Beyond Rebellion: Gezi as a World-Making Movement

Yücel Tunca © 2013 Yücel Tunca © 2013

Beyond Rebellion: Gezi as a World-Making Movement

By : Kaan Ağartan

[This article is part of the Roundtable Discussion: “Remembering Gezi—Beyond Nostalgia Ten Years On" produced by Jadaliyya’s Turkey Page Editors. Read the roundtable introduction by guest editors Birgan Gökmenoğlu and Derya Özkaya and see the other articles of this roundtable here. Bu metnin Türkçe çevirisini burada bulabilirsiniz.]

A comprehensive assessment of the afterlives of the Gezi Park uprising is like fighting three battles at once.[1] The first of these battles has to do with “remembering what happened” at the park and other spaces to which its “spirit” spread. Given the complexity of concerns, resentments, and expectations that brought thousands of individuals to streets, squares, parks, neighborhoods, and others all over the country, not to mention the rich palette of activism that emerged from these spaces, it is a true challenge to piece together the many different versions of Gezi’s memory as they oscillate between despair and hope, success and failure, and other widely polarized recollections. The second battle concerns intellectual and scholarly efforts to tackle Gezi as a social phenomenon. While one may argue that attempts for “explaining what happened” in Gezi Park and beyond may have reached a saturation point by now, there is hardly any agreement on whether what we witnessed was a rupture or continuity in Turkish politics, or whether it should be analyzed as a unique event or an unfinished process, or whether it unleashed something new and unexpected or was the culmination of slowly brewing conditions. The third and final battle, “cultivating politics from what happened” poses yet another challenge for utilizing Gezi’s reservoir of political experience to pursue radical social change. This became all the more difficult under an increasingly authoritarian political regime which has ruthlessly criminalized and persecuted even the slightest connection to the uprising. In such an environment “defending Gezi’s legacy” remained as the only realistic political option, whereas the anticipation for a radical reorganization of the society – the sound of which once rang out powerfully in Gezi park and beyond – feels like a drifting dream.

In order to tackle this daunting task of offering a sober assessment of the tenth (or any) anniversary of one of the largest acts of civil disobedience in modern Turkish history, I believe a different approach can be adopted – one that sees the Gezi uprising not as a mere revolt of the masses against the increasingly authoritarian rule but as a political expression of deeper transformation to reconstitute the social that has been disintegrating under the assault of neoliberalism. Put differently, I believe Gezi can be interpreted as an attempt to build a new and more democratic political community in the face of what Wendy Brown calls “dismantling the social” and “dethroning the political” by neoliberalism. In that respect, Gezi was hardly different from her global sisters – the pro-democracy and anti-austerity movements of the early 2010s whose politics went beyond a mere “system update.” These movements did not conceptualize or experiment with new democratic norms and practices simply to innovate in democratic participation and deliberation, or repair existing political institutions, or bring social injustices to a bearable level. Rather, by turning community into a rebellion and a radical vision for the future, they became “life in rehearsal” through prefiguring and gradually building a different collective existence.

Gezi can be interpreted as an attempt to build a new and more democratic political community in the face of what Wendy Brown calls “dismantling the social” and “dethroning the political” by neoliberalism.

In my forthcoming book Gezi: Making of a New Political Community in Turkey I demonstrate that the unique political mobilization during what I call the “Gezi Episode” – the period stretching from street clashes to the occupation of Gezi Park, from park forums to neighborhood solidarities, squat house experiences and cooperatives – was shepherded by such vision. Through constant, globally-connected activism that centered direct, inclusive, horizontal, and deliberative radical practices in different spaces of Istanbul, Gezi activists were in fact building a new political community on the basis of a new “we.” I trace this world-making character of the Gezi Episode through the unfolding of three distinct yet connected dynamics. The first of these dynamics can be summarized as follows:

It is well known that nowhere did the social movements of the early twenty-first century take place in isolation but belonged to a global wave of social unrest in response to the extremities of neoliberalism. As such they shared what I call a mobilizational dynamic that conditioned activists’ political identity as well as the democratic practices and prefigurative politics they carried out. Regardless of the national context or particular trigger that instigated these protests, globally-linked activists and organizers (“rooted cosmopolitans,” as Sydney Tarrow calls them) were continuously engaging in various forms of contentious politics such as fighting the police in streets, occupying squares, forming assemblies in parks, and squatting in abandoned buildings, all the while inspiring and being inspired by other struggles around the world. For instance, during the early period of the Gezi Episode activists in Caferağa and Yeldeğirmeni squat houses hosted groups from other squats in Europe, strengthening their relationship that pre-dated the Gezi Episode. Even more importantly, every tweet or Facebook message that urged individuals to join each other on the street (or square, park, or squat house) fueled an unceasing mobilization, turning activism in these spaces into an act of everyday life and thus giving it a new meaning. Constant action paved the way for the “normalization of politics” in the street (and later other spaces), reinforced a unique collective identity and solidarity that emerged from these interactions, and eventually steered people into a political community of “insurgent/militant citizens.”

Being constantly primed for mobilization with the help of social media bridged otherwise fragmented, isolated, individualized resentments, potentials and actions in tandem with other global movements. As a result, activists became progressively well-informed based on the political experiences and interactions since the very first days of the Gezi Episode. Even at the height of street clashes against the police, they were becoming more conscious and “enlightened” about the ways the AKP was relentlessly and brutally destroying the city in service of neoliberalism. Later, park forums and neighborhood solidarities across the country became spaces where knowledge about many different issues (mostly local but also broader) were produced, discussed and collectively acted upon by the very occupants, participants and residents. All this instigated a political awakening when Gezi activists began to realize that they could be in command of their own political destiny. They were no longer “calendar activists” who would attend a protest or an event organized on certain, symbolic days, such as May Day or Pride Walk. Being out in the streets, then utilizing parks and other spaces for political activism to transform the conditions of their lives was a source of self-confidence, self-realization and harmony with others in collectively building something new.

What reveals Gezi’s and her global sisters’ world-making character is the very transformative experiences – animated partly by this mobilizational dynamic – through which activists perceived their activism and the very movement in which they were taking part. By normalizing locally-, nationally- and globally-connected activism as a way of life Gezi conferred on activists a nomadic and fluid subjectivity. Activists who could simultaneously take part in more than one group and network were able to maintain multiple political subjectivities. In this way, they were able to carry out politics and establish relations of solidarity with others at different levels. Individuals and groups who became politicized together and experienced an alternative politicization in a variety of spaces ranging from streets to squares, parks, and squats turned this into a common way of life, a novel way of existing.

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The second dynamic that reveals the world-making character of the movements of the early twenty-first century can be observed in their spatial characteristics. It is well known that one of the defining characteristics of new and new-er social movements is that they have often taken place in urban spaces (with unique possibilities or restrictions, and often improvised) where everyday life is experienced. This is why the radical political experience that emerged from these movements has been deeply conditioned, if not triggered, by the effects of neoliberal urbanization on the city. In this process, different urban sites are exposed to different aspects of the same neoliberal attack in the form of gentrification, commodification of the commons, deepening exclusion and inequality, and the like, all of which prompted various social groups in the city to mobilize simultaneously, even if not always in coordination. Although the objections raised from these places seem to be different in focus (maybe an increase in bus fare, the murder of a person of color by the police, or the demolition of a public park) or style, they actually became different fronts in the same struggle.

During the Gezi Episode, too, activism took place in different hyper-politicized sites in Istanbul and across the country which conditioned, through their unique physical infrastructure and historical/cultural baggage, the diversity and complexity of the participants as well as their strategies and horizons. Balconies, movie theaters, subway stations, and of course, squares, parks, and many other spaces in and beyond Istanbul became a site of dissent. It was in these spaces that the Gezi Episode became a multi-faceted political mobilization in forums, neighborhood solidarities, and squat houses, bringing under its fold many groups such as urban outcasts, environmentalists, white-collar precariat, and all other concerned residents. It was in these spaces that the different wounds inflicted by neoliberal urbanization brought people closer, while the fragmented structure of the city simultaneously united and divided their political activism and democratic imagination, giving the Gezi Episode a fluid spatiality. Constantly mobilizing activists with loose and nomadic political subjectivities could easily flow from one urban space to another under the inspiration of similar movements around the world. Meanwhile, they would be both shaping the politics of the particular space they inhabited and adjusting their own identities and subjectivities with the political potential that very space offered.

In this increasingly flexible politicization process, an activist could be a part of different forms of action and mechanisms that took place in more than one place at the same time and in different capacities. On the other hand, this increased fluidity of the activist improved the political capacity of the urban spaces in which she mobilized, for these spaces now had to accommodate diverse identities and subjectivities ready and willing to collectively mobilize with other individuals and groups in different roles. For example, the same political subject could engage in politics as a protester on the street, a watchman at the barricade, a tweeter on social media, a volunteer in the occupied park, a treasurer in the forum, a cook in the squat, or a representative of her neighborhood at a meeting of a newly formed political organization. In other words, as Gezi activists moved from one space to another, from one form of activism to another, they did not necessarily do this in a chronological order or within a hierarchical structure, but emerged (and then dissolved) in unique “space-activism-subjectivity/identity” matrices at any given moment.

In short, political activism during the Gezi Episode, ranging from street clashes in Taksim and Beşiktaş to the commune life experienced during the two-week occupation of Gezi Park, from forums and solidarities in neighborhoods to squat houses and even to the buildings where more formal meetings took place, shaped activists’ capacity to produce alternative political imaginations and forms of social solidarity that could emerge from these imaginations. Perhaps more importantly, the Gezi movement’s spatiality conditioned the emergence of a new political community, nurtured by these struggles and paving the way for a completely different world in their particular microcosm.

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The third dynamic in contemporary social movements that informs the latter’s world-making character is probably the most obvious: the radical democratic vision materialized in the everyday actions of the activists. What I mean by radical democratic practices, or by activism shaped by radical democratic vision, are the efforts to fundamentally transform the conventional understanding of politics in society, and establish in its place a new modality of politics that goes beyond rights-based and representative mechanisms of liberal/bourgeois democracy. It is with this motivation that activists could formulate and implement a set of inclusive, direct, participatory, non-hierarchical and consensus-based practices as a guiding principle for an alternative way of collective existence: a new political community that defies the oppressive and exclusionary mechanisms of neoliberal urbanization and dares to claim sovereignty over its own future.

During the early 2000s, for instance, worker councils and cooperatives in countries like Argentina and Venezuela, or practices like participatory budgeting in Brazil, began to appear as concrete achievements of global urban uprisings. Daily, even instantaneous forms of action were also enriching the repertoires of radical democratic action in different corners of the city. The wide range of horizontal, direct, and local experimentations in square occupations, park forums, and squat houses were in fact heralding a metamorphosis of the political sphere beyond conventional interpretations of democracy. The “assembly” emerged as a uniting element within these diverse radical practices. Assemblies were not merely physical spaces – let alone formal institutions – where decisions about a better and inhabitable world were taken and enacted. Despite their inherent contradictions and mixed record in terms of achieving what they aspired, assemblies were also an expression through prefigurative actions (communication protocols, division of labor to meet the needs of the collective, criteria for participation and representation, and the like) of the collective will to build a better world.

Elements of a similar political horizon could be found in the radical democratic experience that emerged from assembly politics in parks, neighborhoods, and squat houses during the Gezi Episode. Radical activism entered a new stage following the forced evacuation of the Gezi park occupation and the relocation of the activists, first in big public parks such as Abbasağa and Yoğurtçu, then in smaller neighborhood parks all over Istanbul and other parts of the country. The movement was no longer defined primarily by a handful of brave street fighters and occupiers but expanded to broader sectors of the society, and as such became more democratized. During this period, park forums replicated and fine-tuned Gezi’s political practices, including long assembly meetings in which special communication protocols and moderation methods were utilized to ensure the broadest participation, even when this was not always possible in practice. Still, assemblies became sites where participants could not only discuss heated topics, pour their hearts out, and hear others in a safe space, but also collectively work out solutions, make decisions, and actually carry out political action. In addition to hosting experts, artists, intellectuals, and politicians to discuss various issues and “big politics” in Turkey, these park forums produced thematic sub-groups and workshops on topics ranging from women, gender, refuges, the environment, and so forth. In smaller parks, the pendulum of politics swung strongly towards the local, and as such began to be determined by the needs, problems, and potentials of the neighborhood these parks were situated in. The conversion of a public elementary school to a religious school (imam-hatip), the rehabilitation of a brook, or the possible opening of a grove to construction would mobilize residents to join each other to discuss and act upon these issues. No matter how narrowly or broadly these actions were formulated and enacted, they were all expressions of solidarity and a will to collectively tackle shared problems.

Maybe most important of all, the underlying intent of the activism during the Gezi Episode – spanning from the creation of barter-tables, free kitchens, community gardens, libraries, and infirmaries during the occupation of Gezi Park to all forms of political mobilization in park forums, neighborhood solidarities, squat houses, and cooperatives – was to protect the city’s common resources, spaces, meanings, and symbols from neoliberalism and to share them with broader segments of the society. While internal contradictions and numerous other issues circumscribed and crippled its world-making potential, radical politics during the Gezi Episode still attempted to move beyond a social model which placed private property and a narrowly defined national identity at its core, and to rebuild the city, with its inhabitants and common resources, under a new social contract.

It is important not to reduce this vision of the contemporary social movements simply to collective and fair use of economic resources available to the residents of the city. Rather, it should be interpreted as a political project aimed at creating a new social fabric to meet individuals’ most fundamental needs such as employment, sustenance, housing, healthcare, education and others, all of which have been plundered by neoliberal capitalism. At the core of this activism lies a radical democratic vision to rebuild the economic (through pooling resources to meet the fundamental needs of all), the political (through radically democratizing decision-making and participation mechanisms), and the social (through broadening the definition of community to the largest extent possible) pillars of an alternative world and a “common” way of living.

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When looking back from the tenth-year mark to remember what happened at Gezi Park, understand how it happened, and unleash its political potential, the three interrelated dynamics seen in Gezi and her global sisters paint a different picture than the one that often constrains our political imagination within such binaries as failure/success, defeat/victory, loss/win, or others. This new breed of social movements neither simply offered discursive openings to rethink the worsening levels of inequality, exclusion, and other forms of injustice, nor did they offer quick fixes to get “back to normal.” Rather, they emboldened masses to dream about the possibility of a different world. Looking at how these three dynamics have played out over time enables us to remember and understand Gezi not through the prism of unproductive conversations, inter-organization conflicts, personal animosities, failure to institutionalize, lack of leadership, or relying too much on technology, but instead can help us see the possibilities and limitations of Gezi for building an alternative political community defined by a fundamentally different set of criteria, expressed with a new lexicon. Without naively dismissing its limits and contradictions as well as the significant challenges that prevent its full realization, recognizing the world-making character of radical democratic practices ranging from street clashes to park forums, assembly meetings, occupations, cooperatives, and mutual aid networks can expand our political horizon beyond merely resisting market relations or oppressive state apparatuses, and encourage us to reject a narrow political vision in favor of one which is still in the making.

NOTES

[1] I am indebted to Derya Özkaya for numerous conversations on this topic and for kindly allowing me to mention it in this piece.

Fluctuating between the “Local” and the “National”: The Politics of Alliances from Below in the Afterlives of Gezi

[This article is part of the Roundtable Discussion: “Remembering Gezi—Beyond Nostalgia Ten Years On" produced by Jadaliyya’s Turkey Page Editors. Read the roundtable introduction by guest editors Birgan Gökmenoğlu and Derya Özkaya and see the other articles of this roundtable here. Bu metnin Türkçe çevirisini burada bulabilirsiniz.]

Electoral alliances emerged as a significant form of political representation in Turkey, particularly following the transition from the parliamentary to the presidential system in 2017. Pre-election alliances were also operationalized by different segments of political opposition to combine their weakened forces into a collective resistance to the ruling Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP] government and President Erdoğan’s unrestrained hegemony and ever-increasing political repression. Particularly during the latest parliamentary and presidential elections, researchers, analysts, journalists, and the wider public have widely discussed the role of electoral alliances in Turkey’s politics, their strategic programs, working principles, and election campaigns.

There is an urgent need to consider precisely what kind of opportunities and contradictions these new electoral alliances present in Turkey; however, this is not my aim here. Quite the reverse, I invite a shift of attention from party politics to politics from below and focus on the local urban alliances that emerged as the byproducts of popular uprisings during the summer of 2013. I aim to provide a glimpse of how the post-Occupy political landscape was experienced at the level of local opposition movements, taking you on a short journey into the inner circles of local urban activists by building on the ethnographic research I conducted in 2016 and 2017 with Gezi protestors and local activists who have led or been involved in these self-organized citizen initiatives in Istanbul and Eskişehir.

From the City Squares to Urban Neighborhoods: Post-Occupy Local Politics


Photo 1: Yogurtcu Park Forum, Kadiköy, Istanbul (28 June 2013) Source: Halkevleri.

Following the violent eviction of Gezi Park and Taksim Square in Istanbul and the dismantling of encampments in many Anatolian cities in the summer of 2013, tens of thousands of protestors initiated public forums in various districts of many cities until the fall of 2014. As an embodiment of one of Gezi’s main slogans, “Everywhere is Taksim, resistance everywhere,” these park forums decentralized the uprisings, reaching more participants in their regular locales. They have also become catalysts for grassroots political mobilization, fostering discussions on the potential for socio-political transformation from below. Gezi forums facilitated extensive deliberations on ongoing resistance and its possible future, collective decision-making on local and nationwide problems, and organized protests, workshops, thematic working groups, and panels on various topics, including the right to the city, fundamental rights against police violence, sexual violence, urban and ecological resistance, etc. Moreover, they have appeared as places of encounter, producing new affective attachments and feelings of solidarity and belonging among those who had been discriminated against, marginalized, or excluded from politics.

While the park forums initially generated reassuring feelings shared and also reproduced by their regular participants, they were not easily transformed into broader political organizing. The complexities of decision-making processes, increasing workloads combined with an insufficient number of volunteers, and declining participation over time led to discontent among the forum organizers. Sharing the collective feelings of being excluded from the decision-making processes or disappointment that arose from the never-ending and inconclusive discussions among the same political actors, some of the regular participants of park forums stepped back, while others created alternative organizations calling for more localized politics. Even though they were not able to preserve the expansive socio-political composition achieved immediately in the aftermath of the uprisings, these park forums inspired the formation of self-organized local networks of political activism with new repertoires of collective action, which I call “post-Gezi local urban alliances.”

One notable example is the Yoğurtçu Park Forum in Istanbul, which gave rise to various collectives in the following months and years, such as Yoğurtçu Women’s Forum, neighborhood assemblies, squats, consumption cooperatives, urban defense initiatives, and many more. These alliances brought the residents in the respective neighborhoods and districts — who were predominantly anti-government and left-wing citizens and voted mostly for the main opposition parties in the parliament — together with the local political actors, who were mostly leftists, socialists, feminists, and urban activists with (in)direct connections to particular political organizations. While some alliances successfully engaged a diverse range of participants from different ethnic, political, social, and cultural backgrounds, many primarily consisted of politically affiliated young activists and older left-wing, secular, middle-class neighbors.

 

Photo 2: Caferaga (above) and Yeldegirmeni (below) Neighborhood Assemblies (20 April 2014) Source: Facebook.
 

Despite their limited social and political compositions, these post-Gezi local urban alliances have played a vital role in energizing political dissent in urban spaces at different moments of contention. Renaming urban spaces to memorialize Gezi “martyrs,” organizing resistance against urban renewal projects, meeting with municipalities to mitigate local pollution, creating neighborhood gardens and exchange markets, organizing Earth meals during Ramadan, hosting open-air film screenings, and leading protests and marches against police violence, the government’s religion-based restructuring of the education system, the war in Syria, and femicide are among some of their collective actions. These collective experiences later encouraged the formation of new alliances between local activists and various political organizations, aiming to address urban and ecological struggles both within Istanbul and beyond. These alliances eventually became significant actors of urban resistance and political opposition, particularly in some parts of Istanbul.

Photo 3: Eskisehir Gezi Forums in four districts (3 July 2013) Source: Halkevleri.

Similarly, in Eskişehir, protestors created park forums in four districts after the evacuation of the encampment in the city center, and these forums were integrated into a single comprehensive forum, Eskişehir Resistance Forums, due to the decline in attendance within their first weeks of operation. Regular participants of Eskişehir Resistance Forums discussed a variety of topics, including establishing women’s committees to address incidents of rape and sexual harassment, organizing protests during graduation ceremonies at universities, opening anti-capitalist exchange markets, and creating solidarity networks with political prisoners. But a principal focus of Eskişehir Resistance Forums was shaped around the loss of Ali Ismail Korkmaz, one of the protesters and a nineteen-year-old university student, who was brutally beaten by plain-clothes police. At the time of the mass protests, civilians sided with the police, and Ali Ismail lost his life on 10 July 2013, after being in a coma for thirty-eight days.

These collective experiences later encouraged the formation of new alliances between local activists and various political organizations, aiming to address urban and ecological struggles both within Istanbul and beyond.

Sharing intense pain and grief of his loss, collective guilt for not being able to protect him, touched by the proximity of death, and urged to seek justice not only for Ali Ismail but also all Gezi “martyrs,” Eskişehir Resistance Forums collectivized and politicized their participants’ affective responses to Ali Ismail’s loss and created novel forms of resistance with the support of thousands of Eskişehir residents. They organized a public campaign called “Who Killed Ali Ismail?” to find any kind of evidence, photos, or video recordings taken by protestors or by witnesses documenting his murder. They organized a petition and negotiated with the municipality to rename Etipark after Ali Ismail Korkmaz. They held weekly public vigils in the street where Ali Ismail was beaten for almost two months and organized weekly Justice Watches, first in front of the courthouse and then in the city center for more than forty weeks. They also made open calls for the trials of the accused, shared developments about the case, and organized participation in the trials, which continued for almost four years.

Photo 4: Posters writing “Who Murdered Ali Ismail?” Eskişehir, 2013. Source: EverywhereTaksim.
 

Developing collective strategies of resistance and mobilizing a new political language, these local initiatives, both in Istanbul and Eskişehir, led to the creation of cross-ideological alliances bringing the supporters and members of opposition parties, various political organizations, and also “nonaligned” (örgütsüz/bağımsız) individuals — who are not affiliated with a political party, group, or movement, or who have limited ties but do not act in a party/organization/group discipline — together around the burning issues of the moment. In addition to their participant profiles, these local initiatives are also distinctive — and different than conventional issue-based or electoral alliances of established political parties and organizations — due to their working principles which are often defined by leaderlessness, horizontality, consensus-based decision-making, non-representativeness, direct action, voluntary labour, etc. These principles have been repeatedly emphasized by their constituents as one of the main legacies of the Gezi uprisings, and these alliances have often been acknowledged as a new political opening for Turkey’s dissent, albeit temporarily.

From Popular Uprisings to Electoral Campaigns


Starting from the local elections of March 2014, the agendas of post-Gezi local urban alliances were shaped around possible strategies to weaken the AKP government’s hegemony. Discussions in public park forums and neighborhood assemblies centered on upcoming local elections alongside ongoing local agendas. Despite the earlier collective desires for localized politics and the creation of alternative political fields, political activists could not fully detach from national parliamentary politics. While some of the regular participants and organizers supported the idea of taking active roles in the electoral campaigns together with the traditionally organized and centralized political parties, others advocated the need to establish a new political party as the main representative of the masses mobilized during the uprisings. There was also a large group of local activists who preferred to continue prioritizing their local agendas and insisted on keeping the “independent” position of the post-Gezi local alliances often defined as being “beyond politics” (siyaset üstü).

These divergent views on electoral politics resurfaced the political cleavages and different political affiliations that had been overlooked or suspended during and in the immediate aftermath of the uprisings. These contentions not only directly affected the number of regular participants and volunteers of the post-Gezi local alliances but also restricted their diverse political composition, producing much more homogenized groups who closely knew each other. While some of the local alliances started to be dominated by particular political parties’ members and supporters, others struggled to protect their multiplicity of participants. With the approaching June 2015 national elections, political repositioning around parliamentary parties became the predominant path for many post-Gezi local urban alliances, leading to the dissolution of some initiatives grappling with organizational issues. Many participants in these alliances complained about the revival of previous political divergences among the local activists. For example, one of my interlocutors in Kadıköy, Istanbul, claimed that the elections “recreated polarizations” as opposed to the togetherness at Gezi. This was not only a complaint; she was also longing for the affective atmosphere of the Gezi uprisings, during which the diverse composition and inclusionary politics of the occupations and popular protests prevailed over cleavages. Feeling sad about the reappearance of party politics in their local resistance, she said that many of the participants in their neighborhood assembly “got tired of discussions and gave up participating in the meetings.” Eventually, in her words, “Local forces are weakened a lot.”

Photo 5: Press release organized by the election initiative „After 10“ (10‘dan Sonra). The banner reads, "That threshold will be abolished! In order to breathe after 10, Votes for HDP“ Source: Diken.

In almost all park forums and neighborhood assemblies, local activists held lengthy discussions that sometimes resulted in the withdrawal of nonaligned individuals disappointed with this quick return to the “old politics” that was supposedly challenged and transformed during the Gezi uprisings. Many others, at the same time, did not hesitate to mobilize around the upcoming elections. For instance, some of the former Yoğurtçu Forum activists and many of the regular participants of Yeldeğirmeni and Caferağa neighborhood assemblies in Kadıköy organized the After 10 (10’dan Sonra) campaign for the 2015 national elections aiming to support the newly established pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) to pass the ten percent national threshold to be represented in parliament. Going door to door and reaching out to the voters directly, making calls to establish local assemblies in neighborhoods, workplaces, and several districts in the city, they mobilized tens of thousands of volunteers both for the HDP and to take active roles in collective efforts against electoral fraud. However, their political engagement with/support of the Kurdish movement triggered resentment among some other residents of the neighborhood assemblies. Besides this historically and politically rooted contestation, they were also criticized for disregarding the collective decision-making channels that constituted the main working principle of the assemblies. In this contentious political atmosphere, many participants developed uneasy feelings about the rising partisanship in their local alliances, experienced emotional detachment from their former allies, and stepped back.

In addition to these controversies, election-based re-positioning of local political actors was also criticized for ending the “Gezi momentum” by some of the activists. Defining the prevailing electoral campaigns as one of the main hindrances to the endurance of street mobilization in the aftermath of the Gezi uprisings, another interlocutor in Kadıköy lamented the loss of one of the central tenets of Gezi: seeking alternative ways of doing politics through direct action and participation and moving beyond the mainstream practices of democracy limited to representation and elections. Similarly, one of the organizers and regular participants of Eskişehir Resistance Forums recalled their meetings on the local elections of 2014 which witnessed heated debates for long hours, and emphasized that the “voices from the local have been silenced by the political parties’ propaganda campaigns.” Criticizing the directed attention to the ballot boxes, he claimed that “street politics, grassroots organization, and direct action stayed in the shadows.”

A closer look at the meeting protocols and organized activities of the post-Gezi local alliances lends support to these reproachful statements, demonstrating that the previously diverse range of topics discussed in their meetings and the multiplicity of participants were distinctively pared back. However, despite such inner contradictions and the limited field of local activities, the tremendous efforts of both the members and supporters of the HDP and their strategic allies in the post-Gezi local initiatives did succeed in increasing support for the party from the western parts of the country. The HDP achieved a historic victory in the June 2015 elections, entering parliament and denying the AKP an absolute majority for the first time since the ruling party first came to power. Reclaiming their rights in the public space imbued political actors with strength and motivated them to act collectively while increasing the visibility and legitimacy of pro-Kurdish politics and revitalizing the hopes for peace and fraternity among different nationalities in Turkey within activist circles.

Despite the contradictory perspectives on being included in or distancing from national parliamentary politics, the post-Gezi local urban alliances facilitated greater visibility for a wider variety of political actors in public spaces and a sense of collective belonging that expanded the political horizons of the constituents of these mobilizations. Re-energizing the affective politics of Gezi to mobilize at critical junctures in their afterlives, they generated new ties of belonging, support, and a sense of mutual empowerment by building solidarity networks among their constituents and supporters in their locales and by spreading joy, hope, and the pleasure of collective action. Hence, they functioned to sustain protest movements and street mobilization, demonstrated distinctive experiences for reclaiming democracy and freedom, and opened new avenues for political participation and direct action at both the local and national levels.

While most of these alliances no longer exist in their original forms, some (as you can read in this roundtable discussion) continue to explore new ways of doing politics and inspire different collectives across the country. Despite their weakened roles, more limited constituents, and organizational problems, the informal and loose networks among the post-Gezi local alliances remain ready for urgent mobilization around common demands and shared agendas. The establishment of the local “No Assemblies” [Hayır Meclisleri]  for the constitutional referendum of 2017; local solidarity networks and mutual aid groups during the COVID-19 pandemic; and immediate mobilization of self-organized citizen initiatives following the February earthquakes can be seen as the exemplification of such moments, marked by the political dissent’s strong desire to revitalize collective resistance under Turkey’s authoritarian transformation.

Imagining Different Modes of Political Relations


Political organization in the form of alliances instills a sense of strength, vitality, and efficacy among their constituents and supporters, particularly in times of heightened social, political, and affective estrangement. Alliances foster a collective sense of togetherness and belonging, generating intense emotions like rage against oppression, the joy and pleasure of resistance, hope for change, and a strong desire for freedom. These collective emotions motivate their participants and embolden them to take action. Thus, alliances are capable of channeling physical, mental, and emotional energies into the collective struggle for a desired future. While their disposability in different contexts makes them easy to re-establish quickly in times of necessity, they are mostly ephemeral, dissolving immediately after the emergency situation comes to an end, as observed in Turkey’s political dissent around successive electoral processes over the past decade.

Under constant marginalization, criminalization, and violent suppression of any kind of oppositional voice, Turkey’s political dissent is driven by the desire to unite and act collectively, operationalizing the politics of alliance mostly fuelled by a sense of urgency to see the immediate results of its political activities. As often articulated by the political activists themselves, the immediate need to “breathe” or to stop the deepening “darkness” reproduces their main motivation to engage in collective action at different moments of contention. Besides feeling “impatient” for the hoped-for change, this collective sense of urgency also shapes their temporal, spatial, and political horizons. Instead of seeking long-term commitment to transformative actions and organizational structures, dissidents prioritize one-off political actions, campaigns, or short-term projects, such as electoral campaigns. Consequently, their political imagination is entrapped in the present time, unintentionally perpetuating reactionary dynamics and reinforcing the limited political landscape defined by the ruling regime. As a result, their actions inadvertently emulate performative scripts, suggesting the existence of an assumed democracy that offers meaningful freedom of choice and political participation.

However, socio-political transformation requires relentless efforts of organized action and collaboration as well as constant engagement with and negotiation among disparate social actors. Therefore, it is also crucial to explore alternative forms of political relationships to achieve more encompassing and durable forms of solidarity and political activism. To imagine how to rethink alliances among individuals and political parties in ways that can be truly transformative, it is imperative to examine how participants within political alliances engage with one another and to what extent these relationships are converted into transformative praxis. In critically reflecting on the political promises and inspiration of the Gezi uprisings now, a decade later, those seeking to capture the “spirit” of Gezi (if we assume it exists) need to move beyond constantly looking for new allies for each round of political contention. Instead, there is an urgent need to pursue alternative forms of political relationships that empower a collective sense of belonging and maintain discipline as well as joy in collective action, while remaining focused on sustaining transformation rather than reproducing a constricted electoral politics that has proven futile. Such a reoriented politics of alliance would prioritize accountability and self-reflection, aiming to cultivate a politics of dissent that fosters enduring and impactful engagement, along with a continuous commitment to change.