William Carruthers, Flooded Pasts: UNESCO, Nubia, and the Recolonization of Archaeology (New Texts Out Now)

William Carruthers, Flooded Pasts: UNESCO, Nubia, and the Recolonization of Archaeology (New Texts Out Now)

William Carruthers, Flooded Pasts: UNESCO, Nubia, and the Recolonization of Archaeology (New Texts Out Now)

By : William Carruthers

William Carruthers, Flooded Pasts: UNESCO, Nubia, and the Recolonization of Archaeology (Cornell University Press, 2022).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book? 

William Carruthers (WC): Many years ago, I trained and worked in archaeology, including in Egypt. I spent large parts of 2005 to 2008 in the country, where I also studied Arabic. I became interested in how contemporary archaeological and heritage practices there—at the time dominated by then Secretary General of the Supreme Council for Antiquities, Zahi Hawass—reflected earlier, colonial-era ones. Although I had initially intended to pursue a PhD in archaeology, I then ultimately studied for one in the history of science, returning to Egypt to carry out research. A major interest in that work, which ultimately saw the light of day as articles, was the era of post-war decolonization, and how archaeology connected with it (or not). As the territory of what became the Arab Republic of Egypt emerged from various forms of British rule and Egyptian monarchy, I wanted to know how that process impacted upon archaeology, a field that had been dominated by Euro-Americans (and whose major official institution, the Egyptian Antiquities Service, had been run entirely by French men). My PhD (“Egyptology, Archaeology and the Making of Revolutionary Egypt, c. 1925–1958”) concentrated on this history, thinking through how legislative changes made after Britain’s declaration of nominal Egyptian independence, then events after the Free Officer’s coup of July 1952, transformed the fields of archaeology and Egyptology on—and in—the ground. Flooded Pasts is the logical next step to my earlier work, both chronologically and thematically.

... UNESCO’s Nubian campaign built on and transformed colonial-era archaeological understandings of Nubia as a region of picturesque ruination...

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

WC: The book revolves around, but is not limited to, a major event in the development of what became World Heritage, at least in UNESCO’s—and, put bluntly, many other people’s—telling. UNESCO promotes its International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia, which took place in the adjoining regions of Egyptian and Sudanese Nubia from 1960 until 1980, as central to the development of the 1972 World Heritage Convention. The campaign—to a large, but not total, extent staffed by teams from the Euro-American institutions who had long excavated in Egypt—sought to preserve and record ancient temples and archaeological sites in Nubia. Those sites were due to be flooded by the construction of the Aswan High Dam, which, despite having been planned many years earlier, became a centerpiece of Nasser-era modernization plans. Among them the temples at Abu Simbel and Philae, the monuments on the Egyptian—but not Sudanese—side of the Nubian border were listed as part of the second tranche of World Heritage sites in 1979, and today Nubian temples are located around the world: “gifts-in-return” for financial contributions to UNESCO’s project, perhaps most famous among them the temple of Dendur at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. The World Heritage Convention, meanwhile, remains the major international piece of legislation in the heritage arena, and at the time of writing has been ratified by 194 States Parties. Oddly, however, beyond an official history published in the 1980s, there has never been a book-length, critical treatment of the Nubian campaign, nor have the articles and book chapters written about the event really addressed it in terms of the “local” (which is to say Egyptian and Sudanese) perspective, let alone the Nubian one. 

Flooded Pasts discusses how, in combination with the politics of irrigation and development, UNESCO’s Nubian campaign built on and transformed colonial-era archaeological understandings of Nubia as a region of picturesque ruination: a place filled with ancient, Nile-side ruins, and not a place where people—Nubians—lived. During the early decades of the twentieth century (and before and after the British declaration of nominal Egyptian independence in 1922), the building and heightening of the original Aswan Dam had, to increasingly destructive levels, flooded Nubian settlements on the Egyptian side of the Nubian border. These settlements were located alongside the many ancient ruins located in the region, which were also increasingly submerged. Eventually receiving some compensation from the Egyptian government, Nubia’s population were forced to move their homes higher up the Nile’s banks, and many Nubians moved to Cairo and Alexandria to work in domestic service. Meanwhile, Egypt’s antiquities service launched two archaeological surveys directed by colonial officials that sought to record ancient sites before they were flooded. This process, I argue, made it much easier to separate an ancient Nubian past from the region’s present: one dominated by a territorially novel kingdom of Egypt whose permanence was extrapolated backwards in time. 

Accordingly, as Egypt and Sudan signed the Nile Waters Agreement of 1959 and confirmed the impending construction of the High Dam, that process precipitated a continuation of earlier archaeological work in the form of UNESCO’s Nubian campaign. Now, though, flooding occurred to a level where local Nubian relocation became impossible, and the deluge entered newly independent Sudan. This situation meant that UNESCO’s project sought to record a fossilized version of ancient Nubia on an even greater scale than had previously been the case. Simultaneously, separate “ethnological” surveys either side of the newly hardened Egyptian-Sudanese border prepared for the relocation of the now-separated Nubian population to new, government-planned settlements elsewhere (the Egyptian survey was supported by the Ford Foundation and based at the American University in Cairo; the Sudanese one was supported by the Sudan Antiquities Service). Even in the face of Nubian demonstrations—particularly strong in Wadi Halfa in the very north of Sudan—this forced, state-backed process of migration made the job of archaeological survey easier, constituting further representations of the desolate desert dotted by ancient monuments that earlier work had made possible. That those monuments—and that “desert”—clearly had a far more complex history was a fact elided by most involved. To a great extent, too, that elision continues, even as the Nubian diaspora has in recent years become much more vocal about its plight. 

Flooded Pasts addresses these issues, moving from detailed discussion of the genealogy of archaeological survey and irrigation along the Nile (Chapter 1) to the rise of documentary and archival practices in supporting such work (Chapter 2), and then onto discussions of UNESCO’s Nubian campaign as it took place in Egypt (Chapter 3) and Sudan (Chapter 4). Later chapters then detail how the campaign’s practices dovetailed with the forced migration of the Nubians (Chapter 5), in addition to geopolitical non-alignment and pan-Arabism (Chapter 6). The final chapter (Chapter 7) details the consequences of this history today. 

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

WC: As I discussed earlier, the book is in many ways a logical continuation of my PhD research. As an author, though, I tried to let myself feel less constrained by discipline: I wrote as a historian, but also with less critical distance from the disciplines I am writing about than I think some historians of science have traditionally represented themselves as enjoying. I think it is obvious that my biography is in this work, in other words, and—given the histories at hand—that I have a clear critical and ethical imperative to write both that way and in a way that privileges one issue in particular: there is no doubt that the Nubian campaign, and the Nubian archaeological surveys before it, affected tens of thousands of lives for the worse. 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

WC: I would hope that Flooded Pasts enjoys a readership beyond the academic, not least because issues around heritage—what it is, who has a say in it, how its governance operates—have become so salient in the last few years: whether in the wake of the revolutions in the Middle East in 2011 or, more recently, Black Lives Matter. There has been a growing amount of work on the histories of archaeology and heritage—and a corresponding amount of discussion around what it might mean to decolonize those fields—yet it strikes me that little of it has addressed the period in which formal, post-war decolonization took place. That is not necessarily to draw a correspondence between that historical process and decolonization or decolonial thought as it is being discussed today, but rather to highlight that I am not sure such discussions can take place without thinking about what, exactly, the era of post-war decolonization wrought: on people, and on the knowledge created about them. Thinking through that period, I hope that Flooded Pasts both helps to historicize those discussions further, and also engages the wider audiences interested in heritage with how vital the histories at hand are: whether for understanding heritage as it exists and is practiced today, or for understanding the world that heritage has wrought, often in very material ways. 

More pressingly, then, I hope that the book catalyzes discussion around the lives of contemporary Nubians and the relationship of archaeology and heritage with them. Nubian calls for a right to return have become increasingly prominent, particularly as recent political events in both Egypt and Sudan have, however fleetingly, offered a space for such calls to be made. Flooded Pasts helps clarify the historical basis of those calls, and also proffers the questions of whether archaeology can—or should—make amends. In the book, I suggest a possible way forward for archaeological institutions revolving around the voluminous archives that they created due to the Nubian campaign. Any such work, however, should clearly be dependent on the agreement of Nubians themselves, who have not previously had any stake in what happens to the material collected during the project and who should clearly direct that work now.

 

Excerpt from the book (from Chapter 1, pp. 29-32)

[…] the Egyptian constitution was promulgated in 1923, replaced by a different document in 1930, and reverted to the original 1923 document in 1935 as Egypt and Britain struggled over the future of the (semicolonial) country. For British diplomatic agents in Cairo, controlling access to the corridor provided by the Suez Canal justified such interventions.

Suez was of paramount importance to Britain, as control of the Canal’s water meant control of the Nile’s water, too. Continuing the Mehmed Ali dynasty’s irrigation policies, Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer), Britain’s agent and consul-general in Egypt from 1883 to 1907, viewed the Nile as central to Egyptian financial and political stability. British officials, whose knowledge of Nile irrigation was often based on their work in India and not on well-developed local practices, agreed: viewing control and development of the river’s waters as essential to Britain’s position in Egypt. Every year at the end of summer came the Nile’s annual inundation, whose unpredictable height set the basis for the rest of the agricultural year. The development of the river to enable controlled perennial irrigation would, however, produce a stronger cotton crop, not only helping to pay down Egyptian debt, but also (they presumed) enhancing Britain’s ability to mollify Egyptian protests about control of the Suez Canal. More widely, this perception of the shared importance of river and canal helped constitute what Terje Tvedt has characterized as the “British Nile imperial system,” the work of actors throughout the country’s empire whose activities helped to turn the Nile and its tributaries into a “political and hydrological planning unit” geared toward British imperial interests. 

As Tvedt notes, from 1882 until 1956, “a strong and close alliance between [British] water engineers and Nile strategists . . . financed large and small waterworks” the length of the river, from the Egyptian Delta to Lake Victoria. That system included the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, established through a power-sharing (“condominium”) agreement in 1899. Britain hoarded most of the power in the country, helping to mesh its territory within the realm of British imperial hydro-politics. The agreement also, however, built on older notions that control over Sudan constituted an Egyptian national priority, notions whose resonances continued to manifest themselves at the time of UNESCO’s Nubian campaign. Ottoman-Egyptian rule (the so-called Turkiyya) had first been instituted in Sudan in 1821 under Mehmed Ali, ostensibly creating a territory united with Cairo-controlled Nubia, situated to Sudan’s north (the regions of Lower and Upper Nubia, as they became known, straddling a porous Egyptian-Sudanese border at Wadi Halfa). It would only be later in the century that Egypt managed to extend effective administrative authority over Lower Nubia. But in the meantime (and into the twentieth century), Egyptians conflated the predominantly black populations of Nubia and Sudan not only as one, but also as natural objects of their rule. Whether Nubian or Sudanese, people from these regions constituted “al-barbari, or the Nubian, whose color, customs, and accent Egyptian writers sketched out in numerous essays, dialogues, and stories.” These often disparaging representations presaged not only the ease with which the Egyptian government’s archaeological surveys began to record and define the Nubian past in the first half of the twentieth century, but also the way in which UNESCO’s Nubian campaign would itself often seem to be an Egypto-centric affair. The identity of a distinct Nubian region would develop due to such survey work, but the intervention that produced that development was made considerably simpler by Egypt’s pejorative relationship with the areas to, and sometimes within, its south. 

Sometimes, however, those areas struck back. In 1881, a revolt against the Turkiyya led to the establishment of what became known as the Mahdiyya over much of Sudan. During the uprising, the mystic shaykh Muhammad Ahmad Ibn ʿAbd Allah (the Mahdi) and his followers used the momentary power vacuum that the revolt established to foment a political-religious uprising and establish a revolutionary state. Initially, attempts to overcome the Mahdiyya were unsuccessful: in the process of one such venture, the Mahdi’s followers killed the British general Charles Gordon in Khartoum in 1885. From 1896 to 1899, however, British and Egyptian troops led by Kitchener undertook a military campaign that hastened the Mahdiyya’s end. Consequently, Egypt and Britain established the 1899 condominium agreement that gave both countries sovereignty over Sudan’s territory. Britain now felt free to undertake projects like the construction of the Sennar Dam and the development of the Gezira Scheme, a massive irrigation project. But this “triangulated conquest,” as Eve Troutt Powell has characterized it, meant that, as plans for the High Dam developed, Egypt’s relationship with Sudan often seemed much like the one that Britain had established with it.

In Egypt, many of the British engineers and strategists whose irrigation work preceded this development found themselves concentrated in the Ministry of Public Works. Lord Cromer’s interest in their projects ensured that—even as some of those officials expressed ambivalence toward him—the institution enjoyed exceptional power. For example, ministerial officers enjoyed control over many of the ancient Nile-side remains in the country: Egypt’s (French-run, but often British-staffed) Antiquities Service was in the ministry’s portfolio until 1929, when it joined the Ministry of Education. As their hydrological plans developed, so these officials grappled with ruins dispersed throughout the country: including in Nubia, whose pharaonic and Graeco-Roman temples—many of which had later been converted for Christian use—enjoyed significant fame.

To enable partial perennial irrigation of Egyptian land, the ministry began building the Aswan Dam. The dam’s construction led to partial submersion of the area to its south where the structure’s reservoir formed. (Egyptian) Nubia flooded, an event that not only began to threaten ancient remains in the region in an unprecedented manner, but also led to the forced resettlement of the population living there. As Nicholas Hopkins and Sohair Mehanna note, “the Nubians living in the valley were forced to adjust to this variation either by moving farther up the sides of the valley or to a new location altogether,” often Cairo, where many took up work in domestic service.

Water made Nubia—and Nubians—contingent, subjects of circumstance. It also made them and the region in which they lived more visible. This situation ultimately resulted in a series of government-sponsored archaeological surveys and preservationist interventions as construction of the various stages of the Aswan Dam progressed and even as official treatment of the Nubians themselves was considerably less magnanimous. The constitution of Nubia as an object of archaeological enquiry did not occur immediately, however. Nubia became contingent due to water, but water itself only ever constituted a circumstantial threat to ancient ruins. Overcoming such contingency shaped the values attributed to those remains and the people who lived among them. 

From Flooded Pasts: UNESCO, Nubia, and the Recolonization of Archaeology, by William Carruthers, published by Cornell University Press. Copyright (c) 2022 by William Carruthers. Used by permission of the publisher.

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      Spectacles of the Past

      On 3 April, in an event billed as Mawkib al-Mumiyyat al-Malikiyya, or the “Parade of the Royal Mummies” (rendered in English as the “Pharaohs’ Golden Parade”), Egypt’s Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities moved the bodies of pharaonic-era rulers previously displayed in Cairo’s Egyptian Museum to the partially opened National Museum of Egyptian Civilization (NMEC), located on the banks of ʿAin al-Sira in Fustat. Moving south from Tahrir Square to the city founded under ʿAmr ibn al-ʿAs in AD 641 (itself located in close proximity to the Roman fortress of Babylon and the compound of “Coptic Cairo”), the procession neatly tied together the periods of Egyptian history connected to the state’s telling of its past: a story whose entwined genealogies in colonial adventurism, orientalist enquiry, and interwar firʿawniyya (or pharaonism) are by now well-known. Like many acts related to that lineage, the event also encompassed quite a spectacle: one in relation to whose route companies had apparently been busy purchasing advertising space. That pageant, meanwhile, went beyond simple chronology. In a lavish promotional video, the actor Hussein Fahmy explained—in Arabic, with English subtitles—that visitors from around the world had long visited the Egyptian Museum to understand “the story of a civilization that taught … the meaning of being civilized,” or tamaddun. Following the video’s narrative, the act of moving the royal remains to NMEC was only the latest chapter in this apparently timeless story of progress and urbanity.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.