Sarah El-Kazaz, Politics in the Crevices: Urban Design and the Making of Property Markets in Cairo and Istanbul (New Texts Out Now)

Sarah El-Kazaz, Politics in the Crevices: Urban Design and the Making of Property Markets in Cairo and Istanbul (New Texts Out Now)

Sarah El-Kazaz, Politics in the Crevices: Urban Design and the Making of Property Markets in Cairo and Istanbul (New Texts Out Now)

By : Sarah El-Kazaz

Sarah El-Kazaz, Politics in the Crevices: Urban Design and the Making of Property Markets in Cairo and Istanbul (Duke University Press, 2023).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Sarah El-Kazaz (SK): This book grew out of my PhD dissertation research and was motivated by two strands of inquiry. First, I was gripped by an interest in the makings of inequality during my formative college years on the American University in Cairo's downtown Cairo campus that was impossible to shake off. Graduate studies then exposed me to a rich scholarship on inequality, redistribution, and class politics in the neoliberal moment that both fascinated me, especially in the ways it grappled with the modalities of the market, and frustrated me, with its insistence that these modalities worked in tandem to enable a unidirectional wealth-extracting class project. I wondered if we would see more dynamism to these class politics if we were to explore them from less familiar sites to the study of redistribution.

The second was a fascination with searching for the political where you least expect it. Early on during my graduate training I became drawn to the lens that geographers, especially via urban and infrastructure studies, were bringing to how we understand the political. One of the first texts that took me down that path was Eyal Weizman’s work on the politics of verticality, and from there the political was lurking in sewage networks, trans-oceanic container shipping, malarial larvae, telecom satellites, garbage dumps, internet cables, and so on. I became convinced that a four dimensional lens (3D + time) would bring something new to how we think about class politics and inequality, and I went to the spaces of the city’s built environment to start digging.

... what happens when the battle over protections for vulnerable populations shifts from pushing back and contesting the boundaries of the market to finding ways of operating within it?

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

SK: The book travels to six neighborhoods in central Istanbul and Cairo in the throes of large-scale urban transformation projects in the 2000s to explore how redistributive politics were shifting in a neoliberal moment. Rather than witnessing the uncontested triumph of a dispossessive corporate-capitalist class transforming the city into a playground of wealth accumulation, I found a variety of international and local actors fighting both to secure affordable housing and corner real estate markets for a luxury clientele. This battle for housing was not raging in traditional political arenas, however. Rather than agitate for familiar redistributive policies like housing subsidies, exclusive land grants, or rent controls, urban protagonists were relying on the subtle, quiet machinations of urban planning and design to redistribute and restrict access to the city’s housing. Careful urban design was expected to transform how property was valued in a neighborhood to intervene in how property was moving on “freely” traded real estate markets. This book thus asks what happens when the battle over protections for vulnerable populations shifts from pushing back and contesting the boundaries of the market to finding ways of operating within it? How do we come to understand and locate the workings of the political when battles over the distribution of a city’s resources operate from within the logics of the market?

In tackling these questions, the book engages several literatures. Within critical political economy, the book complicates the directionality of political projects enabled through neoliberal market logics. Building on an incisive scholarship on the work that goes into making neoliberal markets (for example, Elyachar, 2005Çalışkan and Callon, 2010Searle, 2016), I was most interested in interrogating how market logics operate and their dynamism. Seeing how urban planning and design becomes deployed to intervene in the workings of property markets, I argue that it is through a struggle over how value is defined, claimed, and lived that a variety of paradoxical political projects seep into the workings of markets.

Tracing these political projects then brings us to the question at the heart of the book: where do we locate the political in a neoliberal moment? There the book engages scholarship in political theory that has often almost defined neoliberalism as a project of de-politicization. I argue instead that neoliberalism has displaced the locus of the political onto the design of intimate, invisible, and private spaces where value is contested by varied political projects. A polity’s most intense political struggles pulsate to the surface through the quiet, unsuspecting, and fragmented crevices of the city.

The book also speaks to a number of debates in urban studies. I was particularly inspired by geographers’ attention to the politics of scale, the agency in urban human-non-human assemblages, and the affective politics they produce. Amongst other interventions, the book entangles forces/actors that sit on opposite sides of the top-down/bottom-up binary to de-romanticize the figure of the urban dweller, and grapple with the agency of what I term “self-reflexive experts,” trained in critical urban studies, whilst attentive to the systemic pressures within which they operate.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

SK: Since this is my first book, it builds its theory from fieldwork that I undertook during my PhD and since. In its writing and theory-building, I sought to enact interventions I have made in published pieces on the politics of scale, de-exceptionalizing Middle Eastern cities, and adopting a four-dimensional lens to the political in tackling the questions from critical political economy that I care deeply about. An early version of theory-building for this book appeared in Comparative Studies in Society and History.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

SK: The book is primarily written to a readership in critical political economy and political theory invested in the machinations of neoliberalism and the political projects and realities it breeds. It also speaks to a literature in political geography and urban studies that interrogates the nature of urban neoliberal transformations and especially how property terrains are shifting in contemporary cities. The choice of Istanbul and Cairo as the sites for that interrogation is purposefully meant to de-exceptionalize how we study the two cities, and in fact the entirety of the Middle East as a region, as marginal at best and most often entirely exceptional to how we understand these phenomena. The book is thus re-centering the sites of inquiry from which to see the layered nature of the neoliberal project and how it operates as a globally connected phenomenon.

Having said that, the book is also written for a readership directly interested in studying Cairo and Istanbul in particular, and by extension Egyptian and Turkish politics as well as urbanism in the Middle East more generally. Part I of the book is written as two chapters that take a longue-durée view for tracing the making of property markets in Cairo (chapter 1) and Istanbul (chapter 2). The two chapters re-read a large secondary literature on each city through the lens of my ethnography to trace the contested making of “value” around property, in order to set the scene for the contemporary redistributive politics we see unfold in Part II. I think deep down I also wrote these two chapters as odes to the cities with the hope that those most intimately connected to Istanbul and Cairo would come to see their cities a bit differently after reading them. I also hope that my readership will ultimately give the spatial-material-affective transformations of a city and its crevices far more space in our theorization of class and its politics.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

SK: I am currently working on two projects. The first and larger one explores the political economy of digital infrastructures in the Global South, particularly the Middle East and Africa. The project builds on my interests in critical political economy, science, technology, and society studies (STS), and geography to explore the politics of Cloud infrastructures as they manifest physically and materially in those geographies but also in how those technologies are being deployed to engineer a re-imagining of the economy and its limits (or limitlessness).

The second project is an even more direct outgrowth of the first book. I am following the Turkish construction and real estate industry that I studied as transforming Istanbul in the first book as they embark on a major project of exporting infrastructure to Africa. In a way, both projects take me to a new geographic interest in studying the connectedness of Africa and the Middle East.

J: What were the challenges and opportunities of conducting a multi-sited ethnography? 

SK: One of the first things I was asked whenever I started a conversation with new interlocutors in either Cairo or Istanbul was: “Where are you from?” In Cairo, my home city, I understood the question, as did my interlocutors, to be referring to the neighborhood in the city where my family and I lived and were long established. In Istanbul, however, when my local research associate was asked or asked the same question, interlocutors meant the town or village the family historically hails from in larger Turkey. Reflecting on this difference, I was struck by how Cairene neighborhoods carried strong class connotations, while information about towns/villages prioritized a geography of ethnic/linguistic/kin networks over strictly class-based identities that colored many of the meaning-making processes I encountered in the two cities. For example, these distinctions came to the fore in the rumor campaigns that neighborhood dwellers waged in suspicion of outsider forces transforming their neighborhoods (discussed in chapters 3 and 4) to dramatically shape howrumors came to life in each city. Without a multi-sited ethnography illuminating these contrasting dynamics across the two cities and neighborhoods, it would have been difficult to see some of the meaning-making processes that came to light. Of course, conducting a multi-sited ethnography was quite ambitious, not just during fieldwork but even more so as I sought to make sense of the mountains of information I was accumulating across the six neighborhoods. However, it was through reading the sites together that I got to see the variety of political projects that burden and seep through a city’s crevices in neoliberalizing polities.

 

Excerpt from the book (from the Introduction, pp. 1-4 and 8)

Haga Samia and her ailing mother have lived in an apartment in Historic Cairo that borders a seventy-four-acre garbage dump for decades. The apartment occupies the top floor of a three-story Mamluk-style building in Darb El-Ahmar neighborhood, and for years Haga Samia’s family could see the heaps of rubbish from the living room windows, its putrid smells wafting over every time wind gusted in from the east. The building had also been unmaintained for decades, and when an earthquake shook Cairo to its core in 1992, its structure started to fracture. After living with the fear of impending collapse for half a decade, the family’s fortunes took a decided turn in the late 1990s. A developmental organization based in the Hague, the Aga Khan Foundation, had taken an interest in this corner of Cairo, embarking on two urban projects in Darb El-Ahmar that would wholly transform how Haga Samia experienced her home. Initially in 1995, the foundation embarked on a project that would excavate the garbage dump and transform it into one of central Cairo’s largest green spaces, Azhar Park. Then in 1997, the foundation initiated a home restoration program that would eventually restore 120 buildings in Darb El-Ahmar. Haga Samia’s home was selected for the pilot phase of the program and offered a grant that would cover 90 percent of the costs of restoring the building from the inside out. When I visited Haga Samia in her restored home in 2011, she took me up to the building’s rooftop (see chapter 4) to show me with joy and pride the view of the park that had replaced the garbage dump. We then turned to see, from the west side of the building, a breathtaking view of Historic Cairo’s many minarets.

During that visit, Haga Samia and I spent hours discussing every detail of the restorations. When the discussion turned to plumbing, the joy on Haga Samia’s face dissipated. Working hard not to seem ungrateful, she explained that the plumbing system that the Aga Khan team had installed was more difficult to use than the original. Whereas each apartment had its own water supply before the restorations, the foundation’s engineers installed a shared water pump in the building. Haga Samia now had to negotiate with her neighbors about when she would be able to pump water up to her apartment, because only one apartment could use it at a time. The pumping system struck me as strange too, and I filed it away, along with other oddities, as intriguing designs that I would ask the engineers about. At that point, though, I assumed that there would be a straightforward technical logic to explain them.

When I did ask the foundation’s engineers about the odd designs, their explanations were anything but technical. They were decidedly political. Samy, an urban planner on the foundation’s team, explained the shared water pumps as follows:

Our purpose was that you learn to coordinate with your neighbors. So, for example when we installed water pumps we would find that, in a building with six residents, each of the residents wants to install their own water pump. We would refuse such requests because if they can’t resolve issues around using a water pump, then there is no sense in them restoring the house altogether. In other words, they have to talk to each other.

Pumping water up building pipes wasn’t the only work expected of the water pump the foundation had installed in Haga Samia’s building. Working quietly from within the invisible crevices of building walls, water pumps were expected to engineer collaborative “community,” as neighbors were forced to discuss sharing the water being pumped up to their floors. The Aga Khan team was designing the intricate features of restored homes to perform the work of societal engineering. Samy then placed that sociopolitical work within a larger vision, saying, “The idea behind the project wasn’t that we fix Darb El-Ahmar. Darb El-Ahmar has more than 5,500 residential buildings and we fixed little over 100 of those. It’s a drop in the ocean . . . housing [rehabilitation] was a tool towards something bigger. It was a step towards ensuring the existing community didn’t leave.” The foundation was working to reverse the displacement of Cairo’s most vulnerable populations from the city’s core districts as the deregulation of property markets worked with several other forces (see chapter 1) to push them out of Cairo’s core. Engineering collaborative community through the careful design of housing restorations would strengthen the bonds residents had with their neighborhood and how valuable they saw their property, producing a counterweight to the highly capitalized forces pushing them out of the center. The foundation was intervening in the workings of Historic Cairo’s real estate markets.

As my research progressed, I realized that Samy and his team at the Aga Khan Foundation weren’t the only ones turning to unorthodox methods to fight for affordable housing in the city. Through a multisited ethnography in Istanbul and Cairo of six neighborhoods undergoing large-scale urban transformation projects, I found a battle for housing raging in both cities. A variety of state and nonstate actors were fighting to secure affordable housing on the one hand and to corner real estate markets for a luxury clientele on the other. This battle was not raging in traditional political arenas, however. Rather than agitate for familiar redistributive policies like housing subsidies, exclusive land grants, or rent controls, urban protagonists were relying on the subtle, quiet machinations of urban planning and design to redistribute and restrict access to the city’s housing. In Istanbul, a group of urban activists turned to the heritage industry to secure affordable housing along the Golden Horn by reframing private residences into globally valued heritage (chapter 3). Meanwhile, the Turkish state appropriated a grassroots environmental movement seeking protections for the city against natural disasters, especially earthquakes, in an attempt to devalue affordable housing in the city’s center—claiming it was prone to collapse and a hazard to the city—and ultimately transfer that property to developers (chapter 2). Back in Cairo, a corporate developer worked to corner downtown’s real estate market not through corruption but by mobilizing building aesthetics, a topography of hidden alleyways, and the “Egyptianization” of commercial culture to render property “exclusive,” secure, and valuable to luxury clientele (chapter 4). Time and again, urban protagonists were deploying the careful design of the urban built-environment to do the work of restricting and redistributing access to housing. In particular, careful urban design was expected to transform how property was valued in a neighborhood so as to favor particular groups over others on “freely” traded real estate markets, fostering what I conceptualize as “particularistic value.” In a neoliberalizing Cairo and Istanbul, the battle for housing had shifted away from familiar extra-market political machinations to processes that operate from within “the market” as a practice and logic. This book asks: What happens when the battle over protections for vulnerable populations shifts from pushing back and contesting the boundaries of the market to finding ways of operating within it? How do we come to understand and locate the workings of the political when battles over the distribution of a city’s resources operate from within the logics of the market?

When our protagonists deployed “community,” heritage, and disaster prevention to perform redistributive work, the technical and logistical decisions experts were making about the design of the city’s built environment became layered with the responsibility to carry out redistribution. Time and again in the coming chapters, experts will expect the city’s built environment to perform work similar to the sociopolitical work Samy expected of water pumps as they churned away in building shafts. Sociopolitical expectations riddled the design of clotheslines, electrical wiring, rooftops, store signage, balconies, bathrooms, façade paint colors, and many of the most private and intimate crevices of people’s homes. The dismantling of traditional, redistributive political forums has come to burden the city’s most intimate and private crevices with the weight of redistributive politics.

Redistributive work and the class-based politics that fuel it did not disappear with neoliberalism. While a corporate-capitalist class project may have fueled a systemic neoliberal shift (and I trace how those corporate-capitalist efforts transformed property markets in Cairo and Istanbul in chapters 1 and 2), its agenda had not successfully captured the workings of neoliberal machinery and the market rationales they valorize. Market logics are, in practice, malleable enough to be reappropriated by a variety of political agendas rather than just “accumulation by dispossession.” The fact that markets don’t organically or automatically commodify “goods” and assign them agreed-upon values opens up the space for a variety of actors to compete over defining that value in ways that engineer particularistic value to skew markets for the benefit of some groups over others. Class-based redistributive politics are still manifesting within a neoliberal order, but they have been displaced from traditional political forums onto the city’s most private and intimate crevices. Some of the city’s most pressing class politics are materializing as battles over the design of clotheslines, water pumps, and balconies rather than being fought through political party campaigns or contentious town halls.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.