance. The results of surveillance help humanity to progress, as patterns and relationships captured from large data sets empower researchers to identify causal factors and linkages which can advance human society. Furthermore, with more access to more information subjects can counter and neutralize perceived violations and elicit greater accountability e.g. citizen journalism. Surveillance is therefore understood to have both positive and negative values dependent upon context and relative strength of civil society and commercial sectors.

Anthony Giddens builds upon this field of literature to illustrate both negative and positive aspects of surveillance and does so by defining the concept neutrally; surveillance is the ‘control of information and the superintendence of the activities of some group by others’. The neutral notion hypothesised by Anthony Giddens firmly adheres to the wide concept of surveillance and ensures that there are both positive and neutral aspects within its capability. The neutral definition postulated by Anthony Giddens allows the research to acknowledge both the coercive and constructive dimensions of surveillance, and thus provides a framework which provides a nonaligned observation of the concept.

A further dimension identified within the field of literature pertaining to surveillance is the influence of modernity upon its conception. In contrast to traditional surveillance Gary Marx defines new surveillance as the ‘scrutiny of individuals, groups and contexts through the use of technical means to extract or create information’. This chapter embraces the modern and predominantly electronic mediums of surveillance that have focused contemporary research into its current forms.

The digitisation of society has prompted the mass collection of personal data and, accordingly, the speed to which it can be accessed by an increasing number of actors; from state security agencies to local council institutions, through to a wide array of commercial entities who have directly, or indirectly accumulated information upon a user or users. This has provoked a split in academic approaches towards surveillance whereby several approaches have emerged; legal and ethical aspects, technological development, employment tactics, and the perceived motivation for the level of surveillance undertaken.

While it is important to understand the applications and approaches of surveillance, it is equally important to highlight the means and restrictions for the collection, access, and use of surveillance data. In practice, this means the degree to which said information can be collected, accessed and used varies dramatically depending on laws and regulations within each state. 

Acknowledging the intrinsic limitations within the field of surveillance, this chapter will explore the UAE’s surveillance capabilities from the three major academic perspectives of the field: legal, technological, and engagement strategy.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.