Benedikt Römer, The Iranian Christian Diaspora: Religion and Nationhood in Exile (New Texts Out Now)

Benedikt Römer, The Iranian Christian Diaspora: Religion and Nationhood in Exile (New Texts Out Now)

Benedikt Römer, The Iranian Christian Diaspora: Religion and Nationhood in Exile (New Texts Out Now)

By : Benedikt Römer

Benedikt Römer, The Iranian Christian Diaspora: Religion and Nationhood in Exile (I.B. Tauris, 2024).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Benedikt Römer (BR): I have a background in the history of religions and in Middle Eastern studies, particularly focusing on modern Iran and Turkey. Through personal contacts with Iranians in the diaspora, I became familiar with the phenomenon of Iranian diaspora churches. Such churches are usually evangelical in theological leaning and at this point exist in virtually every major city in Central and Northern Europe as well as in Turkey, the United Kingdom, and North America. As I began to academically study these communities, I noticed that scholarly works on the subject often did not take into account the abundantly available Persian-language sources, among them Iranian Christian magazines published in exile and recordings of services and sermons in Iranian Christian diaspora churches. Given my proficiency in Persian, I decided to make Iranian Christian exile churches the topic of my PhD. From the beginning of this research project, I was struck by the constant references made by Iranian Christians to Iranian/Persian culture and its supposed affinity with the Christian religion. In result, the construction of a distinct Iranian-Christian national identity became the primary subject of my book.

... we can see that many religious narratives are deeply interwoven with and informed by the experience of forced displacement.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

BR: The book touches upon a number of issues and in many ways is an interdisciplinary work. First of all, the book contributes to our understanding of the religious landscape of contemporary Iran. While the Islamic Republic of Iran tends to present itself as a homogenous Muslim country, we know that many Iranians, as a result of their frustration with the Islamic religion as it is promoted by the Iranian government, turn away from Islam. Some of them give up religion altogether; in fact, many Iranians today harbor strongly anti-religious sentiments. Others, however, explore religious alternatives, one of them being Evangelical Christianity. Christianity is a recognized religion in Iran—however, this recognition only extends to the ethnic Armenian and Assyrian minorities. Freedom of religion for Christians only applies to religious services being held in the Armenian or Aramaic languages. Any Christian activity in the Persian language is sanctioned by the state and in many instances has resulted in severe repercussions, such as imprisonment, denial of education, and internal exile. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Persian-speaking Christian movement in Iran even experienced a series of assassinations and executions of leading pastors. This oppression has prompted many Iranian Christian leaders to emigrate from Iran—and the Iranian Christian exile milieu, in which my research takes place, came into being.

A second issue broached by the book is the relationship of religious practice and diaspora. Previous studies in the field of comparative religions have come up with a number of theoretical tools to study this relationship, one of them being “diasporic religion.” In the case of Iranian Christians in exile, we can see that many religious narratives are deeply interwoven with and informed by the experience of forced displacement. Hopes for a return to Iran are filled with religious imagery and articulated through references to Biblical stories.

Thirdly, the book should interest everyone studying religion and nationalism. The case of Iranian Christians demonstrates the fluidity of religious and national identities. Being Christian in the Iranian context is often conflated with being Armenian or Western in ethnicity. In fact, those Iranian Christians who have a Muslim background often complain that they are portrayed as “alien” to Iran because of their religion. The material I study in the book in many ways is a response to this ascription of foreignness from which Iranian Christians suffer. By connecting, for example, the Iranian new year festival of Nowruz with their Christian identity, Iranian Christians make a statement and say “It is perfectly possible to be BOTH Iranian and Christian at the same time.” Such narratives are somehow reminiscent of other contexts in which individuals or communities are marginalized by an official narrative of religious identity politics.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

BR: Since the book is based on my PhD thesis, it is really the beginning of my scholarly work. I had always been interested in religious minorities in the MENAT region, among them the Shi’is of Saudi Arabia about whom I had written my undergraduate dissertation. During my postgrad at SOAS, I mainly worked to improve my language skills and wrote a thesis in Iranian sociolinguistics that also touched upon the issue of Iranian nationalism. So there may be some connections, however they are rather superficial.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

BR: The book has different target audiences. On the one hand, I hope that it will be read by scholars in the field of Iranian studies. The Iranian Christian movement is an increasingly significant part of contemporary Iran and its diasporas. It is not just a marginal, passing phenomenon but one that will last and become more visible in the future. It should therefore be studied by those who have expertise on Iran. Secondly, the book could also be interesting to different NGOs and even governmental think tanks. Conversion to Christianity among Iranians has become a controversial issue in Central Europe; courts are facing severe difficulties when assessing the asylum claims of Iranian converts to Christianity. My book could provide decision-makers with a deeper insight into the background of such conversions and help them to understand dimensions shaping the religious biographies of Iranian asylum seekers. Finally, members of the Iranian diaspora, whether they are Christians themselves or not, may enjoy reading my book.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

BR: My new project goes in quite a different direction than this book. I have shifted my geographical focus to Turkey and am now studying portrayals of “the Arabs” in the Turkish nationalist discourse. I was inspired to embark on this research project by works in Iranian studies. Iranian nationalism often has a strongly anti-Arab aspect to it. In the Turkish context, works studying perceptions of the Arabs are yet scarce. A first article on this topic in which I analyze portrayals of the Arabs in late Ottoman/early Republican Turkish encyclopedias will hopefully appear next year.

A little side project of mine which is more related to the topic of my book is an article about Iranian conversions to Neo-Zoroastrianism. Without going into too much detail here, those interested in the subject should look out for the journal Entangled Religions in which my article will appear in a few weeks, alongside other interesting articles on the topic of religious conversion. 

 

Excerpt from the book (from pp. 55-58)

Chapter Three: Naturalizing Christianity (I): Introduction and the festivals of Nowruz and Yaldā

Introduction: Iranian nationhood and the double foreignness of Christianity

When Hassan Dehqāni-Tafti, later the Anglican Bishop of Iran, in the early 1940s requested the approval for the publication of a monthly Christian magazine in the Persian language, he received the following reply: ‘Persian is the language of Muslims, Armenian is the language of Christians’. His request was subsequently denied. The answer of the governmental clerk responding to Dehqāni-Tafti’s request succinctly illustrates how the Christian religion in the Iranian context has come to be discursively conflated with Armenian ethnicity. Rooted in pre-modern epistemologies of ‘nationality’ and ‘religion’, the usage of the term Armani (Armenian) in the Persian language resembles pre-modern European usages of the term ‘Turk’: 

In practice, ‘Turk’ was employed by Europeans quite differently, as an indiscriminate blanket term for a Muslim of any ethnic origin. Even Western Europeans who converted to Islam could be referred to as ‘Turks’ – as in the English phrase ‘to turn Turk’, meaning ‘to convert to Islam’ – though such converts were obviously neither natives of Anatolia nor native speakers of Turkish.

Along analogous lines, the term Armani in Persian has evolved as a catchall label for all Christians, irrespective of their origins, and the verb ‘to turn Armenian’ (Armani shodan) as a synonym for ‘to convert to Christianity’. Accordingly, one finds that the historian Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi refers to a nineteenth-century Iranian Sheykhi author who, in his discussion of the dangers resulting from a blind imitation of European modernity, raises the risk of conversions to ‘Armenianism’. Even members of the smaller Iranian Assyrian Christian community have been subsumed under the label Armani. Writing about the late 1930s, Ervand Abrahamian mentions a political prisoner referred to as ‘Yousef “The Armenian”’, adding: ‘(in fact, he was Assyrian)’. Similarly, Mehdi Dibāj, who later served as a pastor for the Jamāʿat-e Rabbāni churches, upon confiding his conversion to Christianity to his parents, heard the following response: ‘No way! You went and turned Armenian?!’.

The 1979 Revolution has further buttressed the hegemonic discourse of a Persian Islam and an Armenian Christianity. The Iranian nation (mellat) was reconceived as an Iranian ommat – a religious, Islamic community. This renewed turn has made self-identification as Iranian very difficult for Iranian Armenian Christians who suddenly found themselves living in an ‘Islamic Republic’, the public sphere of which is governed by Islamic principles, to be adhered to by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. While Iranian Armenians and Assyrians resorted to increasing self-segregation in minority-only gated compounds, Persian-speaking Christians were left behind as an ultimate religious ‘other’. Falling through the established cracks, they seemed not to belong anywhere. A 1979 article in the Anglican newsletter Message of Love (Payām-e Mohabat) used the Persian word gomnāmi to describe the situation of Persian-speaking Christians – a term one Persian-English dictionary tellingly translates as ‘the state of being unknown’.

It bears mentioning that many Iranian Armenians likewise endorse the dichotomy of a Persian-speaking, Iranian Islam and an Armenian-speaking, non-Iranian Christianity, mainly to avoid assimilation. Episodes from the interviews I conducted with Iranian Armenians who attended public Persian-speaking churches in Iran (when they still existed) suggest that the existence of these churches angered other members of their ethnic community. One of my Iranian Armenian interlocutors poignantly described this tendency by telling me how his mother, after she heard that her son now attended the Persian-speaking Jamāʿat-e Rabbāni church, reacted by incredulously asking him: ‘So you are going there and praying next to some ʿAbbās?’. The name ʿAbbās here, of course, serves as a paradigmatic Muslim name. I asked my Iranian Assyrian interlocutor Martin whether, in his perception, Iranian Assyrians possessed a similar sensitivity towards the issue as Armenians. He averred that the sensitivity was markedly more pronounced among Iranian Armenians for whom the affiliation with the Armenian Orthodox Church was a primary marker of their national identity. Nonetheless, later in the interview, Martin mentioned that the decision to conduct Persian-language services in his Assyrian Pentecostal church was met with resistance – also out of a fear of assimilation. Notably, both Martin and my Iranian Armenian interviewees suggested that matters today were more relaxed and the formerly hardened fronts loosened.

Apart from Barry’s illustrative 2019 book, few sources describe contemporary aspects of Iranian Armenian life in Iran. A 2019 episode of the Iranian podcast Radiomarz, however, provides further insights regarding Iranian perceptions of their Armenian compatriots. The podcast’s host invited a number of Iranian Armenians of different generations to speak about the clichés and misconceptions they were faced with when interacting with Iranian Muslims. One respondent, 23-year-old Nārineh, recounted that, when inquiring about her Armenian background, Iranian Muslims occasionally with benign curiosity asked whether they as well could become Christian, ‘or Armenian’. Another respondent, 68-year-old Shākeh, who now resides in the Republic of Armenia, suggested that the confusion regarding the religious and ethnic identities of Iranian Armenians was a matter of the past:

Whenever people have told us ‘Lucky you, when you travel abroad (khārej) you can speak English because you are Christian’, we reminded them that we are Armenians whose language is Armenian and not English. A Christian is not necessarily English or non-Iranian. This is one example of the unawareness widespread among Iranians who did not distinguish between nationality (melliyat), language and religion. That is, they did not know that to be Armenian and to speak the Armenian language is about national identity and that to be Christian denotes our religion. It is possible that an Armenian in fact is not a Christian but an atheist or whatever, a Bahai – everything really, also Muslim, though very rarely of course. But the majority of the Iranian people, those who did not reside in cities like Tabriz, Isfahan or Tehran where there are many Armenians, or in a smaller city like my birthplace Arāk, were not really in contact with the Armenian community. Today of course the situation is different … The awareness has increased markedly and such cute incidents (ettefāqāt-e bāmazeh) along the lines of ‘Lucky you, you can speak English’ no longer happen.

Shākeh’s account is indicative of a second ethno-religious conflation: that of Christianity with Western-ness. In Chapter 1, this topic has been broached in the context of the Western Protestant missions; we have seen how Iranian Protestants themselves have struggled for indigenization and autonomy from the Western churches. Moreover, I have pointed to the ongoing stigmatization of Iranian Christians as supposed ‘agents of foreign powers’, which ushers in their legal persecution. For non-ethnic Iranian Christians, who consider themselves fully Iranian ‘despite’ their religion, their association with the West can be a painful experience. The young Hassan Dehqāni-Tafti, when participating in a Shi’ite taʿziyeh passion play in his hometown of Taft, recounts that the locals made him assume the role of a European (farangi) who had embraced Islam after witnessing the tragedy of Karbala, thus alluding to his Christian faith. In his English-language autobiography, Dehqāni-Tafti comments on this episode by saying: ‘It pained me greatly in my deep pride of being Persian that having a Christian identity made me “foreign” in their eyes’. 

In conclusion, we can observe that hegemonic notions of Iranian nationhood do not provide space for affiliation with the Christian religion. The dominant logic considers Christianity to be either synonymous with Armenian-ness in the Iranian context or an entirely Western entity. Christianity is ascribed with a double foreignness. As a result, Persian-speaking Christians find themselves in a marginal position. How do they react to their marginalization?

 

Note: In-text citations have been removed from the excerpt.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.