Pamela Karimi, Alternative Iran: Contemporary Art and Critical Spatial Practice (New Texts Out Now)

Pamela Karimi, Alternative Iran: Contemporary Art and Critical Spatial Practice (New Texts Out Now)

Pamela Karimi, Alternative Iran: Contemporary Art and Critical Spatial Practice (New Texts Out Now)

By : Pamela Karimi

Pamela Karimi, Alternative Iran: Contemporary Art and Critical Spatial Practice (Stanford University Press, 2022).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book? 

Pamela Karimi (PK): As an architect, I have always been captivated by the ways in which creative agents navigate diverse spatial environments, whether it be a gallery, a studio, the street, or a deserted urban landscape. However, it was my personal upbringing in Iran that served as the primary impetus for exploring how innovative individuals engage in a cat-and-mouse game with state authorities over spatial boundaries. My formative years in post-revolutionary Iran were marked by clandestine art and music lessons, held in private settings beyond the reach of government or public institutions. But as I delved deeper into investigating such spaces, I came to realize that the notion of a wholly “pure” underground was a misconception. There were, of course, some exceptions. In the 1980s, for example, many art events—especially those featuring Western music or women's vocal performances—were held under entirely covert circumstances. However, the majority of creative—even politically daring—endeavors since the 1990s have occurred in areas that are not entirely hidden but are what I call loosely covert. It is within these interstitial zones, such as dilapidated homes, deserted factories, and abandoned urban locations, that alternative dreams and aspirations unfold. 

In 2010 I read the late Svetlana Boym’s Another Freedom: The Alternative History of an Idea, in which she argues that freedom is not a universal idea, but rather an ever-evolving concept that continues to shape our reality. What made it particularly poignant was the fact that, following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, many outsiders assumed that there was no freedom to be found in Iran. Yet Iranians, despite the odds stacked against them, have always been adept at carving out spaces where they can exercise autonomy.

Although the book primarily focuses on nonconforming curatorial projects, independent guerrilla installations, escapist practices, and tacitly subversive performances, it also features case studies that counterbalance the long-held presumption of a deep divide between the progressive art community and the state. Throughout the book, I identify the power of art to take a critical stance across semi-regulated and unregulated spaces, as well as regimes of appropriation and coalition.

Although ephemeral performances in unofficial, makeshift spaces may offer little financial reward or even no reward at all, they provide a glimmer of hope for a more democratic Iran.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address? 

PK: Alternative Iran takes a unique approach to art history, eschewing the traditional focus on iconography and semiotics in favor of a narrative that uncovers the intricate, often obscured networks of spatial, economic, and political discourses that define the artistic landscape of Iran. The book argues that Iran’s alternative art scenes defy the global art economy with projects that prioritize interactions with people and sites rather than object-based work that caters to the gallery, museum, and auction circuits. Although ephemeral performances in unofficial, makeshift spaces may offer little financial reward or even no reward at all, they provide a glimmer of hope for a more democratic Iran. In alignment with the Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch, who has expounded on the concept of “hope,” I maintain that “hope” empowers Iran's artistic labor and enables it to leave an indelible imprint on society over time.

While Iranian artists ensure the longevity of their movements through repetition of ephemeral artistic practices, they also face obstacles. The constraining factors, however, are not merely binary divisions imposed by external forces that are beyond the control of artists. For instance, some artists refuse to participate in government-run initiatives in Tehran, while keenly conforming to the rules of state-run events that showcase art from poor regions outside the capital. The boundaries between private and public and correlated economies are more complex than assumed. Some alternative art practices occasionally benefit from private sponsorships but use the money to promote a higher cause. Additionally, while alternative art practices often intend to benefit society, some critics within Iran view them as elitist. These are only a few examples to show how Alternative Iran avoids what anthropologists call the “romanization of resistance.” Instead, the book explores the intricate networks that underpin the production and perception of art in Iran, shaped by constantly shifting economic and political circumstances as well as diverse critical perspectives.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work? 

PK: My work is interdisciplinary and takes into account the impact of economic, social, and political forces on art and architecture. My first monograph, Domesticity and Consumer Culture in Iran (2013), revealed that modernization in Iran extended far beyond the realm of politics and public life. As Iran teetered on the brink of modernity, the traditional tenets that had long defined the Iranian home began to erode, while the influx of new household goods gradually led to a notable shift in lifestyles. Drawing on a wealth of archival materials, the book shed light on the crucial role that private life played in the social, economic, and political contexts of modern Iran. It showed how Iranian families resisted official transformations by selectively appropriating aspects of their surroundings to assert agency.  

As sociopolitical challenges escalated in the 2010s, I engaged in what I call “activist scholarship.” For example, I co-edited The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: From Napoléon to ISIS, a dossier of essays examining the reasons behind the destruction of cultural heritage in the Middle East. Additionally, I organized the multi-media travelling exhibition “Black Spaces Matter,” in collaboration with community stakeholders, faculty, local experts, and students at my college. The exhibition highlighted the significance of abolitionist history in New Bedford, MA. 

Alternative Iran is a continuation of my commitment to exploring pressing sociopolitical issues of our time. It delves into the intricate networks and discourses that define Iran’s art scenes, revealing that spatial constraints, political obstacles, and economic restrictions do not hinder artistic progress, but instead inspire unique artistic qualities. 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

PK: The book is intended for a variety of audiences and readers. Most of the art forms that I discuss in this book belong to the art-historical category of post-studio practices, which encompasses socially engaged art, interventionist art, participatory art, collaborative art, and community-based art. Experimental music and theater are also addressed insofar as their encounters with alternative sites are of significance. Architecture is explored when the design process is symptomatic of a search for the creation of alternative spaces for art and everyday life.

Above all, Alternative Iran provides a distinctive documentation of the tangled histories of art and civil disobedience in post-revolutionary Iran, which are scarcely found in official archives, and have never been consolidated into a single volume in either Farsi or English. The book employs a variety of theoretical frameworks, from critical spatial theory to affect theory and ethnographic methods; its multidisciplinary approach makes it attractive not only to scholars in the fields of art, theater, music, and architectural history but also to those interested in anthropology and urban studies. 

While the freeform approach to art and community life may seem more prevalent in Western societies, I argue that it is also plausible in the global South, highlighting the ways in which traditional forms of art, such as ta'ziyeh passion plays, have influenced contemporary art practices. So, Alternative Iran will hopefully also captivate readers interested in the Islamic arts of Iran, by showing how non-traditional contemporary artists have co-opted these old practices.

J: What was one unanticipated revelation you encountered while writing your book?

PK: As I delved into writing Alternative Iran, I was faced with the challenge of grappling with a complex phenomenon: the co-optation of the “underground” by the state. While the 1980s and early 1990s allowed for unconventional art installations and performances in independent, underground, and loosely covert art spaces, the first two decades of the twenty-first century brought about major changes in control regimes and art economics. The state and other powerful entities appropriated techniques of covertness and brought aspects of the alternative into the limelight to regulate the creative community. This paradigm shift created a range of gray zones and push-and-pull games between the state and the art community. Alternative Iran presents instances of the Iranian authorities granting permission and even funding formerly “underground” art projects, paralleling the aggressive mimicry identified by art critic Gregory Sholette in the context of Western capitalism. 

Amidst these changes, I discovered that more established artists, curators, and theater experts refused to contribute or took part in limited ways, creating alternatives within alternatives. It was challenging to articulate this phenomenon, but it served as a testament to the determination of Iranian creative agents who have been producing dissident art for four decades. Through my extensive research on Iranian artists, I discovered that they possess remarkable endurance, particularly in situations where state actors attempt to co-opt their art. 

J: What other projects are you working on now? 

PK: Currently, I am working on two monographs. The first was not initially part of my plan, but I became involved due to my interest in how sociopolitical movements have affected Iranian art. The book explores the role of visual arts in this revolutionary movement through ten recurring themes or “acts,” and argues that protest art emerging from Iranian streets and public spaces is not just a pretense of protest but protest itself.

A slightly lengthier book project, tentatively titled Survival by Design, illuminates Iran’s role in the re-emergence of traditional green architecture during a period characterized by Iran’s oil boom and the first oil crisis in the Global North. It explores how a diverse and globally connected group of experts, including architects, planners, philosophers, and Sufi scholars, formulated a visionary plan for the future with a long-lasting impact both globally and within the architectural discourse of Pahlavi Iran and the ensuing Islamic Republic.

 

Expert from the book (from the Introduction, pp. 10-12)

The Ethos of Iran’s Alternative Art

[…] Iran has a long tradition of communal and interactive art that reaches back to premodern times. Oriented toward experience rather than objects, many of these artistic expressions materialized in the form of religious ceremonies during the lunar month of Muharram, notably the ta’ziyeh passion plays that narrate the tragic and heroic martyrdom of Imam Hussain, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, in the battle of Karbala in Iraq in Muharram of 680 CE. Ta’ziyeh means “consolation,” implying the blessing that performers are believed to obtain by dramatizing the events that led to the persecution of the Prophet’s family. While symbolizing the spirit of resistance against tyranny, the ritual drama is also shaped by the active participation of ordinary people. Nonprofessional actors are invited to contribute as both performers and spectators, and the way the story unfolds is spontaneous and at times improvised.

Hamid Dabashi writes that in ta’ziyeh, “[t]he stage is not really a stage, not because [those] who stage the ta’ziyeh are poor and cannot afford a proper amphitheater, but because the stage must be an extension of . . . ordinary realities. . .. Non- actors can frequent the stage easily, while the actors fall in and out of character without any prior notice.” Nor was participation in artistic expression limited to religious art and rituals. Naqqali (storytelling), Shahnameh- khani (reading of verses of the Shahnameh), roohowzi (layman entertainment performances), and motrebi (light music played on streets and at social events) were interactive and time- based entertainment art forms that, in their delivery, resonated with religious passion plays. This collective approach even extended to the high-ranking professional (miniature) painters of the royal courts: while one mastered the portrayal of the human body, another would be an expert in depicting foliage or animals, and so on. In fact, until the modern period and increased interactions with Europe, it was rare to think of art as a solitary pursuit. 

Just how Iranians kept these traditions alive is not so clear. Today, many performance artists and theater experts strongly oppose any connections with the ta’ziyeh while acknowledging the influence of experimental theater directors Peter Brook and [Jerzy] Grotowski, who both traveled to Iran and performed there in the late 1960s and 1970s, during the Shiraz Arts Festival, launched by the Empress Farah and held annually from 1967 to 1977. Ironically, both of those iconic directors were captivated by the dramatic possibilities of ta’ziyeh performances that were brought into the spotlight at the fourth festival, which revolved around the theme of the “ritual.” As Brook explained:

I saw in a remote Iranian village one of the strongest things I have ever seen in theater: a group of 400 villagers, the entire population of the place, sitting under the tree and passing from roars of laughter to outright sobbing— although they knew perfectly well the end of the story— as they saw Hussein in danger of being killed, and then fooling his enemies, and then being martyred. And when he was martyred, the theater form became truth.

Brook would distill his experience into an experimental theater piece, Orghast, performed at the 1971 Shiraz Arts Festival, which was written entirely in a language invented by his collaborator, the poet Ted Hughes. As a contemporary review in the New York Times notes, the use of words that had no meaning— only rhythm, texture, tone— forced “the spectator to listen to the work as they would listen to music, and to watch the action as if it were a religious experience.” Grotowski, who visited Iran four times and closely followed the Shiite rituals, also used elements from the ta’ziyeh tradition to bond performers and audiences. Theater historian Daniel Gerould has written of how Grotowski’s actors became “celebrant[s] for the community of spectators, inciting them to take part in the rituals.”

Often Iranian performances, some featured in this book, draw on what the German dramatist Bertolt Brecht calls Verfremdungseffekt (distancing effect or simply alienation), the theatrical device that intentionally distances audiences from the fictive narrative and instead engages them in real activities. With the exception of a few, Iranian performers tend to deny the connection between the Brechtian distancing effect and the ta’ziyeh. But several scholars, including Hamid Dabashi, have compared the dramatic value of distancing in conveying the strong moral principles associated with the ta’ziyeh, where performers do not “play roles” per se, but try to impersonate the protagonists and the antagonists.

This cross-fertilization—from Shiite performances, to European avantgarde theater, and back again in contemporary performances in Iran—provides an insight into the complex spectrum of influences on Iranian art. Ta’ziyeh props and their methods of assembly—and in particular, the temporary structures hastily assembled for the annual rituals of the month of Muharram— have also proved to be a source of inspiration. As will be shown in chapter 4, the same “rushed” building style (hey’ati; literally, of a delegation—referring to a delegation of devout men who quickly construct large-scale, temporary religious paraphernalia), which has become a defining feature of agitprops in Iran is also used by artists to make sarcastic commentaries on urban propaganda.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.