Stacey Philbrick Yadav, Yemen in the Shadow of Transition: Pursuing Justice Amid War (New Texts Out Now)

Stacey Philbrick Yadav, Yemen in the Shadow of Transition: Pursuing Justice Amid War (New Texts Out Now)

Stacey Philbrick Yadav, Yemen in the Shadow of Transition: Pursuing Justice Amid War (New Texts Out Now)

By : Stacey Philbrick Yadav

Stacey Philbrick Yadav, Yemen in the Shadow of Transition: Pursuing Justice Amid War (Hurst/Oxford University Press, 2022).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book? 

Stacey Philbrick Yadav (SPY): Being wrong about something important was a powerful motivation. OK, maybe “wrong” is too strong, but it was the realization that something I felt I understood well was being interpreted quite differently by some of my interlocutors that pushed me forward with the project. In earlier work, I had described the 2012-2014 transitional process in Yemen as fatally flawed in ways that fueled the current conflict. By 2019, though, I was encountering civil actors who described a “return to the National Dialogue Conference outcomes” as a starting point for forward-looking post-conflict justice. I was confused, and I think that can be an important part of the research process. Encountering something puzzling makes you want to better understand. That is what pushed me to try to understand what exactly people meant by this, what they were praising and why, and how their understandings of the transitional period might relate to Yemen’s present conflict and post-conflict future.

... civil action does not simply mean “non-violence,” but a particular form of non-violence premised on the non-elimination of one’s adversaries.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

SPY: In addition to some of the more predicable literatures on authoritarian stability, contentious politics, and social movements, the book explores features of the transitional justice and liberal peacebuilding literatures, and the concept of civil action. A little over a decade ago, Erica Chenoweth and Adria Lawrence called on scholars to put violence and non-violence in the “same analytic field” in order to both understand and better encourage non-violence. This guided my engagement with the growing literature on civil action. As I explain in the book, civil action does not simply mean “non-violence,” but a particular form of non-violence premised on the non-elimination of one’s adversaries. It can occur within and outside of institutions and at varying levels of formality. Yemen is an excellent context in which to explore civil action, both because there is a great deal of it and because it is constantly occurring alongside considerable—devastating—violence. Exploring civil action in Yemen means trying to better understand both what makes civil action possible and, as importantly, what civil action makes possible in a variegated political field. 

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

SPY: I think I have always been drawn to the work of civil actors, even though I did not use that language until relatively recently. I first started working in Yemen in 2004, shortly after a prominent and very visible assassination and just as the Houthi insurgency was first beginning. I was drawn then to how members of political parties and associational sector activists made sense of violence and its relationship to other forms of political contention. Whether I have been studying parties or protests or, now, peacebuilding, I have consistently wanted to understand what makes people choose non-violent forms of contention, especially when they are proximate to violence.

There are a few ways in which this book departs from earlier work, though. In my earlier work, I was much more interested in partisan ideologies than I find myself now. It is not that I am not interested in ideas or discourse—writing a book about justice demands certainly reflects an interest in the ideas people have about just outcomes and just processes, as well as the opportunities they have to talk about these ideas—but right now, in the current moment, partisan ideology just does not seem to be terrifically relevant. For the most part, parties are not doing a lot of party things—except, of course, insofar as they have a dedicated seat at the negotiating table.

Another big difference between this book and my earlier work is that it advances an explicitly normative argument about what I think should happen. There are a lot of latent normative assumptions in the transitional justice literature and I take these up explicitly in the first chapter. I have set it aside as a chapter that can be read or not, depending on the reader’s reasons for reading the book. The chapter advances what I call a “capabilities approach to transitional justice” or a framework for evaluating post-conflict institutions and practices based on their ability to support what Amartya Sen calls “transpositional scrutiny” on questions of justice. The basic idea, which I have taken from Sen’s work in development economics, is that people do not need to (and probably will not) agree on the substance of justice, but if they have the opportunity to reason together, they may agree on the injustice of a particular state of affairs and be able to address that injustice. I see a lot of potential in this approach, since it can accommodate both liberal and communitarian claims concurrently. I think a capabilities approach to transitional justice addresses some of the critiques of the hegemonic liberalism of transitional justice institutions but is still liberal enough to be recognizable to transitional justice practitioners. On a practical level, I see it already reflected in a lot of the justice work that Yemeni civil actors do through everyday peacebuilding projects. Many of those projects enable or intentionally seek transpositional scrutiny in addressing community needs. I think it is possible to imagine an approach to post-conflict justice built on the same logic. While someone can still learn a lot about Yemen without reading this chapter, I do hope readers will take the time to consider its arguments.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

SPY: As much as I am deeply indebted to my Yemeni interlocutors, they will learn very little from this book that they do not already know. I can only hope that the portrait I have presented in this book is recognizable to them. I had two primary audiences in writing this book—policy practitioners whose work involves Yemen, and students, especially those who may aspire to become policy practitioners. My colleagues in political science and international relations sometimes ask for recommended materials to include on Yemen in their classes. I teach at a liberal arts college, and I teach a seminar on Yemen, so I thought I might be able to write a book that could be useful in the classroom and could introduce students to Yemen’s recent history through the lens of its civil actors.

In terms of a policy audience, one of my biggest concerns is that post-war approaches to justice will only or primarily address those injustices produced by the current conflict and that will obscure many of the justice demands that preceded the war. As the book shows, ignoring or suppressing justice demands has been a past driver of conflict in Yemen. I worry that repeating that pattern will prevent any substantive post-conflict reconciliation. My hope is that laying out some of the consequences of past practices and identifying some current successes at the local level will encourage policy practitioners to think of ways to scale up what is working well and to avoid repeating earlier mistakes. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

SPY: In the last two chapters of the book, I talk about Yemeni knowledge production as a form of justice work. This is something that I became attuned to when working on collaborative research projects with some Yemeni researchers over the past three years and it is something that I have been exploring in greater detail since I finished the book. In particular, I am interested in the work of narration—how and why people narrate the conflict in the ways that they do, how they relate to different audiences, and how they navigate different genres. There are some really creative projects by Yemeni civil actors that (deliberately) blur the boundaries between different genres of knowledge production. I only start to touch on this at the end of the book, but I am excited to expand on it in the future.

Relatedly, I have also been thinking and writing a bit about research collaboration and the ethical and practical questions that it raises. I would not have been able to write this book without having participated in some collaborative projects myself, so I have experienced the thorniness of it first hand and I think it deserves greater attention in our literature on research methods and ethics. I would like to see that engagement be more interdisciplinary, and I have been enjoying learning more about norms and practices in fields other than my own, as well as in applied, or non-academic, contexts.

 

Excerpt from the book (from the Introduction: Pursuing Justice Amid War, pp. 17-20)

Justice and Injustice Over Time

Having laid theoretical ground in Chapter 1, the next section of the book is devoted to tracing the claims and work of civil actors over Yemen’s recent history, marked as it has been by different combinations of disengagement, strategic engagement, and substantive engagement with justice by different actors at different times. It is not organized as a chronological ‘history of Yemen,’ but explores contention that has occurred within and outside of formal institutions to identify how various engagements with justice have shaped conflict and civil action alike.

Chapter 2 focuses predominantly on the ‘institutional story’—the dynamics of the 1990 unification of North and South Yemen, the introduction of an electoral regime to manage dissent, the brief 1994 civil war, and the consolidation of an increasingly narrow authoritarianism in the years that followed. This chapter pays special attention to the role of justice demands in driving the formation of the cross-ideological opposition alliance, the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). Understanding the motives and limitations of this alliance, and its paradoxical role in closing off institutional avenues of contention by 2009, is central to interpreting the 2011 uprising, developments in the transitional period, and beyond. Moreover, JMP members were powerful beneficiaries of the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative (GCCI) and have enjoyed privileged access to the UN-led diplomatic process as part of Yemen’s internationally recognized government.

The partisan story is matched by an account in Chapter 3 of extrapartisan mobilization by the Houthi movement in the North and the Hirak in the South, tracing the antecedents of both movements to justice demands and regime responses in the 1990s and even earlier. If Chapter 2 shows how the regime adeptly pitted elements of the partisan opposition against each other to largely avoid justice demands, Chapter 3 shows the introduction of some limited and strategic engagements with justice, paired with extensive repression. While the two planes of partisan and extrapartisan analysis intersect in some ways, I address them in separate chapters in part because of the different roles played by parties and movements in Yemen’s post-2011 political and armed conflicts. In both chapters, however, the primary emphasis is on the type of justice claims that movements and parties made and the way their claims were (or were not) engaged prior to the 2011 uprising. 

Chapters 2 and 3 jointly introduce several of the core social, political, regional, and economic cleavages in Yemeni society. Drawing on academic literature, interviews, fieldnotes, and other primary materials, the aim of this section is to enable readers to map continuities and discontinuities in the justice claims made by different segments of Yemeni society over time; these not only informed the 2011 uprising and the transitional process but continue to shape justice work in the context of the current war.

Justice Demands and Justice Work

The final section of the book explores the relationship between justice demands and justice work over the decade extending from Yemen’s uprising to 2022. Chapter 4 is the longest chapter and covers the shortest time period (2011–14), mapping the years that demonstrated the greatest substantive gains by Yemeni civil actors pursuing justice. These gains were offset by strategic engagement by transitional elites that undermined civil actors, as well as by armed conflicts that unfolded in several parts of the country as transitional justice mechanisms were being employed at the center. This chapter discusses the role of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) and its Transitional Justice committee as well as parallel mechanisms that operated outside of the context of the NDC and sometimes pulled against it. It ends with a discussion of Houthi military advances in the North and the campaign against Ansar al-Shari’a in the South, showing how these campaigns also mobilized narratives of injustice alongside engagements at the center.

The last chapter asks where civil actors are in the context of the ongoing war. I detail four core interlocking conflict dynamics that are shaping the substantive aims and capacities for action among civil actors: fragmentation, securitization, polarization, and humanitarianization. Amid a formal peace process that has been largely unsuccessful, civil actors are navigating these dynamics without many opportunities to shape negotiations or ensure that their justice priorities are reflected in post-conflict planning. But fragmentation has also enabled the establishment of ‘pieces of peace’ or pockets of stability where justice claims are being pursued.

Both within and outside of such pockets, civil actors are enacting justice projects in real time. Whereas one might make a justice demand, for example, regarding greater gender equality or women’s representation in government, local peacebuilders are working directly with local councils to make this happen where it can, rather than waiting for an agreement from the top. Chapter 5 includes many examples of quotidian local-level peacebuilding that I argue should be read as connected to longstanding justice claims. Peacebuilding research also works as concurrent documentation and enactment of Yemeni agency. As this chapter and the conclusion show, for many Yemeni researchers, research itself has become a form of civil action and justice work insofar as it helps to represent those who might not otherwise be seen or recognized by formal processes.

The challenge remains, however, to connect this work with national or internationally supported efforts to build sustainable peace in Yemen. Civil actors repeatedly stress that they do not have the luxury of waiting for a small number of elites and conflict actors to negotiate an end to the war or initiate a transitional justice program before they begin to address the needs of their communities or repair the legacies of harm. Enacting justice projects in the present is a means of anticipating and contributing to a more just future among those who cannot afford to wait.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.