Khalid Ikram and Heba Nassar, eds., The Egyptian Economy in the Twenty-first Century: The Hard Road to Inclusive Prosperity (New Texts Out Now)

Khalid Ikram and Heba Nassar, eds., The Egyptian Economy in the Twenty-first Century: The Hard Road to Inclusive Prosperity (New Texts Out Now)

Khalid Ikram and Heba Nassar, eds., The Egyptian Economy in the Twenty-first Century: The Hard Road to Inclusive Prosperity (New Texts Out Now)

By : Khalid Ikram and Heba Nassar

Khalid Ikram and Heba Nassar (eds.), The Egyptian Economy in the Twenty-first Century: The Hard Road to Inclusive Prosperity (The American University in Cairo Press, 2022).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you edit this book?

Khalid Ikram and Heba Nassar (KI & HN): We wanted to address a conundrum that dogs anyone who studies the Egyptian economy: why has Egypt, despite the many assets it possesses—a strategically vital geographical location, extensive oil and gas resources, unrivaled tourist attractions, a fertile agriculture, a hardworking population, an extensive diaspora that remits home large amounts of foreign currency, a long history as an important center of education in the Middle East—underperformed its potential over the last sixty years (say, two generations), and what should it do in the next two or three decades to overcome the challenges that might restrict its performance. What should Egypt do to ensure that its past does not become its future?

To address this puzzle one needed to draw on the breadth of ideas that a diversity of voices would bring. We therefore organized a collaboration of experts, Egyptian and foreign, who had considered this matter from different aspects. The result is a collective effort by nineteen scholars from universities, governments, think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and independent researchers who, in addition to their study of Egypt’s economy and society had worked intensively on the economies of more than thirty developing countries. Informed by their expertise and experience, the study would escort the reader through the thicket of the most important issues that would impact on the future of the Egyptian economy.

... the book stresses that with the right policies, Egypt’s government can meet the hopes and aspirations of Egyptians and raise their living standards ...

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

KI & HN: The discussion identifies two key goals for the government: (a) providing a better life for Egyptians; and (b) reducing the country’s vulnerability to external pressures. In operational terms, the first goal requires expanding Egypt’s production of goods and services, i.e., its GDP, and ensuring its equitable distribution; the second requires reducing the deficits on Egypt’s balance of payments and the domestic budget. These are the “what”s of the strategy; the “how”s are addressed in chapters dealing with population growth, the development strategy, the nature of the economy that would make Egypt competitive in the twenty-first century, fiscal and monetary policies, poverty and income distribution, the higher education system, external trade issues, improving the competitiveness of Egypt’s enterprise system, questions relating to energy, the urbanization strategy, the vital question of water availability, crucial institutional issues, and others.

The book provides a platform to discuss Egypt’s main challenges in achieving economic stability and better living standards. It was found that high unemployment and poverty in Egypt live alongside weaknesses in the structure of the economy, such as inefficient systems of subsidies, cumbersome business regulations, low human capital, poor infrastructure, low access to finance, and poor external competitiveness in a highly populated country and poor institutions.

Moreover, the book stresses that with the right policies, Egypt’s government can meet the hopes and aspirations of Egyptians and raise their living standards, while achieving economic stability, by understanding what went wrong and by following timely policies. Suggested directions drawn by the experts contributing to the book include: revisiting the role of the government in the economy; prioritizing spending on mega projects; encouraging private sector investments through an enabling and inviting business environment; and adopting a more inclusive economic approach and capitalizing on Egypt’s most important asset—its human capital—by creating employment opportunities away from low value-added economic sectors, which can help to deliver a more advanced level of productivity growth and consequently positively affect exports.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

KI: My previous books looked at the state of the Egyptian economy at the time of writing and analyzed how it had reached that position over fifty or more years. The analysis applied the tools of modern economics to Egypt’s performance, and also discussed the principal political-economy issues, i.e., the political factors behind the adoption of certain economic policies and the rejection of others. The present book looks forward. It focuses on key challenges that will confront the Egyptian economy in the next two or three decades, and identifies policies that would help overcome the problems.

HN: I have just finished coediting a World Bank report on Population Dividend in Egypt. Most of my previous work focused on several aspects of human resource development in Egypt, starting from labor market distortions, challenges of education, health and human capital, family planning as investment, the economic participation of women, children’s status, poverty dynamics, population, and so on. But this book studies the challenges of the various sectors of the Egyptian economy (including agriculture, trade, water, and industry). It adds intensive and significant analysis to all problems facing the Egyptian economy as a whole. I myself benefitted a lot in the exploration of all these aspects, which gave me a broad picture of the economy going forward.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

KI & HN: We would like the book to be read by policymakers, teachers, students, journalists, and in fact by anyone interested in the economic prospects of the Arab world’s most populous country, and one that occupies a key strategic role in the Middle East and, indeed, in the world. I hope we have provided sufficient data, analyses, and policy recommendations, together with details of relevant international experiences, to support an informed discussion on the subject. Our group would be amply satisfied if the book were to act as a catalyst for such a dialogue.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

KI: At the moment I am involved in some policy papers for Pakistan’s policymakers. 

HN: I am now going back to human resources development, and am working now on gender sensitive budgeting and on the impact of the food crisis on malnutrition of households and particularly children in Egypt. I am sure for this I will benefit from the general overview of the Egyptian economy portrayed in the book.

J: What, in your view, is the essential reason for Egypt’s not performing to its economic potential?

KI & HN: The central problem for Egypt’s economic underperformance is not economic; it lies more in the realm of political economy. It is not that Egypt’s policymakers are unaware of what needs to be done; it is that they have been unwilling to press vigorously for reforms that would eliminate inefficiencies in the economy.

Why are they unwilling? Much of the answer is that the politically powerful class benefits from existing inefficiencies. Inefficient policies create economic rents, i.e., unearned incomes, and these are captured largely by this class. Correcting these policies could reduce their incomes. Understanding the urgency for Egypt of economic reform is not rocket science. But as the American writer and political activist Upton Sinclair said, “It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his income depends upon his not understanding it.”

 

Excerpt from the book (from the introduction, pp. 2-6)

What Is the Nature and Extent of Egypt’s Economic Challenge?

The basic challenge is posed by the conflict between Egypt’s geography and its demography. What Napoleon termed “usable Egypt” is only a narrow oasis located in a vast desert. Although the country comprises about one million square kilometers (386,000 square miles), only about 40,000 square kilometers (15,000 square miles) are inhabited. Crammed into this 4 percent of the country’s area is 98 percent of a population estimated at 104 million in 2020, giving a density of more than 2,000 persons per square kilometer (more than 5,000 per square mile). 

Moreover, the cropped area (the cultivated area multiplied by the cropping intensity) is increasing much more slowly than the population. Between 1947 and 2020 the cropped area increased by only 50 percent, while the population increased by some 400 percent. A feddan in 2020 was expected to support six persons, compared with 2.1 in 1947. “Our density is our destiny,” wrote Hamdan, while Little succinctly summed up the basic issue: “The fact that Nile development can never again keep pace with population is at the root of Egypt’s economic problem.”

Moreover, time is not on Egypt’s side. Every two years Egypt adds a New Zealand or Ireland to its population; every three, a Denmark or a Finland; every four, an Israel or a Switzerland; and every five, a Sweden or a Portugal. And while it adds the population, Egypt does not add the capital assets, the technical knowledge, the institutions, and the governance of these countries.

What of the future? The problem is not merely that Egypt’s population has been growing rapidly; its age structure and fertility characteristics are likely to create a boost or “echo” in the growth rate in the succeeding decades.

For how many Egyptians is a better life to be provided? Egypt’s population in 2020 was about 104 million. The medium variant of the United Nations’ population projections suggests that by 2030 the population will have reached 120 million, by 2040 about 140 million, and by 2050 about 160 million. A special effort must be made to improve the lot of individuals whose consumption falls below the poverty line—these accounted for about 30 percent of the population in 2019.

If the better life is to be provided, as in other countries, principally through employment, what are the chief demographic issues that policymakers face?

The first issue is a rapid growth in the working-age cohort (15–64 years) and the entry of jobseekers into the labor market. The increase results from both the growth of the population and evolutions in its age structure. The additions to the working-age population are projected to rise from about a million persons per year in the 2010–25 period to nearly 1.6 million a year in the 2025–35 period. This growth will gradually subside after 2035, but is still likely to exceed 1 million persons a year by 2045–50. 

Second, rates of participation in the labor force by both males and females have been declining, but the decline should be reversed in the future. The World Bank reports that from 2010 to 2019 the rate for men fell from 75 percent to 67 percent, while that for women collapsed from an already low 23 percent to an abysmal 16 percent. 

The men’s rate declined largely because of youths’ difficulty in finding their first job (the youth unemployment rate at the end of 2019 was 27 percent). This discouraged substantial numbers of them (keep in mind that half of the country’s population is younger than 24 years old) from continuing to look for jobs, and they dropped out of the labor force.

The female rate was affected by (i) the contraction in the role of the public sector (hitherto an important source of female employment); (ii) the pattern of economic development during the last two decades in which growth occurred largely in the construction and transportation sectors, in which women’s opportunities are constrained for physical and social reasons; and (iii) an unwelcoming environment for women in the private sector. The declining participation rates must be reversed if Egypt is to provide a better life for its citizens and also to mobilize its labor resources to benefit from its “demographic dividend” and thus fully realize its economic potential.

Third, the wave of new entrants into the labor force will be substantially more educated than their predecessors: 50–60 percent will have secondary or post-secondary education, and another one- third will have a university education or higher. The quality of jobs created by the Egyptian economy would thus have to improve substantially to satisfy the aspirations of the increasingly educated new entrants.

Along with other changes, the economy must generate more jobs with “formal” characteristics. Those who work in the government or public enterprises, or whose working arrangements provide either social insurance or a formal, written work contract, are deemed to be in the formal sector. Workers who lack both social insurance and a formal, written contract, and are not in the farm sector, are considered to be in the informal private sector.

Most job growth in Egypt in the last two decades has been of the informal variety. Large numbers of workers are involved. In 2018, 62 percent of the workforce had informal employment arrangements (not all were employed in the informal sector). If we subtract the 17 percent working in agriculture, then 45 percent were in informal nonagricultural employment. The proportion of the workforce with formal-type arrangements will have to rapidly increase—precarious and uninsured jobs are hardly the metric of an improved life.

The challenge is thus to rapidly increase the number of jobs for an extended period and also ensure that the jobs are of better quality than in the past two decades. This will require a notable effort. The World Bank estimates that about 600,000 additional jobs would have to be created annually between 2019 and 2030 merely to keep the employment rate at the 2019 level. This is double the average of about 300,000 (mostly informal) jobs a year created between 2009 and 2019. 

At What Rate Must the Economy Grow to Create the Required Jobs?

The relation between GDP growth and job creation is not ironclad or permanent. Estimates by the IMF and the World Bank of employment elasticity with respect to GDP growth provide a starting point. These suggest that the GDP would have to grow at 6–7 percent a year in order to provide jobs for the increasing labor force and to absorb the accumulated backlog of unemployment and underemployment. A high growth rate is also required to expand the range of policy options. A stagnant economy increasingly compels the adoption of zero-sum policies—policymakers cannot increase support to one group without decreasing support for another.

The foregoing labor force projections are conservative; in particular, better working conditions in the private sector for women are likely to induce more of them to participate in the labor force, as would making it easier for the youth group to obtain their first job. Both outcomes would enlarge the labor force and raise the requirements of job creation.

Moreover, since multitudes of discouraged youths and harassed women do nothing to suggest a “better life,” one would expect policymakers to resolve these problems over the next decade or so. It would thus be prudent to think of the required GDP growth rate as around 7 percent a year in real terms. As against this, between 1960 and 2020 Egypt’s real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 4.6 percent

The required growth rate is about 50 percent higher than the average achieved over the last sixty years. But it is not beyond Egypt’s capabilities— Egypt’s GDP growth reached or exceeded 7 percent a year in the mid-1970s and again between 2006 and 2008. Let us also note that the growth rates for the fast-growing countries in East Asia (China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore) during two or more decades of their rapid growth period averaged 8 percent a year, while China’s was frequently around 9–10 percent a year.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.