Rasmus C. Elling and Sune Haugbolle, eds., The Fate of Third Worldism in the Middle East: Iran, Palestine and Beyond (New Texts Out Now)

Rasmus C. Elling and Sune Haugbolle, eds., The Fate of Third Worldism in the Middle East: Iran, Palestine and Beyond (New Texts Out Now)

Rasmus C. Elling and Sune Haugbolle, eds., The Fate of Third Worldism in the Middle East: Iran, Palestine and Beyond (New Texts Out Now)

By : Rasmus C Elling and Sune Haugbolle

Rasmus C. Elling and Sune Haugbolle (eds.), The Fate of Third Worldism in the Middle East: Iran, Palestine and Beyond (OneWorld Publishers, 2024).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you edit this book? 

Rasmus C Elling and Sune Haugbolle (RCE & SH): We first discussed the idea of comparing our respective work on Iranian and Palestinian history of the late 1970s during the early lockdown. This period is incredibly interesting because during these years after 1976 or so, social movements formed during the Marxist 1960s—i.e. student movements, revolutionary cadres, and their internationalist affiliations—began to fracture. It is paradoxical, and therefore interesting, that the period leading up to the Iranian revolution is also a period of intense doubt about the revolutionary project. We wanted to study that paradox by focusing on Iran and Palestine as two revolutionary situations that we linked through the notion of Third Worldism. The idea matured and we submitted a proposal, and received a grant, for a series of workshops that would bring young and more established scholars together. Initially, we wanted to focus on the transformation of radical ideas before and after 1979 inside social movements. But as we engaged a sounding board of scholars—Abed Takriti, Toufoul Abou-Hodeib, Naghmeh Sohrabi, and Eskandar Sadeghi-Bojoujerdi—the focus gradually narrowed to the question of Third Worldism. We gave a group of emerging scholars micro-grants to examine how this idea of Third World solidarity and unity transformed before and after the Iranian revolution, which coincided with other epochal events in the region, not least the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanon in 1982.

The key protagonists of the book’s chapters are student activists, guerilla fighters, volunteer nurses, militant intellectuals, and propagandists.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

RCE & SH: Generally, the book analyzes the factors that together placed Third Worldism in crisis in the Middle East and in the world from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. The years 1979 and 1982 are turning points for this history as we and the book’s other contributors delve into particular movements, individuals, and institutions that contributed to the transformation of Third Worldist ideas and practices. The key protagonists of the book’s chapters are student activists, guerilla fighters, volunteer nurses, militant intellectuals, and propagandists. Most of them are Iranians and Palestinians but they also include Cubans, Norwegians, Lebanese, and many others who were engaged in solidarity movements or in other ways engaged Palestine and Iran. We analyze the vehicles with which they transmitted and exchanged their visions and demands: their manifestos and declarations, organizations and networks, delegations and missions, conferences and festivals, newspapers and periodicals, slogans and obituaries, films, and memoirs. Most of the material in the book has been gathered from understudied archives, private papers, and other sources that have not been studied before.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

SH: I have long been interested in historiography of the Left in the region. The Palestinian cause has always been a central feature of states, movements, and ideas that navigate the spectrum from socialism to Marxism in the Middle East. In the past five years, I have researched the history of Palestine solidarity with my colleagues Pelle Olsen and Sorcha Thomson, whose work also features in this book. It is a transnational history that has taken me out of the region for the first time in my research, to focus on the way Palestinians created a global network of support. Third Worldism—the belief that revolutionary anti-imperialist militancy in what we today term the Global South would lead to national liberation and universal emancipation—was a cornerstone of Palestine solidarity as it emerged globally in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As such, this book contributes to the growing work on Palestine solidarity by putting it in conversation with intellectual and social histories of not just solidarity, as in the work of David Featherstone, but also Third Worldism.

RCE: For the chapter I co-authored with Jahangir Mahmoudi, I was able to connect two strands of my research: one about the politics of ethnic and national identity in Iran; and the other about the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary guerilla, Fadaiyan-e-Khalq (Organization of Iranian People’s Fadais). We did so by zooming in on a chapter of Iranian leftist history that has been neglected and can be considered controversial, namely the view of the Fadais on the Kurdish emancipatory and national struggle in East Kurdistan / West Iran. We asked ourselves the question: what was the role of Third Worldism in generating Fadais sympathy and support for the Kurdish uprising against Khomeini and Tehran that started just a month after the ayatollah returned to Iran; and why did that support eventually end, at least for the majority of the Fadai movement? To answer, we had to delve into questions of Persian- and Tehran-centrism in the Fadai and similar movements, of issues connected to the highly centralized and doctrinally inflexible nature of Marxist-Leninist organizations, and, eventually, the question of limits to Third Worldist solidarity inside a revolutionary moment that has the potential of re-structuring all aspects of political and social life. This was a very difficult and immensely instructive task, and we feel that we have managed to put together an analysis of great importance for new histories of the Iranian left that do not marginalize ethno-nationalist concerns.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

RCE & SH: We want historians to read the book, naturally! But we also think that it will engage people in area studies, sociology, and anthropology. Third Worldism is a timely issue when considering the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and the various constellations of solidarity and support, resistance and struggle, which have reanimated Third Worldist notions. Both in terms of Asian, African, and Latin American countries suggesting alternatives to Western hegemony, as showcased in South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and of global solidarity with Palestine from civil society, including in the West. At the same time, Russia is using anti-colonial struggle against the West to justify its invasion of Ukraine and is ushering groups like the African National Congress—the very drivers of the ICJ case—to participate in anti-colonial fora in Moscow. We hope that our book will help people think through the contradictions inherent in the traditions and ideological vestiges that Third Worldism carries with it today. Far from a set of ideas that “ended” in the 1980s, as some histories have had it, Third Worldism transformed and has lingering effects on world politics to this day.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

SH: I am writing a book about the early history of Palestine solidarity (1950s to 1980s) with an emphasis on Scandinavia. It is a social history based on years of doing interviews and retrieving archives and it features a collection of interwoven and quite colorful (this being the 1970s) personal histories. I hope to publish it next year. I am also working on a side project about politics and humor. After the summer, I begin a new project on futurism and the environment in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

RCE: I am writing two books for the Danish audience about Iran—one of them a unique collection of primary sources from the Iranian Revolution in 1979 that I hope will one day also be published in English. But my big project, which has just launched with Kristin Soraya Batmanghelichi as my co-PI, is about the transnational entanglement of Iranian diaspora politics with homeland politics and geopolitics. My own subproject is about contentions in Iranian digital publics, including the role of West-based Persian-language media and social media. Just after we had filed a grant request in 2022 that project took on new importance with the Jina Uprising in Iran and we are excited to welcome two new postdocs to the project soon.

 

Excerpt from the book (from the Introduction, pp. 12-15)

The fact that 1979 seems to embody many of the changes discussed above clearly makes it a pedagogical way to explain the fate of Third Worldism in the Middle East. Indeed, the 1979 revolution in Iran is still treated in much of the broader literature on the Middle East as the breaking point between the decades dominated by secular and left-leaning ideologies and the following decades dominated by Islamism. However, a too narrow focus on 1979 as the proverbial ‘sharp turning point’ entails the risk of downplaying the precursors. It also affirms a traditional historiographic focus on political leadership – as opposed to social, cultural, or economic history – as the main marker of historical periods. 

When we turn our gaze to social movements, as the authors in this book do, it becomes clear that trends manifesting themselves in 1979 had been a decade or more in the making. These trends point to an emerging social order and include authoritarian co-optation of Third Worldist anti-imperialism, splits and infights between revolutionary groups, Islamic revivalism, and the global advancement of economic liberalism.

The social order that emerged in the Middle East in the 1970s was, as the Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim pointed out in an influential 1982 study, largely the product of the shift from Arab nationalist and socialist politics once embodied by Egypt’s President Nasser to the ‘Petro-Islam’ of the Gulf states.30 During the 1970s, this emerging Gulf power created great wealth disparity with clear social, cultural, and political ramifications: mass in-region migration, new capitalist values, and behavioural patterns linked to liberalisation alongside supposedly ‘culturally authentic’ identity projects propagated by authoritarian states. The Westernised capitalist turn also produced dissent, however, in the form of Islamisation, on one hand, and the enduring attraction of revolutionary currents, on the other. If Third Worldist revolutionaries were still fighting by the mid-1970s, they were largely struggling against the current.

Due to these trends, the basic sense of historical direction arguably began to change in the late 1970s as dilemma and even defeat replaced possibility as the primary ‘structure of feeling’ on the anti-imperialist left. These dilemmas partly resulted from the dynamics of the Cold War, in particular the Sino-Soviet conflict, as well as from the USA’s covert and open counter-revolutionary measures and increasingly broad overtures to states and movements. They also came from internal contradictions on the left concerning the role of women, the lack of democratic organisational culture, and, more generally, a sometimes-destructive debate about the degree of economic, social, and political liberalism that the left should embrace. Another debate that was particularly heated in the Middle East, and which already created significant fissures in the mid-1970s, concerned the role of political Islam in otherwise largely secular opposition movements and organisations.

The structural change of Third Worldism played out inside and between states in the region, but it also echoed in the transnational revolutionary alliances and networks in which movements were embedded. In this way, the drift towards authoritarianism and Islamism had consequences for how the Western world viewed the rest of the world. By 1979, many Western leftists, who had generally viewed the southern political subject as inspiration for their own revolutionary ambitions in Europe and elsewhere during the Third Worldist period, became disenchanted and instead increasingly began to regard the Global South as an object in need of development and assistance.

In short, it is possible to trace many of the reasons why Third Worldist movements were weakened or underwent significant changes in the latter part of the 1970s. Therefore, this book argues, the focus on 1979 also obscures the possibility that the ‘breaking point’ might be periodised differently. While the Iranian Revolution certainly had a major impact on the Palestinian (yet-to-be-fulfilled) revolution, there are also limits to the explanatory power of 1979. Rather, in a Palestinian historiographical lens, it is arguably 1982 that stands out as the marker of the end of an era. Following the Israeli military campaign that included full-scale bombardment of west Beirut in the summer of 1982, Arafat and the PLO were forced to leave Lebanon, ending the revolutionary stage of the Palestinian struggle, and starting a new stage that would culminate in the PLO’s transformation to a state-like entity in the West Bank in the 1990s.

Third Worldism, as indicated above, from the beginning encompassed a statist and a non-statist project. If Iran’s revolution built on earlier postcolonial liberation and state-building projects – only with a new religious colouring – the Palestinian liberation movement until 1982 embodied the spirit of guerrilla struggle. In this sense, 1982 signals a very important shift away from the broader appeal of local military mobilisation that brought initial successes in Cuba, Algeria, Vietnam, and elsewhere. Not that guerrilla activity ceased – as witnessed, for example, by the Iran-inspired and -sponsored Hizbollah movement in Lebanon, founded that year. Rather, the problem-space of Third Worldism transformed from one overwhelmingly concerned with revolution from below, and its contiguous forms of transnational networks, to one concerned with state-driven interventions.

Mirrored in this shift was the gradual decline of Marxism–Leninism as the overarching ideological framework for Third Worldist alliances and the rise of a diverse range of anti-imperialisms throughout a decade of internal splits that had begun around the 1967 war. Dominant political discourse shifted as militants began to question their tactics and commitments, from what remained of the leftist, Marxist discourse towards discourses of political Islam. As Homa Katouzian has put it, the late 1970s saw the face of resistance against imperialism change from the secular fida’yi to the religious mojahed. Iran played a key role in that transition, but it also involved decades of deliberation in Arab societies. Regional tensions and fault lines meant that resistance had now acquired a wider meaning than the straightforward anti-imperialism of the 1950s and 1960s.

Lines that had begun to blur in the 1970s between former allies in the Third Worldist project became deadly in the 1980s. In fact, the most common themes in political studies of the Middle East today refer back to the conflicts of that decade: the solidification of authoritarianism, Islamism as the main oppositional camp, the decline of Arab nationalism, the bifurcation of regional politics between a normalisation camp led by Egypt and the Gulf states versus a rejection camp led by Syria and Iran, the decline of Marxism and the suppression of liberalism, and the rise of the authoritarian-neoliberal axis of power centred in the Gulf countries.

As states adopted different positions and alliances, transnational revolutionary actors were often caught between their agendas. Many militants ended up on the receiving end of state repression, as they ran afoul of the official positions of authoritarian regimes. For their part, the regimes of leaders like Ruhollah Khomeini, Saddam Hussein, Hafez al-Assad, and Muammar Gaddafi sought to monopolise and instrumentalise the antiimperialist struggle in this new age. Conflicts such as the Iran–Iraq War and the Lebanese civil war pitted them against each other, and at the same time exacerbated state repression across the region. The competition for hegemony and ownership of the Third Worldist mantle meant that authoritarian states took a firmer grip on their control over cultural expression, sidelining, exiling, incarcerating, and killing dissidents. This meant that by the mid-1980s, the dominant expression of Third Worldism in the region was no longer organically produced material from social movements, dissident intellectuals, and artists, but rather regime-sponsored propaganda.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.