Transnational and Cross-Generational Flows: Pakistani Fandom, Piety, and Turkish Period Dramas

Ertugrul: The Photo Shows Protagonist of the Show Photoshopped into the Chair of Chief of Army Staff Conversing with the PM. Ertugrul: The Photo Shows Protagonist of the Show Photoshopped into the Chair of Chief of Army Staff Conversing with the PM.

Transnational and Cross-Generational Flows: Pakistani Fandom, Piety, and Turkish Period Dramas

By : Rafay Mahmood

[This article is part of a special dossier on fandom and politics in the Southwest Asian/ North African (S.W.A.N.A.) region. Read all of the pieces, as well as the introduction, here.]

On 3 May 2020, cricketer-turned-politician and the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan addressed a public gathering where he spoke about the importance of watching Turkish shows instead of ‘typical Bollywood’. This speech came a year after Pakistan had banned the import or broadcast of Indian content following skirmishes on the border with India. The PM emphasized how the Turkish shows, and in particular Diriliş: Ertuğrul, can bring Pakistanis close to their ‘Muslim roots’ and allow us as a nation to get inspired from our lost glory.

While historians and critics remain divided over the show’s claim to be an historically ‘accurate’ account, the government of Pakistan didn’t blink an eye before getting the dialogues translated into Urdu and airing it on the state-run Pakistan Television and its digital assets. With an anti-India sentiment already a part of the public discourse coupled by the absence of Bollywood films in cinemas, the country which had relied on Bollywood for a healthy box office was bracing itself for the death of the cinema industry and for the rise of new stars and fans, all at the same time.

While Bollywood stars, even with Muslim names such as Shah Rukh Khan and Salman Khan represented an upper-caste, predominantly Brahmin, North Indian culture, the shared language, a similar set of common values, idiom and similar general appearance made them accessible for the average Pakistani fan. That is obviously apart from the cathartic experience that the Bollywood song and dance formula guarantees.

Diriliş: Ertuğrul on the other hand brought forward an overtly Muslim hero, fighting for the great Islamic cause against anybody and everybody who hinders the message of Allah. It displays the chivalry of a valiant soldier and the generosity of a forgiving king and claims direct inspiration from the lives and events of the various venerated figures mentioned in the Islamic holy book of Quran. While the Islamicate tropes being used in an epic period drama were a direct departure from the dominantly ‘Hindu’ popularly registered as ‘Indian’ mise-en-scène of Bollywood, the narrative elements remained consistent with those of Bollywood, or any other soap opera in the world. This allowed the fans of the Islamic Republic to enjoy a TV show not only as a binge-watch but also as family entertainment which complied by Islamic values and Islamicate culture with all the women covering their heads in front of everyone apart from their husbands along with Arabic phrases and idioms commonly used in Muslim countries around the world. It is pertinent here to mention that women usually don’t cover their heads in Pakistan’s news and entertainment broadcasts, in fact skin-fitted, and partly revealing dresses are common to Pakistani TV, film and fashion events.   

The special treatment of the show successfully enabled the Prime Minister’s propaganda mission to pursue something more than just ‘Indian content’ with the newly launched YouTube channel ‘TRT Ertugrul by PTV’ crossing 8 million subscribers within one month of its launch and amassing 15.9 million in one year. But the state patronage of a TV show, sanctifying it as something more than entertainment, coupled with easy access to the internet and social media created a fan following that wasn’t afraid to express why the stars should be sacred, chaste and pious in their personal lives as well.

In an Instagram post on March 25, 2020, the leading lady of the show Esra Bilgiç, who plays the role of Halime Hatun, a calm, devoted and loyal wife of the protagonist, posted a picture of herself posing on a boat on her verified Instagram account. What started with a few heart emojis to admire her beauty, but the comments section soon turned into a slut-shaming space with militant moral policing, mostly by Muslim Pakistani men. 

Esra: The Screenshot of the Turkish Actor Being Shamed on Instagram


A user by the name of Hassan Mehmood wrote: well done taaliyan honi chahiye hamaray liye aaj hum ek sacha musalmaan kehlanay ke laik hain ab ek dafa apne dil par hath rkh kr bata do kya tum ne kabhi marna nahi aaj mati ke oopar insaan kal matti ke neechay hoga are saamp khayen ge bichoo khayen ga.

“A huge round of applause for we aren’t even close to what a devoted Muslim should be. Take a vow on your heart and tell me that you don’t worry about death, about afterlife, when you will be buried under the sand surrounded by snakes and Scorpions as punishment.”

Another user just posted Bilgiç’s screen name in Arabic/Urdu along with a question mark. As if bewildered at her shamelessness and disappointed at her not covering her body as she did in the show.

Others followed by a plain and simple ‘Shame on you’ while some questioned if this was what Esra learnt from the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him).

Perhaps Bilgiç hadn’t anticipated that her newly found fandom in Pakistan will not only love her but also hold her accountable for the ‘hypocrisy’ of failing to live up to the set of values of her character. For a month or so Bilgiç didn’t respond to any of the policing on Instagram and continued tweeting and posting thank you notes to Pakistani fans until a couple of months later when she turned off comments under one of her pictures and eventually gave a befitting reply to a Pakistani fan.

“Elder sister Halime, please don’t wear such dresses,” wrote astounding_ali to which Bilgiç responded by saying, “Let me give you a little advice: Don’t follow me. Thank you.” Her response was lauded as a ‘clap back like a queen’ and ‘Sultan of Sass’ in Pakistan’s more liberal English language press. 

Ertugrul: The Photo Shows Protagonist of the Show Photoshopped into the Chair of Chief of Army Staff Conversing with the PM.


As the show progressed, so did the fan conversation about Bilgiç. Eventually, Muslim social media users from around the world and in Pakistan started to argue in favor of her choice.

Kim, a Muslim Hijab-wearing woman from Morocco chimed in by saying that she wears a hijab by choice and since Esra is an actress she should be allowed to wear whatever the task demands of her. She even questioned the disbelief of Pakistani fans by asking, do you also think she is married to Ertuğrul (Her husband in the show) too?

Royal_g_98, that appeared to be the Instagram handle of a Pakistani user appealed to PM Khan to take Instagram away from Pakistanis: “PM of Pakistan please stop Instagram in Pakistan. They live in 8th or 9th century,” the account wrote.

The slow and gradual acceptance of Bilgiç as their own, even though with reservations, shows the eagerness of the Pakistani fandom to express itself pertaining to matters of piety and shame and how religion continues to be a launching point of ideas despite the slow death of the conventional missionary and his mission. This persistent confusion around accepting stars also speaks volumes about the politics of heritage and ‘roots’ in the post-nation-state world, especially when compared to Pakistan’s loyal and more than half a century-long, love-hate relationship with Bollywood.

“The dichotomy however collapsed with Bilgiç who, at once possessed appearance close in proximity to European femininity, but the heritage and ideology of the brown, Muslim woman. She was almost white and Muslim enough. She was not to be feared, yet possessed all the desirability. And thus began the crisis that led to the barrage of comments on her Instagram posts,” reported the daily paper, Dawn.

The recently flourishing fandom of Turkish soaps and period dramas, of which the policing of Bilgiç is only one signifier, also demands a conversation about the clash of the conventional TV viewership fandom in Pakistan and the fandoms solely erupted out of YouTube.

The dilemma for Pakistani fans of the Turkish show started with them being challenged to accept the characters and actors as different entities. This further led them to evolve and inquire which stars to own and how to own them and what part of our heritage to own and how to own it since the Turkish or Central Asian aspect was imported and broadcast as a direct replacement, and in some ways, answer to Bollywood.

The recently flourishing fandom of Turkish soaps and period dramas, of which the policing of Bilgiç is only one signifier, also demands a conversation about the clash of the conventional TV viewership fandom in Pakistan and the fandoms solely erupted out of YouTube. Prime time entertainment television in Pakistan is the most watched slot on television with the audience being divided into five different social categories: A B C D and E. The TV viewership predominantly caters to the housewife who is given a larger bracket of between 22 – 40 years of age, that does not include aunts and grandmothers who are a seminal part of the Pakistani nuclear family that resides under one roof. A focus on the housewife-viewer has been central to the evolution of soap operas in the West as well with the success of the first soap operas aired on TV being attributed to the free time housewives had after the introduction of the automatic washing machine and the dishwasher.

These private TV channels also have YouTube channels with remarkable following, but their conventional viewers still very much fuel the network’s formal economy through advertising revenue. Then there’s a huge but separate viewership that consumes both news and entertainment only on their phones via YouTube and Facebook and a significantly smaller viewership for OTT platforms, comprising mostly of people who either have a shared account with an expatriate sibling or can afford a credit and debit card. 

What Diriliş: Ertuğrul managed to do was disrupt all forms of conventional viewing patterns and in turn fan habits. In addition to being uploaded on YouTube, the show was also aired on the state-owned TV channel PTV. The simultaneous and free access to the show not only started a dialogue between two separate set of viewers who shared a vastly different relationship to their medium of choice, TV and cellphone in this case, but also made Diriliş into a show that was being watched separately and collectively at the same time. Since no conventional models apply to Diriliş: Ertuğrul, it becomes even more difficult and equally fascinating to understand the heart and mind of the fan who wants an actor like Bilgiç to be not only answerable, but also accountable for her screen image and its associated morality.

Part of the surprising almost outlandish shaming also begs the question of whose set of moral principles dominates the collective viewing experience of the family and how does the response mechanism work when the shared morality is expressed by younger individuals, with greater agency and technological access to express themselves on the digital ecosystem.
Perhaps there’s another flow of ideas happening within the Pakistani family that relies so heavily on the role of the mother and more importantly, of the wife who is meant to leave her house and settle with the in-laws while making all the ‘necessary compromises’ that daughters are ‘meant to do’. 

Bilgiç’s Halime does all that while braving a smile because she absolutely loves Ertuğrul and more importantly the husband’s service to the tribe and Islam are no huge tasks compared to the family politics and loneliness she faces when the husband is gone. Bilgiç’s character gives a generation of Pakistani mothers and mothers-in-law, who have internalized misogyny over the years, and are divorced from contemporary discourses on inclusivity and gender equality, hope and more importantly an ideal that they can hold to in front of the younger generation that seems too ‘detached’ from their roots and heritage. This fandom of the elder generation might be old in terms of their demographic appeal but constitute a major part of every household and hence take shows such Diriliş as an opportunity to resist or push back against newer ideas.

This cycle of cultural ideals repeats itself when the younger members of the household engage with the social media online.  They feel the urge to express what they have acquired from their elders almost like native wisdom and repeat and repurpose that in discussions online. The same generation of users, also use social media to resist the ideas they have acquired at home and in turn find virtual tribes that use the internet as venting out spaces for familial values they cannot disagree with within the physical boundaries of the house.   

This however is one aspect of the Diriliş's aggressive fandom, where the two viewerships collide. The other aspects are male viewers who are otherwise primarily news consumers, finding enough action, and male-oriented drama about balancing personal, professional and religious life in the rather patriarchal aspects of Ertuğrul's magnanimity and journey. Their shaming of Bilgiç is consistent with the male gaze and its associated morality derived out of the notion of honor and familial respect.

A close analysis of Diriliş's fandom and how it responds to her pictures on Instagram shows how the Pakistani government’s plan to acquire rights to Turkish epics not only triggered a fandom that was symptomatic of our existing religious partisanship but also reflective of how religion, piety and women’s bodies continue to dictate translational flows of identity and shared heritage, almost in a tribal manner, while partaking in a supposedly ‘worldly’ and cosmopolitan ecology of social media.

However, more than a space of policing, I see the virtual villages of participatory culture as spaces of possibility where fans may engage in fierce and ruthless attacks on their stars but there are chances, if not equal, of them being maimed and humbled by the comebacks of those who adhere to more progressive values and use the same internet features and lexicon such as slangs and hashtags as proficiently as the ones policing the stars.

Despite choosing a gendered experience for the paper, one can loosely take the Pakistani fandom of the Turkish star as a place of major ideological contest about both what it means to be a Muslim and Pakistani and what one wants a Muslim and Pakistani to be like on social media, without turning a blind eye to our ‘Hindu’ neighbor with centuries of shared experience.

As Arvind Rajagopal shares the framework of understanding the fandom of Dur Darshan’s 1987 production of Mahabharata, “Merely focusing on media itself does little more than confirm our fascination with power. The media neither cause, nor reflect events, they participate in them.”

With Imran Khan being ousted of power with a No Confidence Motion in the parliament two years after importing Diriliş, now seems the ideal time for him and his party to repurpose Diriliş's themes and symbols to their anti-establishment campaign.  

President: The Photo Shows the Former President of Pakistan Visiting the Set of the Turkish Show under Discussion and His Wife Dressed as One of the Characters.

Note: An earlier version of this article was published in Henry Jenkins' "Global Fandom Jamboree Series" in 2021.

Reflection on Researching Fandom, Politics, and Arabic-Speaking Audiences

[This article is part of a special dossier on fandom and politics in the Southwest Asian/ North African (S.W.A.N.A.) region. Read all of the pieces, as well as the introduction, here.]

I encountered the field of fan studies for the first time in 2015, at a difficult political moment in my life as a displaced woman scholar from Syria in the United States. That moment coincided with the rise of Trump and worsening conditions of war and displacement in Syria. I was starting my PhD training at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and felt that I had finally found, through cultural studies, theoretical tools with which I could describe my politically charged experiences as a fan of television and the experiences of other Arabic-speaking fans that I was witnessing in online communities, mainly on Facebook. I began exploring questions of how fans’ cultural participation can contribute to our understating of non-traditional political participation. 

Since then, I have studied two groups of fans: the Arab fans of Game of Thrones; and displaced fans of Syrian TV drama serials. Fandom in the Arabic speaking world is an understudied aspect of media globalization, generally studied only indirectly. For instance, scholars have previously taken up questions of nationalism and modernity by studying the popularity of Arabic popular television series such the Syrian show Bab Al-Hara i.e.: The Gate to the Neighborhood (Al-Ghazzi, 2013) and the Egyptian show Al-Helmiya Nights i.e.: The Nights of Hilmiyya Neighborhood (Abu-Lughod, 2005). Others have explored the appeal of Arabic-dubbed Mexican and Turkish television serials as providing Arab audiences with counter-hegemonic alternatives to the American domination of TV programming internationally (Kraidy and Al-Ghazzi, 2013; Kraidy,1999). By contrast, my work focuses on fans of local and international television as an interpretive community (Radway, 1984; Jenkins, 1992), exploring the dialogic, affective, and collaborative articulations of fans’ cultural and political formations through media and popular culture. My projects are based on online interviews with fans as well as textual analyses of their posts.

Figure 1: Katty Alhayek arrived at Game of Thrones Live Concert Experience featuring composer Ramin Djawadi at the DCU Center in Worcester, Massachusetts, United States (September 29, 2018).

My first research project on fandom engaged with transnational fan objects and practices around Game of Thrones (GoT) in the Arab world (Alhayek, 2017). I have been a fan of GoT since 2012, the year I arrived at the United States from Syria and started a Master’s program at Ohio University. I found myself attached to the world of GoT and using its characters' motives, journeys, and agendas to explain to my American colleagues the real-world trajectory and complexity of the Syrian conflict. I got attached to the Stark family’s experiences of displacement, Daenerys' longing for a homeland, and Tyrion’s struggle with his ambiguous position of marginality and privilege. I was drawn to the American world of GoT fandom and obsessed with fans’ speculative fiction. However, my ethnicity as a Syrian and native speaker of Arabic made me yearn to find an Arabic-speaking fan community of GoT. In 2014, I found just such a community, and a massive one, on Facebook. As I interacted with the “Game of Thrones–Official Arabic Page” (GoT-OAP), I became interested in the cultural production through which these Arab fans shared their experience of cultural consumption. As of 2016, the page had over 240,000 Arab followers, and was the largest and oldest of its kind among competing similar pages. Although this specific page no longer exists, similar pages continue to flourish on Facebook.

In this project, I noticed that the Arab fans of this show are different from the above-mentioned audiences of the popular Arabic, Mexican, and Turkish serials. I argue that GoT Arab audiences are part of the global fandom of quality television or what is referred to as “Prestige TV.” This type of TV mainly targets global elite audiences who are highly educated, affluent, and male (Hassler-Forest, 2014). The characteristics of the Arab fans of GoT I worked with reflect this observation. In fact, 80% of the GoT-OAP followers were men; many of whom were educated, highly skilled, and tech-savvy professionals. As a woman fan, I recognize that “Prestige TV” shows like GoT still cater to women viewers by presenting diverse, strong women characters like Arya, Brienne, Cersei, Daenerys, Sansa, and Olenna Tyrell. Of course, in a predominantly Western series all these women are white. Thus in this project, I showed how Arab fans responded to the whiteness and Eurocentrism of GoT and their sense of racial difference by producing hybrid posts and memes that reflect their local contexts and lived experiences. For example, one of GoT-OAP administrators’ favorite characters is Arya Stark. In figure 2, the fans imagine a conversation between George RR Martin and his wife by choosing three sequential moments from an Egyptian show. An Egyptian actress and actor are imagined as Martin and his wife in an argument over the destiny of Arya in which the wife is threatening Martin to not kill off Arya unless he wants to sleep on the couch. This meme was inspired by a true anecdote of Martin’s wife’s fondness for Arya and the consequences of killing Arya off on the couple’s marriage (Harvey-Jenner, 2015).

 

Figure 2: An imagined argument between George RR Martin and his wife.

Other posts, such as figure 3, use the show’s imagery for political satire, in this case ridiculing Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Egypt’s current president. In the post below, el-Sisi is compared to Daenerys, represented as a “savior" while being in fact a ruthless dictator.

Figure 3: A hybrid post that compares el-Sisi with Daenerys.

 

Figure 4: A screenshot of “Game of Thrones & House of the Dragon Arab Fans” group on Facebook as of July 20, 2022.

After much anticipation and high expectations from the fan community, House of the Dragon (a prequal to Game of Thrones) premiered on August 21, 2022, drawing a record viewership of nearly 10 million across all HBO’s platforms (Murphy, 2022). It is difficult to estimate the actual size of the international audience, because this viewership number does not include, for example, illegal downloads and other ways of viewing through reginal networks. Today, the GoT fandom in the Arab World continues through Facebook communities like “Game of Thrones & House of the Dragon Arab Fans,” which has over 395.2K members (Figure 4), and “House of the Dragon Arab Fans,” which has over 45K members. In these communities, Arab fans follow the news about the show’s production. They also express their nostalgic feelings to the time when GoT was airing, their unhappiness with how GoT ended (Figure 5), and their excitement about the expansion of the GoT universe (the way Marvel Studios did with the Marvel universe) to anticipated spinoffs such as a sequel series centered around the Jon Snow character.

Figure 5: In this meme, Arab fans use Egyptian comedian and actor Adel Imam to channel their unpleasant feelings about the GoT ending. The meme conveys that it’s a perfect and great series, but its ending was substandard.

My second project on fandom explores how displaced Syrian audiences challenge the harsh conditions they live in by using social media to participate in conversations with creators of TV dramas that resemble their lived experiences of war and displacement (Alhayek, 2020). When we think about the Syrian war and subsequent refugee crisis, we don’t tend to imagine these displaced populations as fans and active audiences of entertainment. However, since 2013 I have observed the interactive trend on Facebook, of befriending, specifically during Ramadan, writers of acclaimed Syrian TV drama serials such as the 2013 Manbar Al Mota (Platform of the dead); the 2014 series Qalam Humra (Lipstick); the 2015 Ghadan Naltaqi (We’ll Meet Tomorrow); and the 2022 Kasr Adm (Breaking Bones.)

Figure 6: A fan praise of Ghadan Naltaqi on the Facebook page of the show’s creator Iyad Abou Chamat on 15 November 2015.

From the early 1990s until the war, the Syrian drama industry flourished and was known for the high quality of its content and production (Kraidy, 2006). Many of the Syrian drama creators became known for their commitment to social and political transformation, exposing structural inequalities and the corruption of the ruling class in Arab societies (Salamandra, 2011). However, after the 2011-Syrian Uprising and subsequent war, the quantity and quality of TV drama declined significantly. Nevertheless, some high-quality shows continued to be produced, for instance, Ghadan Naltaqi. In my research on fan engagement with that show, I explore questions like how such post-2011 top-quality shows (albeit rare) symbolize for the fans the continuity of the respected tradition of Syrian drama’s critiques of power structures. It also provides fans with cultural references that invoke their sense of dignity and pride and alleviate their feelings of loss and humiliation (Zeno, 2017). I demonstrate that the interactive, emotional relationship between fans and drama creators serve as political interventions to cope with a highly polarizing conflict and create healing spaces at a critical remove from violent media discourses. 

Going forward, I hope to continue engaging with questions around fandom of “Prestige TV”, race, gender and class. I am particularly interested in the affective qualities of fandom and the complex ways in which fandom and politics intersect and how that contributes to our understanding of large power relations in society. In this regard, I want to think more about the definition of “Prestige TV” in the local context of Syria. I also want to explore how fandom of local “Prestige TV” like Ghadan Naltaqi is different or similar to fandom of global “Prestige TV” like Game of Thrones. This pursuit is part of larger, ongoing conversations in the fields of

fan studies and critical cultural studies (Chin and Morimoto, 2013; Pande, 2018; Reinhard and Miller, 2020) about the need to examine racial and cultural identities in global online fandom spaces and to question how whiteness affect the workings of media fandom communities. 

[Note: An earlier version of this article was published in Henry Jenkins' "Global Fandom Jamboree Series" in 2022.] 

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